

Peace Studies Newsletter

No. 17 (June 1998)

Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ)

日本平和学会

The Pedagogical Challenges of Peace Education	Betty A. REARDON 1
From Ideology to Space: Regionalism in Europe and East Asia	Glenn D. HOOK 7
An Analysis of the Bosnian Conflict from the Viewpoint of Humanitarian Intervention	AIBA Kazuhiko 12
Construction Units in the National People's Army in the GDR	ICHIKAWA Hiromi 18
About the PSAJ	23

The Pedagogical Challenges of Peace Education: The Good News and the Bad News

Betty A. REARDON

Introduction

If peace research and peace education are going to have anything to do with the emergence of our lives and the lives of those who come after us in the 21st century, we all have a lot of learning to do. We have a very sound base on which to build this learning, produced primarily from our efforts in peace research. That is the good news. The bad news is that we are not using that base adequately or appropriately in our efforts in peace education. We have not been learning our own lessons. I say this from the perspective of a teacher who has talked with many other teachers in various parts of the world. I realize that my perspective is narrowed by my own experience, but it is not so narrow that I don't have some confidence in the validity of my arguments and assertions about the strengths and weaknesses of current practices in peace education.

It is also from the perspective of a teacher

that I define and make distinctions between peace research, peace studies and peace education, the three academic areas that have contributed to the wider field of peace knowledge. Each area has a somewhat different focus and purpose, but each is inextricably linked to the other two. None of them would exist in their present forms without the others. In my view peace education, the focus of my remarks, is a distinct field in the domain of peace knowledge that addresses the means and methods by which those in the field can facilitate the required learnings of the individuals and groups whose political skills, knowledge and values will determine the possibilities of achieving peace. This particular focus on the learning process is what most distinguishes peace education from peace studies, so that in the universities it is most likely to be found in schools and departments of education, while peace studies most often (though not exclusively) emerges from and is located in departments of international

relations and political science. However, every component of the peace knowledge field has an educational or, what I would call, a pedagogic function. So, too, every area must have a sound substantive base. Indeed, effective learning processes are generally *substantively* specific. Most of the arguments for educational change made by peace educators come from the substantive nature of the peace problematic. All three areas contribute to the overall learning that is peace knowledge, as does also peace action, observed in the field in the aggregate as peace movements. I will, however, limit my remarks here to observations on the pedagogic components of the field of peace knowledge, particularly as it is practiced in universities.

The Good News: The Pedagogies of Peace Knowledge

Peace research, as is all research, is devoted to creating knowledge, to acquiring and analyzing the data on which peace knowledge is built. So the focus of peace research is on substance, the content of peace knowledge. The substantive inquiry of peace research is pursued around a problematic, a question, or set of questions. Thus, the pedagogic task of peace research is to teach how to diagnose problems of war and violence, to pose productive questions, to structure an inquiry to guide our search for peace knowledge that can extend and clarify the substance that research produces.

Peace studies as best practiced uses the substance of peace research to teach students the theoretical bases of the field, modes of problem analysis relevant to the understanding and resolution of the problems, and leads them to interpret the theories and analyses in ways which make the knowledge meaningful to the students, their careers and personal lives. At its very best it encourages critical thinking and creative problem solving and challenges students to make their own analyses and pose alternative theories, drawing them into the on going process of developing peace knowledge, and encouraging them to apply the knowledge in action in academic field work

and participation in peace movements.

The task of peace education is the dissemination of peace knowledge primarily through preparation for action. It facilitates learning to intervene in situations of peacelessness, learning how to take action as responsible citizens, but mainly and most especially learning how to learn the skills and knowledge required for effective action. Good peace education helps students to learn to make arguments based on sound analysis and contextualized interpretation. It helps them to determine the types of policies and interventions that follow from those arguments, and, hopefully, opens to them the possibilities to take action. Such goals, of course, have always characterized progressive education's approach to education for citizenship and democracy. However, peace education can be distinguished from traditional citizenship education in two respects. Its primary concern is bringing forth the learnings needed to reduce and ultimately eliminate the various forms of violence defined and investigated by peace research, and its scope is global rather than national, humanly inclusive rather than raising the values and views of one people or state over others.

Peace education also has served as the link between peace research, peace studies, and the larger peace movement. Much of its work has been accomplished through the learners, as activists taking peace knowledge into the peace movement. Those who have been educated for peace bring that knowledge with them into many areas of life. Much peace education has been in the basic life skills of constructive communication, positive human relations and conflict resolution, but its major pedagogical purpose remains education for citizen action for peace.

All social movements, all designated social purposes, accept that education is fundamental to their task. We in the peace knowledge field share an assumption about the fundamental and overarching problem we confront and the goal or purpose we pursue. We have defined and

redefined that purpose at various times in the history of peace research, but most of us now are in some agreement with the notion that the achievement of peace requires a profound cultural transformation. Most of us subscribe to the motivation and theme of UNESCO's program on a culture of peace. A culture of peace, indeed, all the goals of a peace movement, require a peace educated leadership, but most especially and particularly, an active, peace educated public, a public which is consciously learning the ways of peace. We, of course, need to encourage and facilitate peace learning among the individuals who are going to be leaders and individuals who are going to be active citizens. But we also have to understand that there is a wider real of learning than that of individuals, acknowledging that society itself is a learner. It is the learning of society, the common learning of all of those learners forming a community, that comprises the social learning that may produce a culture of peace. However, as has been pointed out on this panel, this social learning has to be a critical learning. It has to be a challenging learning that will capacitate the public to critique, challenge and change the culture of violence and war. Indeed, all university education should contribute to this goal, and I would argue that it is peace studies which should be leading the academy in that direction.

The good news is that we have a significant range of possibilities for challenging learning provided by the three areas of peace knowledge. The bad news is that we aren't educating for challenge. I think we do a reasonably good job at certain aspects of educating for criticism, but it is mainly in reflecting on critiques offered by established peace scholars and not necessarily in building the critical capacities of all the learners for whom we are the major links with our field, most especially, but certainly not exclusively, those students going into politics, research and education.

Nor is the delivery of this education confined to schools and universities. Peace education is something that takes place in all venues and all

channels of education. Those of us who see our responsibility as bringing peace knowledge into the larger society have become aware that we can work in many, many arenas of formal, nonformal and informal education. Even in the institutions of formal education much nonformal and informal education is delivered to the enrolled. Some of the most significant and peace relevant learning is acquired by university students through clubs, volunteering and field experiences.

So, too, all of our academic institutions provide profoundly influential informal education through their structures, policies and the relationships. Perhaps the most powerful informal education both inside and outside academia is through the pedagogy of personal relations. In all of our interactions, we are learners and teachers. What our pedagogy of social relations has been teaching us, over most of the years that I have observed social learning, at least in my own society, has been racism, sexism, ageism, militarism, authoritarianism, a whole complex of social values that are generally accepted, tolerated, even unnoticed, until they become so intolerable to affected groups, that criticism is voiced and a challenge posed. It is primarily through this first wave of criticism that social learning is initiated. We have to be aware that in our interpersonal and social relations in general, and our professional relations in particular, especially our relations with students, we can engage in a pedagogy of reinforcement or a pedagogy of challenge, one which maintains a culture of violence or attempts to transform toward a culture of peace.

Some of the most powerful peace learning is coming from popular movements, from the emergence of civil society and from critical social learning. Citizens are learning by doing. Youth groups, community groups, various advocacy groups are learning how to achieve their objectives in a manner which is very much in the mold of Paulo Freire, in which they have come to critical consciousness about a social problem. They devise and test solutions, taking action to confront the problem, and then returning to

reflection on the consequences of their action, to assess and revise their strategies for the next phase of the struggle. I would submit that this pedagogy of reflection, action, reflection, as well as the pedagogy of interpersonal relations can be brought into our classrooms, into formal education. For it is in formal education that the most significant transformative learning still takes place. This is not to devalue the learning of the nonformal sector, but simply to take our responsibility as academics committed to transforming the culture of violence.

It is in the academy that knowledge is defined. It is in the academy that many of the policies that produce violence, injustice, maldevelopment, the development theory and political theories that rationalize the policies are devised. Those theories frequently come from us and our colleagues. We have to take our responsibility very seriously as we prescribe the parameters of learning and ask what is useful human learning? What do we direct our research toward? We have to understand that we must be more than the agents of transfer of present knowledge. We are the producers of the knowledge makers, of the knowledge disseminators, and our task is more than helping them to understand the present theories. Our task is to develop theorists who can challenge the theories that we are teaching.

The bad news: a need for pedagogical change

We also have to recognize that we educate the powerful. The people who go into the corporations, the ministries, the parliaments, even heads of states, come from our universities, having seen few models of self criticism or challenge to our own institutions. Yet we know that this is what education for leadership demands. We do attend to preparation for citizenship, especially of the average citizen, but I don't think we address ourselves adequately to the real needs of citizenship, to truly empower all not only with the critical knowledge but ability to be knowledge-makers as well as critics.

The transfer model of education most of us

are still wedded to, from our mouths to students' minds, isn't going to be adequate to what I'm advocating here. I wish to associate myself with the assertions of my friend, Professor Fujita, who in his presentation in the Peace Education Commission suggested that peace education is participatory education and that education for peace is education for participation, for peace-making, an active education for responsible civic action. As I have noted, we do have models of action learning and sources of some of the new knowledge we seek in the movements of global civil society. It is toward participation in those movements as well as toward change in national societies and the international system that I advise us to direct our professional endeavors in peace education.

If we begin to examine the learnings, for example, of the environmental movement, we see that the ecological perspective, which is emerging, is a totally different way of thinking from the way in which we have been trained. It is a way of thinking which calls into question the present development paradigm which so profoundly influences international policy-making and asks us to look at all the paradigms that we have used to study human problems.

The human rights movement provides us with standards by which we can assess theories, policies, and various proposals which are advocated to deal with global problems, and it enables us to look at the human consequences of strategic, political and economic programs, and demands the consideration of human priorities when we set policy goals. Human rights movements also call us to try to understand those who are different from us, and insists on learning to respect the human dignity of all. For us that means understanding our students and respecting the dignity of all, not just the gifted or those who are disciples of our work.

Most important for us to understand ourselves and to enable students to understand is that no matter how many texts they read, no matter how many lectures they listen to, those perspectives are still limited, and part of their task is to learn to

look for other perspectives, to form their own, to know what is the basis of their own perspective, and most significant of all to us as peace educators, to be conscious of their own learning parameter and processes, as well as their biases. We need to guide our students to understand that to be fully human, to be responsible citizens is to be intentional, reflective, self critical learners.

The peace and disarmament movement gives us a lot of practical skills of political efficacy that we can integrate into our curricula. We have a wonderful set of lessons in the land mines movement about how we can achieve what popular wisdom says is impossible, about how to move from the reality to the envisioned peace goal. This movement teaches us that while the transformation from weapons dependent security to the abolition of some of the most destructive weapons, perhaps all weapons, what we are projecting and aspiring to may yet be hard to describe, we do know enough about where we want to move to assess present actions by their potential consequences on moving us toward that preferred future, a culture of peace. Envisioning alternatives, and planning actions and policies to achieve them are skills necessary to participatory learning for critical consciousness and responsible civic action. We could be perfecting them ourselves and helping our students to do so.

Indeed, there are many specific skills that we can teach in our classrooms that are necessary to this whole process of learning to make change. The first and most important are, of course, as I have said, the critical skills to challenge, the ability to constantly raise moral as well as policy questions, understanding that most decisions and most policies proposed by governments have ethical dimensions, and realizing that in most cases there are more alternatives than those among which leaders invite us to choose. Too often the ethical issues are avoided because people feel there are no other choices, but there are alternatives, and careful examination of ethical implications leads us, if not to find those that exist, to develop those that are both pragmatically possible and ethically acceptable.

If we are going to pursue alternatives, we are going to have to engage in contention, even conflict. If we are going to do that in a humane, constructive way, then we have to be teaching skills of nonviolent struggle, of resistance to injustice, as well as conflict resolution. We also have to open to analysis and assessment what is now being learned about reconciliation, what is being learned about taking responsibility for illegal and unethical harms and the reconciliation of parties that have inflicted them on each other in the so-called post-conflict situations around the world. This is something we can do in our classrooms.

Taking responsibility for harm requires that we be able to admit to error. But classroom practice discourages even punishes such admissions. When we teach little children, we learn very soon that we have to tell them it's O.K. to make a mistake when you are learning. The only way that you can really reach all of the little learners--and the truth is, it's the best way to reach the big ones too--especially if we are going to say, "You must be a questioner," is to provide the opportunity and develop the confidence to ask questions and openly correct errors. Learners have to have the courage to risk a question and acknowledge a mistake, knowing that the mistake, too, can be the basis for learning.

Admission of error and harm is an important part of the social reconciliation and reconstruction process, as is admitting to injury in our personal relations and in some of our professional relations. Even in professional peace studies associations (at least in the United States,) we sometimes have purportedly "academic" arguments which result in ruptured relationships. In order that the academic community can come together again and continue to pursue its goals, we have to have admission of having inflicted injury in order to heal the relationships. That's the general principle that works, as you well know, in other situations, in personal, professional and politics. These essential skills of reconciliation can be taught if we do it in a participatory way.

Conclusion: the Pedagogy of the Possible

We in professional associations have a special responsibility because we are a learning community, a group of people with a shared concern in pursuing knowledge for our common purposes. We can learn together how to introduce these practices into our teaching, so that the pedagogic functions of all fields of peace knowledge may be enhanced. I call it the pedagogy of the possible. Kenneth Boulding gave us all great courage about what could be achieved in the struggle for social and structural change when he declared Boulding's First Law, "Anything which exists is possible." The kind of pedagogies I am talking about do exist, they are possible. We can practice them, we can emulate them, or adapt them or even, and especially, invent new ones. But if we are going to engage in changing our academic habits, as with other addictions, we're going to need professional solidarity and support. We need to help each other to change.

There are three general areas in which we can help each other to approach these changes. The first is the design of our syllabi. When we determine the content and direction of a course, I would say we should be teaching to the question. We know that most of what we learn, we learn mainly from questions. What is the central question to be addressed in any course? And what are the questions that come from that one? Only by looking to the questions do I think we can really develop critical questioners. Let's help each other to formulate these questions.

The second area is in the arrangement of our classrooms, the physical structures in which we teach. Peace researchers know a lot about changing structures, we've got lots of models of structural change in politics and economics. We know that those structures reflect the relationships among the people who live within them. We need some models of structural change in the our classrooms, the physical structure of our classrooms, and the relationships among those who teach and learn within them. If our classrooms are to be learning communities,

people have to be able to communicate with each other. They need to be able to see as well as hear each other. Indeed all in the community should have a voice, but a lot that happens in classroom communications that isn't communicated by voice. Physical structures can enhance or inhibit communication. The structure of the traditional classroom inhibits communication, discourages intellectual creativity and reinforces the authoritarian ethos that still prevails in parts of academia.

Finally, and maybe most important of all, is using participatory processes wherever we can. We know that as teachers we ourselves learn much through the socratic method. Our learning will increase as we involve most of our students more, not only in the discussion of our lectures and the texts we have chosen, but in the very formation of the inquiry and the design of the process through which we pursue it. The participatory principle is absolutely essential to a culture of peace and therefore a fundamental necessity of peace education be it delivered through peace research, peace studies or any other arena of learning. The best news of all is that most peace educators are aware of this principle, and many of them are trying to apply it.

Betty A. Reardon is Director of the Peace Education Program at Teachers College Columbia University. She has published widely in the fields of peace education, human rights and gender issues. Works published in the last few years are *Educating for Human Dignity* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), *Sexism and the War System* (Syracuse University Press, 1996) *Tolerance: The Threshold of Peace* (UNESCO, 1997). This paper was presented at a biannual conference of the Japan Peace Studies Association on November 15, 1997.

From Ideology to Space: Regionalism in Europe and East Asia

Glenn D. HOOK

The purpose of this essay is to discuss briefly regionalism in Europe and East Asia/Asia Pacific, both in the cold war and post-cold war setting. The regionalist projects now being promoted in two of the three main regions of the global political economy are part of the tripolarisation of regional and global orders, which is occurring along with the widening and deepening of globalisation processes, with Germany in Europe, the United States in the Americas, and Japan in East Asia as the economic cores of these three global 'poles'. Some commentators have viewed these regionalist trends with alarm, imagining the emergence of three economic 'blocs', a return to the trade wars of the 1930s, and the possibility that economic conflict may again turn into military conflict. Yet not only is the idea of 'Fortress Europe' exaggerated, with 'open regionalism' a much more accurate description than 'bloc', but 'Asia Pacific' and 'East Asia' are much more inchoate as regions than the concept of a 'bloc' would allow. Indeed, the existence of two regionalist projects in Asia Pacific, one focused on 'Asia Pacific' and the other focused on 'East Asia', points to the limited utility of the bloc concept in seeking to understand regionalism in this part of the world.

Nevertheless, these regionalist trends are central to the restructuring of global and regional orders now occurring. For globalisation and regionalisation processes, together with the transition in global and regional orders signified by the longer term decline in US hegemony and the more recent end of the cold war, put space, rather than ideology, at the centre of the restructuring now taking place.¹ The centrality of spatial relations in the emerging tripolar order centring on Europe, the Americas, and East Asia highlights how states need to impute space with

regional meaning in order to promote their regionalist projects. For a regional identity only emerges out of contested socio-political processes, where the boundary and membership of a region is not preexisting and stable, but determined in the process of identity creation.

It is in this sense that regionalism can be understood as the ideological essence of a state-led regionalist project, which can be either proactive or reactive. The European Union (EU) can be considered a pro-active regionalist project pushed forward by European states. Of course, within the EU some states may be more supportive of the project than others; the pace at which the project is implemented may differ; and disagreement may exist over means and ends. When examined from a global perspective, however, the proposal for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and in another part of the globe, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), can in part be viewed as reactive regionalist projects which emerged in response to the deepening and widening of the European project. Similarly, the proposal by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia to establish an East Asian regional grouping, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), can in part be regarded as a reactive regionalist project which was proposed in response to the regionalist projects in Europe, the Americas and Asia Pacific.

This is to suggest that regionalism can be distinguished from regionalisation. Whereas the former implies calculating state actors seeking to promote regionalist projects, the latter is understood as a process involving nonstate actors, such as corporations, pursuing their own-in this case, economic--interests. A regionalist project thus is viewed as purposive, whereas

regionalisation is seen to involve a range of actors not necessarily committed to promoting the regionalist project as such. Even though market as well as other activities may or may not be perceived as 'regional' by the actors themselves, as these activities occur within a specific space and imply increased connectedness and connections, they can be imputed with regional identity and meaning by actors seeking to promote a regionalist project. In other words, although regionalisation processes may provide part of the motivation for states to promote a regionalist project, and the imputation of activities within a geographical space with regional identity may give substance to a regionalist project, regionalism is essentially purposive whereas regionalisation is essentially nonpurposive.

Cold war regionalism in Europe

In the cold-war ideological confrontation between East and West, states were often constrained in their regional relations by the ideological pull of bipolarism. Of course, this bipolarism was incomplete, as the non-aligned movement, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the earlier start to the cold war's ending in East Asia, and so on, suggest. Similarly, the constraint imposed on states by the East-West confrontation did not preclude all contact across the ideological divide, as seen with detente and a variety of trade and other relations linking together parts of the East and the West. Nevertheless, the ideological confrontation did serve as a glue to stick spatially disparate parts of the globe together at the same time as it limited international relations across the divide in spatially contiguous parts of the world.

Thus, the regionalism which emerged during the cold war frequently was constrained within particular spatialities by ideology. This can be seen in the case of the emergence of the European Community (EC). Historically, the legacy of the Westphalian system and the development of horizontal relations amongst member states, most of whom were colonisers rather than colonised, provided fertile ground for a new multilateral

institution to take root. Similarly, the need to ensure that Germany became enmeshed as part of the new Europe, the motivation for which grew out of a fear of yet another war provoked by Germany, helps to explain the regional initiatives taken by European leaders in the early postwar years. The breadth and depth of this fear became apparent in 1951, when the United States sought to rearm Germany as part of the rearming of Western Europe, and is behind the failure of the European Defence Community. Given these latent fears of Germany, European governments preferred a military alliance led by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to a regional alliance likely to be dominated by Germany.

At the same time, however, the EC emerged in a limited regional setting due to the cold war bipolar confrontation between East and West. For the European project was constrained from expansion on the Eastern wing by the Berlin Wall: the fear of Germany went hand in hand with a fear of the expansionary ambitions of the Soviet Union. Indeed, for realist scholars, the Europeans' need to balance the Soviet Union has been regarded as the key reason for regionalism in Europe. This grows out of a view of international relations as a struggle for power, where sovereignty is supreme, and the international system is anarchic. From this perspective, realists see the structures of the international system as determining the behaviour of states in promoting regional cooperation.²

The involvement of the United States in the security of Europe and concerns about German ambitions meant that, in pushing forward the European project through the treaties of Rome in 1957, economic cooperation was central. The other main tradition in international relations, liberalism, has paid particular attention to this economic dimension of European regionalism. For liberals, rationality leads nations to pursue economic interests, not power politics, and leads them to cooperate in the creation of multilateral institutions. Rather than the external need to balance the Soviet Union, therefore, liberals have

viewed regionalism in Europe through the prism of the benefits of regional cooperation: economic interests, similarity in culture and norms, and such 'soft' aspects of European regionalism, are seen here as important in facilitating regional cooperation. By focussing on the 'spillover' from economics to politics, moreover, functionalism and later neofunctionalism have sought to show how regional economic cooperation would lead to the deeper institutionalisation of the European project.³

Even in the wake of the cold war's ending, these two approaches continue to offer insights into regionalism, but they seem in their different ways unable to capture fully the deepening and widening of European cooperation, on the one hand, and the emergence of what can be called 'new' regionalism in other parts of the world, as in East Asia/Asia Pacific, on the other.⁴ If we take the realist's concern with the need to balance the Soviet Union as our starting point, then an important question for realists is why, given the ending of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union, has the widening and deepening of the EC gone ahead? Why, in other words, is the EU, which implies a loss of state power through the introduction of the European Monetary Union and other measures, now being pushed forward? Similarly, as far as the liberal approach to regional cooperation is concerned, which highlights the 'spillover' from economics to politics and 'institutionalisation', then why does there appear to be such deep resistance towards 'spillover' from economics to politics and the institutionalisation of regional projects in East Asia? Why, in other words, do East and Southeast Asian governments resist the institutionalisation of APEC as well as EAEC? In this sense, neither the realist's concern with power and sovereignty nor the liberal's concern with 'spillover' and institutionalisation can explain fully regional activities in Europe and Asia Pacific.

Post-cold war regionalism in Europe and Asia Pacific

It is beyond this piece to fill the gaps left by

realism and liberalism. Suffice it to say that post-cold war regionalism needs to be approached as concretely manifested in different parts of the globe. In Europe, the ending of the cold war has removed the barrier to expansion across the former East-West ideological divide. In response, former socialist states of Eastern Europe are seeking the EU's embrace. Indeed, the possibility of the EU accepting at least the five central European applicants, if not all, of the former socialist states was confirmed at the December 1997 meeting of the fifteen members in Luxembourg when they agreed to accession talks. This recent decision confirms the need to look beyond the realist view of the need for a 'balance' in examining the EU.

In Asia Pacific, 'new regionalism' seems to be emerging without the same push for institutionalisation witnessed in Europe. Compared with the 'formal' regionalism of the EU in Europe, East Asian regionalism appears 'informal'. Indeed, the East and Southeast Asian states, especially Malaysia and to a lesser extent the other members of ASEAN, regard the meetings of APEC and EAEC more as a forum for dialogue than as fledgling moves towards institutionalisation. In this sense, the new regionalism is not following the pattern of Europe, with spillover from economics into other functional areas. Rather, resistance is being voiced to the institutionalisation of these regional initiatives. Given the legacy of imperialism as well as the predominant role of the United States in the restructuring of the East Asian regional order during the cold war, East and Southeast Asian states remain concerned that institutionalisation will lead to APEC's domination by the big powers.

Historically, international relations in East Asia have been much more based on hierarchy and vertical relations than in Europe. This is the case to varying degrees within the Chinese world order, Western imperialism, or Japanese imperialism. Indeed, in contrast to Europe, the hegemonic project pushed by the United States during the cold war was based on vertical,

bilateral relations rather than the multilateralism at the heart of NATO and the European project. These historical legacies, especially the legacy of Japanese imperialism, have acted as a constraint on the emergence of regionalist projects in East Asia. The major regionalist project to sink firm roots, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), did not include Japan. Similarly, US bilateralism and the 'hub and spokes' security system set in place during the cold war further constrained the promotion of regionalist projects by states in the region.

At the same time, differences in political values, religion and culture were seen as an impediment to regionalism in East Asia as in Europe. The resistance to Turkey's entry at the 1997 Luxembourg meeting, an associate member of the regional grouping from 1963, suggests how differences in culture, religion and political values have constrained regional cooperation in Europe. It seems easier for the EU to move towards the East than towards Islam. Although such differences have in the past often been put forward to explain the relative lack of regionalism in East Asia, recent developments point to the possibility for regionalism to move ahead, despite differences, even at the level of civilisations. The emergence of APEC and EAEC demonstrates how the political will to promote regionalism can be strong enough to overcome differences. Whether in terms of political system, culture, religion or values a wide variety of difference is embraced within these new regional groupings.

These two groupings took on fledgling form towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. APEC was proposed in 1989 by Australia, although the United States increasingly has taken the leadership role. In many ways, Asia Pacific regionalism as pushed by the United States seeks to build on the legacy of cold war bilateralism, promoting US interests in the region, even if domination of APEC remains difficult.⁵ Although APEC is prepared to embrace those defined as 'Asia Pacific' economies, and is thus inclusionary, it essentially seeks to promote the interests of the liberal, free-market economies. On

the other hand, the 1991 proposal by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia to establish the EAEC, linking together the 'East Asian' economies, is an attempt to promote East Asian interests. As the Malaysian proposal seeks to demarcate the boundaries of a narrower regional identity within Asia Pacific, EAEC can be regarded as exclusionary.⁶ Even though EAEC now has been subsumed under the APEC umbrella, it can still be regarded as an alternative form of regionalism seeking to promote the interests of East Asia as exporting economies. Nevertheless, as the project was opposed by the United States for splitting Asia and the Pacific, the leading economy, Japan, has been reluctant to support EAEC, preferring to join the US in APEC.⁷

Despite these differences, a striking feature of new regionalism in Asia Pacific is the attempt to embrace within both groupings not only those economies from across the former ideological divide, as in the case of China, but also from across the remaining North-South economic divide. The same applies to a certain extent in Europe, too, although economic disparity amongst the EU's members and potential members is low in comparison with Asia Pacific. During the cold war era one approach to the North-South problem was for the weak to join together in order to put pressure on the strong--regional cooperation as a way to strengthen the South's negotiating power with the North, as in the case of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Now, new regionalism sees the developing weak of the South joining together in the same regional grouping with the developed strong of the North. With the ending of the cold war, North-South problems no longer can be interpreted as East-West problems, with regionalism developing across both divides. Now, APEC and EAEC include the developing as well as the developed economies of these regions, on the one hand, and the socialist market economy of China, on the other.

Conclusion

We have suggested that, in seeking to understand regionalist projects in Europe and Asia Pacific, space is emerging in place of ideology in the restructuring of global and regional orders. With the ending of the cold war and the emergence of the triadic regional cores of Europe, the Americas, and East Asia, regionalist projects and regionalisation processes are helping to shape the nascent regional and global orders. At the same time, these processes are intertwined with globalist projects and globalisation processes. As with our definition of regionalism, globalism can be understood as the ideological essence of a state-led globalist project, as in the case of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). States may be involved in promoting regionalist and/or globalist projects. Similarly, globalisation is seen as a process implying increased global connectedness and connections. This is to suggest that, with the end of the cold war and the end of the two poles of bipolarism represented by the East and the West, we are now witnessing the emergence of tripolarism, which is giving shape to space as region as part of a nascent global order. In short, regionalist projects are not only shaping regional order, but global order, too.

Nevertheless, in the same way that the bipolar structure of global order remained incomplete, so the emerging tripolar global order remains incomplete, too. Not only are some of the small and weak left out of the new regionalist projects, as with say the Pacific islands in the APEC project, but a whole range of countries, as in Africa, are also not part of the process of tripolarisation. The fragmentation of the global order in the wake of the cold war's ending and the intensification of globalisation processes thus brings to the forefront of concern those countries not regarded as part of these three core regions. What strategy should they adopt? At the same time, however, globalisation and regionalisation processes do not necessarily embrace all parts of a country equally. For these processes can embrace certain cities more than others; or certain localities more than others; and, indeed, certain

regions more than others. As with subregional and micro-regionalist projects in different parts of the world, national actors may seek to promote subregionalism, as in the case of Singapore's attempt to promote a growth triangle centring on Singapore, Johor (Malaysia) and Riau (Indonesia), and subnational actors, such as local governments, may seek to promote microregionalism, as in the case of Niigata's attempt to promote the Japan Sea Zone.

These different levels of regionalism are part of the transformation of global and regional orders, where globalist, regionalist, subregionalist and microregionalist projects, together with globalisation and a variety of regionalisation processes, are all playing a role. To what extent globalist and regionalist projects are institutionalised remains unclear. It may be that, with the passage of time, the new level of governance now emerging in Europe will emerge in East Asia and Asia Pacific, too. This may signal the emergence of new layers of governance, where regional forms of governance, for instance, begin to complement international and state forms of governance. At the moment, however, the two main regionalist projects, APEC and EAEC, remain incomplete, as do subregional and microregional projects. The APEC project, while more institutionalised than EAEC, lacks a clear form of identity beyond the ideological commitment to liberal, free-market ideology. For EAEC, the idea of an 'East Asian' identity is resisted by the key economic member, Japan. In this sense, neither Asia Pacific nor East Asia has clear boundaries and memberships. Without these, an 'economic bloc' is unlikely to emerge in either Asia Pacific or East Asia.

Notes:

- 1) For a discussion, see Hook "Japan and Contested Regionalism", in Ian G Cook, Marcus A Doel and Rex Li (eds.), *Fragmented Asia: Regional Integration and National Disintegration in Asia Pacific*, Aldershot, Avebury, 1996, pp. 12-28.
- 2) See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, 'Political

- structures', in Robert Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.
- 3) See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958, and Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation State*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964.
 - 4) On the idea of 'new' regionalism, see A. Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics', *Review of International Studies*, 21, 4 (1995), pp. 331-58, and also A. Hurrell 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective' in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds.) *Regionalism in World Politics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 37-73.
 - 5) For a discussion, see Helen E. S. Nesadurai, 'APEC: A tool for US regional domination?' *The Pacific Review*, 9, 1 (1996), pp. 31-57.
 - 6) For a discussion comparing the two, see R. Higgott and R. Stubbs, 'Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific', *Review of International Political Economy*, 2, 3 (1996), pp. 516-35.
 - 7) For details, see 'The East Asian Economic Caucus: A Case of Reactive Subregionalism?', in Glenn D. Hook and Ian Kearns (eds.) *Subregionalism and World Order*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, forthcoming.

Glenn D Hook is Professor of Japanese Studies and Director of the Graduate School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, UK. He recently published *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London, Routledge, 1996), and *Japanese Business Management: Restructuring for Low Growth and Globalization* (co-editor, London, Routledge, 1998). The author wishes to acknowledge the Leverhulme Trust's award of a Leverhulme Research Fellowship, April 1997- March 1999.

An Analysis of the Bosnian Conflict from the Viewpoint of Humanitarian Intervention: Aspects of Legitimacy and Effectiveness

AIBA Kazuhiko

Introduction

In September 1997, I visited Srebrenica, a small town in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH), but now infamous worldwide for the massacre through which allegedly thousands of the Muslims residing there were killed by the Serbs' incursion during the armed conflict. Not only in Srebrenica but also almost everywhere in BiH and Croatia, was "ethnic cleansing" rampant in the course of the conflict. Considered from the standpoint of humanitarian intervention, which is generally supposed to be an activity to save people suffering humanitarian crisis, the Yugoslav conflict can be regarded as a case of failure. Why didn't it succeed?

Based on this question, the Yugoslav conflict, specifically as regards the conflict in BiH and activities by UNPROFOR (The United Nations Protection Force) deployed there, is analyzed in this essay.¹

It is persuasively argued that the conditions for successful humanitarian intervention are *legitimacy* and *effectiveness*. Any activity, when it lacks legitimacy, cannot be fully affirmed, even if it results in a positive outcome. Conversely, an activity, even though legitimacy invests it, will not necessarily be worth taking unless it is in fact fruitful. The same can be said of the activity of humanitarian intervention, and accordingly in this essay an analysis is attempted from these two

aspects: legitimacy and effectiveness.

Definition of humanitarian intervention

One of the problems concomitant with the argument of humanitarian intervention is the definition of the term. Both the term "humanitarian" and "intervention" are words with many shades of meaning. Inevitably the definition of the term "humanitarian intervention" varies. In this paper *humanitarian intervention* is defined as "a series of activities, taken under the circumstances in which citizens of a sovereign state suffer humanitarian crisis within its territorial borders, by an international organization or a state(or states), with humanitarian motivation and purpose, in militarily forcible manners, in order to alleviate the crisis."

The features of the case of the Bosnian conflict

There are several case studies of humanitarian intervention such as the case of Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, of Somalia from 1992 through 93, of Rwanda in 1994, and so on. The Yugoslav conflict, specifically the Bosnian conflict counts among them, and in particular is noteworthy in terms of the following three features.

First, humanitarian intervention can be divided into three types according to the causes giving rise to "humanitarian crisis", that is, 1) civil war, 2) failed state, 3) tyranny. The case of the Bosnian war belongs to the category of civil war. Another significant feature is the coexistence of the approaches of conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention. The dilemma caused by these two approaches is an important characteristic of the conflict. The third feature is the actor of humanitarian intervention was. Under the definition mentioned above, the actor can be either an international organization or state(s), and in the case of the Bosnian conflict the actor of humanitarian intervention was the UN.

These features underlie the following arguments. It is expected that due to these characteristics the case study of the Bosnian

conflict offers some crucial and unique suggestions.

The aspect of legitimacy

The first issue to be discussed is about legitimacy, which is one condition for successful humanitarian intervention. One of the central elements of legitimacy is the legality under the UN Charter. Can humanitarian intervention be legalized in relation to the Charter?

1 The UN Charter

There exists no provision referring to humanitarian intervention in the Charter, but Article 1(3) and 55 state the solution of problems of a humanitarian character and respect for human rights. In the light of these Articles, the concept of humanitarian intervention can be basically seen on the same line of the tenet of the UN. The crux is whether intervention can be allowed when it is directed "within the territorial borders in militarily forcible manners". As is stipulated in Article 2(7), although the non-intervention principle normally prevents such intervention, enforcement measures under Chapter 7 precede this principle. To invoke Chapter 7, as Article 39 prescribes, the existence of any threat to the peace must be determined by the Security Council. Traditionally it has been deemed that the threat to the peace implies inter-state conflicts, but in recent years situations of an internal nature have been increasingly determined as threats to the peace. Given this recent tendency and the accumulation of practices, it seems legally possible that a humanitarian crisis occurring inside territorial borders counts as a threat to the peace. Viewed in this light, humanitarian intervention by the UN, which takes the form of UN enforcement action under Chapter 7, can be regarded as lawful. Thus in this respect, one can say that UNPROFOR in BiH theoretically has lawful grounds.

2 The Security Council resolutions

Another component of legitimacy is the consistency between the Security Council

resolutions and the concept of humanitarian intervention. How far did the resolutions concerning UNPROFOR in BiH reflect the doctrine of humanitarian intervention?

The key resolution is 836 adopted in June 1993. The resolution states:

The Security Council,...

Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,...

Authorizes UNPROFOR, ... in carrying out the mandate..., acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force,

...

What is to be noticed is the extent of coerciveness deriving from this resolution. It is generally considered that this resolution, as a whole, is in the similar framework to Resolution 814, by which UNOSOM II deployed in Somalia was dubbed the first "peace-enforcement unit". The activity of UN peace-keeping has evolved and now it falls into three categories. What is called the first generation peace-keeping is the conventional type; the second generation is the versatile and large-scale type formulated in the post-Cold War era; and the third generation is the type authorized to take enforcement measures. It can be argued that categorically UNPROFOR in BiH after Resolution 836 belongs to the third generation peace-keeping, to which UNOSOM II also belongs. However, the wording of "acting in self-defence" is inserted in Resolution 836, whereas no such phrase is added in Resolution 814. Taking this into account, it is not to be denied that the authority of UNPROFOR in BiH to take enforcement actions was restrained to that extent, in contrast to UNOSOM II.

Regarding the specific mandate, Resolution 836 states mainly two tasks: one is "to deter attacks against the safe areas", and the other is to "participat[e] in the delivery of humanitarian relief". A notable point is that concerning the safe areas the task is deterrence, not protection. This reads that in the event of failing to deter armed incursion into the safe areas, UNPROFOR is not

necessarily mandated to respond militarily against it. In fact, Commander M. Rose of UNPROFOR in Gorazde, one of the safe areas, reserved military action when bombarded by the Serbs in April 1994, saying that their mandate was neither defense nor protection.¹

Judging from these points, it becomes quite clear that the extent of coerciveness which Resolution 836 invests is limited and ambiguous. Accordingly, since one of the core factors underlining the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is coerciveness, it follows that the consistency between the resolutions and the doctrine can be deemed considerably tenuous.

Thus, reflection on these aspects of legitimacy makes it clear that, 1) regarding the legality under the UN Charter, UNPROFOR in BiH can be confirmed, but that 2) when it comes to the consistency between the Security Council resolutions and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, UNPROFOR in BiH lacked the basis of legitimacy.

The aspect of effectiveness

The other condition for successful humanitarian intervention is effectiveness. In other words, it means how much humanitarian crisis is alleviated. As is described in detail in the reports by T. Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,³ given the facts of massive and gross violation of human rights, i.e. "ethnic cleansing", it is plain that UNPROFOR was insufficient in effectiveness. The question then arises as to what caused this deficiency of effectiveness.

1 Lack of ground troops

The first point to be identified is the lack of military capability of UNPROFOR. In discharging the mandate of deterring attacks against the safe areas, UN Secretary General B. Boutros-Ghali recommended the reinforcement of 34000 ground troops, but in reality only 7600 were sent. The Serb force, responsible for the downfall of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, said that "it would take about 30000 soldiers for

UNPROFOR to protect the safe areas",⁴ but in fact only 450 Dutch peace-keepers were stationed in Srebrenica. "The problem was no longer one of the mandate, but of the resources to carry it through."⁵

As previously pointed out, first of all, the Security Council resolutions, in particular 836, did not invest UNPROFOR in BiH with outright coerciveness. In addition, given the limited military resources, UNPROFOR in BiH proved virtually incapable of taking any enforcement measures. Therefore to all intents and purposes, for UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate, it needed to seek the consent and cooperation from the parties concerned. Reasonably, when the involved parties rejected cooperation, UNPROFOR could no longer bear fruit. In theory UNPROFOR in BiH was potentially endowed with some degree of enforcing authority as a case of the third generation peace-keeping, while in practice the mode of activities was more like the first or second generation peace-keeping, whose activities were based on the principle of consent.

2 Lack of unified will at the international community level

Under the present UN system of collective security, the military capability at the UN's disposal depends on the voluntary supply of national troops from member states. To paraphrase, the lack of ground troops serving in UNPROFOR in BiH was a result of the lack of the will to mobilize their national troops. Apropos of the will, to be noted first is disagreement within the international society. Because of differences in their approach towards the Yugoslav conflict, integration of the will was made difficult.

For one thing, it seemed that at first B. Boutros-Ghali was more preoccupied with catastrophes in Africa rather than the former Yugoslavia. Comments such as "I can give you a list of ten places where you have more problems than in Sarajevo" represented his standpoint.⁶ For another, it is obvious that there existed discrepancy between the US and European

countries. Europe unavoidably faced the influx of refugees and the conflict in its "backyard" did not allow it to be indifferent, while the US geopolitically could afford to stay out. Furthermore, even among European powers opinions were divided. The influence of inherent affinity like the tie between Russia and the Serbs; and that between Germany and the Croats, worsened the discrepancy. This being the case, an integrated will could hardly form at the international community level.

3 Lack of US will

As regards the will, in addition to the disagreement at the international community level, the problem at the national level of each member state is also of importance. This was particularly true of the US. Under the present circumstances where the US predominantly possesses the salient military power, its failure to commit the ground troops often results in fatal ineffectiveness. Truly, in the case of the Bosnian conflict, the US did not dispatch ground troops from start to finish, and the result was impotence of UNPROFOR.

Concerning this point, the comparison between BiH and Somalia is suggestive. The US sent troops on a large-scale to Somalia from the end of 1992 to 93, while not to BiH. Many reasons for the contrast are conceivable, and yet it does not seem that any significant difference was identified as to the magnitude of humanitarian tragedy. Both the plight in Somalia and the predicament in BiH were severe enough to cause moral conviction. What was different, rather, was whether there existed an alternative to the dispatch of the US Forces in order to deal with humanitarian crisis. Unlike Somalia, in the case of BiH there was believed to be an alternative. It was thought in the US that the humanitarian tragedy in BiH, which was mainly represented by the Muslims' victimization through the "ethnic cleansing" policy, was brought about by the Serb's military ascendancy over the Muslims. Accordingly, it was convinced that reinforcement of Muslim's military capability by way of lifting

the arms embargo on BiH was in need to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, and that correspondingly there was no need to send the US Forces. This idea was to "kill two birds with one stone" in the sense that both the demand of moral conviction and that of the safety of US troops could be satisfied, and therefore Clinton and the Congress basically shared this view.⁷

B. Boutros-Ghali mentioned that such US's argument might be attributed to the cowboy culture in which there is a clear distinction between hero and villain.⁸ Though it may not be irrelevant, more pertinent would be the realism-based judgment of national interests. The case of Macedonia is also telling in this regard. The US, notwithstanding its reluctance to BiH, had dispatched ground troops for UNPROFOR in Macedonia, though just about 600 soldiers. UNPROFOR in Macedonia, renamed UNPREDEP subsequently, was what is called "preventive deployment" of peace-keeping force. Since no armed conflict had yet occurred there, it evoked little humanitarian impulse. Rather, the US's commitment was more national interests oriented. It was a probable scenario that the occurrence of armed confrontation in Macedonia between ethnic groups could trigger chain reactions of conflict so that it would end up in chaotic breakdown of the southern Balkan region. Such spillover of the struggle "would be much more disruptive to the immediate interests of the United States than the Bosnian war has been."⁹

Considered in this light, it is evident that a grave reason for the US's reluctant will in sending troops to BiH is that it could not identify vital national interests there.

4 The dilemma between conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention

The arguments above are about the specific issues inherent to the Bosnian conflict. In examining the matter of effectiveness, there is another issue, a conceptual one, which deserves explicit emphasis. As pointed out at the outset, one of the features of the Bosnian conflict is the coexistence of the concept of conflict resolution

and that of humanitarian intervention. Seen in perspective, some contradictions between them can be found, and this dilemma seems to be another factor hampering the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention.

One example is the dilemma of air strikes. The operation by UNPROFOR in BiH practically had to be dependent on the consent and cooperation of the warring groups, but air strikes due to its unilateral and aggressive nature easily created hostility in targeted party, and brought about a situation where cooperation could no longer be expected. On the one hand, to achieve UNPROFOR's humanitarian mandate, air strikes were counter-productive, but on the other, to resolve the war itself, air strikes were among indispensable options. Facing such a dilemma, the BiH situation became deadlocked. Eventually, however, NATO's massive and consecutive air strikes against the Serbs were implemented in August and September 1995, and this was actually the determinant leading to the Dayton agreement in November.

Another instance is the dilemma of supporting Croatia. The US began to take a proactive stance towards the conflict in 1995, and it was assumed that the bottom line for settling the conflict was to reduce the incentive to continue the war by means of putting the parties concerned, especially the Serbs, into strategic stalemate. For this, the Muslim and Croat sides needed to roll back. In fact, given covert support from the US, the Croats, disregarding the ceasefire, made recoveries of the Serbs-occupied areas, but at the same time "ethnic cleansing" by the Croats entailed their operations. US Secretary of State W. Christopher, saying that there was an expectation of facilitating the peace negotiation by such Croat attacks, though the concurrence of humanitarian problems was foreseen,¹⁰ pointed out the dilemma between the aim of conflict settlement and humanitarian demand.

Furthermore, there was the dilemma of the enclave of Srebrenica. Srebrenica, one of the UN safe areas, was an enclave detached from the Muslim-controlled area. It fell in July 1995,

assailed by the Serbs. In terms of the reasons for the international community's inability and reluctance to save Srebrenica, a journalist¹¹ says that there might be a thinking that the enclaves could be an obstacle to the negotiation on how to divide the territories. Actually, the negotiation of the Dayton agreement stalled on how to handle the only remaining enclave of Gorazde. The dilemma here also stands for a confrontation between the merit of forwarding the peace negotiation and the demerit of ignoring humanitarian sufferings inflicted by the fall of Srebrenica.

These examples illustrate 1) that there existed the conceptual confrontation between the aim of settling the conflict vis-a-vis the demand of reacting to humanitarian disasters, and 2) that the aim of settling the conflict outweighed the humanitarian demand, after all. It seems that a dilemma of this kind can almost inevitably occur when the approach of conflict resolution and that of humanitarian intervention coincide, because essentially there surfaces conceptual incompatibility. The concept of humanitarian intervention fundamentally assumes immediate and temporary reactions to emergencies, whereas the notion of conflict resolution is constituted of more comprehensive and long-term actions. Therefore, in a case where both concepts compete, the dimension of humanitarian intervention, given the inherent temporary nature, can be conceptually absorbed or assimilated into the dimension of conflict resolution. Consequently, it follows that if humanitarian demand, judged from the comprehensive and long-term perspective of conflict resolution, turns out to be counter-productive, the concept of humanitarian intervention may well be relegated or discarded.

Examination above concerning effectiveness will clarify that the deficiency of effectiveness was directly due to the lack of military capability of UNPROFOR in BiH, brought about by the lack of unified will of the international community and the reluctance of the US, which could not find vital national interests there. The conceptual

incompatibility between conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention was another impediment to effectiveness. Due to these factors UNPROFOR in BiH lacked in effectiveness.

Conclusion

Analyzed in this light, it can be concluded that, in the case of UNPROFOR in BiH, both conditions of legitimacy and effectiveness were not sufficiently met, and that it was natural that the Bosnian conflict was evaluated to be a failed case of humanitarian intervention. It is reasonably argued that humanitarian intervention by the UN has legitimate grounds, but the problems such as the Security Council resolutions, military capability, lack of will, national interests, and particularly the dilemma between conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention seem quite formidable. Despite the impulse of morality triggered by the stark facts of humanitarian tragedy, under the present international climate where realism-based thinking persistently dominates, the realization of successful humanitarian intervention is an unlikely prospect, if not an impossible one.

Notes:

- 1) This paper is a summary of the article "Jindoteki-kainyu no shiten kara mita kyū-Yugoslavia funso: Bosnia UNPROFOR ni kansuru 'seito-sei' 'jikko-sei' no kanten kara no kensyō (An Analysis of the Yugoslav Conflict from the Viewpoint of Humanitarian Intervention: Aspects of Legitimacy and Effectiveness)", in *Kokusai Kokyō Seisaku Kenkyū (International Public Policy studies)*, vol.2, no.1, 1998. Because of the limited space, the contents argued in this paper are quite simplified.
- 2) TV documentary, "A Safe Area", fifth part of the series *The Death of Yugoslavia*, produced by Brian Lapping Associates, Britain, 1995.
- 3) E/CN.4/1996/9, E/CN.4/1994/3, E/CN.4/1993/50.
- 4) *Asahi Simbun* (daily newspaper), 14 July 1995.
- 5) J. Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-*

- 1994, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.16.
- 6) TV documentary, *A Soldier's Peace*, produced by Screen Life, Canada, 1994.
 - 7) This US's assertion of lifting arms embargo, however, meeting with strong opposition mainly from Britain and France, was not put into practice, at least not officially.
 - 8) Y. Akashi, "Bosnia PKO Kakarezaru 700-nichi", *Bungei Shunju*, 1996 May, p.309.
 - 9) M. Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.74, no.3, 1995, p.103.
 - 10) TV documentary, "Pax Americana", sixth part of the series *The Death of Yugoslavia*, produced by Brian Lapping Associates,

Britain, 1996.
 11) CHIDA Zen, a Japanese freelance journalist specializing in the Yugoslav matters.

AIBA Kazuhiko is a part-time Research Assistant at the Osaka School of International Public Policy(OSIPP), Osaka Univ., and a Ph.D. candidate in international public policy. He was a newspaper reporter for the Yomiuri Shimbun (daily newspaper), and awarded an M.A. in Peace Studies from Univ. of Bradford. He also worked for the OSCE Bosnia mission to assist in elections held there in 1996 and 1997. His contact address: OSIPP, Osaka Univ., 1-16 Machikaneyama-cho, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka-fu, Japan. E-mail: aibak@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp.

Construction Units (Baueinheiten) in the National People's Army in the German Democratic Republic: a Form of Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience

ICHIKAWA Hiromi

The GDR was the only East European country to have Construction Units in its army. This unarmed branch of the National People's Army played a unique role in social development by giving a place to conscientious objection. Conscription was one of the main civil movement issues in the GDR from the late 1960s. A conscientious objector is defined in this paper as someone who refuses to serve with arms in the military.

Attitude of the church toward conscientious objection

1. Idea and tradition of objection based on Christian beliefs

Christians in the ancient Roman Empire refused to bear arms and to kill, even in a battle. They believed firmly in the words of the Bible, i.e., "You shall not kill (Exodus 20-13)," "Do not resist one who is evil (Matthew 5-39)," "Pray for those who persecute you (Matthew 5-44)," "Put your sword back into its place: for all who take

the sword will perish by the sword (Matthew 26-52)." The negation of violence and love for an enemy were for them reasons for refusing to serve in the army. "Happy are those who are persecuted because they do what God requires; the Kingdom of heaven belongs to them!(Matthew 5-10)." Not a few of them were executed for those beliefs and have been regarded as martyrs ever since. It was said that Christians could not serve in any army without violating God's precepts. However, with the Imperial Ordinance of Milan in 313 AD, Constantine I made Christianity the officially recognized religion of the Empire, which meant that the Church could now have the protection and other advantages of the Empire. From this time Christians were excommunicated from the Church when they refused to serve in the army of the Empire. The Church obliged its people to serve in "just wars."

This mainstream Christian perspective gave rise over the centuries to various sects seeking to reconnect with the origins of Christianity. The

Church of the Brethren in Germany in the 18th Century, the Friesland Mennonites in the 16th Century and the Quakers in the 17th Century in England all advocated non-violence and contributed to the development of conscientious objection. Forced to emigrate to America, they aroused a new social consciousness there. They made it clear that they would not bear arms and fight against native Americans. In doing so they forced the government to legislate in order to exempt them from military service.

It was not until after the Second World War that the right of objection was first taken into account in Europe. For a long time, those who refused to bear arms were only members of Christian sects. The mainstream Church denominations -- Catholic and Protestant groups -- had paid little attention to what these more peripheral Christian sects had been advocating. However, the horrors of two World Wars brought about a change in the position of the mainstream Church denominations. In 1949 a synod was held in Amsterdam, at which the mainstream Church discussed conscientious objection. It was declared that the Church would now support conscientious objection as the proper attitude of a Christian.

2. Attitude of the Church in the GDR to the issue of conscientious objection

About 80% of the GDR population in 1949 were members of the Protestant Church. Members of Protestant Church in the GDR had harsh experiences during the Second World War, when it had ingratiated with the State and allowed it to send many of its young members to the front. It therefore regarded the "Confessional Church (Bekennender Kirche)" in the Nazi period as a model in charting its own basic course. It saw its most important task as guaranteeing spiritual freedom. The Church in the GDR had lost most of its privileges in the State, and consistently supported conscientious objectors immediately from the end of the Second World War until the GDR's disbandment in 1990. The Church recognized that each individual could take a direct "action for peace" in society. It gave advice to

members who refused to serve in the army, and regarded them as good Christians. It also repeatedly requested the State to create legislation to guarantee the right of conscientious objection.

Conscientious objection in the GDR

1. Introduction of conscription in the GDR

On 13 August 1961, the Berlin wall was built. Fifteen days later, the National Defense Council decided to introduce general compulsory military service, and in January of the following year the law was put into force. In the first round in April 1962, 231 draftees refused to serve in the National People's Army. By the time the second draft was put forward, that number had climbed to 287. Almost all these objectors were Jehovah's Witnesses.

In response to the arrest of these people, the Protestant Church approached the government to request that it protect the freedom of conscience of a Christian, and in 1963 the government began to consider the issue of how to deal with those citizens who refused military service. As a result, the GDR Defense Council ordered the introduction of what it called "Construction Units (Baueinheiten)" within the National People's Army on 16 September 1964. Soldiers in these units served without any weapons. The government wanted objectors to be able to serve in the army, but to be isolated from other soldiers. In the government's view, conscientious objectors were "pacifists" and "hostile to the State."

There were a number of reasons why the East German government could not guarantee conscientious objection as a human right. One reason was that the East German Army was one of the most important members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Another was that the military forces of West Germany, over three times the size of the East German forces, could not be ignored.

At the same time, however, the East German government needed to avoid oppressing those citizens who refused to bear arms because of their consciences. West Germany's Basic Law has always assured the right of conscientious

objection as a basic human right. The East German government wanted to appear democratic in the international community and to make its people feel that East Germany was a better country than West Germany. The East German Constitution acknowledged freedom of religion and conscience. It was therefore important to assure these rights, at least in order to promote its reputation in the world. The government promoted the idea that the "the introduction of the Construction Units expresses true socialism and the guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion."

It was no longer a crime to choose not to bear arms. It is generally considered that the introduction of Construction Units gave rise to an increase in the number of conscientious objectors in the GDR.

2. Inner decision due to non-religious reasons

In the period following the introduction of conscription in the GDR, the majority of objectors were Christians, but there were also others who objected for non-religious beliefs. Not a few objectors in the GDR expressed their pacifistic attitude on the basis that the two world wars had been caused by Germans. The proliferation of nuclear weapons after World War II altered forever many people's perceptions of war. This led to some young people refusing to acknowledge their duty to serve in the army. East Germany's enemy was the Germany in the West. The possibility of fighting between Germans frightened many East German, particularly those who had families or other relatives in West Germany. The late 1960s saw more and more young people choosing the Construction Units, or in some cases, refusing even to serve in them. This growing tendency was influenced by international affairs at that time. In 1964 the United States intervened in Vietnam. Wretched pictures of the conflict on television screens shocked many people in the GDR. Conscientious Objectors in the GDR began to establish contacts with American objectors. In 1968, the East German Army invaded Prague as a member of the

Warsaw Pact Treaty army, and the "Prague Spring" ended. This case led to an increase in the number of conscientious objectors due to non-religious beliefs in the GDR. Not a few young people thought that they could not serve in an army which fired upon civilians.

The East German government promoted ideological policies of "delimitation" (Abgrenzung). It feared that Willy Brand's policy of Ostpolitik and the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanys would give East German citizens more chances to communicate with West German people. "Education to raise hostility against the West" was promoted especially amongst young people. In 1978 military training at school was made mandatory for 14 to 16-year-olds. This policy forced pupils, including girls, to be aware of the issue of whether or not to take up arms. The school training program did not even offer an alternative corresponding to the Construction Units. Previously, when a young man was called up, he had to make the difficult decision alone. But after this mandatory requirement was instituted, the issue was brought into the classroom. Construction Soldiers offered pupils a model to follow. Families and teachers became involved, and they began a movement calling for "education for peace."

Ex-Construction Units soldiers and total objectors provided this movement with their experiences and knowledge. The movement encouraged many people to think about conscientious objection and peace.

Conscientious objection as a form of civil disobedience

1. Conscientious objection seeking social reform

Those who refused to bear arms in the GDR decided to do so for their own conscience. But their experiences as Construction Units soldiers led them to work for social reform.

Construction Units soldiers had military officers. They were obliged to make a promise of loyalty in which they stated that they would fight against all enemies and obey their superior unconditionally. They were obliged to participate

in rush, march and operation drills with other soldiers. Other activities were also directly connected with military, such as repairing shooting ranges. In short, while not actually carrying arms, they were nevertheless soldiers.

In the army, they were subjected to ill treatment. Many were conscripted, for example, when they were almost 26 year old, the oldest age for calling up. At that age many of them already had families, but they were deliberately stationed far away from their home so that they could not see their family members during weekends. Their superiors would often cancel their leave without warning and without reason. Needless to say, such treatment made life extremely difficult for their families, especially those with small children. In addition, clergymen were often denied access to Construction Units soldiers in a post. Moreover, the threat of lifelong discrimination after their service was real. University entrance was scarcely possible.

Service in the Construction Units was always a very difficult choice for a young person in the GDR. People who chose these units would feel guilty for not completely refusing to serve in the army. They were trying to avoid the legal sanctions imposed on those who refused to serve. But through their experiences in the Construction Units, they were awakened to the necessity for social reform and they began activities seeking to relax social constraints. Not a few ex-Construction Units soldiers recall their experiences in the army as "a training period to confront the difficulty in a positive way."

The Construction Units did not guarantee the right of conscience, but provided young people with a place to meet each other. Their network activities gave East German citizens information about conscientious objection and showed that it was possible in reality. Ex-Construction Units soldiers or total objectors provided a vital nucleus for autonomous civil movements and their activities brought together large numbers of people.

2. Conscientious objection as a means of exodus

The East German government expelled 41,000 citizens from the country in 1984 and 30,000 in 1985. These were people who had been active in the civil movements which became popular in the 1970s and early 80s. Their expulsions served as an incentive for people who wanted to emigrate to the West. They thus declared their refusal to serve in the army because they wanted to be expelled for being on the "black list".

In the late 80s, the majority of conscientious objectors were people wishing to emigrate. One third of Construction Units troops in 1987 applied for emigration, and 70% of the people who came to churches in 1989 asking about conscientious objection were also in this group.

3. Legislation for non-military service by conscientious objectors

In the summer of 1989, thousands of East German citizens left their country daily through Hungary or Czechoslovakia. These chaotic circumstances showed that conscientious objectors had gradually achieved what they had set out to do. Pastor Harald Bretschneider, an ex-Construction Units soldier himself, allowed 50 conscientious objectors to serve in hospitals rather than in the Construction Units. The government lost its power after the Berlin Wall crumbled. Conscientious objection was discussed officially for the first time. A bill for civilian service, written by a group led by Bretschneider, was approved on 20 February 1990 and put into force on 1 March. This Ordinance for Civilian Service stipulated that citizens who refused to bear arms should be stationed in health, social or rescue activities or local government institutions. Those who wished to serve in civilian service would be called up between the ages of 18 to 23 years. They would serve for 12 months, the same length of time as for military service.

They would be stationed according to the discretion of the labor office. Those determinations would be examined by a local civil service committee, whose members were

often ex-Construction Units soldiers or total objectors. For the first call-up in May 1990 53,000 young citizens applied for 18,600 service places.

Conclusion

In East Germany only a few young people refused to serve in the army when conscription was first instituted. Their interest was primarily their own peace of mind. Their personal decision to protect their own consciences forced the government to deal with conscientious objection. But their experiences in the Construction Units led them to organize civil movements, and to become active in society. They insisted on their right to refuse to carry arms. Their movement encouraged many more people to participate. Conscientious objectors were important members of most civil groups during the *Wende*. For many GDR citizens who did not want to stay in the country, conscientious objection was a clear way to express non-confidence. The radical changes in the State in domestic and international affairs in

1989 finally brought about new legislation for civilian service. However just after it was put into force, East German citizens voted for early unification with West Germany in the election of 18 March. Eight months later the law was no longer necessary, with the German Democratic Republic's incorporation into the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990.

ICHIKAWA Hiromi has been a lecturer at Meitoku Junior College in Imabari since April 1996. Her master's thesis was on independent peace movements in the GDR. She has written a paper, "Church and Civil Movements in the GDR: Role and Limit of 'Church in Socialism'" and "'Construction Units (Baueinheiten)' in the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic: Soldiers That Aimed for a Constraint-Free Society." This paper is in part a summary of her thesis, "The Principles and Social Development of Conscientious Objectors in the German Democratic Republic," *Peace Studies*, No. 22, 1997.

Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ)

PSAJ had only 72 members when it was founded in 1973. Now with 750 registered individual members and 10 corporate members, it is one of the largest national peace research organizations in the world. PSAJ tries to maintain good relations with peace researchers and organizations around the world. We wish to extend our warm greetings to all peace researchers in the world and invite you to participate in our endeavors. If you happen to come to Japan, it may be possible to arrange a meeting with Japanese peace researchers during your visit. Please advise the PSAJ secretariat as far in advance as possible.

Activities:

- 1) study meetings & lectures
 - a) two major conferences every year
 - b) smaller ad hoc meetings
- 2) publications
 - a) *Peace Studies* (annals of PSAJ, in Japanese)
 - b) *PSAJ Newsletter* (in Japanese)
 - c) *Peace Studies Newsletter* (in English)
 - d) books and other publications
- 3) the coordination of national and foreign academic associations and other related institutions, as well as the promotion of intellectual exchange among researchers
- 4) research activities based on study commissions of PSAJ
- 5) various activities which are considered to be necessary and appropriate achieving the purposes of this Association

Membership:

Any national can apply for the PSAJ membership. If you are interested in becoming a member or wish to know more about PSAJ activities, please contact the secretariat.

Main Activities in 1997:

The spring session was held on 14-15 June 1997 at Kitakyushu University, Kitakyushu City with the main theme of "Asia and Human Rights." The fall session was held on 15-16 November 1997 at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo with the main theme of "Global Society and Peace: Agenda for Peace Studies in the 21st Century."

The contents of the latest issue of *Peace Studies* are as follows:

Peace and Security in Global Civil Society FUJIWARA Osamu / SAWADA Sinji

Special Theme: Peace and Security in Global Civil Society

Reflections on Nonviolent Defense TERAJIMA Toshio

New World Order of International Peace and the

Elimination of Nuclear Weapons KUROSAWA Mitsuru

British War Crimes Trials of Japanese HAYASHI Hirofumi

Domestic Regime Types and International Disputes:

The Democratic Peace Proposition Reconsidered ISHIDA Atsushii

Democratic Peace Theory as Intellectual Colonialism:

Beyond the Logic of Assimilation TOSA Hiroyuki

Southeast Asian Security and Democratization:

The Quest for Peace in the Post-Cold War Era SUDA Sueo

NGOs and the "New Policy Agenda" of Development Assistance TAKAYANAGI Akio

International Politics on Issue-area of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era:

The Role of Human Rights NGOs in the CSCE / OSCE Process MIYAWAKI Noboru

The Principles and Social Development of Conscientious Objectors

in the German Democratic Republic ICHIKAWA Hiromi

Humanitarian Intervention as Power Politics:

Its Basic Problems and Its Possibility MIYASAKA Naofumi

The Present State and Prospects of

International Peace Research Association KODAMA Katsuya

Book Reviews..... KIMIYA Tadashi

Research Activities of the PSAJ

**Peace Studies Association of Japan (*Nihon Heiwa Gakkai*)
(November 1995 - October 1997)**

President: OHNISHI Hitoshi
Vice-Presidents: MATSUO Masatsugu, SHUTO Motoko
Secretary General: ISHII Mayako

Council Members:

ALEXANDER Ronni	ANZAI Ikuro	ARASAKI Moriteru
FUJIWARA Osamu	FUKASE Tadakazu	HATSUSE Ryuhei
HIROSE Katsuya	HOSINO Akiyoshi	INOUCHI Kuniko
ISHII Mayako	ISOMURA Sanae	ITO Takayuki
KAMATA Sadao	KATSUMATA Makoto	KAWATA Tadashi
KIKKAWA Gen	KITAZAWA Yoko	KODAMA Katsuya
MAEDA Yasuhiro	MATSUO Masatsugu	MITSUHASHI Hiroshi
MOGAMI Toshiki	MURAI Yoshinori	MUSHAKOJI Kinhide
NEMOTO Hirotooshi	NISHIKAWA Jun	OGASHIWA Yoko
OKAMOTO Mitsuo	OHASHI Masaaki	ONISHI Hitoshi
OHSHIBA Ryo	OTA Kazuo	PARK I I
SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu	SATO Motohiko	SATO Yukio
SHINDO Eiichi	SHUTO Motoko	SUGIE Eiichi
SUZUKI Yuji	TAKAHASHI Susumu	TAKAHARA Takao
TAKAYANAGI Sakio	TODA Misato	USUI Hisakazu
WADA Shun	YABUNO Yuzo	YAMAUCHI Toshihiro
YAMAWAKI Keizo	YOKOYAMA Masaki	YUI Daizaburo

Chairpersons of Committees:

Program Committee: KIKKAWA Gen
Editorial Committee: HIROSE Katsuya
Overseas Liaison Committee: YAMAWAKI Keizo
Newsletter Committee: ISOMURA Sanae

PSAJ is a member of IPRA (International Peace Research Association). It was the host organization of the 1992 IPRA Conference in Kyoto.

PSAJ Secretariat (November 1997- October 1999)

c/o Prof. ISHII Mayako, Keisen University, 2-10-1 Minamino, Tama, Tokyo 206, Japan

tel: +81-42-376-8251 fax: +81-42-376-8219

E-mail : psaj @ keisen. ac.jp

URL : <http://wwwsoc.nacsis.ac.jp/psaj/>