Peace Studies Bulletin

Special Issue

Rethinking "Regional Peace" from the People's Viewpoint: Peace-Building from Below

Spring in the Arab World, Autumn in NY, Summer in Japan, and Next?

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The Japanese are often said to be patient and courteous. This can be observed in the behavior of people after the devastating 3.11 earthquake in 2011. However, there are times when these affectionate people stop being gentle. Rather, they stand up, rally, and protest.

Demonstrators' tents spread over many places in Japan, in Henoko and Takae in Okinawa, in front of the office building of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and at the Kyushu Electric Power Corporation. People continue to occupy these sites 24 hours a day to monitor the government's reaction. On July 16, as many as 170,000 people, according to the organizers, attended an assembly at Yoyogi Park in Tokyo calling for an end to nuclear power. Such a large-scale demonstration has not been seen in Japan for decades. The outrage against the government's nuclear policy brings people out on to the streets as was also seen, for instance, in the Occupy Movement.

Several reasons account for this outburst of outrage, which essentially expresses people's anger towards the undemocratic manner of the Noda administration.

First, the government insisted on restarting the Oi nuclear power reactor at the end of June despite the fact that more than 70% of the people were against it.

Second, the government revised the Atomic Energy Basic Law without any adequate debate in the Diet. It is reported that the words "contribute to Japan's national security" were slipped into the law. This led the nation's neighbors, especially South Korea, to show their concern that Japan might be preparing to possess nuclear weapons.

The third issue is the deployment of the Osprey, a hybrid of a helicopter and a fixed-wing airplane, in Okinawa Prefecture, where unsafe American military bases are assembled. The local government and people strongly called for the cancellation of the planned deployment. However, the government did not give enough attention to these voices in its bilateral negotiation on the deployment with the U.S. government. The question raised is, whose security is the Noda administration trying to secure?

Lastly, the government and the electric power corporations are still promoting nuclear plant exports, for example, to Vietnam and Jordan, in spite of the fact that little progress has been made to compensate the victims of the 3.11 accident. Whose interests are the promoters of nuclear exports attempting to secure?

Demonstrations have been a way for people to express their opinions strongly to the public. It is now the way Japanese people have chosen and they are continuing to use this method. Tents have occupied the corner of METI providing a space for voices of protest. There have also been assemblies every Friday night in front of the Prime Minister's residence in Tokyo. The number of protesters grew significantly from hundreds in the spring of 2011 to more than 200,000 in the summer of 2012. This number will continue to expand in the autumn until the government sincerely listens to people's voices and changes its energy policy. People have already come to the conclusion that human beings cannot live where nuclear power exists.

The character "angry" is written on a people's tent in front of the office building of METI

Rethinking "Regional Peace" from the People's Viewpoint: Peace-Building from Below

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People in peripheral regions sometimes suffer from an unequal and unjust distribution of risk. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is a typical case. Following this incident, more than 100,000 residents had to evacuate from their homes due to the high levels of radiation. Nobody knows when these internally displaced persons can return. This incident shows structural inequality in terms of the distribution of uncertain risks (dangers). There are several reasons why the people there embraced the nuclear power plant. One of them is a sort of internal colonialism. In short, it can be said that a relatively poor but peaceful region such as Fukushima was sacrificed for the electricity needs of a rich global city, Tokyo.

We can notice similarities in the "Okinawa problem." The residents in Okinawa have also suffered from an unjust distribution of risk, which is sustained by institutional discrimination. They lost 120,000 people, one-fourth of their population in the Battle of Okinawa during the Second World War. Following almost three decades of U.S. military occupation, Okinawa was formally "returned" to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. However the islands of Okinawa continue to accommodate 75 per cent of the U.S. military facilities in Japan, and U.S. bases occupy 20 per cent of the land on the main island. The American military presence has caused many incidents, including aircraft accidents like the U.S. marine helicopter crash at Okinawa International University in 2004. Although the people of Okinawa have continually protested against the U.S. military presence following these incidents, the Japanese government tenaciously keeps the bases in the name of national security. Although Tokyo has tried to relocate the Futenma Air Station to Henoko, the eastern coast of the main island of Okinawa in accordance with SACO (the Special Action Committee on Okinawa) report, the people in Okinawa have demanded the relocation of the base outside Okinawa.

In both cases, regional peace is threatened due to the unequal and unjust distribution of risk, which governments justify with excuses such as national security or energy security. It seems that the people in these areas are sacrificed to the politics of securitization. The politics of securitization demands people's unquestioning obedience to a unified sovereignty in the name of peace and security in a fictitious Hobbesian contract. Bearing this in mind, we need to question the conditions needed for regional peace from the viewpoint of marginalized or excluded people while critically examining the protection racket involved in the hegemonic politics of the area.

"Realities" of the Local Community regarding Nuclear Power Stations and Military Bases

MAEDA Yukio
PSAJ Member
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Presenter 1: HAYASHI Kiminori (Tsuru University), "Development of the Military Economy and the Widening of the Destruction of Life"

Presenter 2: AKIMOTO Kenji (Japan Women's University), "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Rokkasho Village: A Local Economy that Lost its Autonomy"

Presenter 3: NANASAWA Kiyoshi (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute), "Okinawa's Reversion to Japan and the TV"

Discussant 1: NISHIKAWA Jun (Waseda University)

Discussant 2: HAYASHI Hirofumi (Kanto Gakuin University)

Chair: MAEDA Yukio (Osaka University of Economics and Law)

First of all, Kiminori Hayashi claimed that he focused on the destruction of life to understand the environmental problems caused by the military, because he believed that the theories regarding environmental pollution exports, "sufferers/beneficiaries" from the noise of the military aircraft, and unwanted facilities cannot sufficiently explain the core problems of the military bases. He explained that the meaning of the military economy was not that of a war economy but of war industries embedded within a normal national economy in peacetime. Especially after WWII, structural violence has constantly harmed local communities. He also showed what conditions produced the military economic system. He con-

cluded that it is worth pursuing *intrinsic virtue* with no pollution for human beings, not economic value with transaction properties and the accumulation of capital.

Next, Kenji Akimoto described the history of Rokkasho Village and its high-level radioactive waste after the plan of a petrochemical complex was drawn up there due to the oil crisis in 1974. He showed some local newspaper articles from that period. Ample revenues as a result of special subsidies and opaque anonymous donations constructed a system that corrupted the local community. Tariffs were based on a cost system in which proper profits were added to costs. This system allowed for the stable supply of electricity because electric power companies did not go bankrupt, but it imposed high costs on electricity consumers. On the basis of this system, electric power companies upgraded and engaged in excessive investment in facilities around the nuclear power plants, resulting in the formation of an interest group "The Nuclear Village." However, he pointed out that the system did not function either economically or in terms of safety, and he suggested reforms.

Third, to begin with, Kiyoshi Nanasawa cited the Asahi Shimbun on the day when the newspaper had a front-page report on the accident in which a U.S. helicopter crashed onto the campus of Okinawa International University. However, the main article on the front page carried a report on the resignation of Mr. Watanabe, the owner of the Yomiuri Giants. The article on the crash was pushed down into a corner of the front page. This shows that the media did not regard the accident as a very serious problem, and therefore subscribers on the mainland might also unconsciously ignore its importance. Through this example, he illustrated that it was impossible for journalists to be objective. He also showed how the TV coverage of the day reported on the accident. The media coverage intentionally constructed an attitude among the Japanese, in which they cannot focus on news from Okinawa, which they somehow

consider to be "overseas news" and therefore in some sense not related to the homeland of Japan. He reaffirmed the fact that both Okinawa and Fukushima played a sacrificial role on the periphery. As a media worker, he self-critically commented that the mass media should try to find a more proper way to show facts democratically, and that alternative media could help make this possible.

Responding to these three presenters, two discussants gave comments and asked questions. Hirofumi Hayashi, an authority on the "Battle of Okinawa," pointed out that the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) had not shed light on the problem of Japan's responsibility for the war at the level of the annual convention. In future, the association should handle the issue of responsibility for the war to show the importance of the existence of the association. He asked them to answer from a post-colonialist perspective.

The other discussant, Jun Nishikawa, suggested that Japan experienced (1) a homeland-ization of Okinawa, (2) and an Okinawa'sization of the homeland. The former resulted in the marginalization of Okinawa and the tremendous urbanization of Naha. The latter means Japan entered under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S., it dispatched Self-Defense Forces outside its national territory, and adopted the "peaceful use" of nuclear power. He evaluated the approach of connecting Okinawa and Fukushima, where the homeland both intentionally and unintentionally ignored affairs within local communities, locating facilities on a Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NINBY) basis. He suggested that Japan should transform its centralized administrative framework, as symbolized by the nuclear power plants and military bases, and transition to an era of de-growth. Such changes are conducted not by big talk from the top down but from our awareness in our daily lives. Therefore, he indicated how we should move step by step toward overcoming discriminatory and dependent attitudes in the system.

PSAJ Spring Conference / Session II

Peacebuilding from the Grassroots: Reconsiderations of Human Security

OSA Yukie
PSAJ Member
Rikkyo University

Presenter 1: HASEBE Takatoshi (Japan International Volunteer Center), Japan Volunteer Center, Concept of the "Japan-Afghanistan Fund to Support Civil Society"
Presenter 2: KUWANA Megumi (Ochanomizu University), "Transition in Community Development in Nation Building after Conflicts – the Case of East Timor
Presenter 3: SHINODA Hideaki (Hiroshima University), "Reconsiderations of Principles of Ownership in the Local Community in Peacebuilding, Nation Building, Rebuilding of Community, Japanese Modernization and Tohoku"
Discussant: MATSUNO Akihisa (Osaka University)
Chair: OSA Yukie (Rikkyo University)

"Peacebuilding from the grassroots" was the theme of the 2nd Working Group with three contributors offering varied viewpoints, including on Afghanistan, East Timor and the Tohoku region. Their presentations, augmented by a comment from the discussant, were followed by lively discussions, drawing many questions from attendees on the floor who made several important suggestions.

Takatoshi Hasebe, the first to speak, drew on his seven-year experience of coordinating programs for Afghanistan since 2005 at the Japan Volunteer Center (JVC) as he presented the overall picture of the relief effort for Afghanistan's reconstruction, and outlined the concept of the "Afghan Civil Society Support Fund (ACSSF)," which could be an alternative to the much heralded but disputed scheme of

the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). He defined PRT as "coordinated actions between military forces and civilian organizations with the aim of approaching three different aspects of peacebuilding holistically, namely security, development, and governance," and he argued that PRT, which could threaten the neutrality of civilian activities, could not be the ultimate solution, although it was widely believed that cooperation between the military and civilians was effective considering that the country's security had deteriorated in the course of the war against terrorism. He pointed out many challenges facing the reconstruction process, including corruption in the government, unbalanced aid distribution, the unilateral implementation of aid programs by the international community, and a lack of NGO/CSOs capacity to grasp the needs of the society. He introduced the basic design of the ACSSF, which was conceived as a new framework that was expected to facilitate people's involvement in relief programs by expediting collaboration with local NGO/CSOs based on the actual needs of the Afghan people.

Megumi Kuwana, who has extensive experience of working as an NGO staff member or researcher in countries such as East Timor, where peace building was a national priority, first expounded the definition of "community" and the significance of looking into communities, taking examples from community development in East Timor, then she continued by explaining the concept of a "bridge" between peacebuilding at the central government level and the grass roots. Taking stock from her research in the field since 2004, she argued that the local administrative system was crucial as a formal "bridge." However, she said that such a formal system could be time-consuming to install, and she emphasized the importance of external stimuli, especially the role of NGOs as outsiders who could function as informal "bridges."

At the same time, citing the shortcomings of an over-emphasis on support to Middle Range Groups (NGOs or other registered organizations), aid programs that yield too much control to donors, and

the limitations of project-based aid programs, Kuwana proposed a shift to an open-ended approach which would confer greater ownership to the local communities.

Hideaki Shinoda drew attention to the domestic situation and discussed the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake as a peacebuilding expert. After describing both the unique features of the disaster-hit areas in the Tohoku region and the similarities with other fields of disaster relief overseas, he reviewed the principle of local ownership in a peacebuilding process, with examples from the modernization of Japan and Tohoku. Touching upon the history of the Tohoku region as the "losing ground" of the Boshin War, and of its coastal area as the "hinterland in the hinterland," Shinoda referred to such issues as the role of local communities in the aftermath of the Earthquake, the hypocrisy of standardized "Reconstruction Plans," and endangered "community ownership," which has been very much formalized and heeded, the fiction of "local administrations as the hub of reconstruction," the fragility of "local administrations as communities," etc. He called for a reconsideration of the meaning of community rehabilitation and nation building, pointing out that excessive emphasis on "ownership" had been transformed into various procedures and used as a tool to solicit money.

Akihisa Matsuno, the discussant, reflected upon the purpose of the Working Group, commenting that its basic idea of reconsidering, or critically studying the concepts of peacebuilding or human security, could provoke a discussion as to the conventionally unilateral and imposing approaches of the donors (the international community, international NGOs) who had both money and power.

He responded to Hasebe that it would be important to ponder the question of who the peace building in Afghanistan was intended for as the fundamental issue concerning peacebuilding was that of its subject and object, rather than just focusing on the issue of joint operations between the military and civilians.

Matsuno reacted to Kuwana by asking to what

extent outsiders should be responsible for work which would normally be executed by the local people. He also pointed out that the implementation of aid projects through the channel of overseas donors (international NGOs) on the local people, excluding dysfunctional local administrators, could slow down the formation of a functioning public sector and prevent the basic patterns of democratic procedures from taking root.

Referring to the "old way of thinking" and the sense of frustration which pervaded the reconstruction of Tohoku mentioned by Shinoda, Matsuno asked how one could actually detect these and what could possibly be done to achieve a break-through.

In response, Hasebe reiterated the importance of the role of local NGOs and a proper process that takes the common welfare of the community into consideration. Kuwana explained how much NGOs were now involved in peacebuilding, and emphasized the necessity to listen to the voices of the grassroots, as local NGOs, run by urban elites, often had different views from those of the local community. Shinoda called for a reconstruction plan featuring younger generations, instead of the Reconstruction Agency, which was manned by relatively old veterans who were often predisposed to obsolete thinking about high economic growth.

These discussions aroused many insightful questions and comments from the floor. One stated that the underlining of "ownership" raised doubts as to the eligibility of the very concept, while another asked whether it was possible for a community to become the subject of spontaneous development without external assistance. There were also comments that stressed the role of a functioning legislature in nation building, and questions on the way to get beneficiaries off over-reliance on aid programs, or the possibility of an NGO ending up soliciting subordination from the local people.

In closing the session, the presenters made final remarks by stressing the significance of an adequate coordinating mechanism, a clear identification of the subject, and a proper distribution of responsibilities.

Playing, Prayers and Peace: Touching the Power of Peace Creation in Okinawa's Spiritual Culture

OKUMOTO Kyoko
PSAJ Member
Osaka Jogakuin University

This was presumably the first time that a session conducted and based on non-verbal methods was held at a PSAJ conference. The session addressed the conference theme, "Things that threaten and things that create 'regional/local peace'," through the spirituality and arts/cultures of Okinawa.

The use of the arts was meant to introduce artistic expression that acts through visual, oral and physical movement on the senses and emotions of people. This enables us to explore the diversity of Peace Studies and Peace Creation together with the reason and logical thinking that are the orthodox and traditional approaches to the discipline. This also has practical significance when we try to examine a wider variety of "channels" of peace creation which eventually open up more potential for criticizing violence and promoting peacework by using songs, prayers and performances to express a peaceful spirit.

The significance of the session was also found in Okinawa's practice. When we discuss "regional/local peace," that is peace in the Okinawa area, we are required to face the reality of peace, conflict and violence in Japan and Asia. Since the 17th century, Okinawa/Ryukyu has been the object of direct and structural violence by Yamato (Japan) and the U.S., politically, economically, historically and culturally. How have the people of Okinawa prayed for peace and security in their

lives, and how have they expressed this? The session was meant to provide PSAJ members with opportunities to think and feel the richness and power of Okinawa's spiritual cultures around the creation of peace by learning about the islands' spirituality. What can we learn from Okinawa's art focused on the creation of peace? Also, if possible, what can PSAJ give when we discuss "regional/local peace"? This time, the key concepts were peace, prayers, spiritual rituals, folklore, drums, songs, souls, the dead, memorials, community, shamanism, expression, representation, and communication—especially through music.

The session was a workshop. Generally, participants at PSAJ conferences tend to focus on their intellect/reason and choose a discussion style's which itself is important in peace studies, but the organizers of this session realized that our activities (both action and research) should include the heart, the spirit and the body. Once participants realize the necessity of the spiritual and physical work that is based on practical activities for peace creation, they are exposed to new discoveries. The organizers also expected that participants be taken aback by a sense of strangeness and that they would continue to think about their experiences at the session long after the conference.

The session started by focusing on "improvised music." In order to think about the meaning of music in the place called Okinawa, and to realize the meaning of "listening," Takehiro Sato started a warm-up exercise using "egg shakers." Participants listened to the sounds and rhythms of the egg shakers that everyone produced, collaborating with each other. After this dividing into several groups of 6 or 7 people, they engaged in a joint project to create a "sound of peace."

When participants were warmed up physically and spiritually, the session welcomed Susumu Kumada, a professor and scholar of ethnic musicology at the Okinawa Prefectural University of Arts. His expertise lies in the cultures of music and ritual in Asia, especially the "Eisa," an Oki-

nawa's festival held during the last days of the Bon holidays. At Eisa festivals, to honour the spirits of the ancestors, performers dance and play musical instruments, such as different kinds of drums and the sanshin, a stringed instrument. Kumada is also an active jazz pianist and studies all sorts of popular music from around the world. The session was blessed with Kumada's deep knowledge of Eisa, and participants had a chance to learn about its origins and process, its relation to Buddhist philosophy on mainland Japan, and the categories and varieties of Eisa in modern times.

During the break, Eiko Asato sang an Okinawa's folk song accompanied by Kumada on the piano, and this encouraged participants to sing together and share their experience of art for a short time.

Next came Asato's presentation on the perspectives of the relationship between the local community and the ritual world, the changes it has undergone and its sustainability, the Okinawa's aspect toward life, the problematic issue of the U.S. military bases and the possibilities of peacework. Asato discussed these from the local perspective of the philosophy and spirituality of ancestors and spirits, resurrection, life and peace.

After the presentations, participants freely discussed and shared their own perspectives on the theme. Someone pointed out that in mainland Japan and other parts of the world, Eisa is sometimes performed by non-Okinawa'ss. As an Okinawa's, he confessed that he does not feel this is correct. However, as Kumada indicated in the presentation, Eisa itself is also an object of change along with the times. This led to the idea that our society needs to re-question its sense of history and ask what change means to different people in different times, which leads us to consider the link between a locale and music (art) as we realize that Okinawa's music is played outside Okinawa.

In recent years, to truly understand peace studies, peacebuilding and related fields, it is becoming important to see the role and potential of

the arts, performance and culture. There is already a thick layer of folkloric and cultural studies in the research of Ryukyu/Okinawa. Nevertheless, in the post-war history of Okinawa, the connection between the social activities for peace and the local folklore and culture has not yet been properly investigated.

Therefore, this session tried hard to dig out the peace philosophy of Ryukyu/Okinawa from the perspectives of folk-art, community rituals and life. Through physical and spiritual exchange and dialogue among the participants, various aspects were revealed. As Asato commented, "as a non-professional and someone who is not that good at singing, I sing with you, the participants." This is a symbolic expression indicating that each one of us is a subject and an actor who creates regional and local peace. The session opened a new channel where people can mutually be inspired—intellectually, spiritually and physically—in solidarity.

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, Established and Hoping to Shift Conditions toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and to Raise Youth Leaders

UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi
Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)

Hiromichi Umebayashi

Following a preparatory period of approximately two years, the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), perhaps the first center in the world to deal exclusively with the issue of nuclear weapons abolition, was inaugurated on April 1, 2012.

A meeting between history and the good fortune of the present provided the backdrop to RECNA's establishment. The predecessor of the present Nagasaki University School of Medicine was hit at point-blank range when an atomic bomb was dropped on August 9, 1945. Having inherited such a history, there has long been a desire to see the university contribute academically to efforts to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons. In October 2006, a movement was initiated in the U.S. to transcend the theory of nuclear

deterrence in the Cold War era. This was followed by President Obama's speech in Prague, which gave birth to new worldwide momentum for the elimination of nuclear arms. It was at this point in time, when history and the present were coming together, that discussions on the establishment of RECNA began in Nagasaki. Over the course of these discussions, RECNA took shape as an organization that would work toward these three objectives:

(1) To transmit knowledge and proposals that will contribute to the abolition of nuclear weapons, based upon academic studies and analyses.
(2) To help contribute to the independent thinking, cognitive ability and personal growth of students through this process and the results obtained.
(3) To function as a think-tank to serve local citizens interested in abolishing nuclear weapons.

As a subject for research, nuclear weapons abolition is a very specific theme that is highly rooted in practice. It is therefore characterized as a field that is not only interdisciplinary in academic terms but also sector-transcending. For example, nuclear deterrence theory, which dominates nuclear weapons policy, has many facets and touches on areas such as political science, military studies, history, psychology and law. People in positions of responsibility in these fields are not only academics but also politicians, diplomats, jour-

RECNA

nalists, activists and religious leaders who independently make intellectual contributions based upon their own thinking cultivated during their activities in these sectors.

When looking at the characteristics of this type of research subject, we see that it is essential that a foundation of factual information be built up and expanded upon so as to provide common ground. With that goal in mind, RECNA has set about creating a database that will extend across a wide variety of fields related to nuclear weapons abolition. This will include country-by-country listings for types of nuclear-weapons (warheads and delivery systems), nuclear capabilities and policies for their use, as well as data about the amounts of weapons-use fissile materials they possess, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), legal documents, resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, non-governmental policy recommendations, documents created by local authorities, collections of quotations and the names and locations of publications aimed at a general readership.

In addition to maintaining this base of factual information, the primary tasks for RECNA will be the tracking of the ever-changing state of affairs regarding nuclear weapons, the continuous dispatch of information, and the grasping of an understanding of the underlying dynamics of the situation. The observation and tracking of changes in the state of affairs will be necessary for advancing the findings of researchers. It will also be of great significance for the capacity building of citizens' movements to abolish nuclear weapons. By knowing about the constant changes in the issue of nuclear weapons abolition, it will be possible for citizens to become directly involved in this matter in timely ways and on a regular basis.

Specifically, RECNA will track and report on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. This activity of tracking and reporting will be

conducted in conjunction with the maintenance of the above-mentioned database. This will also include the concurrent release of any past documents or factual information that are necessary to understand new developments.

While it is possible to consider the present state of affairs, to which the creation of RECNA is tied, as a trend in which the paradigm shifts away from nuclear deterrence to a world free of nuclear weapons, the mentality of the Cold War era remains firmly in place, even in this age of multipolarization. To increase the momentum of this new trend and shift current conditions, emphasis is being placed on three critical areas:

(1) A nuclear weapons convention or a framework of separate instruments (as proposed by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2008),
(2) The establishment of new NWFZs (in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, the Arctic Circle, and so on) or the strengthening of existing zones,
(3) Nuclear disarmament efforts focused on international humanitarian laws.

In all of these areas, the focus will be on which group of countries will step forward to take leadership roles. Fresh initiatives are needed if changes are to be made to the current state of affairs.

As regards RECNA, we are committed to bringing about changes in the policies of the government of Japan, where the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took place. Unfortunately, the government of Japan is generally considered to be passive on the issue of nuclear weapons abolition while fervent on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. This current state of affairs clearly arose as the result of Japan's long-standing policy on security, under which it is assumed that the nuclear deterrence which the U.S. extended to Japan is essential for the security of the country. At RECNA we would like to attempt to change the present situation by proposing a new approach through a Northeast Asia NWFZ as an alternative policy to this extended nuclear deterrence.

The achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons is a pressing issue. As knowledge pertaining to nuclear weapons will never disappear, it will be essential to cultivate proactive young leaders in order to achieve and maintain such a world. RECNA hopes to contribute by making Nagasaki University a stronghold for the nurturing of such human resources. In order to do so, we need to employ a dual approach, with, on the one hand, fundamental knowledge built up through lectures and training and, on the other hand, proactive behavior formed through interaction with the real world of local and international communities.

For RECNA to undertake these activities, the cooperation of people from many different fields will be indispensable. We sincerely ask for support in these endeavors.

For more details, visit our website at www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/index_e.html.

Commentary

Thinking of Peace after (State) Violence: From the Logic of Security to the Ethics of Care

OKANO Yayo
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Since 1991, when the first former "comfort" woman, the late Kim Huk-sun, came out in public as a victim of the sexual slavery system of Japanese Imperial troops during WWII, I have been thinking of what I, as a feminist scholar of political philosophy, could and should think about in order to respond to her and other victims' demands. Their foremost demand is that the Japanese government take legal responsibility for the sexual enslavement of women.

In December 2000, the Tokyo Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (hereafter, the Tokyo Women's Tribunal) was organized by VAWW-Net Japan (The Violence against Women in War Network Japan) and other grass-roots Asian women's organizations, such as the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery. This was a people's tribunal held in order to restore justice to female victims of Japan's military during WWII by "end[ing] impunity and reversing the blatant disregard of *the bodily integrity, inherent dignity*, and indeed, the very *humanity* of women."[1] During the tribunal, victims of the sexual enslavement during the war often made the claim that they wished to restore justice for themselves. While I was so moved by their courageous witness and powerful voices for justice, I could not help asking myself whether any kind of political theories of justice had ever engaged with this kind of atrocity.

In my first book, *Law as Politics: Law, Justice and Feminism*,[2] by referring to the image of the Roman goddess Justitia, I criticized the mainstream theories of justice, which still follow Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, where he categorized two kinds of justice, retributive justice and distributive justice. Neither type of justice can give enough focus to the wounds of the victims or repair the harm that they have received. Rather, it maintains the legal order of society as just. Through a critical reading of mainstream theories of justice, I keenly realized that feminists needed an alternative theory of justice which could respond attentively to victims' voices, that is, silenced and oppressed voices within a male-centered society, and cure the deep sorrow and harm caused especially by brutal state violence.

Right after the Tokyo Women's Tribunal, there was the terrorist attack on the U.S. on September 11th, 2001. With the shock of September 11, people all over the world began to be anxious about a life of peace among various cultural communities and nation-states. While peace is the most crucial end of foreign policy as well as domestic politics, people have been surrounded by a certain atmosphere of fear, insecurity, uneasiness and distrust.

The U.S. government quickly decided to go to war against Afghanistan and Iraq and both countries are still suffering from this warfare. Again, I asked myself why searching for a peaceful life with others could not lead us to a non-violent state but to a mega-violent state. These two historical events made me think seriously and critically about the logic of the national security of sovereign states and led me to try to find an alternative way to realize justice, especially for the victims of state violence or the people who were vulnerable to such violence.

In my latest book, *Feminist Political Theory: Applying the Ethics of Care to the Global Society*,[3] I mainly argue three themes; the intricate relations

between the liberal notion of autonomous, independent and individualistic subjects with a free will and sovereign militant states haunted by a fear of others; the total erasure or oblivion of the human experience of being born by a mother and being cared for by (M)others; and alternative principles of society, which is what the ethics of care indicates.

In the following parts of this essay, I would like to contrast the logic of national security with the ethics of care.

The idea of national security generally has two paradoxes. Firstly, security is derived from the Latin word, *se-curus*, which means "free from anxiety, care or cure." Security literally means to maintain a safe situation where people do not have to worry about risk. Therefore security demands that anything which might cause harm has to be eradicated beforehand. It is the logic of taking preventive action. It prepares for the worst.

On the other hand, preventive security does not care about the aftermath of what a security system cannot prevent because it should not have happened, according to its logic. For example, no military strategist should worry beforehand about the aftermath of losing a war. Paradoxically, a security system is a system which does not care about the aftermath of what they might not to be able to prevent.

Secondly, historically and theoretically, national security has been recognized as the core value of sovereign states. Modern political philosophers, especially since Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, have repeatedly asserted that the single and final aim of constituting the sovereign state is security. The issue of security is ultimately political in the sense that sovereign states are legitimately established, above all, in order that national security be established.

On the other hand, national security requires highly advanced knowledge and information. Its highly advanced and ultimately political character takes the issue of security away from people. Because national security is the core value of the state, information about national security should be protected as classified and kept secret among the experts. Specialists tend to monopolize information about security. Politicians and top officials hide the process of decision-making from the public under the banner of security. So, again paradoxically, the highly political issue of security becomes politically de-politicized.

Political theories keep justifying the state monopoly of violence by supposing that the state of nature is the state of war. The ethics of politics, if any, should consider how efficiently and where and when violence monopolized by a state should be used. For a long time, political theories have insisted on national security by sending the threatening message, "Don't you know what will happen if there is no armed security system of a sovereign state?" Jean Elshtain asserted, for example, when she endorsed the Bush administration's attack on Afghanistan, "When states fail, we approach something like the nightmare of Thomas Hobbes's war of all against all."[4]

However, does Hobbes's account hold for the survivors and victims of state violence? It was the state itself that deprived some people of their lives. Although there are innumerable cases of state violence, contrary to Hobbes's observation, most wars in the contemporary world have started because sovereign states exist. Why have social contract theories never told us what we should do *after* we or others have suffered state violence?

My question enabled me to encounter feminist theories about the ethics of care. The ethics of care owes a lot to Carol Gilligan's masterpiece, *In a Different Voice*, which was published in 1982.

The ethics of care is the ethics demanded when we respond to the needs of particular persons within a socially and historically situated context. This ethics was found through the practice of caring work, such as child care, elderly care or care for disabled people, which, historically, has mainly been done by women.

Since Gilligan's book, many feminist theorists have tried to construct an ethics of care as an al-

ternative or supplement to the theory of justice. On the one hand, a theory of justice presupposes the equality of autonomous individuals with rights and duties. On the other hand, the ethics of care recognizes that human beings are vulnerable to and contingent on particular social situations that are interdependent. Therefore, everybody needs to be cared for by others at some point in their lives. Human beings are all connected, in a sense, by the relations of caring and being cared for, although they are differently situated in their relationships of care because of differences in their abilities and circumstances.

The core idea of the ethics of care generally consists of the following four characteristics: 1) It recognizes vulnerability and the fragility of human beings and therefore that human begins should live in relationships as relational beings; 2) It involves a focus on attention, responsiveness, and responsibility to the various needs of others within a concrete context. Responsibilities are not personal but social, because responsibilities spring out of our connectedness with each other; 3) No one should be left without the attention of others. It conceives that human beings are harmed if they have no connection to others. It tries to distinguish a good caring relationship from a bad one. Society needs to be constituted so as to maintain better kinds of care relationships; 4) It involves a deconstruction of the traditional understandings of the nature and relationship between the public and private spheres, and their reconceptualization.

Although we can criticize the logic of security from the viewpoint of the ethics of care in many ways, I will only point out two important contrasts, because we have limited space.

First, the logic of security is haunted by the fear of others, especially when people are so afraid of being dependent on those others. However, in fact, ontologically, we are interdependent beings and society should exist to maintain better caring relationships among us. The experiences of victims of violence have shown us that it is signifi-

cant for them to create a space where they can mutually support one another and feel that they are being listened to. They can then find the courage to expose the violence and challenge its legitimacy. The logic of security tries to control individuals from above and from a distance. The ethics of care makes us realize that being attended to by others and listened to concerning our particular needs makes us feel safer, even though we cannot eradicate or solve the source of our fear once and for all.

Secondly, the logic of security misses the point, which we have to consider seriously, when people suffer and are wounded. In fact, there is no knowledge in the logic of security about how to care for or how to cure suffering people. The ethics of care, however, does not teach us how to cure wounded persons efficiently but rather how long and difficult it is to do this. It seems an impossible task to repair the irreparable. We need to engage in long and various processes to care for and listen to victims' own voices. For example, the Tokyo Women's Tribunal asked the Japanese government to compensate for survivors' prolonged sufferings as well as for the harm done during their sexual slavery and educate future generations not to repeat such cruel acts. The women's tribunal showed a different way for the Japanese government to take responsibility other than by restoring justice by simply punishing the offenders.

The ethics of care has now become an indispensable normative idea to approach restorative justice or transformative justice.[5] I am now approaching the ethics of care as a normative theory which can indicate an alternative way to building a more peaceful and less violent world for vulnerable people.

Footnotes

1 Matsui Yayori, "How to end impunity for wartime sexual violence?—The meaning of the Women's International War Crime Tribunal 2000 on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery." A paper for the 19th General

IPRA Conference in 2002, p.1. (Italics are mine.)
(http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-japan/english/
womenstribunal2000/impunity.pdf)

2 Yayo Okano, *Law as Politics: Law, Justice and Feminism* (Tokyo: Seido-sha, 2001).(『法の政治学——法と正義とフェミニズム』青土社).

3 Yayo Okano, *Feminist Political Theory: Applying the Ethics of Care to the Global Society* (Tokyo: Misuzu-shobo, 2012). (『フェミニズムの政治学——ケアの倫理をグローバル社会へ』(みすず書房).

4 Jean B. Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World* (NY: Basic Books, 2003), p. 166.

5 Cf. Fiona Robinson, *The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011) and Walker, Margaret U., *What is Reparative Justice?* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010).

Opinion

Thinking about Territorial Issues in Japan

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Introduction

Recently, territorial issues in Japan, such as the Northern Territories (South Kuril), Takeshima (Dokdo), and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,[1] have often been covered by the mass media. However, their approach, and that of the government of Japan, is still haphazard. In my opinion, the reason is a partial and unbalanced perspective. In fact, Japan's territorial sovereignty, like that of others, extends beyond land territories to include both sea and air zones. This article attempts to present a more comprehensive and balanced perspective on Japan's territorial sovereignty and thereby suggest how Japan might resolve her territorial disputes. This paper is organized into three parts: (1) The Japanese attitude toward territorial sovereignty; (2) The history of Japan's territorial sovereignty; and (3) The choices available to the government of Japan to resolve territorial issues.

The Japanese Attitude toward Territorial Sovereignty

At present, the territorial sovereignty formally claimed by the government of Japan is shown in Figure 1. However, as you know, the Northern Territories and Takeshima are effectively controlled by Russia and the Republic of Korea, and

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this control includes the airspace involved and the air defense identification zones (ADIZ).

Figure 1. Territorial Sovereignty Formally Claimed by the Japanese Government

(Source) Furukawa 2011, 298

On the other hand, Japan and the Republic of Korea have agreed to set up two joint fishing zones: one in the Sea of Japan around Takeshima and the other in the East China Sea near Jeju (Furukawa 2011, 305). Also, based on the Japan–Soviet Union Adjacent and Offshore Fishery Agreement (1984), Japan and Russia conduct fishing operations in each other's 200-mile zone. Japan also catches Russian salmon under the Japan-Soviet Union Fishery Cooperation Agreement and conducts fishing operations in waters within 12 miles of the four Northern Islands under the Framework Agreement Concerning the Operations of Japanese Fishing Vessels in the Waters around the Four Northern Islands (1998). Although we can evaluate the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZs) as examples of "fruits of compromise," the resulting situation nevertheless interrupts sustainable fishery in these areas (Furukawa 2011, 306).

Regarding air zones, Kadena Radar Approach Control (RAPCON) in Okinawa was officially

returned to the Japanese government only on March 30, 2010. However, the Yokota (Tokyo Metropolitan) and Iwakuni (Yamaguchi Prefecture) airspaces remain under U.S. military control. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has been promoting the complete return of Yokota airspace because this vast area (covering Tokyo and eight other prefectures) poses serious obstacles to setting up flight routes and causes overcrowded air traffic (Furukawa 2011, 310).

Thus, the Japanese attitude toward territorial sovereignty varies along the three dimensions of land, sea and air. First, the Japanese government tends to take a hard-line position on some territorial issues. Japan's position is uncompromising on the Northern Territories, Takeshima, and the Senkaku Islands. Second, in contrast to such an "all or nothing" position, Japan's attitude toward sea zone issues is more flexible, leaving room for compromise. Finally, Japan's attitude toward airspace issues is passive and submissive, in sharp contrast to the first two situations (Furukawa 2011, 310).

The History of Japan's Territorial Sovereignty

Japanese people, particularly the younger generation, should know more about how the Japanese attitude toward territorial sovereignty has been formed if they support their government's attitude. Otherwise, they will be at a disadvantage because some foreign interests make use of Japanese people's ignorance about Japan's modern history to justify their position. Also, Japan's people have to make an effort to know more about Russia, South Korea, China, and Taiwan's positions on their territorial issues with Japan if they wish to persuade them of their case.

The ground for Japan's claim to territorial issues after World War II is the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951). However, we also have to know the grounds for Russia, Korea, China and Taiwan's counterarguments concerning the territory

that the government of Japan claims be her "inherent territory." For example, (1) the government of Russia insists that the Soviet Union occupied the Northern Territories before the government of Japan signed an instrument of surrender on September 2, 1945.[2] (2) Although not listed in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty among those areas to which Japan renounced all right, title, and claim, Takeshima, Habomai, and Shikotan were all excluded explicitly from the new Japanese territory in the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers Instruction (SCAPIN) No.677. (3) In 1880, the Japanese government proposed a settlement that would give Miyako and the Yaeyama Islands to China in return for Japanese trading rights in China equal to those of the United States and European nations (For more information, see Furukawa 2011, 299-301).

The Choices Available to the Government of Japan to Resolve Territorial Issues

At the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 2012, Yoshihiko Noda, the Prime Minister of Japan, addressed the assembly as follows:

> It is the philosophy of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as a shared principle in the international community, to settle disputes in a peaceful manner based on international law. Japan, under any circumstance, is determined to comply with the principle and seek peaceful solutions based on international law. The world should pay more attention to the role the international judicial institutions can play in the peaceful settlement of disputes.[3]

For Japan, in whose Constitution Article 9 states "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes", the

choices available to resolve territorial issues are limited to resolutions through bilateral negotiation or international judicial institutions.

Regarding the Takeshima dispute, on August 21, 2012, the government of Japan made proposals to the government of the Republic of Korea about instituting proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On August 30, the Republic of Korea's government replied with a note verbale rejecting these proposals. The government of Japan intends to continue to take appropriate actions to resolve the Takeshima dispute in a calm and peaceful manner, based on international law and including a unilateral referral of the dispute to the ICJ.[4]

However, at the same time, the government of Japan will have to consider the possibility that the People's Republic of China (PRC) will make proposals to the government of Japan about instituting proceedings before the ICJ because the PRC, which doesn't recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ now, has the potential to recognize it in the future.[5] In addition, Japanese people will have to make up their minds to accept the conclusions of bilateral negotiations or international judicial institutions.

Conclusion

Territorial disputes often draw on people's nationalism. However, this only stirs the nationalism of those in other countries and the result is an escalation in these disputes. To prevent this vicious spiral, we need the ability to judge calmly. Therefore, we have to think about the real situation, the history, and the choices available to resolve these disputes now. By doing so, a comprehensive picture, such as this article attempts to present, should help us to formulate a strategic vision that encompasses a deep appreciation of the territorial issues in Japan.

Reference

Furukawa Koji, 2011, "Bordering Japan: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 26(3): 297-314.

Footnotes

1 The government of Japan's position is that there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands. For more information, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html (accessed October 1, 2012).

2 In fact, they say the Soviet Union carried out their occupation between August 28 and September 5 of that year.

3 For more information on the Address by H.E. Mr. Yoshihiko Noda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/assembly2012/67_address_pm_en.html (accessed October 1, 2012).

4 For more information on the Statement by the Minister for Foreign affairs of Japan on the Refusal by the government of the Republic of Korea of the government of Japan's Proposal on the Institution of Proceedings before the International Court of Justice by a Special Agreement, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/8/0830_02.html (accessed October 1, 2012).

5 The government of Japan made the following statement concerning the court's compulsory jurisdiction in July 9, 2007: This declaration does not apply to any dispute in respect of which any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other party to the dispute was deposited or notified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court. For more information, see http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP (accessed October 1, 2012).