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The Great Transformation of the Global Political Economy and Peace Research

ENDO Seiji

18th President, Peace Studies Association of Japan
Seikei University



The author

We are now witnessing multilayered transformations in the global political economy. There have been indications of such changes over the past several years, but the events of this summer seem to have marked a tidal change in the structure of the global political economy. First, the ongoing crises in the American and global financial system have confirmed the practical failure and inevitable philosophical decline of the dogma of neoliberalism which has been the dominant ideology since the 1980s.

Second, the military clash between Russia and Georgia and the ensuing political turmoil were a culmination of political wrangling between NATO and Russia, and may turn out to be a critical turning point away from the relative political stability between the West and Russia that held in the post-Cold War era. With Russia adopting a unique authoritarian political system and a more politically independent course, the current chill between the West and Russia may develop into a relationship based on structural conflict.

Third, China demonstrated its power and

pride at the Beijing Olympic Games despite multiple difficulties, both domestic and external. China has been one of the most vigorous growth engines of the world economy, and is virtually an archetypical unregulated capitalist economy despite its monopoly of political power by the Communist Party. With its economy slowing, partly due to the global financial crisis, however, China now faces complex adjustment processes at a variety of levels to remedy the polarization and division in its society. With its growing external strength and assertiveness, it is changing the global balance of power and has become a source of concern for the rest of the world. With its internally polarized and divided society and weak governance, it could become a source of serious destabilization for the world.

Fourth, the US and other major countries accepted India as a unique exception to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. This will probably lead to a multiplication of the existing contradictions in the non-proliferation regime and make it all the more fragile. Talks over North Korean nuclear weapons are time and again running into stalemate, and it will become increasingly difficult to persuade Iran to stop and abandon its nuclear development program.

We may be able to understand the current situation based on what Karl Polanyi described as the Great Transformation. He delineated the emergence and decline of liberal market society from the late 18th century to the 1930s. In our time, the first half of the great transformation was the emergence and triumph of neoliberalism in the 1970s; the symptoms of the second half have been witnessed since the late 1990s. The departure from the neoliberal policy and doctrine will be welcomed by most critical thinkers and

activists all over the world. But we still do not know what will or should follow the neoliberal doctrine as a new and more egalitarian economic policy mix, although we are certain that most of the electorate will accept a certain degree of governmental intervention into the economy since the unregulated market has turned out not to be self-regulating after all. We should be well aware, here, that the first round of the great transformation may have brought about the New Deal and welfare states as a desirable solution to the myth of the self-regulating market, but that they were accompanied by Nazism and Stalinism and the ensuing Second World War and Cold War. In other words, we do not know the solution to the second round of the great transformation.

Seen from this perspective, then, the second to fourth factors mentioned above create many concerns. Changes in the political and strategic balance of power and the drift toward more divergent domestic political configurations among major countries may lead to a more incongruous world with a variety of sources of conflicts and rivalries. Although it is in practice difficult to think of new candidates for nuclear armament under the current circumstances, there is some possibility that, under the weakened non-proliferation regime, we may find ourselves in a world with more countries armed with nuclear weapons.

The challenge before us is, then, a very complex and formidable one, where we have to cope with a whole set of problems. We will

have to tackle not only traditional problems such as the shift in the balance of power and nuclear proliferation but also political and economic turmoil following global economic crises. Practitioners and academics tried to tackle these new problems and questions of peace and security by creating new visions and concepts such as human development, human security, and new wars, in order to cope with the enormous and rapid transformations since the end of the Cold War.

But institutional reforms at the global level since the 1990s have not been sufficiently robust to cope properly with various forms of violence. Since 9/11 and the Bush doctrine, very few global institutional reforms have been put in place for peace and development; on the contrary, existing multilateral institutions have been seriously damaged. Now with the Bush doctrine effectively dead and those transformations at hand, we will have to use this opportunity as a second chance for global institution building for peace. We will have to be more creative and innovative in formulating effective and peaceful blueprints for the future at many levels of global governance and make more concrete efforts to put those visions into reality.

The Peace Studies Association of Japan should and will play a large part in making such efforts from the East Asian part of the globe, and we are very happy to share our analyses, ideas and visions with our colleagues from around the world.

A Quest for Concrete Means for Peace


The Aims of the 2008 Annual Spring Conference

SASAKI Hiroshi

Chair, Planning Committee of PSAJ
Niigata University of International and Information Studies

Peace Studies in Japan is at an important turning point. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the gap between Japanese pacifism as an official position and the actual political processes promoting a *de facto* re-militarization of this country has widened. As a result of the globalization of war, the strategic change in the U.S., and the rightward political swing in Japanese society, Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, which has functioned as a substantial “limit” against the rearmament of this country, seems to face the threat of amendment by the government at any moment. In addition, as some public opinion polls indicate, Japanese people have gradually become suspicious of efforts to maintain the pacifist article as the “realistic” option for the future of this country. Certainly peace studies have consistently played the important role of articulating strong criticism against these reactionary tendencies. But it cannot be said that we have been able to adequately produce and propose concrete ways or means to overcome the political contradictions that existed throughout the latter half of the 20th century in Japan.

In other words, we should have prepared answers to questions such as how the present Self-Defense Forces could be reorganized into a smaller and more self-limited organization that would never constitute a menace to any neighboring country, or what kinds of “international contribution” (*kokusai kouken*) could be realized in the place of a reckless dispatch of military forces to global battlefields, or what we could do to build a new relationship of equality with the U.S., based on a steady vision of what kind of world order would exist some decades later. “Critical” social sciences, including peace studies, are always required to show clear alternatives to the existing system.



The author

But this has always been our most difficult task.

At the 2008 Annual Spring Conference of the PSAJ, we refocused on the problems of the linkage between pacifist ideas and political realities. Namely, we returned again to the problems of “peace by peaceful means.” We also tried to grapple with not only “peaceful means” but also “concrete” and “practical” peaceful means. I believe that if we cannot propose specific alternatives for overcoming the present difficulties, our “peace” and our peace studies itself will surely lose its own reason for existence. As peace researchers, we should no longer be simply judges or critics of the reality of violence. Instead perhaps we should be like clinicians or therapists who can confront an actual difficulty and discover concrete helpful ways for each specific struggle for peace. Thus, at this conference, with the main title of Designing Policies for Peace: Dynamics of Japan’s Pacifist Constitution, we mainly placed our focus on “peace policy” in a broad sense as the next agenda for peace studies. The concrete issues of the conference can be roughly integrated into three elements.

First of all, we proceeded with our talks based on the assumption that Article Nine has not necessarily been able to be a universal value for everyone in current history, since it has excluded many actors including foreigners

and foreign countries. Japanese “peace” in the postwar period needs to be carefully reexamined. In Section 1, we looked anew at the historical limitations of Article Nine and confirmed the difficulty of the realization of peaceful ideas from various outside points of view including Okinawa and foreign residents. Our “realistic pacifism” should be launched with a proper recognition based on the historical negative side of pacifism as well.

Secondly, we should ask whether “pacifism” and the design of a security policy are compatible. We should recall that realistic peace studies in Western Europe in the 1980s grappled with many security problems and created the intellectual basis for the end of the Cold War there. Will the same thing be possible in East Asia?

Section 2 was a roundtable taking a new look at the attempt to create the Basic Peace Law (Heiwa Kihon Ho) in 1993. At that time, some Japanese peace researchers published a proposal in the journal *Seikai* (Iwanami Publisher) for the legislation of a Basic Peace Law in Japan, with the intent to both complement and strengthen Article Nine and contain the continuing movements for constitutional revision. However, the proposal was strongly criticized for supporting the tendency toward the amendment of Article Nine, as it seemed to give *de facto* recognition to military forces and thus seemed to misread the political context of those days. Because the argument involved a detailed evaluation of military forces, it was meaningful for peace ideas today. But the controversy has not yet been resolved in a constructive way. We thought that we needed to return to the starting point in order to create a new stage for a meaningful peace theory. Many of the participants in Section 2 were concerned individuals, including authors of the proposal, the initiator of the idea (the editor-in-chief of *Seikai*), and critics at the time. In addition, in the last part of the conference, Section 4, we also looked at alternative policy design for peace with the aim of moving towards a new state of Japanese foreign policy.

Thirdly, we tried to concentrate our discussions on the problems of life sciences

and technology as critical issues for peace studies today. Peace research initially developed through the struggle against the abuse of the power of nuclear science and technology. Today, however, we have to face the problems derived from another big science, the life sciences. This new type of science will radically change the whole human condition and create new types of discrimination and violence. Our argument about Peace Policy, therefore, had to include this as one of the biggest issues of the world today. Section 3 of the conference was a first attempt to tackle this serious issue on a full scale, inviting researchers with various academic backgrounds, not only from social science but from natural science as well.

In order to change the world, and in order to build a more peaceful society, we have to commit ourselves to a greater or lesser degree to the political sphere and to political power. That’s why we emphasize the importance of paying attention to peace policy in this conference. But at the same time, that is the very reason why we must maintain a certain distance from political power and maintain a critical stance against any and all political “policy” at all times. In order to fulfill these two opposite purposes we must continue to create and propose a concrete peace policy from a critical viewpoint. That is the very narrow path forward for future peace studies.

Rethinking the Right of Resistance: Henoko and Takae Sit-inners' Standpoints

ABE Kosuzu

PSAJ Member
University of the Ryukyus

"Some say that Anpo supersedes the Constitution of Japan. If we are arrested for breaking the Keitokuhou, what kind of legal ground can protect us?"

"International law or some?"

"I'm afraid that can't guarantee our human rights."

"Justice, that's it!"

"And moral principles...hmmm."

Such a conversation took place one day at the sit-in protest site in Takae District, in the northern part of Okinawa Island where the construction of the six new helicopter landing zones for the U.S. Marine Corps is currently in progress. "Anpo" is the prevalent Japanese shorthand for the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, and "Keitokuhou" is short for the long title of "Law on Special Measures concerning Criminal Cases to Implement the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (Law No. 138, 1952)."

The SACO (Special Action Committee for Okinawa) Agreement in 1996 did not result in any major scaling down or reduction of the U.S. bases. Ironically, instead, it spurred the emergence of two epoch-making protest movements on the east coast of Okinawa Island. One is the sit-in protest on the sea of Henoko that has just passed its 1500th-day mark. After the main purpose of SACO — the promised closure of the Futenma Air Station — turned out to be a mere relocation of the base to Henoko sea in the east side of Nago city, concerned people began protests whose targets included the 1997 referendum. This movement culminated in the sit-in at sea in April 2004 against the



The author (right)

oppressive enforcement of the construction by the Japanese Government.

The other is the "No Helipad" sit-in movement in Takae, a local district of Higashi Village. SACO's overall design included another plan to hand over more than half of the Northern Training Area on condition that its helicopter landing zones (helipads) be relocated. In 2006, after many twists and turns, the government released the relocation plan of the six helipads, which once constructed, would surround the residential area of Takae District. Without taking into account the decisions taken at a district meeting opposing the plan, the Okinawa Defense Bureau began construction in July 2007. Somewhat reluctantly, people then set out their sit-in blockade in front of the gates of the construction sites.

Interestingly, the motivations underlying both movements are not considered reasonable according to the current notions of property rights, because the Henoko site lies on the surface of the sea, and that of Takae is in national forest. Also, as a result of the decade-long enforcement of the "stick and carrot" promotion measures taken by the Japanese Government vis-à-vis local municipalities, communities have been severely divided and weakened, so it has become much harder to rely on "local initiative" as a device to mobilize the public. Even so, these protest movements can be seen as having created an alternative "common"

(Hardt and Negri, 2004), or irregularly long-surviving T.A.Z. (Temporary Autonomous Zone) (Bey, 1985). Participants include jobless young adults, women, elderly people, and rootless wanderers, and they come from both in and outside of Okinawa.

The creativity of these activisms, which include music festivals, peace marches, D.I.Y. building of the sit-in sites, and richly imaginative sit-in strategies, is very impressive, as, of course, is the sit-in on the sea with canoes and divers at Henoko. In Takae, the sit-in sites are located in the gray zones between the civilian areas and those of the U.S. military. The squatters' sit-in struggle makes visible the invisible borderline dividing their land.

The creation of virtual communities through blog tools and SNS (Social Networking Sites), though with some difficulty of the language, has helped to spread information of these movements all over the world. These features show that their movements should be examined in the context of the emergence of the new "New Social Movements" (Bird, 1999).

Notions such as Global Citizenship and a consciousness of global peace and justice need to be examined alongside the strong sense of local identity in Okinawa. The anti-U.S. base movements in Okinawa have long pursued a full realization of Article 9 at each turning point in Okinawa's history after its occupation by the U.S. These points include the abandonment of Okinawa by mainland Japan when the latter returned to the international community with its peace constitution, and the "reversion" to Japan in 1972. This "state of exception" in Okinawa still continues to this day with the concentration of U.S. bases on the island. If the spirit of Article 9 should be something to be implemented rather than merely to be gifted and admired, Okinawa as the location, or present struggles of Henoko and Takae, where equal opportunity for Article 9 has been systematically denied, ironically are the very places eligible to it. The anti-U.S. base movements employ various measures and tactics, including a campaign to elect appropriate representatives to the legislative assembly, legal battles in courts, the use of the mass media to shape public opinion, and direct

action (with non-violent methods). The struggles of Henoko and Takae have taken the last course through direct sit-in action to intercept construction.

This practice of civil disobedience and non-violent direct action to stop the procedures for construction should rather be termed "civic" disobedience following Balibar's insight.

DÉSOBÉISSANCE civique, et non pas civile - comme pourrait le faire croire une transcription hâtive de l'expression anglaise correspondante : civil disobedience. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'individus qui, en conscience, objecteraient à l'autorité. Mais de citoyens qui, dans une circonstance grave, recréent leur citoyenneté par une initiative publique de « désobéissance » à l'Etat. (Balibar, 1998)

Makishi Yoshikazu, a well-known architect and activist in Okinawa, once associated the protest movement in Henoko with the anti-U.S. base movement in Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, as the people from the two islands discovered that they had a wealth of experience and information to share. It was no coincidence, therefore, that he has successfully connected the activism of Henoko with the term "Civil Disobedience" since then. Residents of the two islands could share the same emotion as they live on the edge of the Empire, where struggles against U.S. military bases even after the end of occupation or colonization are regarded as synonymous with their own expressions of citizenship, righteousness, or people's awareness of human rights that should be guaranteed both nationally and globally.

Here, we should recall a moment of the practice (and of failure) to exercise the Right of Resistance in the history of Okinawa. After the Koza Rebellion in 1970, the Naha branch of the Fukuoka District Court dropped charges against the ten accused because of insufficient evidence in 1976. However, the judge rejected the defendants' claim made on the basis of the Right of Resistance.

Some scholars of constitutional law support civil disobedience because it should be an

important part of natural rights, while others do so by citing Article 12 of the Constitution of Japan, “The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare,” and Article 97, “The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.” Nevertheless, in the Japanese judiciary, the Sapporo District Court in 1962 rejected an appeal based on civil disobedience by requiring that stringent conditions be applied to its practice.

The practice of civil disobedience in the anti-U.S. base activism in Okinawa as an expression of the Right of Resistance was, in some sense, a sign of people’s hopes for the application of Article 9 before the reversion of 1972. But people still have to struggle for the realization of Article 9, and their struggles have been put at risk when they are seen as a violation of the Keitokuhou after the reversion.

In 1976, in the middle of the Kisenbaru Tousou, which interfered with live-fire exercise over a prefectural road for civilian use, the protesters who had entered the firing range were arrested on charges of violating the Keitokuhou. The defendants challenged the constitutionality of Anpo and the Keitokuhou, but in vain because they were found guilty and given suspended sentences.

Japanese courts have long avoided making any judgment as to whether Anpo and the presence of the U.S. military forces are constitutional or not in the light of Article 9 since the Supreme Court judgment of the Sunagawa Case in 1959 employing the “political question” rationale. A recent news report, however, scooped the existence of a document, which proves that a secret meeting took place at the time between the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the Ambassador of the U.S.

The cornerstone judgment, which declined to rule the treaty as unconstitutional, considering it a “political question,” has turned out to be a case where the independence of the judiciary might have been seriously compromised under the influence of the U.S.

In strong contrast to the case in Japan, there has been a landmark judgment in Australia recently, the so-called “Pine Gap Trial.” Four activists of Christians Against All Terrorism were arrested in violation of the Defense (Special Undertakings) Act of 1952 after they broke into the secret U.S. Echelon base in Pine Gap near Alice Springs. They insisted in court that there had been suspicion about the involvement of this spy base in the mass killing of civilians when U.S. Forces bombed Iraq, and that was precisely why they had decided to carry out a “citizen’s inspection.” Finally in February 2008, they won an acquittal in the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal, which successfully raised significant questions about the Defense (Special Undertakings) Act of 1952.

In this country where the court has long avoided making any decision about the appropriateness of the Keitokuhou, the significance of the following question remains: how should we examine the values of the practice of the resistance in Henoko and Takae, as practices which “recréent leur citoyenneté par une initiative publique de « désobéissance » à l’Etat,” (re-create people’s citizenship through a public initiative of disobedience to the State), as the obligation of the global citizens to pursue democracy and justice, and as the performativity that practices the right of resistance.

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On the Possibility of a “Peace Code”: Retrospect and Prospects

SUZUKI Yuji

PSAJ Member
Hosei University

I

The end of the Cold War, in retrospect, brought about a dramatic change in Europe, but not in Asia and the Pacific. One of the reasons for this, I would argue, is that Europe succeeded in “de-coupling” the global Cold War and regional peace beginning in the early 1970s whereas Asia, especially Northeast Asia, failed to appreciate the possibility of regional peace. Related closely to this, of course, were lingering historical issues in Northeast Asia which discouraged initiatives towards a common peace in the Asian region as a whole. However, it seems to me that what is more fundamental to building regional peace is the paradigm shift of cross-border national security policy. In this respect, theoretical as well as policy debates have suffered from extreme paucity throughout the sub-region. One of the few exceptions is a proposal put forward by a group of Japanese peace researchers in 1993 with which this paper is mainly concerned.

II

Before touching on the main issue, however, I should not neglect to mention another rare but concrete attempt at making common peace at the regional level, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The nations of the Southeast Asian had, well before the end of Cold War, launched serious attempts to combine the search for regional peace with changes in each country’s security policy. The countries in the sub-region, which were deeply involved in the so-called “proxy war” in Indochina during the Cold War, determined to promote an initiative for the peaceful settlement of disputes and declared the sub-region a “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” in 1971. Yet, this process attracted little interest in Northeast Asia until most of the countries of the sub-



The author (center)

region joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the early 1990s.

Nonetheless I should make three remarks involving the possible theoretical implications of ASEAN’s experiment upon peace processes in Northeast Asia and at the same time a national policy debate in the sub-region. First of all, despite their vast diversity, Southeast Asian nations have a common historical experience, namely colonial domination and susceptibility to extra-regional powers. Hence, for those countries, national as well as regional security and peace must involve refusing to allow any one or any combination of powers to dominate the regional peace. The “de-coupling” of regional peace from global disputes, therefore, has been the top priority. However, ASEAN’s success in building regional peace processes has been much dependent upon the support, if not intervention, of extra regional powers. In other words, a “balance of power” among the extra regional powers with ASEAN in the “driver’s seat” is an important condition, whatever the balance means. And thirdly, within the context of regional peace, choices regarding national peace and security have rarely been limited by the regional accords. On the contrary, ASEAN has made it a tradition that the regional accords do

not place limits upon sovereign rights including the use of military force. The serious search for a security community building only began after 2003 when all member states recognized the need for a more comprehensive integration and declared ASEAN Concord II or Bali Concord II. Yet, ASEAN still needs to promote a paradigm shift in national peace policy, which, as the case of Myanmar indicates, remains a stumbling block.

III

The proposal of 1993 was composed of four main themes. First, it saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to “de-couple” Japanese security policymaking from US Cold War policies in Asia and the Pacific. Second, it argued that the Peace Constitution, which denies the right of belligerence as a means to settle international disputes, should be equipped with peace initiatives for building a common peace in the region, the concept of de-militarizing security and existing security arrangements including Japan-US Security Treaty, and the strengthening of measures against the proliferation of WMDs. Thirdly, under the constitution, Japan’s defense force should be limited to a minimum defensive capability, and to be a defensive defense force. Hence, the expanded Japanese Self Defense Forces should be substantially reduced both in quality and in quantity. And finally Japan should make every effort to contribute to global peace through non-military means including economic aid, cultural and educational exchanges and so on, with more participation by NGOs.

Of course one can scrutinize the proposal from various points of view, as happened when the proposal was made public. First, some argued that it was a mere idealist blueprint and lacked any realistic evaluation of regional peace and security conditions. As long as the “Cold War situation” remained in the region even though the Cold War itself had ended, “de-coupling” with US policy meant, from their point of view, creating a defenseless Japan, which was unacceptable. Secondly, some argued that the “de-militarization” of the Japan-US Security Treaty would lead to the re-militarization of Japan. This view was in fact quite similar to the

evaluation by Asian neighbors of the Japan-US Security Treaty as a “safety valve” or ceiling on Japan’s re-militarization. In addition, the majority of Japanese saw the alliance as the indispensable backbone of Japanese peace, since it was believed that the US was the only force that could protect Japan from external threats to which Japan could defend itself only within its own territory. Thirdly, the defense establishment claimed that Japan’s constitution did not deny the right of self-defense and thus that self defense forces with “minimum offensive capability” should be maintained, if not expanded. However, the most common criticism was that the concept of “minimum defensive capability” was unrealistic.

From the above, it is clear that the proposal cast new light upon the issues that had divided public opinion in post-war Japan. On the basic contradiction between the constitution, especially its Article 9, and the Japan-US military alliance, it offered a space where the “de-militarization of the Japan-US Security Treaty” would lead Japan not toward the “re-militarization of Japan” in line with the concern of Asian neighbors, but toward Japan becoming part of the global collective security system envisioned by the UN Charter. In addition, the concept of “minimum defensive capability” was seen as a preview of the role of peace and security in one country in the age of globalization. It is fundamentally different from “minimum offensive capability,” which is never free from possible “overkill.” Instead of repeating century old security dilemmas, the concept provided a long-term perspective upon which a national peace and security could be conceived within the framework of global common peace and security, with the recognition of new agendas such as the global environment, drugs, terrorism, and the arms trade, especially in WMDs.

IV

A decade and a half have passed since the proposal was issued. During that time, the so-called 1955 System under which the conservative LDP maintained supremacy for 38 years, collapsed for a brief period of time, and then re-emerged with a more inward-looking LDP

and conservative policy agenda. Reflecting the decline of Japanese economic power and the serious regional economic crisis in the late 1990s, it seems that “reform” became the order of the day. However, the end of the 1955 System did bring about a quite drastic “rightward drift” on peace and security issues including Japan’s involvement in the Iraq War by sending SDF troops into a war situation for the first time. The proposal for a “peace code” was forgotten.

Despite, and perhaps because of the above, I would argue that many of the arguments and concepts put forward in the 1993 proposal remain meaningful in the present day. Of course, it goes without saying that concepts such as “minimum defensive capability” require further elaboration. But there is one thing that should

not be overlooked today. One salient feature of the 1993 proposal was the near absence of arguments related to regional peace processes or regional peace itself. This lack of a regional orientation stands out in retrospect, in the following two senses. First, there were no non-Japanese participants in the group, even from other countries of Asia. Indeed, more active discussions and exchanges of views need to be carried out at the regional level. Second, there is a need for a more serious search on the possibility of “common security” at the regional level, or more specifically speaking at the sub-regional level of Northeast Asia. Although this is no easy task, I believe the concept of regional peace will surely provide a bright prospect for peace studies and peace policymaking.

The Concept of Security and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan

KOSEKI Shoichi

PSAJ Member
Dokkyo University

In Japanese, it is possible to think of “security” or *anzen hoshou* as something that pertains to the 1951 United States-Japan Security Treaty. In this context, security is conceived in a way that is connected to the military or to means of self-defense. Thinking of it in these terms is hardly surprising. Japan’s most authoritative dictionary, the *Koujien* (Iwanami Shoten Publishers, 6th edition, 2007) defines “security” as “securing the safety of the nation and its citizens against external aggression.” In contrast, the definition of security in the *Oxford English Dictionary* is: “The condition of being protected from and not being exposed to danger.”

While *anzen hoshou* is generally translated as “security,” the use of the term in Japanese generally conveys the meaning of “national security.” Accordingly, the concept of security in Japan includes only military force, and excludes



The author

civilian policing, the protection of people caught in armed conflicts, the protection of refugees, the prevention of and protection against infectious diseases, and protection against economic poverty.

Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the Japanese people renounce war and the threat or use of force. Under this Constitution, it is meaningful to use “security” in a non-military sense.

Genocide and Sexism - Reflections on the Indonesian Massacre in 1965-66

MATSUNO Akihisa

PSAJ Member

Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Genetic politics

The massacre of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members and their (alleged) sympathizers by the Indonesian army in 1965-66, which resulted in the physical extermination of half a million people or more, has not been considered genocide as defined in international law because the massacre does not constitute “an act committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.” The targeted group was a political one, which is not protected under the genocide convention.

However, to understand the nature of the Indonesian massacre in 1965-66 more precisely, it seems to be necessary to look into the idea of how politics and genetics are related. Here, politics is a notion not about a chosen or acquired stance but about some inherent and unchangeable nature. The communists in Indonesia were regarded as something like bloodstock. Their extermination took the form of murder or perpetual segregation and containment.

I am not claiming that the massacre of the Indonesian left constitutes a crime of genocide as defined in current international law. For that to be so, the protected groups under the law need to be expanded to cover a political group. Instead, this short essay aims to explain that we are facing a situation in which it seems useless to separate a political group from others. If ideology is regarded as an inherent and inalienable attribute of a person and for that reason a group of persons is attacked, the distinction between a political group and other national, racial, ethnic and religious groups becomes vague, at least at the level of the perpetrator’s intent.

Two facts are available to support this

argument.

One is that the communist purge in Indonesia was applied well beyond the persons involved to cover their innocent family members, including children and grand-children. To be accepted into state institutions, one needed to prove that one was “environmentally clean,” meaning having no one related to the Communist Party in one’s family. This was done by obtaining a “letter of good conduct” from the police. Members of the armed forces, as the guardians of the New Order, were not allowed to marry a woman who was not “environmentally clean.”

The second fact is the existence of the category of *eks-tapol* or ex-political prisoners. Communists and their sympathizers who survived the massacre were imprisoned, often without charge or trial, for fourteen years or more. Then they were “returned to society,” that is to say released, to live the rest of their lives as ex-political prisoners. As ideological pariahs, they were not allowed to become public servants, teachers, journalists, writers, or preachers, or to occupy important positions in vital industries. Here, imprisonment was not a form of punishment in the modern sense, but was mere segregation. Their existence as sinful *eks-tapol* was never to change.

The hidden notion behind this anti-communist discourse in Indonesia is clear. Communism is like an incurable disease. If one person is infected, the whole stock must be exterminated. This notion explains why sometimes a whole family or even a whole village was attacked and killed by military-backed vigilante groups.

Sexism and the massacre

Sexism plays an important role in the

construction of this notion.

Both men and women were brutally, sometimes sadistically, murdered. In terms of numbers, perhaps more men were killed, but women were subjected to all kinds of gender-based violence before they were killed, when arrested or while in detention. The mutilation of sexual or reproductive organs sometimes accompanied the killings, symbolizing the conquest, humiliation and destruction of the enemy's reproductive power.

What was unique to the whole operation was the attack on the nature of the female communists and sympathizers. These women were depicted as "sadistic whores" who had indulged in free sex parties before they participated in killings in a failed coup attempt in the early hours of October 1, 1965. The army deliberately disseminated false propaganda that members of Gerwani, a PKI-related women's organization, while dancing in the nude, sexually abused kidnapped military men and cut their penises with razors. Major-General Suharto, who took over command of the army and subsequently ordered the "hunt" for the communists, was well-aware of the truth because the army-commissioned forensic team reported that the sexual organs of the murdered military men were intact; there was no sign of torture (Anderson: 109-134). The anti-Gerwani propaganda began several days afterwards and spread mainly through the armed forces and Muslim newspapers. The propaganda developed in the following months with "new evidence," such as the confession of a Gerwani member who reportedly said that she "competed with other female activists in free sex with 400 young male activists." This woman also reportedly confessed that the PKI's secretary-general, D. N. Aidit, encouraged them to engage in free sex saying that communists should be free from religious restrictions. (Wieringa 2002: 301-317)

By constructing an image of sadistic, barbaric and immoral communist women, the army successfully provoked hatred against Gerwani among the people and made the "hunt" easy. Gerwani members were arrested, tortured, raped, and killed or detained for many years, often without being charged. The stigma

brought their family not just fear but also shame, and many of them had to live away from their families, including away from their own children.

As the negative model for Indonesian women

For some time since the 1980s, the killing site at Lubang Buaya in Jakarta has been a military-run memorial park of the events there. The well, into which seven murdered military men were thrown, is covered with a Javanese-style pavilion protected by Hindu mythological creatures. Just next to the well stands a monument with seven military figures. The one in the middle, General Ahmad Yani, is pointing to the well with his finger as if he is telling us not to forget the communists' betrayal that occurred there. At the pedestal of the monument there is a large relief depicting the failed coup, including scenes of the killing site. Gerwani members are discussing and dancing. The relief also shows an image of New Order women, one of whom is holding a baby, protected by a firm-standing soldier. The message is clear. "Women, go back home and there will be a calm life that will be protected by the military." Pupils and students visit the park and learn "the truth" of their history.

Every year on October 1, state television broadcasts a film about the coup. The film includes a scene of Gerwani members performing an erotic "dance of flagrant flowers" at the killing site. People have been brainwashed through this nation-wide ritual of watching the film at home.

The image of Gerwani activists as "bad women," which is so firmly rooted in Indonesian society, prevails to this day. In April 1999, a year after the fall of the Suharto government, the chairperson of the umbrella group of the Indonesian women's organization, Kowani, warned readers in a magazine against the "infiltration of Gerwani members" and wrote that in the early 1960s "Gerwani supported an understanding of lesbianism and tried to run a prostitution network" (Wieringa 2000: 445).

The New Order's gender ideology, *Panca Dharma Wanita* or Five Duties of Women, defines the woman first and foremost as a wife, then as a mother. These roles are said to be in accordance

with the woman's *kodrat* or nature. Women must stay at home, manage the household, and if necessary support the family budget with part-time work. They should not supersede their husbands. With this New Order gender ideology, the wives of civil servants and military personnel were organized into state-sponsored women's organizations. Here the positions of the members were determined according to their husbands' positions. Meanwhile, villagers were mobilized for the state-sponsored welfare movement, which taught women how to become good wives and mothers.

During these three development, the de-politicization of the women's movement, the spread of patriarchal gender ideology, and the mobilization of women to build a corporatist state based on the traditional division of labor, the image of Gerwani continued to be the negative model for Indonesian women: the model which was thought to be incompatible with the nature of Indonesian women (Matsuno 2006: 113-5).

It is important to note that male communists and sympathizers in Indonesia have never been depicted in such a way. They might have lived an existence that was wrong politically, but they were basically accused of being what they were, although the accusation about what they did was totally false. The New Order's propaganda also talks as if young male communists were invited to an orgy by naked women performing an erotic dance. Indonesia's best selling novelist Ayu Utami's second work, *Larung*, draws a parallel between the legendary Balinese witch *Calonarang* and the discredited Gerwani activists, and asks why those that bring disasters are always women and why the saviors are always men (Matsuno 2007: 71-77).

Interestingly, such a depiction of Gerwani members is not found in the state's official discourse, such as the White Book on the September 30th Movement. The New Order regime never seriously tried to prove that Gerwani members were engaged in these gruesome acts. Nevertheless, this image appears repeatedly in media such as newspapers, novels, movies and monuments. Having a subliminal effect, it has constructed a fact-like picture, the

origin of which, however, no one questions any more. Rumor has become an established part of military intelligence operations.

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The Japanese “Constitution Issue” and Korean Civil Society

KWON Heok-Tae

SungKongHoe University, Korea

Korean public interest in Japan’s “constitution issue” has been increasing in recent years. Of course, in comparison with issues that are highly contested within the context of Japanese-Korean relations such as history textbooks, the Yasukuni shrine, and territorial issues, the debate surrounding Japan’s constitution has little direct relevance for Korean citizens, and there are “trendy” opinions indicating that the Japanese constitution is not an issue which members of Korean society should be making comments about. In other words, some argue that Japan’s constitution is a Japanese domestic concern. This was indeed something that was heavily considered when members of Korean civil society organizations gathered with researchers, lawyers and others to launch the Peace Constitutions Citizens Network Conference.

Naturally, there seems to be a reasonable solution to this issue – viewing Japan’s constitution as a new idea for a mechanism for peacebuilding. Considering the situation of the Korean Peninsula which has for the past 60 years been one of the world’s most militarily tense areas, the incorporation of unarmed pacifism as in Japan’s constitution might not be immediately possible, but this concept does provide a vision for the future creation of a state if the reunification of Korea becomes possible. This perspective is conceptually linked to the ideas of “Exporting Article 9” and “Article 9 as a World Heritage,” which have been gaining attention in Japan recently.

However, things are not quite so simple. Such a path would be complicated even for regions with only sparse relations with Japan; yet for the Korean Peninsula – which suffered greatly at the hand of Japan in the recent past, and whose own history cannot be discussed without including discussion of relations with Japan – the linkages between the situation on the Korean Peninsula and Japan’s Peace Constitution are incredibly complicated. Thus, in consideration of both history and the present situation, perceiving Japan’s Peace Constitution as an idea of the future can be somewhat difficult to accept.

This is because of the strong relationship between the Korean Peninsula’s contemporary situation and moves towards constitutional reinterpretation to address the “peculiar coupling” of the birth of Japan’s peace constitution and the Self Defense Force/Japan-US Security Treaty, and the recent moves towards the full-fledged amendment of the Constitution.

If we discuss the origins of the Peace Constitution, historical recognition naturally becomes important.

Many critics have already reminded us of the fact that the Peace Constitution was created based on the premise of the “absence of Asia.” If we take a deeper look at its relation to the Korean Peninsula, we find that the Peace Constitution is based on a reflection over the 15 Years War, but not as a response to the recognition of Japan’s responsibility for its colonial rule of Taiwan and Korea. Specifically, the problem of the colonization was ignored in the process of the birth of the Constitution. As a result, the conflict arising from the issue of historical recognition particularly since the 1990s is a result of Japan’s movement rightward, but at the same time is also a sign that the inherent limitations of the Peace Constitution and its origins (the lack of responsibility for colonial rule) have come to a head.

The second point in regards to constitutional reinterpretation is the widely known fact that the Self Defense Force (National Police Reserve) was originally formed as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War. However, if we take this reinterpretation thesis as the structure of the peculiar situation whereby the military supports a constitution which prohibits the military, and at the same time the military is restrained by the very constitution which itself prohibits the military; the “military” referred to here is not only Japan’s Self Defense Force and the US military in Japan, but also the Korean army, which was formed under Korea’s dictatorial regime. Consequently, the Peace Constitution is very closely related to the Korean military dictatorship. Within the United States’ strategy for Asia, Japan and Asia are linked under a kind of division of labor, as a network in which the US sits at the pinnacle. Japan is given the role of hosting logistic bases, and Korea and other neighboring regions fulfill the role of having combat bases. The reason that Japan has managed to maintain its “peaceful status quo” despite not having a full-fledged army is that 70% of the US bases hosted by Japan are in Okinawa, and Korea has acted as Japan’s combat base or “bumper.” In other words, Japan has been able to maintain its post-war “peaceful status quo” by having neighboring countries take on the burden of the military risk. To put it somewhat figuratively, Korea’s strict military conscription system is related to the right, which is taken for granted, of Japanese young people not to have to join the military. Within this division of labor, political structures are needed that are suited to the roles granted by the US to countries of the region, including Japan, but the US has supported the stabilization of the political structures through aid and the provision

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of a market. The result of this has been the long rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan, and the dictatorships in Korea and other countries of the region. This is the completion of the virtuous cycle of so-called “Cold War development.”

The third point involves how to view the crisis of constitutional reinterpretation, which gave way to moves towards total amendment of the constitution. The position of “constitutional reinterpretation” faced a crisis through the 1990s (post-Cold War) “shock” from both the US and Asian sides. The US’s “displeasure” at Japan’s Gulf War era stance of “sending money but not troops” amounted to a criticism of the position of “international contributions,” well known through discussions of SDF deployment overseas. This instantly reveals the contradiction of “constitutional reinterpretation,” which had thus far survived through the persistence of the principle of exclusively defensive defense, starting to undermine the very idea of constitutional reinterpretation. “International contributions” refer to Japan’s incorporation into the US-led global military strategy, but this could not be done without either a breakdown or realignment of the doctrine of “constitutional reinterpretation.” Consequently, the idea of revisions needed to be added to the framework of “constitutional reinterpretation.” This undermining led in the short term to the establishment of a series of laws including the extension and expansion of the SDF, and ended with “constitutional reinterpretation” becoming a mere facade, as seen by the deployment of the SDF to Iraq. In the long term, it has led towards the establishment of the national referendum laws which have the potential to lead to actual constitutional amendment.

However, the wave of democratization throughout Asian nations has been hidden within this series of moves initiated under the doctrine of “international contributions.” While democratization itself can be seen as a purely domestic issue referring to the democratic realignment of political structures, if it is viewed internationally, and particularly in regards to its connection to Japan, it can be positioned as the possibility of breaking the fetters of the Cold War, and refusing the continuation of interlocked colonialism. Thus, while democratization has the potential of being a voice of opposition to the US-led vertical grouping (structure of alliance), it is also a consequence of the eruption of historical issues which were neglected during the Cold War. As a result, the doctrine of “constitutional reinterpretation,” which stands upon the “continuation” of colonialism and the fetters of the Cold War will unavoidably be restructured in some form. This is another crisis faced by that doctrine. Let us examine the relation with Korea. Under the military dictatorship, Korea prevented the emergence of the anti-Japanese movement, which would have damaged the US-mediated “fictitious alliance” with Japan.

While of course there was never a total lack of “anti-Japanese” voices questioning Japan’s historical responsibility, this anti-Japanese sentiment was only permitted within the frameworks of being politically convenient for the regime or anti-communist. This is why there was barely any conflict over issues of historical recognition during the period of alliance between the LDP and the military dictatorship. It could be said that the Japanese and Korean governments were in a form of complicit relationship with the common goal of anti-communism. However, since the 1990s, Korean democratization has partially taken on the characteristic of voicing opposition to the Cold War-like structure of division of labor. The mood towards reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula through Korea’s democratization symbolizes the move towards “partial refusal” of the role of combat bases for anti-communism. Subsequently, as a result of the loss of the “bumper” of Korea, the military burden has returned to Japan, raising unease over Japan’s security and creating a new composition promoting a shift towards the right. This reveals, ironically, that Japan’s post-war pacifism was propped up by the anti-communist military dictatorships of its neighbors, and that the democratization of the region has promoted Japan’s right-leaning tendencies. This is an issue of asymmetry between Japan and its neighbors.

As a result, even under the doctrine of constitutional reinterpretation, if a Japan which already boasts one of the world’s largest military power adds some form of revision to its existing constitution and comes to recognize the right to collective self-defense, without being able to combat the allure of further constitutional reinterpretation, it will then move towards further military expansion. This would mean the loss of checks against militarism, and could lead to an arms war within the region. Thus, the movement against constitutional revision must not only question the total amendment of the constitution, but constitutional reinterpretation as well. This questioning should certainly involve a reconsideration of the current US-Japan alliance, yet should also include the preservation of consistency within the region. This consistency cannot be preserved merely through the trial of building a common regional security framework. This is because the resolution of historical issues which have been ignored under the framework of “constitutional reinterpretation” must be a precondition. In this sense, the true value of the Peace Constitution is yet to be seen.

Reflecting on the Counter-Movement against the G8 Summit in Toyako, 2008

KOSHIDA Kiyokazu

PSAJ Member

Sapporo Freedom School "Yu"

In early July, many events – symposia, meetings, workshops, peace-walks, demonstrations, etc. – were held in Sapporo, the capital of Hokkaido. I argue that these protests against the G8 and neo-liberal globalization can as a whole be called a “Counter-Movement.”

Many people have come to understand that: 1) the G8 summit has no legitimacy, 2) that it has become an unaccountable decision-making body, and 3) that it is an unjust system where a few big countries meet by themselves and dominate crucial global issues. This common understanding among Japanese citizens has become possible because they have heard the voices of people from all over the world in their struggle against neo-liberal globalization and its leading forces, such as the G8 countries.

This is particularly important for those of us who live in Hokkaido who started to pay attention to the G8 after the venue for the summit was decided. We gradually learnt to question the legitimacy of the summit. In a new phenomenon, some mass media also began to report on the summit from a critical point of view. A local mainstream newspaper, *The Hokkaido Shimbun*, used its front page to report on the Peace Walk of July 5 under the headline “Criticize G8 Arrogance.”

Also important thing is that even the majority of Sapporo citizens who did not join the Peace Walk came to realize that the G8 summit is both ridiculous and oppressive. This was a side-effect of the thousands of police and vehicles that flooded Sapporo from all over Japan.

In Sapporo, People’s Weeks on the G8 started from mid-June. Under this banner, many events, such as The Indigenous Peoples’ Summit, The International Symposium on Military Forces, Bases and Women, The International Peoples’ Solidarity Days, the Challenge the G8: Peace Walk of 10,000 People, and The Peoples’ Summit, 2008 were held every day. The Citizens’ Media Center and the People’s Convergence Center were organized in Sapporo, and an international camp site was also established in neighboring Tobetsu Town.

Three main Japanese networks led this movement. First is the 2008 Japan G8 Summit NGO Forum (NGO Forum), which consists of 180 Tokyo-based NGOs. Its main activities are advocacy and campaigning. They have three issue-based units: the environment, poverty and development, and peace and human rights, and they actively presented their proposals to the summit.

To do so, the NGO Forum hosted the Civil G8 Dialogue in April 2008, where international civil society organizations and officials from G8 countries’ called sherpa had a discussion. The Forum also talked with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo (who has since resigned) in June to push their ideas. Japanese NGOs as a whole have been criticized for their weakness in getting involved on a political level, but the activities of the NGO Forum may have begun to change this.

The second network is the G8 Action Network, a Tokyo-based social movements’ network. It consists of diverse social movements that include labor unions, religious groups, independent leftist groups, farmers’ unions, women’s rights groups, the peace movement and anarchist groups. “Make Toyako the Last G8 Summit” is their main slogan, and protest actions, workshops and demonstrations were held both in Tokyo and Sapporo.

The third network is the Hokkaido Peoples’ Forum on the G8 Summit, which consists of 80 Hokkaido-based NPOs and NGOs, and includes peace activists, indigenous Ainu groups, environmentalists, farmers’ unions, and labor unions. “No Welcome for the G8 Summit” was their slogan, and their main work was to link local Hokkaido issues - indigenous people’s rights, environmental deterioration and local governance - to global issues.

These networks tried to coordinate joint actions, which were in fact not so well-coordinated, but the effort was nevertheless a big achievement for Japan’s social movement, because diverse groups in the social movement - NGOs/ NPOs, labor unions, farmers’ unions, environmentalist groups and so on - have actually sat down together to discuss joint activities, such as the July 5 Peace Walk. They have looked beyond their differences on politics, the issues, activism and strategy and concentrated together on the G8 summit.

This might be the start of a mass anti-globalization movement in Japan, ten years after the struggle in Seattle in 1999. With regard to social movements in Asia, the Asian social movement groups that joined the anti-WTO struggle in Hong Kong in 2005 converged on Sapporo and set the key for protests, and Japanese civil society organizations and social movements responded.

In many senses, the counter movement against the G8 summit is a big step and constitutes an important experience for Japanese civil society to re-think its position and activities against neo-liberal globalization.

Second Annual PSAJ Peace Prize and Peace Studies Prize for Young Researchers

ISHIKAWA Shoji

Chair, Selection Committee of PSAJ
Kurume University

Second Annual PSAJ Peace Prize



Prize recipient UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi

Recipient UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi (member of PSAJ) and Peace Depot, for research and policy proposals on nuclear disarmament, and the publication of the periodical, *Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor* and the yearbook, *Nuclear Disarmament and Peace*.

In particular, our decision to award this prize was influenced by Peace Depot's research which led to the disclosure of some serious problems regarding the MSDF's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean, in 2007.

Antinuclear movements in Japan have attained widespread grassroots support and a continuity that are rarely seen in the world, while on the other hand, factional splits and a basic reliance on war memories have tended to make the movements into no more than annual events. The Peace Depot was organized with the goal to form an independent citizen's movement with strong specialist knowledge and the capacity to make policy proposals, as observed in western NGOs. Its achievements for over a decade are

due to the work of its president, Umebayashi Hiromichi.

Through his engagement in peace movements, Mr. Umebayashi came to the conclusion that weight should be attached to research. His belief is that objective data, rather than emotional political appeal, is effective for building solidarity among ordinary citizens. This idea has borne fruit, in the form of the Peace Depot. Therefore the significance of the Peace Depot lies not only in the birth of a research-based disarmament NGO, but also represents the first establishment of a full-fledged civil peace movement in Japan.

Despite its lofty goals and the quality of its research, the Peace Depot has faced hurdles in influencing a wide range of people in Japanese society, which is rarely accepting of citizens' campaigns. However as one member of PSAJ correctly predicted, last year's vigorous and steady efforts allowed Peace Depot to garner wide recognition of its name and activities by tearing down the Japanese government's rationale for the MSDF's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean, which was an important political agenda at the time. In light of this outcome brought about by the organic conjunction of research and peace movements, we confidently concluded that the contributions of Mr. Umebayashi and Peace Depot to peace studies and the peace movement are deserving of the 2nd annual peace prize.

Announcement from PSAJ

Second PSAJ Peace Studies Prize for Young Researchers



Prize recipient TAKAHASHI Hiroko

Recipient TAKAHASHI Hiroko (member of PSAJ), for the book, co-edited with Seiichirou Takemine, one of the co-representatives of Global Hibakusha Kenkyukai, *Shiminnkouza Ima Ni Tou Hibakusha To Sengoboshou* (We Now Ask: Hibakusha and Postwar Compensation), Gaifusha, 2006; *Fuuin Sareta Hiroshima/Nagasaki: Bei kakujikken to Minkanbouei keikaku* (Hidden Facts of Hiroshima/Nagasaki: US Nuclear Tests and Civil Defense Plan), Gaifusha, 2008.

TAKAHASHI Hiroko, a member of PSAJ, carries out research focusing on the following issues: human experimentation and the manipulation of information related to the atomic bombings, which have remained

veiled so far, censorship such as the Press Code implemented by the Allied occupation forces in Japan, the suffering of local people from the nuclear test conducted in Bikini Atoll in 1954, and US-Japanese complicity in the cover-up of the truth regarding the test.

Her books reveals the nature and truth of the information controlled by the US and Japanese governments, using the case of Bikini Atoll. Through her inquiry into nuclear policies in the US civil defense plan, she makes clear “the hidden facts of Hiroshima/Nagasaki” and the problems and contradictions of nuclear policies in the US in the post-war period. Ms. Takahashi’s accomplishments have convinced us of her broad historical perspective and deep insights. This impression is also underpinned by her solid research methods, including detailed documentary searches into such sources as the US National Archives, and interviews with local people in the course of her field research in the Bikini Islands. She has also made active social contributions by making public new documents and information found during her research activities. In addition she launched a panel named “Global Hibakusha” to address the concerns of all radiation victims, including those suffering from nuclear tests or from accidents at nuclear power plants. This clearly explains why she deserves the prize.



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C/O Mr. HAKATA Kei

Seikei University

3-3-1 Kichijyoji Kitamachi, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8633, Japan

Email: psaj@fh.seikei.ac.jp

Fax: +81-422-37-3875