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* In our titles, we follow the Chinese, Korean and Japanese
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Preface

For Viable Transnational Collaboration: Peace Studies Association of Japan Turns Forty

ABE Kohki

20th President, PSAJ

Kanagawa University Law School

Founded in 1973, the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) celebrates its fortieth anniversary this year (2013). Following a well-known phrase in the teachings of Confucius, one is supposed to be free from vacillation when reaching this age. In fact, very few people, if any, can live in accordance with this precept of the great Chinese philosopher. PSAJ is no exception. Far from attaining the state of mind depicted in the *Analects of Confucius*, the association is in the throes of vacillation as the very concept of “peace” oscillates, as is clearly shown by the foregrounding of the term “security”. The discourse on peace has increasingly been challenged by an emerging security discourse. One should recall here that it is not the reality that predates the discourse; rather, it is the discourse that constructs and transforms the reality.

The discourse on security has been heavily influenced by the US-led War on Terror. As delineated by Idil Atak and François Crépeau in their article in *Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law* (2013), “[s]tates, and specifically their external security agencies, which traditionally worked against a foreign enemy, have identified new threats, such as terrorism and international criminality, which coalesce in the image of the migrant”. These threats are very often defined as having their origin ‘out there’. Irregular migration, including *inter alia* asylum-seekers and refugees, is now perceived as a threat to territorial sover-

eignty and the ever-shrinking welfare state. Such people are likely to be categorized as criminals and excluded from the national community. The criminalization of migrants is a visible effect of the contemporary discourse on security that is often witnessed in the Global North.

Brazen nationalism, militarism and racism often lie in the background of this criminalization. In contemporary Japan, one can distinctly feel how these socio-pathological conditions negatively affect the social fabric. The upsurge of racially motivated hate speech aimed at Koreans and Chinese (and in not a few cases tolerated and even abetted by the authorities) is such that even traditional rightist activists cringe. Government inaction against heinous racist violence, though harshly criticized by UN human rights organizations, is at least partly assisted by the general populace, many of whom allowed the current administration to win a landslide in the latest Upper House election.

As has been reported widely, this administration is led by a staunchly right-wing Prime Minister. Determined to be militarily strong against neighboring countries in alliance with the dominant power, the US, he has publicly announced that he wishes to revise our proud pacifist Constitution. “Revision” is a mild term to express his malign intention. His is a *rewriting*, as opposed to a revision, of the Constitution. The rewriting is targeted not only at pacifism but also at constitutionalism *per se*. The Draft Constitution announced by the ruling party manifestly gives priority to the State of Japan. It is the citizens (nationals) and not public officials who are obliged to abide by the Constitution. This is a logic that is fundamentally at odds with many people’s understanding of modern constitutionalism. Steadily receding from the mind of the Prime Minister and the mainstream political scene is the shameful treatment of the colonized Okinawans, who have long been forced to accept disproportionately heavy military burdens against their will, as well as the devastating situation that is still in-

flicted upon large numbers of people due to the unprecedented nuclear power accidents in Fukushima.

Clearly, all these issues lie within the scope of Peace Studies. Indeed, they have constituted a major part of our discussions during PSAJ's academic gatherings all these years. There is no doubt that we are at a critical juncture. We are being urged by society to show the *raison d'être* of Peace Studies when its contribution is most needed. The fortieth anniversary is thus not a time merely for celebration, but, more importantly, it is a moment to renew our firm commitment to make peace truly viable and durable in the face of the ever-changing (and worsening) realities before us.

In so doing, PSAS intends to pursue transborder academic collaboration with our fellow academics and activists. Korea, China and Taiwan, among others, are not our adversaries; they are our partners. Territorial boundaries are not where people are separated. They are where people meet. PSAJ is willing to serve as a meeting point where people engaged in peace research and activities across the ocean can come and exchange views on issues of common concern. By inviting people to talk and write, we have already initiated this approach. Our humble wish is to deepen this initiative and construct a dynamic intellectual space for peace movements in an otherwise disquieting North/East Asia. Given the highly volatile political situation, it is even more the duty of socially responsible academics and activists to collaborate in forging a variety of transnational perspectives for sustainable peace in our region.

Forty Years of the Peace Studies Association of Japan

NISHIKAWA Jun

3rd President and Honorable Member,
PSAJ

Professor Emeritus, Waseda University

1. The Historical Meaning of 1973

PSAJ (The Peace Studies Association of Japan) was founded in September 1973. Some one hundred researchers, scholars and teachers in peace research/education gathered at the International House, Tokyo, to set up a new society. Today, after forty years, the membership has increased to more than eight hundred. The "Heiwa Kenkyu," the PSAJ's annual research review, published its fortieth issue this year. In these forty years, PSAJ has organized peace researchers in this country, convened annual conferences and occasional seminars/symposia, published newsletters (both in Japanese and English) and a series of peace research/school texts, promoted academic exchange among both domestic and international peace researchers, supported peace education in schools, etc. In short, PSAJ has assumed the role of effectively promoting peace research in Japan, while keeping contact with peace research elsewhere in the world.

It will be useful to examine the meaning of 1973, the year when PSAJ was established.

This year marked a turning point both in international relations after WWII and in the period of high economic growth in Japan.

The shift, in 1972, to a floating exchange rate for the dollar marked the end of the dollar's hegemony and the arrival of multilateralization. The oil shock, which took place in October 1973 with

the fourth Middle East war, marked a new period when the countries of the South started to correct the old international division of labor and to industrialize themselves using their own natural resources.

In Japan, the Tanaka Kakuei cabinet (1972-74) announced its "Plan for remodeling the Japanese archipelago," which presaged the last spurt of high economic growth, which was destined to fail with the "oil shock."

In short, 1973 marked the collapse of U.S. and Northern hegemony and the necessary shift to a multilateral world. It also marked the end of the period of high economic growth that Japan had enjoyed since the mid-1950s.

These major changes in both international and domestic politics and economics had a strong impact on peace research in this country.

2. Characteristics of Peace Research in Japan

We might indicate three roots to peace research in this country.

First, the Peace Constitution of 1946. This unique Constitution, which was drafted on the basis of the cruel experience of humanity in WWII, clearly renounced war as a means of settling international disputes and declared for the non-possession of armies and all war potential. Second were the atrocities of the atomic bombings that Japan experienced in 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Third came people's reflection on Japan's militarist invasion of neighboring countries during WWII as well as their decision never to repeat such war crimes.

Let us examine these points. In the 1950s, during the Cold War, the people's movement for peace treaties with all countries (including socialist countries) developed into the movement against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which would tie Japan to the U.S. In the midst of the Cold War, this movement, inspired by the Peace Constitution, aimed at West-East détente and nuclear disarmament. The movement against atomic

bombs originated in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki experience and gained new momentum with the hydrogen bomb disaster that hit the Japanese fishing boat, Daigo Fukuryu-maru, in international waters near the Marshall Islands in the Pacific in 1954. This movement, together with the worldwide anti-nuclear movement, became a promoter of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The people's reflection on the Japanese militarization and invasion of Asian countries resulted in the movement to normalize diplomatic relations with the P.R. of China, which was realized in 1974, and the solidarity movement with Asian people at the time of the rush in investment by Japanese firms in Asia in the 1970s.

The characteristics of peace research in Japan were to consist of the following: it made efforts to develop a theory and clarify the rationale behind this peace movement and aimed at providing feedback on theory and policy and thus help the development of this people's movement. This academic movement corresponded to the movement to establish an international academic society. In 1963, the Peace Science Society (International) [PSSI] was set up in the United States, and the next year, in 1964, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) was established in London. These international bodies started networking activities for peace research across the world.

In Japan, in the early 1960s, a small circle of peace researchers started to hold regular meetings in Tokyo. It started with research seminars held by Dr. and Mrs. Kenneth Boulding, a visiting professor at the International Christian University. After the two returned home, the group expanded its activities through a monthly research meeting and the publication of an annual English review, "Peace Research in Japan." This group named themselves The Japan Peace Research Group (JPRG). Its first delegate was Dr. Kawata Tadashi, a professor at the University of Tokyo (at that time). Dr. Kawata and several other research-

ers participated in the initial IPRA meetings.

Thus, in the first half of the 1970s, in Japan, people were intent on institutionalizing peace research. This goal was nourished both through the Japanese tradition of peace research as well as through close contact with international peace research activities. Encountering the changes in the international and domestic order mentioned earlier, several peace researchers in JPRG took the initiative to set up PSAJ in 1973. There was also a move among young researchers who had come back from the U.S.A. to set up a branch of PSSI in Japan, and Dr. Seki Hiroharu, a professor at the University of Tokyo (at that time), who had affiliations both with JPRG and the PSSI group, believed it necessary to include the various currents of peace research into one body in order to develop peace research in Japan rather than have small groups working separately.

Thus, in the first General Assembly to set up PSAJ, the keynote speakers were invited both from IPRA (Dr. Anatol Rapoport) and PSSI (Dr. Walter Isard). Several researchers from South East Asia were also invited, thus reflecting PSAJ's concern to network internationally. In fact, several months after PSAJ's foundation, strong anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in several SE Asian countries (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand) during Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to these countries, which illustrated the validity of PSAJ's concern to develop dialogues with Asian researchers/people.

In this first assembly, peace researchers of various trends gathered: people from JPRG, those concerned with quantitative research on conflict resolution, researchers in 'Third World' and North-South issues, physicists related to the Pugwash conference, economists working on disarmament issues, activists in peace education, etc.

Prof. Seki was elected first President (1973 - 76) and Prof. Kawata second President (1976 - 78). They worked hard to consolidate the academic base of the new society.

They advocated for the institution of a Liaison Committee for Peace Research (LCPR) inside the Science Council of Japan (SCJ). LCPR took the initiative of publishing advocacy and proposals for developing peace research in the Japanese higher education system and peace education in schools. PSAJ was always an active member of LCPR, issuing several public proposals for developing peace research in the country. The LCPR continued its activities until the SCJ was reorganized in 2005.

3. Orientation of Peace Research

PSAJ has strenuously worked, in these forty years, to develop peace research in Japan, while keeping contact with international and Asian peace research. For IPRA, Dr. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, the University of Tokyo, served as SG from 1979 to 1983 and Dr. Kodama Katsuya, the University of Mie, from 2010 to 2012 as co-SG. PSAJ hosted the general meeting of IPRA twice during this period: the first time was in Kyoto in 1992 and the second, in Mie, was in 2012. PSAJ also contributed to actively developing and networking on peace research in the Asia-Pacific region. In the first conference of the Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association (APPRA) in Yokohama in 1980, Dr. Ishida Takeshi, emeritus professor at the University of Tokyo, was elected as first SG, from 1984 to 1991, Dr. Sakamoto Yoshikazu served as the second SG, and from 2010 to 2014 Prof. Kimijima Akihiko has been serving as SG. PSAJ has constantly been developing itself, recruiting fresh members from various fields. It includes researchers in international politics, international relations, international economics, nuclear research, gender studies, philosophy, sociology, environmental studies, journalism, etc. NGO members and practitioners in peace education are also active members. It holds bi-annual research conferences (spring and autumn), supports activities for commissions (when proposals from the members were endorsed by the Directo-

rial Board), awards the PSAJ prize for memorable work by members, maintains seven district research meetings, organizes a “peace caravan” to send specialists to localities to organize seminars on particular subjects related to peace, and publishes regular publications such as the Newsletter and its annual review (the aforementioned “Heiwa Kenkyu”) as well as planning publications suited to the interests of society.

However, we should take into account the radical changes that are taking place in the world in the 21st century, such as the end of economic globalization, the end of high economic growth in the developed world, including Japan, the rise of newly emerging nations, the deteriorating global environment and the frequent occurrence of “natural” disasters and new diseases. All these factors present a challenge to peace research whose original basis was formulated during the time of the Cold War and North-South conflicts.

In this period of a shift in the global, regional and domestic order, which bears comparison with what was happening in 1973, we observe, first, a rise in nationalism which promotes an atmosphere of belligerence and an arms race both globally and regionally. In Japan, political forces have taken power that would like to modify the Peace Constitution. They justify the right of the nation to have an army and see hardly any problems with the involvement of Japan in an international war under the name of the “collective right of self-defence.” They intend to ally themselves with the strategy of a superpower and force the Okinawan people to continue to accept the burden of military bases on their small island.

Secondly, in a time of economic difficulties due to changes in the world order, Japan’s politicians have adopted financial and fiscal policies of lavishing money on different pressure groups in order to secure political support. The consequence has been an unprecedented accumulation of public debt which leaves future generations with a very heavy burden to bear. Japan’s leaders also intend to restart atomic energy plants and

even export them, in spite of the fact that the disaster of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station is far from being resolved. There are still nearly 150,000 internal refugees, four plants continue to contaminate the soil and water, and nobody has yet found a solution to the radioactive wastes and contaminated water.

All these factors aggravate a non-peaceful situation in our country and the world. It is necessary that peace research finds concrete ways to attain positive peace. This approach should start from the development of an appropriate life-style in the post-economic growth stage, advocate reconciliation with our Asian neighbors, promote values of non-violence and co-existence with nature and the environment, find a well-being which is different from the accumulation of material wealth, and validate the community and a spiritual life. The Japanese people once again discovered the importance of a “kizuna” (liaison, ties) lifestyle at the time of the Earthquake-Tsunami-Atomic disasters of March 11. The ruling elite has, however, adopted a top-down strategy with a shower of money, the revival of the growth myth and the stirring up of nationalist feelings that will serve to make people forget the growing social gaps arising from Japan’s adhesion to economic globalization. This is a difficult time for peace research, but, if we change our point of view, it is a very challenging time for posing alternative strategies and policies from the standpoint of peace research. When PSAJ formulates these strategies and policies, perhaps it would be a good idea to convene an international seminar of IPRA/APRA in Fukushima, in order that the peace researchers of the world can directly see the atomic/tsunami disasters, talk with the victims and inhabitants, and reflect on peaceful forms of reconstruction as well as on the relationship between nuclear armament, atomic plants and top-down types of development-oriented administration. This will serve to help develop alternative ideas at this crucial moment in history. In any case, as a member of PSAJ since its foundation, I am confident that

PSAJ will respond effectively to the actual challenges ahead.

PSAJ Spring Conference / Session I
(Roundtable) jointly sponsored by
the Association of Women, War and
Human Rights

The Present Situation of the Japanese Military's "Comfort Women" Issue and the Prospects for Its Resolution

FURUSAWA Kiyoko

PSAJ Member

Tokyo Woman's Christian University

SHIMIZU Nanako

PSAJ Member

Utsunomiya University

YAMANE Kazuyo

PSAJ Member

Ritsumeikan University

Panelists:

HAYASHI Hiroshi (*Kanto Gakuin University*)

WATANABE Mina (*Women's Active Museum on War and
Peace: wam*)

HA Jongmoon (*Hanshin University, Republic of Korea*)

Chairperson: FURUSAWA Kiyoko (*Tokyo Woman's
Christian University*)

The PSAJ has debated Okinawa, nuclear energy and the history of the war as essential questions for the Japanese to answer. Criticizing the present social system of Japan, which victimizes the marginalized, the PSAJ has argued that the situation cannot be regarded as truly peaceful. The Osaka Mayor's recent remarks should be understood against this background. Mayor Hashimoto said that Japan's wartime sexual slavery was necessary, and he later even boasted that he had suggested that the US military brass in Okinawa should control the sexual energy of the marines by mak-

ing more use of the legal facilities for sexual services available to them for this. By making these remarks, he condoned the military's general exploitation of women's sexuality. The remarks, unexpectedly, revealed a link between past wartime sexual slavery and the current military's exploitation of women's sexuality, and this brought to light the fact that these problems still exist in Japan.

Co-sponsored with the Association of Women, War and Human Rights, the session brought together Japanese and Korean historians and human rights activists to discuss the present situation of the "comfort women" issue and to explore the possibilities for civic solidarity in East Asia.

Akibayashi Kozue, representing the Association of Women, War and Human Rights, opened the session. She said that the PSAJ had not devoted enough debate to violations of women's human rights, including the sexual slavery during the war, and she expressed the hope that this session would activate both research and activities from a gender perspective within the PSAJ.

Hayashi Hiroshi raised the question of why the denial of Japan's war responsibility by high-ranking officials, such as Prime Minister Abe and Mayor Hashimoto, is accepted in Japanese society. He said that behind this phenomenon was a certain social transformation. At a fundamental level, there has been an atomization of human beings due to neoliberalism. This has caused a setback in human rights awareness on all fronts. We can clearly see this, for example, in phenomena such as "the politics of jealousy" ("civil servants are rich"), "a pulling-down democracy" ("Your higher pay should be cut in order to fill the gap."), or the discourse of "self-responsibility" ("living on the basis of your own responsibility as an individual"). Open postings of discriminatory statements on the Internet have become rampant. The LDP's draft new constitution denies the theory of natural human rights. Reluctance in dealing with Japan's war responsibility and past colonialism have bred deep-rooted discrimination

against Korean residents. The recent surge of hate speech is a manifestation of this. The shameless public statement that the "comfort women" were necessary can be understood against this backdrop of social transformation.

As to prospects with regard to this issue, Hayashi stressed the importance of the achievements of the "comfort women" movement since the 1990s. The movement from the outset regarded the issue not just as a problem of the past but also as a problem of today or even as a problem of the future, since violations of women's rights still continue. The "comfort women" issue has also stimulated intellectual reflection encompassing a wide range of notions like gender, the nation, class, region, aggressive wars, colonial domination and minority issues. Some civic initiatives have been excellent. For example, Korean and Japanese students studied in a seminar that showed that the Korean military had a similar system of exploitation of women's sexuality during the Korean War. They had a debate in an effort to shift the paradigm from a state-centered dichotomy, such as Japan vs. Korea or Japan vs. China, to a human rights-centered one between a view which justifies a statism that suppresses human rights and a view which opposes such a position. The issue of war responsibility is very important for democratization in both Japan and Korea.

Watanabe Mina summarized the state of non-resolution. After twenty-two years since the first survivor came out to speak, survivors are dying one after another without a remedy. The Japanese as citizens of the perpetrating country have not fulfilled their responsibility to ensure that their government corrects this wrong. The issue still remains an obstacle to the building of trust in East Asia. The precedent of a responsible state giving compensation to the victims of sexual slavery has yet to be established. Watanabe argued that the Kono Yohei statement (acknowledgment of and apology for the military's sexual slavery) was not sufficient as the sole base for further

steps. Instead, the baseline of the movement's demand should be an explicit reference to state responsibility, recognition of the sexual slavery as a violation of international human rights law at the time, and an apology and compensation based on such recognition. Quoting the concluding remarks of the UN Human Rights Committee in 2008, Watanabe also said that the government must "refute and punish state officials for denying the historical facts". To achieve these objectives, we must strengthen the movement, make laws, and expand solidarity in Asia. International support and external pressure, especially from the UN, are important as well.

But to strengthen the movement in Japan is most difficult. The establishment of the Asian Women's Fund in 1995 brought about a deep division in the movement, and the division has become an obstacle for restoring relations with liberals who otherwise could have been comrades in the movement. Defending the Fund, these liberals put the blame on the supporters of the victims for the Fund's own failure. On the other hand, the latter have presented a counter-argument from a victims' and supporters' perspective on the Fund. The Fund's biggest mistake was that the people managing it unilaterally decided on the process without listening to the survivors and their supporters. They did so from domestic political considerations in Japan. After all, the survivors would receive private donations, not state compensation. We saw this as a trick to evade state responsibility. The governments of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea criticized such an intention to obscure state responsibility, but the Fund did not listen. The Fund's move to contact survivors secretly and behind the scenes only fuelled the distrust. Particularly problematic was the fact that the Fund's activities spread a false image that the survivors only wanted money. This is a denial of the survivors' 'agency'.

Ha Jongmoon presented on the very complex situation in Korea. He said that 2008 was a "year of civil war over history" in Korea. For example,

the new right published "Counter Textbook: The Modern and Contemporary History of Korea". The nationalist Gwangbok association (of the families and sons of the independence heroes) protested against the construction of a "comfort women" museum on the premises of Independence Park, saying it would stain the honor of patriotic independence fighters. In 2011, while donations for the victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake reached 30 billion won, the Museum on War and Women's Human Rights could raise only 1.7 billion. When the Supreme Court ruled that the government's failure to represent the survivors of sexual slavery against Japan was in violation of the constitution, a heated debate occurred. When the Foreign Secretary stated that he would use the term "sexual slaves" instead of "comfort women" following the example of the former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan criticized his approach by saying that it was more important to negotiate with Japan than to merely change the terminology. Finally, when Mayor Hashimoto made his remarks in May, the whole nation rose up in fury.

In thinking about the prospects, he said, we should pay more attention to the process than to the outcomes. Then we will understand the similarities in how history becomes an issue in both countries. The reconfiguration of the notions of individual 'agency' and the state may be useful for overcoming internal obstacles. The Supreme Court's ruling was truly a turning point in this regard. The argument it presented was that the government's inaction to protect the human rights of the victims (not a collective interest of the nation) constituted a violation of the constitution. It is also important to understand the "twisted" nature of "anti-Japanese" sentiments in Korea. Nationalism fuelled "the civil war over Korea's history". Korean nationalism is an amalgam of ethnic identity and statism based on anti-communism and feelings against North Korea. In

May 2013, there arose the suspicion that the Japanese textbook publisher Kyogakusha wrote, “Kim Gu and An Chung-gun (Korean independence heroes) are regarded as terrorists”, and “comfort women were prostitutes”. As history is an increasingly contested field, the Association of Korean Modern History is now a vehicle for the new right. What is necessary then is to overcome the perception of “comfort women” as “the suffering of the (Korean) nation” and to understand the issue as a universal gender problem of “wartime sexual violence against women”.

In the subsequent question and answer session, a participant raised questions about the role of the judiciary in Korea and the prospects for the joint efforts of the two countries to overcome differences in resolving the “comfort women” issue as a universal human rights problem. Ha answered that the Supreme Court’s ruling not only contributed to the relativization of the state within the domain of the “comfort women” issue but it also strengthened democracy in Korea. He further said that for the Japanese side it was necessary to understand the “twisted nature” of the Korean situation that dates back to pro-Japanese forces at the time of independence.

Another participant raised a question on the necessity of comparative studies on sexual slavery. Hayashi answered that there is a serious lack of experts who work to establish historical facts. However, he expressed hope that experts on other regions would provide information on cases of sexual slavery in those areas. A question was then raised about whether or not it was the right strategy to define “coercion in a narrow sense” (whether or not victims were forcibly abducted from their homes or on the street). Hayashi answered that sometimes it would be necessary to “go into their ring” to disprove people’s claims one by one. He also pointed out that if there was a possibility of agreement, albeit only partial, it would be necessary to set aside “a big difference” and work together for “a small common goal”.

A different participant, while acknowledging

that the prospects are very grim, suggested that the movement should have a dialogue with people with different positions. Responding to this suggestion, Watanabe said that twenty-two years was too long. To say the problem has been solved by the Fund would kill the hopes of other victims of sexual violence in the world.

The session concluded that the “comfort women” system is essentially a systematic blend of patriarchy and militarism that abuses women’s rights. After World War II, a similar system has been reproduced in many other places. Unfortunately, nationalists in both the perpetrators’ and victims’ countries often do not want to see beyond the injury to their pride, and they tend to look at the problem only from the viewpoint of the “state” or “nation”. The session rendered visible the battles that are being fought both in Japan and Korea, and it described not only the violent discourse of the right but also the fragility of the liberals. Conflicts, friction and exhaustion are the reality of the civil society in both countries. A cool-headed understanding of each other’s situation will become the base for solidarity. Therefore, all peace researchers and activists must begin to speak on the “comfort women” issue (Watanabe) to overcome individual inner obstacles (Ha) by upholding the idea that the resolution of the problem of “comfort women” is a universal challenge to protect women’s human rights (Hayashi).

(Summary by Kiyoko Furusawa and Nanako Shimizu. Translated by Kazuyo Yamane.)

PSAJ Spring Conference / Session II

Creating Peaceful Communities

OKUMOTO Kyoko

PSAJ Member

Osaka Jogakuin University

TAKEUCHI Hisaaki

PSAJ Member

Tokyo Woman's Christian University

Presenters:

TANAKA Masaru (*a photograph and video artist*), "*The Power of Art in the Creation of Peace within Communities*"

ENOI Yukari (*Osaka University*), "*Creating Communities through the Practice of Multicultural Coexistence*"

SUGIURA Shinri (*Ritsumeikan Uji Junior and Senior High School*), "*Citizenship Education Uniting Individuals and Society through Social Science Classes*"

Discussant:

MURAKAMI Toshifumi (*Kyoto University of Education*)

Moderator:

OKUMOTO Kyoko (*Osaka Jogakuin University*)

The value of peace should be realized in everyday life, and a viewpoint and firm belief about peace can be gained by exploring the concrete and realistic routes to a peaceful community. This approach has been developed in a variety of ways not only through pioneering educational practice in schools but also in social movements. The panel discussed the possibility of dealing with subjects which today's peace education faces, together with measures and views concerning "peace education as lifelong learning".

In the presentation by Masaru Tanaka titled "The Power of Art in the Creation of Peace within Communities," the power of art in places of peace creation was examined from the viewpoint of "dynamic peace." "*Revive Time*" *Kaki Tree Project*, *Paper Crane Airplane: Phoenix, Kizuna* and *I Will*

Never Forget You! Magede Tamakka! were introduced as examples from the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. All art works are trying to reach out to people with the message, "Do not forget us!" and they come out of the sentiment of "nestling up" to people and the themes of their communities. In Arts-based Peace Studies, a land at peace stands at zero, and violence is a minus. To move from minus to zero requires factors that work positively (plus factors) and they lie in the power of art which creates peace that starts from "nestling up." Each person who collaborates in a work is not merely a bystander or an observer but a subject as a messenger of peace using the power of the art as expressed in each community. Also, this subject is a place of peace creation in the community. In the Q&A session, the concept of "art in you" by the modern artist, Tatsuo Miyajima, was introduced, relating to the question of the positions of the creators and receivers of peace creation.

The second presentation by Yukari Enoi, titled "Creating Communities through the Practice of Multicultural Coexistence" introduced a measure of multicultural coexistence in an international communications association that is a self-governing body. Despite the fact that many foreigners and people who have their roots in foreign countries live in Japan, the present situation is such that it is not fully recognized that they are the subjects of rights and are members of the community. The Association for Toyonaka Multicultural Symbiosis receives DV victims and people with other unsolved problems. Through such activities, it became clear that, previously, the support group had made assumptions about there being certain kinds of foreigners who required certain kinds of help. The group decided to work for marginalized people who truly need support and who do not have a place to go by simply being there, and it focuses on foreign women and children. As a result, people are getting back the power that has been taken away from them. In fact, the limiting knowledge which thinks that the

Japanese are a majority is natural is just a mechanism that eliminates foreigners. To “unlearn” such a concept is the key to tolerating human diversity, including with regard to foreigners. Changing the relations in the connections within communities and encouraging attitudes and behaviour where people are trying to transform themselves are necessary.

The last presentation by Shinri Sugiura titled “Citizenship Education Uniting Individuals and Society through Social Science Classes” reported on practices in school education. The theory and practice of citizenship education has been attracting attention in recent years. However, in some cases it appears to be a tool to mobilize citizens easily, and Sugiura calls it “top-down citizenship education.” He suggests that it should be “citizenship education from the bottom up” and introduced his own approach and practice in school settings based on the perspective that students can mobilize local administrations to improve the lives of people in the community by using the functions of the local parliamentary system. Students discover an agenda for their community through investigations and interviews. Then, they study the process of submitting petitions (on welfare, education, environment, traffic, etc.) to the local parliament. Through the paperwork of producing the petitions as a realistic and effective means, students acquire the ability to create their own community and learn that they are actors in their community. This type of active citizenship education encourages the following paradigm shift in understanding education. The new approach 1) raises political literacy, 2) emphasizes the need for collaboration studies—in order to increase the number of citizens as active policy makers, it is important to work together as a group—, 3) addresses local political subjects—students will achieve solidarity among group members and the ability to participate as citizens of a peaceful community and practice nonviolent and democratic means—, and 4) suggests the effectiveness of citizenship education from the

bottom up—it is important to organize students’ families’ and others’ meetings in order to research the agenda in the community and find solutions. Also, it is necessary to gain active political literacy through reality-checks and study policy approaches to overcome problems.

Finally, Toshifumi Murkami discussed all three presentations, pointing out the following. Tanaka indicated that peace creation through art activities gives people a sense of togetherness, and offers a shared experience of participation. This encouraged the panel audience. Enoi referred to the potential of people co-existing together by introducing the detailed practice of Toyonaka Multicultural Symbiosis. Sugiura’s presentation was not to place political education in the category of basic political studies, but to experience it as a practice of education in politics in order to produce high school students with enough wisdom and power to participate in democratic politics. All three presentations were reports on the practice of positive peace for the realization of “the creation of peaceful communities.” This means the realization of democracy and well-being and happiness (connections within communities, being together with people with difficulties, care for others, guaranteeing the rights to study and freedom of political participation). This panel proved that the “creation of peaceful communities” can become a theme with substance in the field of peace studies.

PSAJ Spring Conference / Session III

Peace Research after 3/11 — 1: To identify and overcome divisions

FUJIOKA Mieko

PSAJ Member

Hosei University

Panelists:

YOSHINO Yoshino (*Fukushima Network to Protect Children from Radioactivity*): “*To Live in Fukushima at Present: Impact of the Nuclear Disaster and the Future from the Perspective of the Affected*”

KITO Shuichi (*University of Tokyo*): “*Comparison with Minamata: To Overcome Divisions*”

INOSE Kohei (*Meiji Gakuin University*): “*To Create Knowledge’—Towards an Anthropology for Survival after a Nuclear Disaster*”

Discussant:

HASUI Seiichiro (*Ibaraki University*)

Moderator:

FUJIOKA Mieko (*Hosei University*)

This session was planned as the first of a series to discuss the issues for peace research in Japan after the 3/11 earthquake/tsunami and the nuclear disaster. After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, conflicts and rifts surfaced over what to do in the face of dangers from radioactivity—whether to leave Fukushima or not, whether to eat produce from Fukushima or not, and whether to accept the debris and contaminated waste from the disaster-stricken areas to help lessen the volume for processing. These conflicts and rifts have made it more difficult and complex for individuals and communities to decide on how to respond to radioactive contamination. How can we identify where these divi-

sions, rifts, conflicts and difficulties lie and what kind of guidance for knowledge and action can we find to overcome them? What role can researchers and teachers play in such an endeavor? That was the theme of the session.

Presentations:

Yoshino pointed out that the root cause of the divisions lies in the dose of radioactivity. Depending on the dose, lines have been drawn between those who left Fukushima and those who did not, and even among those who have left, between those who have decided to live elsewhere permanently and those who are thinking about returning to Fukushima. Moreover, since the dose is not necessarily measured in sufficient detail to take account of people’s daily routines, individuals find themselves in a very uncertain situation where they cannot make a decision in a decisive way.

The “Law on Support for Children and People Affected by the Nuclear Power Accident” (“Support Law”) passed in June 2012 aimed at helping the people and children affected by the accident according to their needs regardless of such differences in their positions. However, even one year after the passage of the law, it has not yet been translated into concrete measures. The biggest obstacle is the inability to decide the radioactive dose level that will be the threshold for providing support. If the threshold is set at 1mSv a year — the upper limit of the dose allowed for ordinary people (those not working in the radioactivity management areas) prior to the accident — the law’s coverage will expand well beyond Fukushima to include many parts of the Kanto region (Tokyo and its vicinity prefectures). Then the same divisions now seen in Fukushima will occur in places other than Fukushima. It will also mean that the cost of support will rise dramatically.

Citizens’ movements, such as the one Yoshino is involved in, want to use the law as a means to overcome the divisions as its aim is to enable sup-

port to be provided to whoever needs it, regardless of their position. He emphasized that it is important that the law be known to people around the country and be used to prepare for future accidents, since an accident may happen at any time anywhere in the future. If this is not done, the sufferings of the people in Fukushima will be in vain.

Kito, comparing the situation with the Minamata case (mercury poisoning caused by industrial wastewater), spoke about how the damage of the nuclear accident should be understood and compensated for and what lessons we can learn from the experience of Minamata in “reconnecting.” Not all damage from the accident is measurable. Kito pointed out that non-monetary economic and communal relationships, such as sharing edible wild plants and home-grown vegetables with one’s neighbors, have also been destroyed. The entire way of life rooted in the community/place was negatively affected. While the compensation is provided on the basis of the monetary economy, the damage can also be non-monetary, and this can lead to further divisions that are created by compensation if it is based on a monetary economy.

What we learned from the experience of Minamata was that third parties tend to limit damage to the specific and narrow scope of damage to people’s health, as they try to be faithful to objectivity, equality and neutrality. Third-party researchers are inclined to see the situation from the top down by adopting a bird’s eye view (policy perspective). It is important to insist on viewing the situation through the individuality of each patient’s life (the down-to-earth perspective), he stressed. This point is insightful not only for researchers but for everyone. To overcome the divisions, the “decontamination-return” model presently being pursued will not be effective. A long-term perspective spanning 50 to 100 years, including the option of immigration, is needed, he said.

Inose suggested that the division lies not in what we can observe externally, but in what we

could and would not do and what we tried or did not try to do. It is suggested that we should consider how we can connect those who want to forget the accident and those who do not.

In his university, for example, teachers could not make connections with other teachers out of the presumption that others were not interested in the issue. But the teachers who apparently were not interested in the accident turned out to have changed the syllabus of their courses after the accident, or showed interest in the programs for children in Fukushima to spend some time elsewhere so that they are less exposed to radioactivity. The university avoided having discussions with the students about whether they should go to Fukushima for volunteer work.

Recognizing and overcoming the divisions are difficult tasks and we tend to avoid them, but there are attempts not to avoid them and engage in dialogue. Inose touched on an episode of Mikio Shimaoka, a veteran activist who was the leader of the movement against the planned Kubokawa Nuclear Power Plant. Shimaoka was at first not favorable to the idea of continuing farming on the lands contaminated by radioactivity. But when one farmer told him about his determination to continue farming in the contaminated land, Shimaoka was silent for a moment and then expressed his support for the decision. Inose suggested that without accepting and appreciating that “silence,” new knowledge will not open up before us.

Discussion:

The discussion by Seiichiro Hasui and the Q&A with the floor can be summarized in the following three points.

1. What is it that creates and deepens divisions?

Yoshino pointed out that each individual has to make his/her own decision when there is no “right answer” because of the differences in the

dose level and people's views of the risks involved. Having their decision denied by others in such circumstances is to have their way of life and values denied, he said. This is a very important point as the psychological conflicts and splits are a major factor in the divisions.

There was a discussion on the roles of experts. What should we think of the fact that it was the experts who have generated conflict among people by expressing their views about the danger of radioactivity, which widened the divisions? Kito responded that it was important that experts think and act together with people living in a very complex situation, rather than "go to seek" damage to people's health. Otherwise, experts will find themselves playing a role of creating and deepening the divisions.

2. What is needed to overcome the divisions

In responding to a comment that those who live in places with lower levels of radioactivity hesitate to voice their opinions, Yoshino said that those who left Fukushima have the same hesitation towards those who have remained there. He pointed out that the issues raised by people in Tokyo are being "re-imported" to Fukushima and impact people's thinking there. As the dose level is not being lowered by decontamination, the "decontamination-return" model has become a policy for sustaining the municipalities, rather than serving the needs of people. It was emphasized that we needed a framework to go beyond this model. It was also pointed out that what is needed to mitigate the divisions are policies to address diagnostic issues and early treatment in order to respond to potential health risks based on a wholistic identification of harm, rather than compensation for damages.

3. How to "reconnect"

Kito pointed out that we need a framework for the new "reconstruction" of "homelands" looking

at the future 50 or 100 years from now. Yoshino claimed that overcoming the divisions is possible by publicizing the "Support Law" nationwide, and working together to promote the law. It can be one way of practicing a "reconnecting" that goes beyond the distinction between the affected and unaffected areas.

As was noted by one commentator from the floor, a clue to overcoming divisions seems to lie not in the dichotomic view of divisions but in the pursuit of building relations with those who insist on safety or are trying to forget the incident. This is a point worth further discussion.

PSAJ Spring Conference / Session IV

Resisting Increasing Militarization

YAMANE Kazuyo

PSAJ Member

Ritsumeikan University

This session was organized by Professor Eiichi Kido of Osaka University, who was the main organizer of this PSAJ conference at Osaka University. The theme of the session was “Resisting Increasing Militarization” and he explained that the purpose of this session was to analyze the present situation of militarization from various viewpoints and clarify how to overcome the issue. There were four speakers and the following provides a brief summary of each speaker’s presentation.

Speakers:

SEIFERT Andreas (*Informationsstelle Militarisierung (IMI) e.V.*), “Militarization of the EU, Nobel Peace Prize Winner”

SAI Katsuhisa (*Secretary General of No Nukes Asia Actions Japan*), “For the International Solidarity Movement against Nuclear Power Systems”

FUJIME Yuki (*Osaka University*), “Militarization of the Hiroshima Bay Area and Sexual Violence”

YAMANE Kazuyo (*Ritsumeikan University*), “Grassroots Efforts against Changes in the Exhibitions at Peace Museums”

Chairperson:

MATSUNO Akihisa

The main points made by each speaker are as follows.

1. “Militarization of the EU, Nobel Peace Prize Winner” by Dr. Andreas Seifert, Informationsstelle Militarisierung (IMI) e.V. in Germany

Seifert pointed out that the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU is controversial. He said that the EU did not promote the peaceful unification of European countries. It does promote military action in peacekeeping operations. For example, military units were sent to Macedonia and Congo in 2003. Since 2010, it has become possible for EU members to use force for political ends. The expansion of military capacity became compulsory for EU members. As a result, some countries in East Europe began to be forced to buy weapons from Western countries. The EU members can militarily intervene in any country if there are any disputes over natural resources, wage hikes or trade that would worsen the economic environment for large European enterprises.



It was also pointed out that the EU has been promoting the concentration in its military industry, which benefits big munitions companies such as BAE Systems in England, EADS in France, and so forth. Furthermore, EU members might feel pressured to fight in a war even if the majority of their citizens do not wish to go to war. The EU is closely connected to NATO, and non-member states of NATO, such as Malta, Cyprus and Austria, will be asked to be NATO members. NATO will become more powerful under the supervision of the United States, and there is a danger of European countries getting involved in wars that they might have been able to avoid in the past.

EU countries are already leading arms providers and will continue to sell weapons in the future. According to SIPRI, the United States is the biggest exporter of arms (30% of the world market) followed by Russia (26%), Germany (7%), France (6%), China (5%) and Britain. In conclusion, the EU is not worthy of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. It is still necessary to tackle the various peace issues facing this organization.

2. “For an International Solidarity Movement against Nuclear Power Systems” by Katsuhisa Sai: Secretary General of No Nukes Asia Actions Japan

Sai criticizes TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) and the Japanese government for being irresponsible because the causes of the Fukushima nuclear accident have not been made clear and there are many people who are suffering from the effects of radiation. Moreover, the Japanese government is trying to export nuclear power to Lithuania (although this was rejected in a referendum) (Hitachi), Turkey (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), Finland (Toshiba), Jordan, and Vietnam. Also, 4 nuclear power plants were made by GE, Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Taiwan, but it has not been possible to operate them because of people’s protests. About

220,000 citizens protested in Taiwan, but this was not reported in the media in Japan.

Toshiba is planning to build two nuclear power plants in the United States where none have been built for almost forty years since the nuclear accident in Three Mile Island. It also plans to make ten nuclear power stations in China. If there were nuclear accidents in China, not only the Chinese but also Koreans and Japanese would be affected by radiation, which would cause serious problems.

No Nukes Asia Actions was founded in November 2012. Citizens in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia are members. There is a plan to file a lawsuit against GE, Hitachi and Toshiba, who produced the nuclear power plants in Fukushima, on November 11. Citizens of any nationality are able to become plaintiffs. He insisted on the importance of international solidarity to get rid of nuclear power in the future. There is a plan to bury nuclear waste in Mongolia and the NGO has been protesting against it.

There has been discrimination against Koreans in Japan, and Sai criticized the rise of nationalism in Japan. He suggested that all citizens work together for a better future regardless of ethnicity.

No Nukes Asia Actions: <http://ermite.just-size.net/nucleare/>

3. “Militarization of the Hiroshima Bay Area and Sexual Violence” by Professor Yuki Fujime, Osaka University

Fujime criticized the state-regulated prostitution system while referring to the Asian women who were forced to work as sexual slaves by the Japanese military during World War II as well as the women working for American soldiers at the U.S. military bases in Japan. Not only nationalists but also some Japanese politicians tend to justify such a system. For example, Toru Hashimoto, the mayor of Osaka and the co-leader of the Japan Restoration Party, mentioned that “everyone should understand why a system of trafficking of women

from one end of the Japanese empire to the other was necessary, given the stresses of military life at the time." In May 2013, he also said, "When soldiers are risking their lives by running through storms of bullets, and you want to give these emotionally charged soldiers a rest somewhere, it's clear that you need a comfort women system." He also declared that "U.S. Marines on Okinawa should make greater use of sexual services establishments to release their sexual energies." He was severely criticized by citizens in Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, the United States and so forth. This is because the history of Japan's aggression has not been well reported in the media and it is not sufficiently explained in school textbooks.

In Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture which is west of Hiroshima, there is a huge American military base which has been used in US wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been strengthened and is said to be the biggest US military base in the Far East. It has about 789 hectares of land. There was a referendum in Iwakuni City in 2006 and an overwhelming majority protested against moving the military units of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers from Atsuki military base to Iwakuni.

Fujime declared that women have suffered sexual violence from American soldiers since the Korean War and there have been many crimes, such as rape, robbery and so forth. The expansion of the Iwakuni military base and the history of violence by American soldiers is part of a history of militarization in Hiroshima Bay. Such sexual violence is not well-known, but women's human rights should be protected.

4. "Grassroots Efforts against Changes in the Exhibitions at Peace Museums" by Kazuyo Yamane, Ritsumeikan University

Military expenditure in the world decreased for the first time since 2012 according to a report from SIPRI. On the other hand, in Japan, the budget for self defense was increased for the first

time in eleven years while the welfare budget was reduced. Peace education has been promoted at museums for peace against militarization. In Japan there has been great pressure from nationalistic politicians to change the content of exhibits at peace museums in order to support militarization.

An example is the Osaka International Peace Center, which was founded in 1991 because of a grassroots movement for peace. The speaker sent a questionnaire to over forty peace museums in Japan and found that the peace center is rare in that it was a public peace museum that exhibited examples of Japan's aggression. This made her search for the reason, and she found that there was a network of NGOs for peace that protested against changes in the content of the exhibits. It used to be possible for the NGOs' members to rent a room at the peace center, but the authorities (Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City) changed the rules so that it would not be possible for citizens to rent a room for a meeting. This made it hard for them to have a meeting there, but they rented rooms in different places and held a peace symposium against changing the exhibits on June 29. Citizens started to protest against changes in the exhibit at the peace center where exhibits on the Nanjing Massacre were scheduled to be omitted in the future.

Such a movement is not only in Osaka but also in Saitama because Saitama Peace Museum was changed by the authorities. There will be a joint project of collaboration between peace museums and the Peace Studies Association of Japan in the future.

In conclusion, there has been a trend toward militarization not only in Japan but also in other countries. However, it seems that citizens' actions are vital when it comes to trying to stop this militarization and create a better future for peace.

Commentary

The current situation of Japan's constitutional pacifism as formulated in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

Klaus SCHLICHTMANN

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“Disarmament comes from the common desire of all people to create a safer and more peaceful world, and is inseparable from humanitarianism.”¹

“Since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace, if there is to be a happy and well world.”² (Dwight D. Eisenhower)

1. Introduction

At the end of April 2012, Shinzo Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) published a new proposal for amending the constitution which suggested “a number of significant changes” that outdid those of the 2005 proposal and envisaged “a complete overhaul of Article 9.” “These changes,” according to University of Pennsylvania Professor Craig Martin, are “on balance, dangerous.” The amendment proposes to delete paragraph two of article 9 and replace it with new provisions, among which would be one to give the prime

minister supreme command over the proposed “national defense military.”³ One may disagree with Craig Martin's statement that “the denial of rights of belligerency ... makes no sense,” but then one would have to deny and overlook the article's intent and potential as a precedent for facilitating world-wide disarmament and the abolition of war. I agree with Martin though that the changes will, if they come to pass, “utterly undermine the normative power of the third pillar of the Japanese constitutional order—that is, the principle of pacifism and non-use of force.”⁴

On 21 July 2012, Shinzo Abe was elected for the second time as Japan's prime minister. Soon after, in anticipation of the possibility that Japan's foreign policy would become more assertive and aggressive, Abe's second cabinet was severely criticized by some as “a cabinet of radical nationalists.”⁵

As is well known, the revision of the pacifist constitution to allow Japan to participate in war is one of Abe's chief foreign policy objectives. In 2006, when Abe was Chief Cabinet Secretary, just before he became prime minister, he proposed amending the constitution. This, however, he said, would not be achieved “in a year or two.”⁶

3 Craig Martin, LDP's dangerous proposals for amending anti-war article, *The Japan Times*, 6 June 2012. See also Utsumi Aiko, Action for Peace, Peace Studies Bulletin, No. 25 (November 2006), p. 2, pointing out the newly developing nationalism regarding defense and the military: “The draft for a new constitution presented by the Liberal Democratic Party in 2005, which includes a clause establishing a military for self-defense, also includes in the preamble the statement that all people ‘shall jointly have the obligation to support and defend with affection, responsibility, and spirit the nation and society to which they belong.’ Patriotism is thus written into the preamble.”

4 Craig Martin, LDP's dangerous proposals for amending anti-war article, *The Japan Times*, 6 June 2012.

5 Japan's new cabinet: Back to the future, *The Economist*, 5 January 2013. His “appointment of a scarily right-wing cabinet bodes ill for the region.”

6 Abe further stated: “We should be thinking in terms of a span of about five years ... [but] if a public consen-

1 Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Disarmament Policy*, The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2003, Preface.

2 “... there is no longer any alternative to peace” quoted in Quincy Wright, Project for a World Intelligence Center, *Conflict Resolution*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1957), p. 315.

On 9 October, not long after Abe had become prime minister on 26 September, North Korea exploded a nuclear device while Abe was on his way to a meeting with South Korea's head of state, Roh Moo Hyun. This provided Japan's Prime Minister with a further incentive to become more belligerent. The Japanese Constitution,⁷ with its renunciation of war and its plea for an "international peace based on justice and order" is significant and relevant – and not only for Japan. It aims, like the UN Charter and several national constitutions, for instance, the French, German, Italian and the Danish constitutions, at an effective system of collective security.⁸ What is the current situation affecting the Japanese position with regard to peace and security in the 'Japan Area'?⁹

... develops ... it's possible to do so earlier. ... The era in which there was the preconception that things decided back then [under the occupation] cannot and shall not be changed is over." Abe eyes new top law in 5 years, *The Daily Yomiuri*, 12 September 2006.

7 On the Japanese constitution, many important books were written by Suzuki Yasuzo. See, for example, *Nihon kempogakushi kenkyu*, Tokyo, Keiso Shobo 1975. Suzuki Yasuzo was a scholar on Ueki Emori and the Freedom and Human Rights Movement, whose draft constitution after the Second World War was translated by the Americans and used extensively for drawing up the post-war Japanese constitution.

8 Some proposals in connection with the discussion to revise or amend the constitution that has been going on for many years, have stressed that "along with positive participation in the various United Nations activities, every effort shall be made toward what can be termed common security on a global scale in the form of a UN-centered collective security apparatus." *SEKAI*, Peace and regional security in the Asia-Pacific, A Japanese proposal (1993-1994), translation in Glenn D. Hook und Gavan McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution, documents and analysis*, London and New York, Routledge 2001, p. 96. See also Ozawa Ichirō, A proposal for reforming the Japanese Constitution (1999), translation in *ibid*.

9 See also the recent article by the *Global Article 9 Campaign*, News from Japan - A Backdoor Approach to Changing Article 9: "During his first mandate in 2007, Abe set up the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. In its 2008 report, the Panel had

2. History

A brief excursus into history may be in order.¹⁰ The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 already wanted to abolish the institution of war and replace it with a system of law. The chief aim besides disarmament, i.e. establishing an international court with binding powers, was voted upon twice. The vote having to be unanimous, the proposal for a court was vetoed twice by Germany, followed by Austria-Hungary and Turkey, who later became Germany's allies in the First World War.¹¹ Despite this, a court was created, but without binding powers.

Going back even further, the Constitution of the First French Republic adopted in 1791 contained a stipulation banning aggressive war, which was subsequently emulated, among others, by Brazil in its constitution in 1891 on the occasion of the centenary of the French article.¹²

advocated that Japan's exercise of the right to collective self-defense be allowed in limited cases. But the report was never acted upon as it came out after Abe had resigned as Prime Minister. Revived shortly after Abe took up his second mandate in December 2012, the Panel is expected to release its final report by the end of the year. According to its Chairman Yanai Shunji, the report is likely to recommend this time that Japan embrace the right to engage in collective self-defense in a comprehensive manner." Online at <http://www.article-9.org/en/newsletter/2013/july-sept.html#article1>.

10 Teaching proper history is a task for peace education, as H.G. Wells, the famous author of science fiction, a pacifist and great historian stressed. For some of the background, see Klaus Schlichtmann, H.G. Wells and Peace Education, *Journal of Peace Education*, vol.4, no.2 (September 2007), e.g. p. 193-206

11 Klaus Schlichtmann, Japan, Germany and the Idea of the two Hague Peace Conferences, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40, no. 4 (2003), pp. 377-394, and Japan and the Two Hague Peace Conferences, 1899 and 1907, *Transactions of the International Conference of Eastern Studies*, no. XLI (1996), pp. 142-144.

12 Article 88 of the constitution of 24 February read: "Dans aucun cas, les Etats-Unis du Bresil ne s'engageront dans une guerre de conquete, directement ou indirectement, par eux-memes ou comme allies d'une autre nation." Quoted in B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Revue Helle-*

Eventually, and most significantly, in the interwar period, a resolution was adopted at the twenty-second Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in August 1924 in Bern, Switzerland, calling for “proposals [to] be submitted by the National Groups to their respective parliaments for amendments to the Constitution ... to forbid resort to war.”¹³ In Japan, which had been an IPU member since 1910, the then-foreign minister Kijuro Shidehara, is likely to have appreciated and understood the importance and relevance of the IPU Resolution. Shidehara was a pacifist and had been close to the Hague Peace Conferences, but it was highly unlikely that Japanese lawmakers under the Meiji Constitution would have seriously considered or actually discussed implementing the proposal. For various reasons, this would not have been a realistic approach to policy for Japan.

The new “constitutional law of peace” (*Droit constitutionnel de la paix*), which became an integral part of the *ius gentium pacis*, the international law of peace, was promoted and explained by Russian-born jurist Boris Mirkin-Guetzévitch (1882-1955), “the great international teacher of constitutional law,”¹⁴ who taught in New York and Paris between 1936 and 1955.

The idea surfaced once more, when, on 24 January, 1946, Shidehara,¹⁵ on visiting General

Douglas MacArthur, remembered and suggested abolishing war in the new Japanese constitution, which was to feature three key elements which were identified by Professor Tadakazu Fukase, professor emeritus of Hokkaido University, as the “three original pacifist principles,” i.e. “1. The renunciation of all kinds of war...; 2. The necessary disarmament...; [and] 3. The guarantee of the ‘right to live in peace,’”¹⁶ the latter, according to Professor Fukase, being the foremost among human rights: the denial of absolute state sovereignty and the non-recognition of the right of belligerency of the state.¹⁷ The ultimate meaning of Ar-

New York, Toronto, etc., 2 vols., Lexington Books 2009, and Japan, Germany and Shidehara Diplomacy, *The Journal of International Studies*, Institute of International Relations, Tokyo (January 1998), pp. 1-19, and A Statesman for The Twenty-First Century? The Life and Diplomacy of Shidehara Kijûrô (1872-1951), *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, fourth series, vol. 10 (1995), pp. 33-67.

16 For recent developments to codify a universal “human right to peace” see, for example, the Luarca Declaration on the Human Right to Peace and the activities of the United Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee. See also the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace approved by U.N. General Assembly, ‘Resolution 39/11 of 12 November 1984.

17 Fukase Tadakazu, Les deux problèmes constitutionnels japonais d’aujourd’hui - La tradition et la paix’, *Revue De La Recherche Juridique*, Droit prospectif (1990-1993), No. XV, 42, p. 497 (482-505) (my translation from the French). See also Klaus Schlichtmann, The Ethics of Peace: Shidehara Kijûrô and Article 9 of the Constitution, *Japan Forum*, vol. 7, no. 1 (April/Spring 1995), pp. 55-56 (43-67): “In other words and phrased slightly differently again, the three propositions are: (i) Without the renunciation (or limitation) of national sovereignty, there is no just and orderly pacific settlement of international disputes (i.e. no international peace based on justice and order); 93 (ii) Without arrangements for the just and orderly pacific settlement of international disputes, there is neither demilitarization nor disarmament; and (iii) With absolute national sovereignty not being recognized, there is no (right of) belligerency of the state. On these grounds, we may deduce that Article 9 is indeed a true syllogism, the last sentence containing the conclusion, or ‘matter to be proved’, the first two sentences being the premises by

nique de Droit International, vol. 4 nos. 3-4 (July-December 1951), p. 10.

13 Union Interparlementaire, *Compte rendu de la XXIIe Conférence tenue à Berne et Genève du 22 au 28 Août 1924*, Lausanne, Genève, Librairie Payot 1925, p. 666. See also, for a comprehensive account, Hans Wehberg, *The Outlawry of War*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment 1931. This publication comprised a series of lectures which first appeared in French and were later also published in German.

14 Leon Paliakov, *The History of Anti-semitism: Suicidal Europe, 1870-1933*, University of Pennsylvania Press 2003, p. 392. Paliakov apparently was Boris’ brother-in-law.

15 Klaus Schlichtmann, *Japan in the World. Shidehara Kijûrô, Pacifism and the Abolition of War*, Lanham, Boulder,

Article 9 is not to “regulate military power,”¹⁸ but to abolish it or transform it into police power.

The Japanese government and foreign ministry, backed by the Japanese people, have in essence throughout been “determined” “to make every effort” to contribute to “creat[ing] a just world order; that is, they are engaged in a search for positive peace.” Thus “the pacifism of the Japanese constitution” is not a “pacifism of inaction,” as people have sometimes claimed.¹⁹

In addition, one must not forget that the full text of this constitution was to a large extent based on the draft constitution written by Suzuki Yasuzo for the Research Commission on the Constitution (Kempo Kenkyukai), a draft which GHQ had translated in December 1945 and from which subsequently the Americans copied freely, having but little time at their disposal. It should also be stressed that this Kempo Kenkyukai draft was based on another draft constitution discussed and published by Emori Ueki,²⁰ a leading Jiyu Minken activist-theorist, who was the intellectual brain of the movement.

3. Interpretation/Meaning

Japan in its constitution has commended its national security and existence to a (future) pacifist order of peace.²¹ Article 9 is “one of three ‘pillars’

which we arrive there.”

18 See Akihiko Kimijima, *Global Constitutionalism and Japan’s Constitutional Pacifism*, *Ritsumeikan kokusai-kenkyu*, 23-3 (March 2011), p. 43.

19 Akihiko Kimijima, Article 9, *Oxford Peace Encyclopedia*, Oxford University Press 2010, p. 151.

20 Klaus Schlichtmann, *Japan in the World, Shidehara Kijuro, Pacifism and the Abolition of War*, 2 vols., Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto etc., Lexington Books 2009. The doctoral dissertation, of which this title is the translation, was originally published in German in 1997.

21 See, by comparison, the statement at the German constitutional convention in 1948: “We must renounce the most important right of the state, the right of self defense ... [Thus] we acquire the right to an alterna-

at the core of Japan’s constitutional framework [which] has operated to keep Japan out of all armed conflicts of the last 65 years.”²² In today’s situation, where Japan’s sovereignty is threatened, as in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with China or the issue of the Takeshima/Dokto rock islands, it is good to remember that for the peaceful settlement of such and similar disputes, Japan submitted, right after it became a member of the United Nations in 1956, to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Unfortunately, neither China nor South Korea accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, which means that Japan may have to consider other options for resolving such conflicts, should China, for instance, become even more obtrusive. Japan has engaged in a lot of different approaches, and it has also been one of the chief promoters of the principle of ‘human security’. The Japanese government quickly realized the importance of the connection between “the ‘consolidation of peace’ and ‘human security,’” making it one of the “important pillars of Japan’s foreign policy.”²³ China should reciprocate and submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ without delay.

The time-honored principle and hope (against all opposing forces) still is that Japan will, “through its ... constitution,” be recognized as a “vanguard of nations in establishing a new and

tive guarantee of our security, which can only be found in a system of collective security.” Quoted in Klaus Schlichtmann, *Die Abschaffung des Krieges. Artikel IX JV: Ursprung, Auslegung und Kontroverse* (The abolition of war. Article IX: origins, interpretation and controversy), *Sicherheit+Frieden* [Security+Peace], vol. 20, No. 4 (2002), p. 223.

22 Craig Martin, LDP’s dangerous proposals for amending anti-war article, *The Japan Times*, 6 June 2012.

23 Kiyokazu Koshida, Militarization of Japan’s ODA, *Peace Studies Bulletin*, No. 23 (April 2005), p. 7. There is a connection between the concept of ‘Human Security’ and the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). However, the argument favoring humanitarian intervention on the basis of the accepted R2P is flawed as no sovereign or moral authority exists so far to decide ultimately when humanitarian intervention is justified.

more peaceful international order.” China and others should acknowledge that Article 9 was understood and upheld not only by a majority of “the political elite (though there were strong opposing forces among these as well, to be sure), but also by the people of Japan. It was the beginning of a process by which Article 9 ... [became] a powerful constitutive norm, providing the legal foundation for a new national identity centered on pacifist ideals.”²⁴

Japanese like to see their country as “the Switzerland of the Far East—that is, a country whose neutrality and integrity would be guaranteed by the United Nations.”²⁵ As Professor Anthony DiFilippo of Lincoln University in his book *The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement* pointed out, there is also a connection between Article 9 JC and Article X of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which maintains that the treaty should “expire whenever in the opinions of the[ir] Governments ... there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise

of international peace and security in the Japan Area.”²⁶ This 1951 stipulation, which was adopted after the failure of the Russian attempt, on the occasion of the Korean crisis, to have the U.N. embark on the transition,²⁷ was to ensure that this future option would remain open and enable the implementation of the provisions in the UN Charter that are vital for the transition to collective security. This option together with Article 9 was clearly “[r]eflecting [not only] the non-belligerent sentiment of the Japanese constitution”²⁸

24 Craig Martin, A Constitutional Case for Amending Article 9, in Bryce Wakefield, ed., *The Constitution of Japan At 65: Time for a Change?* Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2012, p. 53. See also Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 4-5, 44, 112; and Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of *Jus ad Bellum*, *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, vol. 30 (2008), note 1, pp. 282, 304-305, 355-356.

25 Michael M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*, New York, Columbia University Press 1982, p. 49, quoted in Klaus Schlichtmann, Schweizer Neutralität und japanischer Kriegsverzicht [Swiss neutrality and the Japanese renunciation of war], *Zeitschrift für Friedenspolitik - friZ*, 1 / 2007 (Journal for Peace Policy, by the Swiss Peace Council), p. 20. Prime Minister Koizumi is known to have said: “Taking a permanently neutral country such as Switzerland as a role model, many people here think that Japan should be a Switzerland of the East.” (At a meeting with the Swiss foreign minister, Joseph Deiss, in Tokyo in 2002)

26 Article IV of the 1951 treaty. The present Article X of the treaty stresses the UN role, leaves out the “otherwise” provision and just states: “This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.” Quoted in Anthony DiFilippo, *The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment*, M.E. Sharpe 2002, p. 49. I have heard that Shidehara, Speaker of the House until his death in 1951, had a say in the drafting of this article. See also A. DiFilippo, *op.cit.*, p. 8: “... the United Nations will provide Japan with security. This expectation is the political linchpin that, if ever realized, will become the reason, according to Article X of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, for ending the accord. ... *this is the ... (multilateral) security response favored by Russia and China.*” (Emphasis added)

27 In 1950, the Russians refused to sanction the actions of the United Nations in Korea, insisting on an “invocation or implementation” of Article 106. On 11 October 1950, for the last time, they submitted this resolution:

“The General Assembly, Taking into account the particular importance of concerted action by the five permanent members of the Security Council in defending and strengthening peace and security among nations, *Recommends* that before armed forces are placed at the disposal of the Security Council under appropriate agreements concluded in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter, the five permanent members of the Security Council ... should take steps to ensure the necessary implementation of Article 106 of the Charter for the purpose of taking such joint action on behalf of the organization as may prove to be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

28 A. DiFilippo, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

and the Japanese people, but also the common understanding that to abolish war the international organization must be endowed with the authority to make binding decisions on behalf of the international community.²⁹ The 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense, “which remains fundamentally important to Japan’s defense policy” (A. DiFilippo), and is still relevant today, upheld the vision of an effective United Nations, while temporarily agreeing to face external aggression “on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, [but only] pending effective functioning of the United Nations in the future deterring and repelling such aggression.”³⁰

Yet Article 9 is part of only one among several constitutions³¹ aiming at an international peace based on cooperation, justice and order that were introduced after WWII.³² As we have seen, their origins go back to the French Revolution and the

Enlightenment, the Hague Peace Conferences and the interwar period when the League of Nations attempted to outlaw war, and there were many proposals for limiting national sovereignty in constitutions with regard to the right of belligerency.³³ However, being the only provision that has limited state sovereignty with regard to the right to go to or take part in war, Article 9 can be seen as a public law, constitutional motion or precedent that needs to be followed up or seconded in order to become effective. This is confirmed by the provisions in the constitutions of France, Italy, Denmark and several others that agree to such limitations on national sovereignty only on condition of reciprocity. The 1957-1964 Commission for the Investigation of the Constitution (*kempo chosakai*), headed by Kenzo Takayanagi, the “eloquent advocate of the rule of law,”³⁴ was well aware of these constitutional provisions and debated the possible introduction of the condition of reciprocity into Article 9.

It seems that in the order of things Germany is the natural candidate to follow up on and ‘second’ Article 9.³⁵ This tallies with Takayanagi’s state-

29 Thus, “[w]hen Japan became a member of the United Nations in 1956, and for some time thereafter, many Japanese, including policy makers, maintained the expectation that in time this multilateral organization [the U.N.] would provide the country with security; thus, there would be no need for a security alliance with the United States.” *Ibid.*, p. 49.

30 Quoted in A. DiFilippo, *op.cit.*, p. 49. (Emphasis added)

31 Klaus Schlichtmann, A Short History of the “Constitutional Law of Peace” and its possible Application in the Light of Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, *Indian Journal of International Law*, vol. 39, no. 2 (April-June 1999), pp. 291-310

32 Klaus Schlichtmann, *Kenpou daikyuujou ga toikakeru. Kokka shuken no seigen—kakkoku kenpou to hikaku shi nagara* (Investigating Article 9. Limitations of national sovereignty—a comparison with other constitutions), *The SEKAI* (Tokyo, Iwanami), 3 (2006 March, no. 750), pp. 172-83, and *Article Nine in Context – Limitations of National Sovereignty and the Abolition of War in Constitutional Law*, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, vol. 23-6-09 (June 8, 2009), online at <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Klaus-Schlichtmann/3168>, and *The Constitutional Abolition of War in Japan. Monument of a Culture of Peace?*, *Internationales Asienforum – International Quarterly for Asian Studies*, vol. 32 (2001), no. 1-2, pp. 123-149.

33 See a list of these provisions online at http://www.unfor.info/liste24list_en.html. But see also, for example, Article 54, para 2 of the Siamese constitution of 10 December 1932, which declared: “Une déclaration de guerre ne peut intervenir que si elle n’est pas contraire aux dispositions du pacte de la Société des Nations.” Citation in Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Droit Constitutionnel International*, Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey 1933, p. 144.

34 John Maki (ed.), *Japan’s Commission on the Constitution. The Final Report*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press 1980, p. vii.

35 See Klaus Schlichtmann, How to make Article 9 global, *Kyoto Journal* 72 (2009), p. 20, online at <http://www.kyotojournal.org/kjback/72/Making%20A9%20global.pdf>. Apart from my own work comparing the Japanese and German peace constitutions, a little book has recently come out by a German author comparing the two: Markus Gascha, *Der Kriegsverzicht Im Japanischen Verfassungsrecht - Hintergründe und Aktuelle Diskussion Zu Art 9 JV* [The renunciation of war in Japanese constitutional law—backgrounds and recent debate on Article 9], GRIN Verlag, 2011.

ment that “not only the Japanese people, but politicians from all countries must make the greatest efforts toward the realization of this ideal,”³⁶ i.e. to renounce and forego war once and for all. However, the German constitution deliberately did not posit a condition of reciprocity, arguing that after all that Germany had done, the limitation of national sovereignty renouncing war should be unconditional. Article 9 is a precedent, and following up would trigger the process of the transition to collective security³⁷ stipulated in Article 106 of the UN Charter,³⁸ during which the five permanent members would assume their responsibility to assure safe passage, while nations disarm to the minimum level stipulated in Article 26 of the Charter. However, since Germany has not acted on its promise, and is not honoring the relevant provisions of its own peace constitution, which explicitly spells out collective security as one of its main foreign policy aims, this amounts to Germany effectively blocking the development of the United Nations into an effective organization for maintaining international peace and security. This also affects Japan’s position and stand with regard to Article 9.

36 TAKAYANAGI Kenzô, *Kaiken zehi no mondaiten, Jiyû 5*, (1963). According to the commission on the constitution (Kempou chousakai), set up by the government in 1956 under Takayanagi’s chairmanship, there was no direct relationship between the official plans of the American government and the drafting of article 9.

37 See Klaus Schlichtmann, Linking Constitutional Laws of Peace and Collective Security, *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, vol. 17, no. 2 (December 2004), pp. 1-22.

38 See Quincy Wright, Political Conditions Of The Period Of Transition, *International Conciliation*, No. 379 (April, 1942), pp. 264-279, for a comprehensive exposition of the concept of the transition, as it was later introduced into the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. Online at http://www.unfor.info/transition_text.pdf See also Klaus Schlichtmann, An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform, *Beijing Law Review*, vol. 2, no. 2 (June 2011), pp. 97-110, and UN Collective Security and the Transitional Period: A Myth over the Founding and Aims of the United Nations, *Journal of East Asia and International Law*, vol.3, no.1 (Spring 2010), pp. 99-122.

It may largely be due to Germany’s omission after the end of the Cold War that, as Makoto Katsumata and Naomi Kamijo pointed out in the beginning of 2005, the world has

“entered a new era in North-South relations, in which the optimistic scenarios of the early 1990s for a peace dividend seem more unlikely than ever to come about. ... We see increasing globalized socio-economic disparities throughout the world, accompanied by uneven power relations. ... This is particularly true in East Asia, where the legacy of the Cold War persists.”³⁹

Instead of following up on Article 9 to abolish war, Germany set off a new wave of nationalist fervor.

These general omissions are addressed in an article in *Foreign Policy* entitled ‘Avoiding War’, where Doug Bandow argues that when, after the “collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,” the United States, like many other countries, was re-evaluating its security policy, the “most discussed alternative” was collective security, which according to the author had “long been an important aspect of American foreign policy.”⁴⁰ However, nothing came of it, leaving Japan, among others, in the doldrums. Again, on 31 January 1992, at the first-ever summit-level meeting of the Security Council, the fifteen heads of state assembled stressed “the need for the international community to deal effectively” with acts of terrorism and maintain international peace and security, thus confirming their continuing commitment to bring about an effective system of collective security.⁴¹ Again, as no nation ceded

39 Makoto Katsumata and Naomi Kamijo, *Peace Studies Bulletin*, No. 23 (April 2005), pp. 13-14.

40 Doug Bandow, Avoiding War, *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter 1992/1993), p. 156 (156-174).

41 See Edward C. Luck, Tackling Terrorism, in David M. Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, Boulder, CO and London, Lynne Rienner 2004 (A Project of the International

“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” to the Security Council, to ensure its “prompt and effective action” (U.N. Charter, Article 24), the matter remained ultimately unresolved.⁴² Similarly perhaps, the problem of unequal representation among the five permanent members also remains unresolved. The solution would be to give a suitable candidate representing the Global South a permanent seat, while reducing the European seats to a single united European representation.⁴³

So, although the SDF were prohibited from participating in PKOs so long as the UN security system was not in force,⁴⁴ the situation changed in

Peace Academy), p. 94.

42 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility*: “The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked.” (p. 4) Though the Report mentions “collective security” more than a hundred times, it did not address the problem of limiting nation-state sovereignty, although it did point out that “[w]hatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community.” (p. 17) In view of these facts and perceptions, the continued patience that Japanese policy makers have displayed is astounding.

43 It may be important to maintain the number “5” to ensure optimal operational functionality rooted in the consensus principle during the transition. See also Klaus Schlichtmann, Mahatma Gandhi and the Quest for an Effective United Nations Organization, *The Stakes, 1917-1947, Gandhi Marg*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April-June 2004), pp. 55-81, and by the same author, *Hitotsu no sekai chitsujo. heiwa kouchiku no tame-ni Nihon to Indo wa tomoni ikaga katsudou ga dekiruka?*, *Gunshuku mondai shiryō*, No. 330 (May 2008), pp. 70-75.

44 Indeed, according to the 2006 “Defense of Japan” Annual White Paper issued by the Ministry of Defense, among the SDF’s primary objectives, apart from granting the natural right of self-defense, were “Disaster Relief and Civil Protection.” Providing assistance in the wake of natural disasters and adopting policing functions in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) are still perceived by

the 1990s, when it was hoped that the U.N. system would start its operations under the Charter. Had the system become effective, the SDF could have been recognized as what India’s Mohandas K. Gandhi called the *Shanti Sena*, i.e. having the purpose and potential for becoming genuine peace soldiers.⁴⁵ Still today, the most sensible way, to escape the predicament of the present anarchic international system, is to realize the Gandhian concept and establish a universal “*Shanti Sena*” (Soldiers of Peace) or “Peace Corps,”⁴⁶ and have the Self-Defense Force “placed under the UN command and be transformed into a UN police force stationed in Japan,” as renowned Japanese peace researcher Yoshikazu Sakamoto has suggested. The SDF could be a cornerstone and founding member of a multinational police corps, in accord with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.⁴⁷ These ideas “that push the UN to

the public as well to be two of the SDF’s main purposes, but, increasingly, problems of how to counter threats from outside have come to the fore. See Defense of Japan 2006, at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2006.html

45 OZAWA Ichirō, A proposal for reforming the Japanese Constitution (1999), printed in Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan’s Contested Constitution, documents and analysis*, London and New York, Routledge 2001, p. 167 (Creating a “UN standing army”): “The only way to maintain order is through the concept of collective security, in other words, policing power on a global scale.”

46 Glenn D. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, Honolulu, Center for Global Nonkilling 2009, p. 116. Available online at: <http://nonkilling.org/pdf/nkgps.pdf>; Vinoba Bhave, *Shanti Sena*, Varanasi, Sarva Seva Sangh 1963; Thomas Weber, *Gandhi’s Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peace-keeping*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press 1996.

47 Yoshikazu Sakamoto, The Postwar and the Japanese Constitution: Beyond Constitutional Dilemmas, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, November 10, 2005, online at <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshikazu-SAKAMOTO/1847>. This I have argued in a recent paper, The Role of UCAV, PGM, Nonlethal Weaponry and Cyber Policing, in Joám Evans Pim (ed.), *Nonkilling Security and the State*, Honolulu and Omaha, Center for Global Nonkilling and Asia World Center 2013, p. 204.

have a mostly civilian rapid deployment force are sensible” and promising.⁴⁸

4. Prospects

It is necessary to revert to the original purposes and principles of the United Nations. In 1946, a U.S. Department of State Report outlined “a transitional period in which the United States would gradually turn over its secrets, atomic weapons, and processing plants to the Atomic Development Authority as the international controls tightened,” with the aim “to protect American security and minimize the danger of the premature release of atomic information”⁴⁹ that would jeopardize international peace and security. Interestingly, in 1990, when there were various official proposals for an effective international order and for strengthening the United Nations, the USA “dug out the ‘transitional’ security arrangement of Article 106 of the UN Charter,” as though expecting someone to initiate the process of empowering the United Nations.⁵⁰

Also, in an undated Memorandum, probably from around 1950, United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie, noting points for consideration in the development of a 20-year program for achieving peace through the United Nations, pointed out the temporary nature of systems of collective self-defense, stating that “Measures for collective self-defense and regional remedies of other kinds are at best interim measures, and *cannot ... bring any reliable security from the prospect of war*” (Emphasis added).⁵¹ The title of paragraph 10 of the memorandum significantly reads: “Active and systematic use of all the powers of the Charter and all the machinery of the United Nations to speed up the development of international law towards an eventual enforceable world law for a universal world society.”⁵² This is a clear statement on the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Disarmament is still regarded as utopian, although research has clearly shown its feasibility.⁵³ A lot depends, however, on the U.N. members making good on their promises, including em-

Available online at: <http://nonkilling.org/pdf/nksecurity.pdf>.

48 Akihiko Kimijima, Japan’s Contribution to Global Constitutionalism, *Societies Without Borders*, vol. 4 (Leiden 2009), pp. 112-113. See also the proposal for a “United Nations Emergency Peace Service” by the director of the Joan Kroc Institute at Notre Dame University, Robert C. Johansen (ed.), *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service—to Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, New York 2006, and the *Draft Statute for the Formation and Operation of the United Nations Emergency Peace Service for the Prevention of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*, online at http://www.globalactionpw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/uneps-statute_december-05-2010.pdf.

49 U.S. Department of State, *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy* (Washington, D.C., March 16, 1946), pp. 4-61. Reference in Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America*, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1974, p. 268.

50 Niels Blokker, *Towards More Effective Supervision of International Organizations: Essays in Honour of Henrys G. Schermers*, Martinus Nijhoff 1994 (International Studies

in Human Rights), p. 56. Professor Niels Blokker teaches public international law at the University of Leiden.

However, the author states that these “transitional security arrangements ... enable[d] the permanent members to act on behalf of the UN outside the context of the Charter if necessary.” This obviously is a misunderstanding, because the transition to collective security could and should never take place ‘outside the Charter.’

51 From the President’s Secretary’s File. Online at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/un/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=0000-00-00&documentid=38&studycollectionid=UN&pagenumber=1. (Emphasis added)

52 A. DiFilippo, *The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment*, p. 49.

53 On the feasibility of arms conversion, see, for example, Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*, New York, Basic Books 1992. With regard to chemical weapons, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has succeeded in reducing chemical stockpiles by 80% over the past 16 years.

powering the United Nations. How far politicians, even in Japan, have strayed from believing in the original purposes and principles of the United Nations, is apparent, for example, in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* when it states that there is “no way in sight to achieve A-bomb survivors’ shared hope—a world without nuclear weapons”⁵⁴—a judgment that reflects the present government’s intention to revise the Constitution. It would not be a surprise to anybody if Japanese politicians and even the public, having faithfully upheld Article 9 for over sixty years, now feel disappointed and may even have given up.

A kind of ambivalence on the part of the victorious powers may be discernible in their dual approach to maintaining peace and security, as in the US, with peace through law, on the one hand, and peace through strength, on the other. However, some countries, like Germany, have no such objectives, their sole political target being political and economic power.⁵⁵ Countries like the USA appear to be willing ultimately to rely on a system of law, if only this could be initiated.

5. Conclusion

In the West, every time the JC’s peace imperative is discussed in Japan, this is taken as a sign that changing the constitution is imminent. Revising Article 9 in favour of allowing Japan to legally participate in collective self-defense would be an-

other serious blow to achieving the UN’s objective to establish a comprehensive system of collective security—the first blow having been the German Constitutional Court’s verdict stating that systems of collective self-defense (like NATO) fulfil the condition for qualifying as a collective security system under the UN Charter. Even if revising the Japanese Constitution’s Article 9 should take another two to three years, an eventual revision would have a domino effect, of which the last domino falling would be the UN.

54 A-bomb memorial held in Hiroshima, *The Japan News* (The *Yomiuri Shimbun*), 7 August 2013. Nevertheless, in February 2010, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) member Hideo Hiraoka “and 203 other Japanese legislators sent a letter to US President Obama supporting his stated policy objectives of moving towards a world without nuclear weapons.” Online: <http://gsinstitute.org/blogs/enewsletter-archives/204-japanese-legislators-support-obamas-vision-of-nuclear-disarmament>.

55 Klaus Schlichtmann, *Wartime Atrocities and Responsibilities: The Japanese and the German Case*, *Sophia International Review*, vol. 24 (Tokyo 2002), pp. 61-73.

Commentary

Buddhism and Peace Research

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A fundamental ethos of peace research, about which most would agree, is that it should be “directed towards the understanding of conditions that may prevent international and intergroup violence and conditions for furthering harmonious and creative relations between nations and other groups of people” (Galtung, 1975: 157). Another conspicuous feature is the diversity of approaches to peace and conflict studies. The plurality within peace requires us to appreciate multiple perspectives on the research agenda. Peace research is a methodologically plural community with emancipatory interest in transformative possibilities for the improvement of human well-beings as well as the resolution of violence and the prevention of its resurgence (Jeong, 1999). Based in this spirit, peace research experienced its evolution in the sense of expanding its research themes and subjects.

However, despite its progress through self-reflexivity, contemporary peace research is mainly socially, structurally or institutionally-oriented in nature, as epitomized by the predominance of liberal peacebuilding. Newman et al. claim that the mainstream of contemporary peacebuilding is liberal peacebuilding which is characterized by the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms, and a range of other institutions

in line with the modern state system (2009).

With regard to the psychological dynamics of peace and conflict, social psychology has played a major role. Fisher (1997) and Bar-Tal (2011), to name but two authors, are good examples. However, as it has confined the nature of mind exclusively to a social orientation, the purview of psychological dynamics has been qualitatively limited. Vaughan asserts that the study of the human mind as a social science is “still in its infancy” (2000: 151) and her critique seems to apply to peace research; despite the invaluable contribution of social psychology, the study of the human mind needs further development if we are to deepen our analysis of the dynamics of peace and conflict.

Buddhism since its beginning has laid a major emphasis on the analysis of the human mind and has seen it both as the locus of suffering, including violence and conflict and as a key to addressing suffering. Our understanding of reality in terms of its contents is mediated by the knowing mind and its perceptual and conceptual apparatus (Burton, 2001). On a Buddhist view, the object of analysis is consistently human beings, and the aim of the analysis is the realization of the mind-base for knowledge and the construction of knowledge (Matuso, 1981). The purpose of Buddhist philosophy is to “know thyself in terms of understanding the structure of one’s own thinking process” (Ibid: 151).

Buddhism claims that human suffering derives from craving, that is, a mental state that leads to attachment, which, in its turn, is characterized as the tendency of the mind to cling to certain specific objects or views. Besides, ignorance, which is understood as our basic misapprehension of the nature of reality or lack of self-awareness of the nature of reality (Geshe Tashi, 2005), is recognized as a fundamental cause of suffering. The basic feature of ignorance is the tendency to see things, including human beings, as having a permanent or fixed nature and to cling to anything

that reinforces our concept of permanence, pushing away what threatens that conception (Ibid). In other words, the human mind is the locus wherein the gap between reality and the human hermeneutical reality represented in conceptual or linguistic rendering, and accompanied by desire, takes place. The result is suffering including conflict and violence (Park, 2008).

Buddhism suggests conflict and violence of any form begins with our own mind or thinking (Ibid). Though external conditions and causes cannot be ignored, it is essential to deepen our awareness or experience of internal dynamics in order to grasp the entire picture of conflict and violence. On a Buddhist view, the root cause of conflict and violence lies in our propensity to absolutize any particular form of conceptual thought as universal or complete (Gomez, 1976). From time immemorial, human beings have developed conceptual thought as the main tool to make sense of the world of experiences in abstraction, and to communicate this to fellow human beings (Ichimura, 1997). As social beings, our minds get shaped by socially embedded assumptions, worldviews, and habitual ways of interpretation that are conventionally accepted as valid and effective in the practical matter of the given life-world (Gunnlaugson, 2007). By becoming socially or culturally conditioned, we build and accept frames of reference – certain patterns of cultural values, political orientations, and ideologies, religious doctrines, moral-ethical norms, and so on – to construct and lead a meaningful life (Mezirow, 2003).

However, once we have constructed certain conceptual or discursive thoughts that socially or culturally condition us, we are led to fixate the real – objects, persons, groups of people, events and so on – with some supposedly fixed attributes or qualities (Chang, 1971). When we build our world with fixed attributes and keep a strong hold of these qualities as absolute or complete, we come to have greed, anger or obsession with respect to them.

Further, when we establish some particular thoughts and claim completeness for the perspectives that we cling to, that causes us to be dogmatic, and to exclude other views or other distinct identities (Ramanan, 1978). As a fixated idea of identity becomes strong and extreme, it drives us toward extreme behaviors against those with different attributes (Der-lan, 2006). What should be emphasized is that the basic mode of thinking is conceptual thought. Although becoming conditioned by social or cultural conceptual or discursive thought is natural to us, it is fundamentally of a dualistic nature (right/wrong, good/bad, black/white, to name a few dualities) and this divides the world into ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ (Wade, 1996). Those with dualistic thought are informed by the principle of the excluded middle (Fenner, 1994). This logical stance in nature prioritizes one over the other by enhancing the dichotomous relationship between an in-group and an out-group, where an imbalanced attitude invested by extreme in-group self-interest and desire is favored and promoted (Nagatomo, 2000).

Once we see the other as something disconnected from us, it becomes easier to propagate violence upon the other outside the boundaries. In a dualistic logical and epistemological structure, we tend to project negative qualities onto the outside and see them as objectively belonging to others (Wilber, 1993), which promotes self-righteousness and discriminatory attitudes and can result in violence of some kind being committed against them.

Social or cultural conditionedness through the establishment of certain conceptual thought, though essential to our lives, with its dualistic nature can cause us to exaggerate differences between people, create supposedly firm boundaries between the in-group and the out-group and reify these groups into fixed and independent entities that are segregated from one another by purportedly intrinsic and insurmountable differences (Waldron, 2003). This leads us into conflict and

prevents us from constructing a harmonious and constructive relationship.

As the root cause of conflict lies in our minds, the key to peace also lies in our minds. Peace with ourselves and with the world surrounding us can be achieved mainly through the development of mental peace: inner peace is the key. One of the core philosophical foundations of a Buddhist inner peace is the realization of the dependent-originated nature of any conceptual or linguistic framework: any form of symbolic knowledge that shapes dichotomous relations cannot be seen as existing outside the purview of interdependency (Muller, 1998). This does not mean total erasure of difference or the demise of all distinctions into an all-frozen sameness. Instead, it advocates a reformulation of dualistic thinking.

What must be understood is that dualistic either-or thinking, though useful and important in some circumstances, is “only one product of the total functioning of the mind” (Tart, 2000: 28). The awakening to the interdependent and interpenetrating nature of conceptual thought or frames of reference enables us to effect a perspectival shift from the dualistic stance to a non-dualistic stance (Nagatomo, 2000) where *prima facie* opposing views are not seen as a fixed pair of opposites, but as inter-relational constructs. When we are liberated from the attachment to a particular fixed view, we can open up the infinite network of meaning that is not tied to any specific, self-centered standpoint (Blass, 1996), and have multiple perspectives when regarding and approaching reality, including human relationships.

A contemplative practice is proposed as a practical tool to promote internal peace. Normally, once we become conditioned by certain thoughts, we tend to remain identified with the thought and are kept imprisoned in the conditioned state (Welwood, 2000), which restricts patterns of awareness and limits our intentional range and capacity for meaning-making commitments. So, the first step is to dis-identify ourselves from the conditioned state so as to be conscious

of it and reflect on it. The practice of the contemplative mind means the practice of detachment from the contents of our consciousness, the thoughts, feelings, and reactions flowing from our minds (Hart, 2001). Put differently, the practice of the contemplative mind cultivates our first-hand experience of the nature of the social or cultural conditioned-ness of our thinking and knowing within a collective context, which helps us become less identified with our habits of mind and standpoints (Gunnlaugson, 2007). The aim of contemplative disengagement is to create a space in our minds for the development of an enlarged awareness, accompanied by an attentiveness to broadening the dimensions of how our minds can work by pushing beyond collectively-built presuppositions and sedimented habits of thinking and knowing (Hart, 2001).

The integrative expansion of the range of experience that results from the practice of the contemplative mind enables us to engage with the world in a more extensive and inclusive manner (Firman and Gila, 2002). Recognizing the interdependent and interpenetrating nature of reality, including human relationships, makes us aware that we need to approach the phenomenon of conflict from a perspective that is distinct from conventional dualistic logic. It becomes impossible to draw a complete line that judges which party in the conflict is absolutely right or wrong. Rather, what must be acknowledged is that those in conflict are interdependent and interconnected with each other (Park, 2008). They are interwoven on a profound dimension despite their conflictual relationship on the visible level (Ibid). With the dualistic view of conflict transcended, we come to realize that violence against the other becomes an act of violence against ourselves and is understood as an undesirable and unrealistic option or course of action if we seek to transform a conflictual situation (Brantmeier, 2007).

Further, understanding interdependence leads us to recognize our happiness comes through others' happiness. Awakening to the inherently,

interdependent nature of reality enables us to appreciate that our own well-being and others' are inseparable; without considering and acting to promote others' peace, our own peace is impossible. As is widely accepted, identity assumes a critical role in peace and conflict studies. A key to lasting peace is to go beyond ego or identity (Vaughan, 2000). This does not mean the denial of identity; rather, it refers to a qualitative transformation of our view of the nature of identity. Rather than seeing our identity as possessing an independent and fixed existence, we need to understand it as part of the interdependent web of life with no fixed nature (Loy, 1993). Realizing identity to be an open and dynamic living system existing within a larger interdependent ecosystem can awaken us to an ultimate, nondualistic relationship between the in-group and the out-group.

Truly, the practice of the contemplative mind is not easy. However, since how we act and how we speak are derived from our mind-states, it is imperative to monitor and control them in order to act and speak constructively and harmoniously (Kosom Sunim, 1999). Practice and the development of deep reflection – looking deeply into each act and each thought in our daily lives – sharpens our capacity to observe and control our behavior, attitudes, and thoughts, to have multiple ways of thinking and knowing, and to develop dialectically constructed synthetic or integrative views and ideas when approaching peace (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1999). The dynamics of peace arise from our interior transformation, transcending an attachment to a particular frame of thought, moving towards understanding diversity and differences as being part of mutual interdependence to find sympathy and compassion for each other (Coleman, 2006). Put another way, peace can be understood as an exploratory ongoing and ever-lasting process that explicates or unfolds new values and meanings between/among those with distinct ideas and views to achieve and sustain interdependent and mutually liberating and transformative relational dynamics.

As Groff claims, peace is a multi-faceted process that focuses on many different substantive aspects and dimensions. It deals with multiple levels, from the macro to the micro in the external world and even extends to our inner world (2008). Peace lies at the nexus of significant interdependencies among diverse physiological, psychological, spiritual, social, economic, and political realities (Hershock, 2006). As inner peace and outer peace are interdependent dimensions of the human experience, merely developing inner peace cannot lead to lasting peace.

However, Francis asserts that “in human societies, minds and hearts are the main arena” (2010: 129). Since every day we are creating our own subjective realities (Vaughan, 1979), every moment of our lives can be an opportunity to know the value and power of mindfulness and contemplative practice. Mindful and contemplative practices emerge as tools to balance our inner dimensions within our outer social spheres of action, and our inter-personal and inter-group relationships.

Although it is crucial to maintain a balance between outer and inner approaches, at the center of the process of peace should lie the human mind that employs various ways of thinking and knowing, such as rational consideration, mindfulness, reflective self-awareness, intuitive induction, creative imagination, empathy and so on, in order to bring about positive change. As Ramsbotham et al. argue, peace research has entered a phase where distinct philosophies, values, and wisdom from around the globe should be appreciated and, if necessary, a complementary relationship between/among them needs to be explored to deepen our views of peace, conflict, and violence (2011). Thus, constructing a complementary relationship between Western approaches, which are mainly socially, structurally or institutionally-oriented, and a Buddhist approach, which basically focuses on the internal dynamics of peace and conflict, should be acknowledged as an example of what can claim to be peace research.

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Commentary

Analysis of China's Position in the World

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Being a rising power, China has a role to play in world affairs, but what is its proper role? Being a *follower* cannot just be decided by ourselves, while being a *challenger* is neither necessary nor possible (at least in the short-term). So, what is the right choice for China? The right choice for China cannot easily be defined by current conceptions. There is no doubt that the present international political and economic order was established according to principles that favored the developed countries, and that this favoring is part of what much of peace studies is against. While there is also no doubt that these principles embody justice in the modern world to some extent. So I think that it is wiser and more viable for China to adopt the goal of maintaining the current international code of conduct. Assuming such a role, China should neither be identified as a follower nor be identified as a challenger. *Maintainer* is a proper description for the role, meaning that China's goal lies in maintaining the current world order. We will not discuss here the justifiability of the current world order and economic system, which were established by the developed countries, for what China is aiming at is to get the things we deserve by acting on these principles, and also prevent the superpowers from both undermining the principles they themselves drafted

and holding double-standards, two practices that are now frequently denounced. Being a *maintainer* entails struggling against world hegemony, but here the struggle is justified and moderate, for China will not seek to establish new standards, but only require all countries, including the superpowers, to act on accepted principles. Playing such a role will meet with the approval of the majority of nations as well as effectively protect China's own interests.

If China assumes the role of a *maintainer*, it may not only restrict the superpowers' unreasonable actions, but it may also allow China to present itself as a peace-lover so as to get the support of the international community, and then some countries who feel some misgivings about China may gradually change their opinion.

Therefore, being a *maintainer* is the strategic decision that is most beneficial to China's interests, as well as China's best choice in dealing with international affairs. Then, after becoming really strong, will China settle for being just a *maintainer*? I think, in view of its long-term interests, China need never pursue supremacy and be a superpower. Experience has demonstrated that all worldwide empires which established and maintained a world order according to their will, although they gained a lot politically and economically for their own nation, inevitably disappeared from the historical stage, however mighty they were, because the cost of establishing and maintaining their world order eventually became unaffordable. This is now an accepted fact within western academia. Being a superpower means entering a decline, so to speak. Hence, even if it is strong enough, China must not seek to be a superpower and establish a new world order. Doing so will spell disaster for China in every respect. Actually, judging from the trend in developments in the world, it is not likely that the world order will be dominated by a super power. The global pattern is bound to develop toward pluralism, and several of the strongest and less strong countries will play more and more important roles in world

affairs. Thus, China's role of being a *maintainer* is positive rather than negative, for it is necessary that China provide constructive advice while also confronting unreasonable actions on the world stage. In so doing, China need not confront any superpower or any other power or group of powers. What China and other countries need to do is learn to consult with each other on the basis of equality and maintain accepted principles in the international community together. In addition, historical experience has also indicated that any superpower inevitably becomes the enemy of all other countries, and has to deal with all kinds of challengers. Thus being a superpower is a stupid choice for China to make and one that China should always try to avoid.

The international situation in the post-cold war era is not unconnected with the international situation before, but one change is undeniable, which is that ideologies are fading, and countries are now paying more attention to economic development and the practical gains to be gained from that development. With the arrival of such a trend, the era when a superpower could force other countries to act in obedience to its will has gone forever, and cooperation will become the new international convention. Cooperation and interdependence between different countries is the necessary trend of history. Confrontation will only lead to mutual hurt, while cooperation will bring about mutual benefits. Though some people still stick to the concept of the cold war and try to develop policies according to that perspective, such an approach is destined to fall into oblivion.

In fact, Chinese traditions contain an abundance of peaceful thought. Regarded as the basic principle for action by Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, the Confucian Middle Way unifies "ren" with "li" in harmony. The essence of "ren" is to love others as the highest standard in handling relationships among people, and to behave like an upright person, while "li" functions as the outside norm in one's behavior. Confucian doctrines pos-

sess some resemblance to Aristotle's thought in that they reckon it significant to mediate reasonableness and sensibility through the Middle Way. The moral peaceful ideal is advocated in Confucianism, namely, to conciliate conflicts in human relations and national affairs through moral means instead of by means of the just war as proposed by Christianity. Confucius is the first prophet in China to put forward an ideal of "convincing others through morality", laying the foundation for the later Confucian way to deal with disputes. The ideal has demonstrated such enormous power in politics that it can even replace violent mechanisms like an army and criminal laws in the government of a country. Meanwhile, Daoism propounds a compromise regarding peace in thought. As the chief founder of Peace Studies, Johan Galtung, puts it: "Thoughts of peace and violence coexist in Daoism, warning people to be prepared for danger in times of safety." In particular, he emphasizes that peace studies is as practical a science as medicine, and he cites Chinese traditional medicine as an excellent example of this. He has therefore practiced the principle of the balance and maladjustment between Yin and Yang in his peace studies. Bearing this point of view in mind, I hope that Peace Studies in China will be able to provide constructive advice to the Chinese government as it formulates its foreign policies, to encourage people to value peace more highly and to enhance and deepen China's traditional peaceful thought so as to contribute to the peace of the world as well as the peace of China. We especially hope that younger generations in all countries will reach adulthood determined to follow a peaceful road to development and avoid the tragedies of wars that have devastated the environment and the lives of millions of innocent human beings in Nanjing, Hiroshima and countless other places around the world.

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