

Peace Studies Newsletter

No. 18 (June 1999)

Peace Studies Association of Japan

日本平和学会

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OKINAWA: A Struggle for Peace and Autonomy 1995-1998

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Simple but intractable

Since the autumn of 1995 the US military base problem in Okinawa has become a central issue in Japanese politics and the Japan-US security relationship. The US base problem in Okinawa is, in essence, very simple. Though the area of Okinawa prefecture is only 0.6% of the total national land, 75% of all the US bases in Japan is concentrated in Okinawa. This disproportionately heavy military burden has for decades annoyed and threatened the Okinawan civil life. With the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by US Marines in September 1995 and the subsequent surge of the anti-base campaign in Okinawa, the Japanese and the US governments for the first time took up the US base problem in Okinawa as a serious political issue. The two governments organized the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO); and this committee drew up the report whereby the US

government agreed to return several military bases and facilities to Japan, including the notoriously dangerous Futenma Air Station, which is located in the midst of residential and school areas. However, though the return of Futenma Base surprised and delighted Okinawan people, all the returns of major bases and facilities in the SACO report were conditioned by securing their alternatives in Okinawa; and this condition led Okinawan people to ambivalent or negative reception of the SACO report. Masahide Ohta, the then Okinawan governor, finally rejected the alternative plan to Futenma Base in SACO; and the Japanese government in its turn refused to have any talks with Ohta as long as he stuck to the no-relocation-in-Okinawa position.

With all the campaigns and arguments, negotiations and maneuvers for more than three years since the tragic rape incident,

surprisingly, almost nothing about the US bases in Okinawa has changed (Live cannon exercises were transferred to the Japanese mainland.); and no hopeful prospects for substantial reduction of bases are in sight. Moreover, though Ohta received overwhelming public support when he confronted the Japanese government shortly after the rape incident, three years later he was rejected by none other than Okinawans for the next gubernatorial term and beat by a pro-government new face candidate. The base issue has seemingly returned to the start again with the new Okinawan governor. The rise and fall of Ohta in so short a period suggests how complex and intractable the Okinawa base issue becomes once the process of its solution is kicked off. Why is this apparently simple issue so difficult to solve? What is the heart of the matter? What was wrong with Ohta's strategy? Where is a way out, if any? This small essay tries to contribute to answering those questions by analyzing the process of the Okinawa base issue from the rise of the new anti-base campaign in 1995 to the defeat of Ohta in 1998.

The rise of the new anti-base campaign

Okinawan people have for decades complained about troubles caused by the US base; but only after the rape incident in 1995, an island-wide mass campaign against the US bases was launched in Okinawa. What are the factors that gave rise to the new campaign and its political strength?

First, though evils of foreign military bases have always annoyed Okinawan people, and anti-base campaigns have never ceased in Okinawa, the base problem has become less conspicuous to the Okinawan people as a whole since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The Japanese government has poured money and investment to Okinawa since the reversion; and that made Okinawan economy less dependent on the US bases and more prosperous in a material sense than before. In particular, the Japanese government raised the

land-lease rent of the US bases by several times higher than that under the American rule, and thereby secured the cooperation of landowners of the US bases. Landowners used to be the stronghold of the Okinawa anti-base movement because many of them were violently confiscated their life-supporting land by the US military government with small compensation; but now many of them are strong supporters of the government base policy. (However, a small portion of landowners has refused to cooperate with the government and to sign the land-lease contract. They are called 'anti-war landowner.')

Second, however, the long-overdue settlement of the base issue has accumulated the irritation in the mind of Okinawan people; and this latent dissatisfaction only needed some symbolic incident to burst out as a mass campaign. The source of this irritation is not only of tangible nature as in accidents and crimes, but also of political and moral nature. Okinawa has long been deprived of political and social autonomy to a significant degree because Okinawa's space, the land, waters, and the sky, has largely been occupied by or reserved for the US military; and Okinawa virtually has no controls over a large part of their own space. Besides, the anti-base sentiment has by and large been combined with the Okinawan pacifist tradition. The peace and anti-war sentiment has always had particular strength in Okinawan society due to the devastating historical experience of the Battle of Okinawa in the Pacific War. The outstanding feature of the Battle of Okinawa is the disproportional suffering and death of Okinawan civilians and the thorough destruction of Okinawan cultural heritage. Therefore, the peace and anti-war orientation has become at least latently the most important part of postwar Okinawan identity. It should also be noted that Okinawa's moral case against bases is not only based on this pacifist sentiment but also on the problem of its moral autonomy. The Okinawa bases have for decades been actually used for wars and numerous

military operations. Each operation might be justifiable even for some Okinawans; but Okinawans have no means to decide which one is to be admitted. War or the use of force is normally a very sensitive and controversial moral issue; but Okinawan people have long had no choice but to see a large part of their land being used for war regardless of whether they support it or not. This loss of moral autonomy is one fundamental source of the Okinawan anti-base sentiment.

Third, the victimization of a schoolgirl greatly shocked the Okinawan people and caused their serious self-reflection. Many citizens were not only raged at this abominable case but also felt terribly ashamed that they have virtually surrendered to the encirclement by the large military bases and thus failed to protect the part of the population that must by all means be protected by the society as a whole. They realized what has been a truism and therefore easily forgotten: how abnormal a society theirs is. That is why many people were deeply moved by the first words of Governor Ohta's address to the landmark mass rally on 21 October 1995 against the incident: "as head of Okinawa prefecture, I have to apologize the schoolgirl for failing to protect her dignity."

Fourth, the crucial factor that drove the Japanese government into serious reconsideration of the Okinawa base policy was Governor Ohta's refusal to cooperate with the government for land-lease contracts of the US bases. (One third of the land leased for the US bases in Okinawa are owned by private citizens; and therefore, the Japanese government has to renew contracts of the land-lease for certain intervals. The Japanese government legally needs the cooperation of municipal or prefectural governments to use the land of anti-war landowners against their will. Ohta's strategy took advantage of this rule. However, the land-lease law was amended April 1997 so that the legal status of the US bases would not be lost even with the defiance of local governments.) An Okinawan governor

for the first time confronted the government on the US base issue. The mass campaign crossing almost all sections of Okinawan society made possible Ohta's defiance policy; and Ohta's apparently bold decision as governor in turn encouraged citizens' active participation in the campaign, and drew the wide public support even from the Japanese mainland. With Ohta's defiance, the Japanese government had to face the prospect that the legal status of the US bases in Okinawa would soon partly be lost. Thus the Japanese and the US governments immediately took measures to pacify the anti-base feeling among Okinawan people. Concentration of the US bases in Okinawa means that if Okinawa's support, or at least its grudging acceptance, of bases is not secured, both Japan's security policy and the US global strategy would be in great difficulties. By hosting the large US bases, Okinawa in their turn holds hostages the Japanese and the US security policies. The governor's defiance policy along with the wide public support enabled Okinawa to have strong bargaining power over the government; and now the latter had to tackle the Okinawa base problem seriously.

Finally, the legal trouble about the land-lease that the government had to face, which turned out to be the crucial leverage for Okinawa, was only made available by the existence of the very small minority of landowners of the US bases that has stubbornly refused to contract with the government. These anti-war landowners have long been in a difficult social position: they have been pressured and harassed into submission through various means by the government; and most seriously, they have faced peer group pressure from neighboring landowners who have contracted with the government. The number of those anti-war landowners who have survived such hardship is naturally very small; and they have often been regarded as queer, and in any case considered to have no effectiveness as to the government base policy. However, had it not been for their stubbornness,

Ohta's defiance strategy would not have been made possible; and therefore the government's seriousness on the Okinawa base problem would not have been invoked at least to the extent that it actually was. After the autumn of 1995 anti-war landowners were for the first time appreciated by their fellow citizens. This fact points to the importance of a minority conscientious group. Anti-war landowners call themselves 'pilot lights' that guard Okinawan pacifist conscience and someday rekindle the latent pacifism of the wider public. Anti-war landowners played exactly the role of 'pilot lights' in the 'hot' autumn of 1995.

Governor Ohta's leadership

As noted, Governor Ohta's leadership was a decisive factor in awakening the Japanese government to the Okinawa base problem; and the governor's leadership was crucially important in the whole process of this problem. However, the following course of his leadership took peculiar turns. From the autumn of 1995 to the summer of 1996, Ohta exercised the strong leadership and commanded the overwhelming public support. However, Ohta abandoned the confrontational policy in September 1996; and his leadership thereafter was notably weakened. Particularly, since this change of policy was announced shortly after the prefectural referendum that demanded the reduction of Okinawa bases, which was one height of the popular anti-base campaign, Ohta's volte-face deeply disappointed those who strongly supported his policy. After the SACO report was released late 1996, Ohta swayed back and forth between the acceptance of the relocation-in-Okinawa plan in SACO and the rejection of that plan. The waters east off Nago, a northern city of 54000 in Okinawa Main Island, were designated as a candidate site for an offshore heliport to replace Futenma Base. As Ohta kept silent about the heliport plan, citizens of Nago took the initiative of holding a referendum over the proposed offshore heliport, which was actually held late 1997 and resulted

in NO. For more than a year, Ohta avoided making his own decision on this issue; and his indecision was severely criticized by both pro and anti-SACO groups. Finally, he declared the rejection of the offshore heliport plan early 1998; but the confrontational policy this time did not work well for him. He continued to lose political momentum, and lost the election. How can this sharp contrast of Ohta's leadership before and after September 1996 be explained?

The strength of Ohta's early leadership comes from the fact that his *moral* leadership alone could command strong political support during this period; and that Ohta, a leading academic of Okinawan history, was remarkably skillful in exercising the moral leadership, as was fully exemplified in Ohta's moving testimony at the Supreme Court in July 1996 on Okinawa's historical hardship. On the other hand, the Japanese government presented its own policy, responding to Ohta's challenge: the SACO report and, in particular, the return of Futenma Base. Therefore, what was required of Ohta after SACO was, above all, *political* leadership that could obtain public support for some concrete policy proposal. Yet, that was what Ohta could not, and would not, exercise. Ohta did not take trouble to close the gap between the government plan and the Okinawan public opinion that largely disfavored the base relocation plan. Why did he take such an attitude?

First, there is a serious structural difficulty or contradiction in the Okinawa base problem that should bother any Okinawan political leader. Okinawa's agony comes from too many and too large military bases that have occupied the small island for too long a period; but the very same conditions have made Okinawan economy and society heavily dependent on bases. Though the relative size of the military base economy has, as noted above, become smaller than before, municipal budgets to a significant extent rely on fiscal transfer from the central government in compensation for hosting bases. In addition, the fundamental

problem about Okinawan economy is that Okinawa has never had substantial local industry that can sustain local autonomy; and therefore, the alternative source of income to military bases and the fiscal assistance has never been persuasively presented. Thus landowners that depend on the land-lease rent for their living have adamantly opposed to the immediate return of bases. Base employees are also fearful of losing their jobs. The unemployment rate of Okinawa has always been two times higher than the national average; and nowadays the US bases are the very attractive workplace for young people. This problem has particular acuteness in the great recession that coincided with the last three years of Ohta's gubernatorial term. The structural weakness of Okinawan economy has led to its heavy dependence on the central government. Thus the economic assistance has been a decisive leverage for the Japanese government to secure Okinawa's acceptance of the oversized bases. Any Okinawan political leader faces the contradiction of confronting the central government on the base issue while economically heavily depending on it, particularly in the case of the conversion from the military base economy. Precisely, Ohta was trapped in this dilemma.

Second, however, exactly because Ohta for the first time successfully confronted Tokyo with strong public support, he had to face new difficulties and possibilities in addition to the old structural dilemma. What is new about the Okinawa base problem after the autumn of 1995 is that the Japanese and the US governments for the first time agreed to large scale relocation of bases within Okinawa in order to relieve the burden of Okinawa while keeping the US strategic requirements intact; and that the Japanese government is now very willing to make large scale public spending for Okinawa provided that Okinawa accepts the relocation plan of SACO. The return of Futenma Base is the core of this deal. Naturally, the two contrasting assessments are

possible for this proposal: 1) it is simply a relocation, not reduction, and therefore not a real solution; 2) it offers a good chance for Okinawa to remove the most dangerous base (Futenma) while receiving exceptionally generous public spending. The public opinion in Okinawa has been split into pros and cons though, as noted, the majority has always disfavored the relocation-in-Okinawa idea. What was extremely annoying to Ohta was that it seemed impossible to make a compromise between the two contrasting positions: to accept a new alternative base or not. The way out Ohta chose was to maintain that whether or not to accept an alternative base primarily depends on the negotiation between the central government and a municipality that is to host an alternative base; and that the best way to solve the problem is to seek the reduction of the US Marine force. In other words, Ohta simply passed the buck to a municipality, Tokyo, and Washington.

Thus Nago was to go through its own tough decision-making process. The mayor of Nago repeatedly asked for Ohta's leadership on this matter, but in vain. The rationale behind Ohta's indecision may be summarized as follows: 1) Ohta did not have confident criteria by which he could make a decision on the relocation problem; 2) a municipality that is to host an alternative base has the most serious interest in this matter, and therefore its opinion should be most respected; 3) thus, given the fact that the governor is not confident enough to persuade all the parties concerned into accepting his judgement, a decision on this problem should best be made between those which have a direct interest in it: a candidate municipality and the Japanese government. From Ohta's viewpoint, this indecision may be quite an honest and careful judgement; but it has several fatal defects.

First, the negotiation between the central government and a municipality as to an alternative base would almost inevitably turn into a virtual bribery deal between them:

government money solves all the troubles. Generally, the central government is almost infinitely more powerful than a municipality in terms of political and economic resources; and it is far beyond the institutional capacity of a municipality that it should make a substantial judgement on the important national security matter. Therefore, the negotiation would most likely simply be about how much compensation the central government affords to pay; and the national security policy, which requires the highest public virtue exactly because it entails life and death problems for a whole nation, would suffer moral degradation. Of course, if the national security policy has already established the solid legitimacy and entails no serious problems of fairness and equity among the nation at large, the negotiation between the government and a municipality would duly be a technical matter of compensation. However, the Okinawa base problem clearly does not come under that case. The core of the latter is the gross inequality to Okinawa prefecture in the distribution of the national security cost. Therefore, this problem must be solved first and foremost at the national level and then at the prefectural level.

Second, the decision-making on the base issue at the municipal level would inevitably involve very different levels of citizens' concerns, from an individual economic interest, through a community's own welfare and identity, to national and international peace and security, which can never be satisfactorily processed into a political consensus at the municipal level without appropriate rules and conditions established at higher levels of political society for the municipal decision-making. (How can you tell which is more important, world peace or the construction of a community hall?)

Third, therefore, particularly in the case of a small municipality of a low economic profile, which is most likely targeted as a candidate site, disputes over the base problem among citizens easily become heated and damage the solidarity among fellow citizens for community-building.

All these troubles and hazards actually came true in Nago. (However, this analysis does not mean that the actual referendum of Nago lacked legitimacy as a decision-making on the Okinawa base problem. On the contrary, given that those who should first take responsibility to solve the problem -- the central government, the nation as a whole, and the prefectural government -- all evaded their duties on this issue, many citizens of Nago, with all their difficulties, sensibly made too heavy a decision; and it had the incomparable legitimacy in a given situation and strongly influenced Ohta's final decision. Yet, the problem of capacity remains, as leaders of the referendum bitterly commented later.)

However, before denouncing Ohta's indecision, the agony of Ohta on this problem must fully be appreciated. Ohta, or any Okinawan governor, knew well the vital importance of securing assistance from the Japanese government to solve Okinawa's predicament. From this viewpoint, Ohta could not have rejected the relocation-in-Okinawa proposal. Ohta was searching for some compromise until the last moment of his final decision. In the end, Ohta decided to reject the offshore heliport plan. Three factors seem to have dictated this decision. First, Ohta felt that the construction of a new base with the agreement of Okinawa would weaken Okinawa's moral position against bases. (If Okinawans cooperate for the construction of a new base, they will thereafter have moral difficulty to protest about bases. Cooperation and compromise is only possible in a normal situation. The Okinawa base situation is quite abnormal.) Second, the construction of a new base would most likely lead to strong direct action resistance by Okinawans, and thus to a tragic clash between Okinawan people, which he by all means wanted to eschew. Third, Ohta had been desperately searching for the *volonté générale* of the Okinawan people on this matter for more than a year. The referendum of Nago offered a decisive cue to him in this regard; and

ordinary women's sincere and moving appeals to him seem to have finally convinced Ohta of what he should do.

Of course, the weakest point about the rejection of the offshore heliport plan is that the dangerous Futenma Base would remain intact; but both rejection and acceptance of the plan have their own merits and defects. (Which is more heartbreaking for an Okinawan governor, a helicopter crash or Okinawans' clash?) According to the opinion poll, the majority of Okinawan people supported his final decision; and although Ohta did not exercise active leadership, his reasoning of the final decision appears to be faithful to democratic principles. Yet, Ohta could never recover the political authority that he had once enjoyed in the early period. In order to understand the fall of Ohta, finally, one must examine how democratic his political method really was in dealing with the base problem.

The democratic method for the Okinawa base problem

Ohta's indecision was due to the fact that he had great difficulty in finding the will of the Okinawan people on the base problem. In this sense, Ohta tried hard to be democratic in his decision-making. However, the two most important decisions of Governor Ohta after September 1995 had in fact seriously weakened his leadership. One is that he abandoned the defiance policy in September 1996; and the other that he rejected the offshore heliport plan early 1998. These two decisions are diametrically different in nature: the former is cooperation with Tokyo; the latter defiance. However, both failed to persuade those who were disappointed by his decision, hence his loss of political momentum. The reason why his decision lacked persuasion to those who were most needed to be persuaded (such persuasion does not count for much to supporters of his decision) is, as one leading Okinawan political commentator has pointed out, that the criteria of his decision were not disclosed beforehand;

and that therefore his decision lacked objectivity and looked quite arbitrary. In the first case, Ohta had first shown the strong moral leadership; and therefore the attentive public had expected that he would act according to the moral principle. Then, he did the opposite. After this volte-face, he repeated the necessity of a realistic approach; and the Japanese government and pro-SACO people duly expected that he would in the end cooperate for the SACO plan. Then, again he did the opposite.

This criticism does not mean that politicians should not change their policy. It means that political leaders should always make clear what their rules of conduct are to the public so that the public can confirm their trust in their leaders, and so that a controversial decision can receive the support from at least part of the opposition. This is particularly important for a morally divisive issue. Thus, despite the democratic appearance of Ohta' leadership, Ohta was in fact undermining the democratic solution for the base problem, and thus paved the way to his own defeat. It may be contended that the sincere and careful leadership of Ohta as an outstanding academic led to the glorious moral leadership in the early stage, and then to the failure of political consensus-building later. Though Ohta tried hard to *find* the will of the Okinawan people, there was no such united public opinion, as Ohta himself admitted; and what was pressingly required of the Okinawan governor was to *shape* a consensus among the divided Okinawan people through the democratic method. Transparency and objectivity in the decision-making process are the key to it.

Conclusion: is there a way out?

As was noted, a compromised solution was almost impossible for the Okinawa base problem. Therefore, a successful policy depends on how much persuasion it can have to the opposition. Of course, the very essence of the Okinawa base problem is, as Ohta repeatedly

pointed out, that Japanese people as a whole have unjustly evaded the burden of the national security and imposed its outrageous cost almost exclusively to Okinawa. Therefore, any persuasive policy must make clear that the gross injustice built in the Japanese national security regime is to be at least on the way to being rectified, if not immediately eliminated.

If Okinawa accepts an alternative base inside Okinawa, some arrangements must be contrived to show that it will not damage the moral integrity of Okinawa so that the acceptance of a new base will in no sense be regarded as lending a hand to the fundamental injustice of the whole Okinawa base situation. If not, a tragic clash between Okinawans might be unavoidable. To attach a time limit to the use of a new base is one solution. This is the new Okinawan governor's election promise. This method, however, would be very difficult for the US government to accept though something close to the time-limit arrangement might be devised.

The strict no-new-base policy may be difficult to pursue under the present economic difficulties. In fact, the primary cause of Ohta's defeat has widely been considered to be Okinawa's current economic plight (and Ohta's trouble with Tokyo). Moreover, in addition to the problem of political feasibility of transferring bases out of Okinawa, this option has a serious defect that it is unlikely to draw

the large economic assistance from Tokyo, which would be vitally important when bases are actually eliminated. Yet, this option has been a morally legitimate policy all the time; and its moral strength is still a very high hurdle for realists and the government despite Ohta's defeat.

Thus, a possible way out may be some combination of the moral integrity of the no-new-base policy and the political and economic convenience of the relocation-in-Okinawa policy. Policy innovation that makes such combination possible is urgently required of both sides along with strictly democratic policy process. In any case, a careful examination of the success and failure of the Ohta administration will be a helpful guide.

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Japanese Government and Its Environmental Policy : Afterthought of the Kyoto Conference

MATSUSHITA Kazuo

Introduction

This paper reviews the relationship between environmental policies and the role of governments based on the experiences of the preparatory process, results, and developments that followed the third session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP3) held in Kyoto, December of 1997. The two points I would most like to discuss in this essay are the role of the government of Japan and the direction of the reform of the environmental administrative system.

The significance of the COP3 from the history of civilization

The difficult debates and negotiations were finally settled in Kyoto after an extra day of discussion and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol which mandated industrialized nations to reduce their emission of greenhouse gasses (GHGs). It is true that much more remains to be discussed in the future, such as the levels of the emission reduction targets and the building of an international framework for emission trading, joint implementation, and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, it is beyond question that this protocol marks the starting point of political measures to prevent global warming in the twenty-first century. The protocol is especially significant because it gave legally binding power to control the emission rates of GHGs in industrialized nations. To be exact, the EU, U.S.A., and Japan are being asked to reduce the average emission of gasses such as carbon dioxide by 8%, 7%, and 6% respectively from the emission levels of 1990 in the years 2008 to 2012. The total emission from all industrialized nations combined is expected to be reduced by 5.2%. A message is clear. The consumption of fossil fuel cannot be increased, and economic activities with a premise of increasing fossil fuel consumption are no longer permissible. This means that it is inevitable for nations or societies to switch from conventional economic activities if they want to survive in the next century.

Why did the negotiations at Kyoto take so long to settle? There seems to be a "clash of civilizations", or many different ways that people view civilization in the twenty-first century. Each nation at COP3 was asked to choose whether they wished to stay in a "throw away industrialized civilization" based on mass-production, mass-consumption, and mass-disposal, represented by the United States and followed by Japan; or if they intended to switch drastically to "metabolistic civilization" based on a sustainable and

material recycling society. The difference of opinion at COP3 was a phenomena of the difference of these two choices. Furthermore, there are difficult questions in the background. How can we be fair to both the present and future generations, and also find a balance between the "self-interests of nations or private companies" and "global public interests"?

Evaluation of the COP3

Long before it was actually held, many people anticipated difficult negotiations and conflicts at the COP3 due to the importance of the agenda. Why, then, did the Government of Japan choose to host such a difficult conference?

Japan first volunteered to be the host of the conference at COP1 held in Berlin, in April of 1995. I suspect that the officials of the Japanese government at that time did not have any clear strategy behind inviting the COP3. However, as one of the delegates from the Japanese government, I personally held the following three expectations in inviting the COP3.

The first expectation was to raise the awareness of the Japanese public concerning the issue of global warming, and I was hoping that COP3 would be the driving force in that arena. The second expectation was that a clear decision would be made at COP3 that could serve as a basis for setting a concrete strategy for promoting measures within Japan to prevent global warming. The initial aim of the framework convention on climate change was a desirable goal that did not have any legally binding provisions. The Action Plan to Arrest Global Warming, which was put forth in October 1990 by the Government of Japan was a mere compilation of related policies of governmental agencies which in reality did not possess any legally binding power. Thus the plan was not effective in promoting concrete measures to prevent global warming. I hoped that based on the legally binding GHGs emissions reduction targets expected to be adopted at COP3, a systematic ground for

domestic measures would be established. The third expectation I held was for an international contribution in the environmental field. I believed that it would be meaningful if Japan could exert its leadership in creating an international agreement against global warming, the biggest environmental issues mankind faces.

Contrasted with these expectations, the results of the Kyoto Conference could be evaluated as follows:

As for raising public awareness of global warming, substantial results were attained due to the unprecedented campaigns extended by governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as extensive news coverage of COP3 by the mass-media. In particular, a so-called "epistemic community" on climate change composed of experts from various fields was formed in Japan during the process leading up to COP3. This epistemic community is expected to continue to function as an important agent in building an international regime on global warming and to propose environmental policies in the future, all while overcoming short-term national self-interests.

As for the second point, it was a significant achievement that a "Kyoto Protocol" was adopted and that legally binding GHGs reduction targets were agreed upon. The most urgent task now for the Government of Japan is to set up a framework of environmental administration which could be responsible for executing various measures to attain the targets mandated in the Kyoto Protocol. So far, the Japanese administrative system responsible for combatting global warming has been an irresponsible one.

In the Action Plan to Arrest Global Warming, there were objectives and targets to control the emission of GHGs. However, there were no direct links between these targets and the various policy measures listed in the Action Plan. The policy measures in the Plan were in reality a compilation of measures conducted by

ministries and agencies which were supposed to indirectly contribute to the mitigation of global warming or the reduction of GHGs emission. As a result, no one (or no ministry or agency) was held responsible for the success or failure to attain the targets of the Action Plan.

Concerning the third point as to whether the Government of Japan lived up to the expectation of the world and exercised leadership as the host country, I regret to say that there remains a big question mark. The roles expected of the host country include not only managing the conference properly, but also exerting a kind of international leadership which facilitates a constructive agreement by the participating countries through negotiations at the conference. Also, as a member of industrialized countries, Japan should have demonstrated concrete domestic measures to arrest global warming.

According to an analysis presented in *Global Environmental Politics* by Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown published in 1996, Japan was not a "lead state" in international regime formulation on global warming, like the European Community is. Rather, she may be classified as a "swing state" (note). In fact, among the most often heard statements within the Japanese Government delegation were, "We should not isolate the United States," and "The effectiveness of the Convention and the Protocol will not be guaranteed without the participation of the United States." This indicates that the environmental diplomacy of Japan is still following the path laid down by the United States. On the other hand, the United States did exert leadership in formulating several international frameworks such as emissions trading, joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which enabled her to accept more stringent GHGs reduction targets than originally expected.

In the final stage of the COP3, direct negotiations among the Heads of Government took place including direct communication

between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton. This final process skipped conventional domestic consensus building procedures among related governmental ministries and agencies, which ultimately resulted in the acceptance of a higher GHGs reduction target for Japan. The impact of this phenomenon is yet to be seen. A higher than expected target may result in additional domestic measures to reduce GHGs. On the other hand, it may cause internal conflicts and problems among ministries and agencies in attaining the target.

Problems associated with the decision making process of COP3

The following problems were encountered in the preparatory process of COP3 by the Government of Japan, particularly in formulating Japanese proposals.

First of all, there was a lack of transparency in decision making. Very little information was disclosed by the Government about the options of counter measures to mitigate global warming and how to carry out such measures. Also, there were few opportunities for public participation. The government organized joint meetings of related advisory councils, which turned out to be ceremonial.

Secondly, consideration of proposals by the Government of Japan for COP3 was reduced to a mere battle game or series of debates among governmental ministries and agencies in Kasumigaseki, particularly between MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and the Environment Agency.

Moreover, there was no player who acted as a coordinator or mediator in this debate. The Director General of the Environment Agency is at the same time the Minister in charge of Global Environmental Affairs. Therefore, he is supposed to have the authority to coordinate matters relating to global environmental issues on behalf of the Prime Minister. In reality, he does not have the authority and is not empowered to do so. The Prime Minister gives a

“go sign” on matters which are granted consensus by the cabinet members, i.e. ministries and agencies concerned. Conversely, if there was no consensus, the issue would not be taken up by the Prime Minister. Also, until a consensus was reached, all the internal debates and related information were kept confidential. However, as stated earlier, at the final stage of negotiation of the Kyoto Conference, the issue came up and was brought directly before the Prime Minister for his judgement. As a result, the inter-state consensus building process overrode the domestic consensus building process.

Also, who was supposed to act as a coordinator or mediator in arriving at an agreement on the global warming issue, particularly on setting GHGs reduction targets? Under the existing parliamentary democracy in Japan, the parliament or politicians are expected to act as coordinators and facilitate discussion to arrive at national policies. In practice, they did not function. It was only in October of 1997, when a so-called Japanese proposal for COP3 was leaked to the media, that some politicians started to act. This illustrates that there are no concrete political or social groups in Japan which would express their wish to safeguard the global environment and to build a sustainable society through voting practice and lobbying politicians.

How about the roles played by and the performance of NGOs? Japanese environmental NGOs, despite their limited time in preparation of COP3, played a significant role. In particular, Kiko Forum (or Climate Forum Japan), a network of more than 200 organizations throughout the country, carried out various campaigns, invited NGO members to Kyoto from developing countries, and added a remarkable new page in the history of Japanese NGOs. However, as the Kiko Forum itself admitted in its self-evaluation, Japanese NGOs as a whole failed to influence the policy making process effectively. In fact, Japanese NGOs are still very small in

size and therefore weak in influencing politics. However, they will constitute an important part in the coming civil society of Japan in which diversified views will be expressed and incorporated in decision making. We should clarify the structural reasons for why they were unable to influence the policy making process and how the structure should be modified in order to have a more democratic and open decision making process.

In conclusion, in order to arrive at an effective set of global warming policies and implement them in an efficient and fair manner, we need a new, open forum or mechanism for public policy debate, in which a wide range of people will be involved and can participate.

The role of government in the age of the global environment: a challenge to environmental policy system reform

Contemporary global environmental issues, represented by global warming, cannot be solved by the voluntary actions of individual citizens and business enterprises alone. Voluntary actions and efforts to change the life styles of individuals are of course essential. However, if too much emphasis is given to voluntary initiatives, we may lose sight of the significance and enormity of the whole issue, and may give a false impression that small actions by individuals can prevent global warming.

In a modern society such as the one in Japan, most of the options which an individual chooses accompany or result in a significant environmental impact, such as the emission of GHGs. These options are structurally built into Japanese society. Therefore, without a fundamental change in the existing socio-economic structure, we cannot hope to win a battle against global warming. The issue then is how to transform the existing socio-economic structure to one which is more environmentally benign and which encourages and rewards environmentally conscious voluntary actions. This is essentially the role expected to be

played by the government.

In that transformation process, due regard must be paid to free choice by individuals. At the same time, the important role for government is to set rules and guidelines for the proper use of common social capital by individuals, and to monitor and guide their implementation.

Following are some of the specific necessary elements for environmental policy system reform, paying particular attention to coping with global warming:

---The first is to set clear policy objectives. By doing so, the government can send a clear message to various economic entities which constitute the society.

---The second is to establish a legally binding domestic framework with a clear objective of preventing global warming. This should take the form of a new law to be deliberated and adopted by the Diet, which specifically aims at addressing global warming. Since there is no law so far in Japan which specifically deals with the issue of global warming, a new law is essential in attaining the legally binding numerical GHGs emission target set out in the Kyoto Protocol. The new bill to arrest global warming which was submitted by the Government to the Diet and is now under deliberation is not adequate from this perspective but at least it is a step forward in the right direction.

---The third is to try to combine various policy measures and options in order to reduce GHGs emissions efficiently and effectively. In addition to regulatory measures which are typically used in combating traditional industrial pollution, encouragement of voluntary actions, as well as economic incentive measures which make use of market mechanisms should be developed and used. Particularly, the introduction of economic incentive measures such as carbon or environmental tax should be considered more seriously since they are effective means of lowering GHGs emissions fairly and effectively. The introduction of these

taxes should be considered in a wider context of "green tax reform".

---The fourth is to reform the existing administrative structure and set up an administrative organization endowed with the authority and power to prepare, plan and implement policies and measures integrally related to the global environment. This organization should be accountable for the results of policies and measures implemented. At the same time, government priorities should be made clear. The newly planned Environment Ministry should at least be empowered in those major policy areas and measures which are essential to build a society with a sound material cycle. These include waste management and recycling, and water and forest management.

---The fifth is to make the decision making process more transparent. Through providing opportunities for more public participation in the decision making process and by disseminating information more openly, a new forum for public policy debate should be formed. Political leadership is essential in this regard.

---The sixth is to promote more comprehensive environmental assessment.

---The seventh is to give guidance to technology development by promoting social objectives which incorporate environmental consideration.

With the fundamental changes in the existing socio-economic system as well as in the formulation of global environmental policies mentioned above, we hope to approach a more sustainable and environmentally sound society in the twenty-first century in Japan.

Note: "The most important actions by state actors in global environmental politics are those relating to the process of regime formation. In negotiations of an environmental

regime, a state actor may play one of four possible roles: lead state, supporting state, swing state, or veto/blocking state. A lead state has a strong commitment to effecting international action on the issue, moves the process of negotiations forward by proposing its own negotiating formula as the basis for agreement, and attempts to get the support of others state actors. A supporting state speaks in favor of the proposal of a lead state in negotiations. A swing state may demand significant concessions to its own interests as a price for going along with an agreement. A veto or blocking state either opposes a proposed environmental regime outright or tries to weaken it to the point that it cannot be effective." (Porter, Garreth and Brown, Janet Welsh, *Global Environmental Politics*, Westview Press, 1996, p.32)

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An Approach to Eliminate NGOs through Capacity Building of the Local Population

HARAGO Yuta

Introduction

In this monograph I will advocate a rather challenging agenda: an approach to eliminate non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and instead, to facilitate capacity building of the local population. The discussion will be based on my personal empirical observations through working experiences in various NGO communities, specifically in Brazil where I resided during 1991-1997 as a researcher and a consultant for various local, national as well as international NGOs and research institutions.

Emergence of NGOs in the Amazon

In Brazil there are more than 1,500 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working for environmental conservation and social development, recognized by the Brazilian environment agency - IBAMA. Active NGO activities in the country reflect a burgeoning democracy restored in 1985, after the end of a military regime which had been in power since 1964.

Extensive deforestation accompanied by rapid colonization of the Amazon since the 1970s brought about irreparable damage to the forest ecosystem while causing serious consequences for the local inhabitants of the region. It led to the demise of various indigenous communities as well as the destruction of traditional rubber tappers' estates.

Such consequences have aroused worldwide concern since the 1980s, and there has been a call for the conservation of vast tracts of the Amazon forest, as well as the safeguarding of the survival and well-being of the traditional forest dwellers. The disorderly migration of colonists into the region also called for resolution of the problem of unequal land

distribution in Brazil.

These concerns formed a basis for the flourishing emergence of innumerable NGOs pressing to support various local populations in the Amazon. Those NGOs usually opened a headquarters in urban centers, with staff normally comprised of a group of middle-class city dwellers who had graduated from a university in the southeastern or southern part of the country, such as Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro.

Three types of NGOs in the Amazon

Compared to their Japanese counterparts, many Brazilian NGOs were larger in staff, politically more dynamic and influential, and more professional in their technical capability. Major international NGOs were also active in Brazil working on environmental and social issues, including OXFAM, WWF and Nature Conservancy, in addition to innumerable church-related charity organizations.

In the Amazon, NGOs were largely classified into three categories according to the type of local population that they worked for: 1) rubber tappers, 2) indigenous peoples, and 3) small farmers.

The three local population groups - indigenous peoples, rubber tappers and small farmers - have historically been enemies with each other in the struggle over disputed land tenure in the Amazon. Figure 1 illustrates such a relationship of struggle among them.

The territory originally inhabited by the indigenous communities in the Amazon was constantly invaded and occupied by outside colonists. A large-scale migration occurred since the late nineteenth century to exploit latex in the Amazon, politically motivated by the government. This created a rubber tapper

population in the region. Since the 1960s a series of massive development projects were introduced to the region under the military regime, bringing about the influx of agricultural colonists as well as cattle ranchers.

Conflicts among NGOs in the Amazon

During my three-year stay between 1991-94 in the western Amazonian state of Rondonia, various forms of political conflict were observed among NGOs supporting each type of the local population, probably reflecting the historical conflicts among the above three types of local population.

Figure 2 shows such a situation of conflict among the NGOs, which include a group of environmental organizations, in addition to NGOs supporting rubber tappers, indigenous peoples and small farmers.

As shown in Figure 2, environmental organizations tended to be in confrontation with the NGO group assisting small farmers with land distribution in the Amazon. This group in turn was in confrontation with those supporting traditional forest dwellers such as indigenous peoples and rubber tappers. NGOs supporting indigenous peoples and rubber tappers were also in confrontation with each other in the attempt to maximize indigenous territories and extractive reserves.

NGOs' role for the local population

Many NGOs were established to provide necessary 'technical assistance' for the local population so that they could organize themselves and articulate their needs for public services such as health and education while demanding recognition of their land rights.

To further that goal, various NGOs in the Amazon embarked on various types of diagnostic research on the environment, land-use as well as socioeconomic aspects of the local communities. Since the late 1980s, a series of seminars, conferences and workshops have been organized throughout the Amazon and urban centers, in the attempt to facilitate social

organization of the local population. The community leaders as well as national and international speakers used to be invited to such fora to advocate the creation of extractive reserves and the demarcation of indigenous areas, while denouncing the extensive invasion into designated areas by colonists, ranchers, loggers and miners.

As a result, a number of rubber tappers' and indigenous peoples' organizations were established by the early 1990s in the Amazon, such as National Rubber Tappers' Council (CNS) and Brazilian Amazon's Indigenous Organizations' Coordination (COIAB), together with innumerable small farmers' associations and cooperatives. Such organizations were facilitated with great political as well as financial support obtained from various NGOs specialized in public policy, legal instruments and scientific capability.

The articulation of social demands by the local population, calling for land rights, sustainable resource management, and improvement in production, education and health, was also greatly facilitated by the supporting NGOs, which organized various types of seminars, conferences and workshops.

Project design by the NGOs

Based on the results of research and seminar findings, these cause-related NGOs embarked on designing various projects calling for the implementation of social services for the local population in the Amazon, usually with the following components:

- 1) recognition and consolidation of the local populations' land rights,
- 2) sustainable land-use planning by way of ecological-socioeconomic zoning,
- 3) provision of social services in education and health,
- 4) introduction of a sustainable production system such as agroforestry, with improvement of transportation and marketing opportunities.

Designing a high-quality project proposal sufficient to capture donated funds from a variety of funding sources would require good technical capability, which was precisely the area of expertise those NGOs demonstrated.

During the course of time, however, the NGOs tended to become 'spokesmen' of the local population, virtually representing the local population at various national as well as international speaking opportunities. Further, the NGOs were inclined to act as if they were the local population themselves in relation to funding agencies, virtually representing the local population's interests and virtue.

The mechanism of the NGOs' intervention

Figure 3 illustrates how an NGO intervenes between the local population and a funding agency. By way of presenting a variety of project proposals representing the local population's needs, the funds become available for NGOs to execute projects. Administering those funds, NGOs provided the local population with various forms of technical assistance.

Figure 4 outlines a number of areas in which the NGOs provided technical assistance for the local population. The kind of technical assistance provided by the NGOs would include the following, according to the type of local population in the Amazon.

1) rubber tappers

- creation of extractive reserve at the federal, state and municipal level.
- producing valued-added latex-related products while stabilizing the rubber price
- introduction of forest management systems including harvesting timber in rubber tappers' estates, in an attempt to generate and diversify income sources.

2) indigenous peoples

- demarcation of indigenous areas guaranteeing land rights,
- providing education and health services,

- introduction of a forest management system managed by indigenous communities themselves to halt and control illegal logging within the indigenous areas.

3) small farmers

- promoting orderly colonization and appropriating lands for landless farmers,
- facilitating sustainable land use by introducing agroforestry systems,
- establishing producers' associations and cooperatives for value-adding and better marketing of their produce.

Who is supporting whom ?

The structure in which the above three agents - an NGO, a funding agency and the local population - function as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, however, tended to cause a series of inconveniences and negative consequences for the local population, in spite of supposed benefits of implementing such projects.

An NGO once established tends to pursue its own means of survival as an institution by performing an intermediary role between a funding agency and the local population. Although technical assistance projects were intended to benefit the local population, projects were increasingly designed for self-serving purposes to be able to support themselves, principally in the effort to maintain various office expenses including the staff payroll. It was observed that in a sense it was a part of the local population who virtually supported a community of NGOs, rather than the contrary as is normally perceived.

In the south such as in Latin America, NGOs' activities are heavily dependent on the financial contributions from their counterparts in the north as well as from various aid agencies. In some cases, the non-governmental sector is so entrenched in the political system that it serves as a 'shadow cabinet' or the political opposition power.

In Bolivia, for example, a group of bureaucrats in a given government often find

their seats with various titles within NGOs, as they have to leave their office every time the election is won by the opposite power. In many 'developing' countries the public sector plays a significant role in their economy. A large portion of the population finds employment at government offices and various public institutions.

A variety of NGOs often provides important job opportunities, financially supported by bilateral and multilateral aid schemes, in so far as such organizations are concerned with public interest in environmental conservation, resource management and social development. These institutions are legitimately recognized and registered by the government, serving as semi-governmental agencies.

In many developing countries, NGOs tend to act as institutions to provide jobs for a group of high-profile technocrats, who carry out research about the local population and will continue to do so by writing new project proposals. The more emphasis is given to the misery of the local population, the higher is the chance for a proposal to be approved, securing a means of survival for the institution.

NGOs as a 'broker' in project financing

In such circumstances, NGOs would function as the 'lord of misery' feeding on the local population, while serving as a 'broker' in aid project financing. It was a natural consequence then that the local population, as they are increasingly aware of the situation, started to vehemently denounce such NGOs with regard to their abuse of power and lack of legitimacy in speaking and acting on their behalf.

Among groups of the local population in the Amazon, indigenous peoples were the most severely exploited, illegitimately represented by various NGOs established among outside 'supporters'. It was also observed that international NGOs often misrepresented the indigenous peoples in promoting self-serving conservation values.

Conflicts with such NGOs became prevalent,

as the local population began organizing themselves with the establishment of their own class organizations. Such conflicts were most notable between the indigenous groups and NGOs supposedly assisting them.

Interestingly, conflicts were less evident among the rubber tappers', indigenous peoples' and small farmers' organizations. Possible explanations may be the following.

First, a class organization already shares a distinguished identity as being organized by rubber tappers, indigenous peoples and small farmers themselves. On the other hand, an organization for a cause is based on a certain ideological background, such as 'saving the rainforest' and 'saving indians,' and is constantly pressed to revitalize the cause they stand for. Such organizations tend to become aggressive in the attempt to secure their identity, and are inclined to run into political conflicts with other cause-related organizations.

Meanwhile, the class organizations, especially those comprised of indigenous peoples and rubber tappers, rather tended to be united together as 'forest peoples' jointly seeking for political support from the public.

The second reason is financial. A cause-driven organization seeks to capture political support and subsequent financial assistance. In so doing they are tempted to 'upgrade' their cause while 'downgrading' other competing organizations, in the effort to have more funding dispersed for the cause they are defending. For example, those organizations struggling to create extractive reserves for rubber tappers tended to neglect the need for land demarcation of the indigenous peoples, in the struggle to win limited funds from government sources.

As NGOs sought for survival as political as well as economic entities, various class organizations started to condemn the prevailing practice of illegitimate solicitation of funds through submission of project proposals in the name of a community, often without their

knowledge. Such projects normally brought about dubious benefits for the community, in the absence of transparency and accountability in project administration.

Further, a group of class organizations increasingly started to challenge those 'supporter' NGOs, by way of searching for political support by themselves, as well as seeking for financial assistance without the intervention of NGOs.

Based on the above discussion we can summarize the principal problematic areas for NGOs' role as the following:

- 1) Illegitimate representation of the local population in many speaking opportunities and in project formulation for funding,
- 2) The lack of transparency and accountability in project administration in relation to the local population.

Capacity building for independent project administration

The identification of the above suggests the following immediate measures to be taken to rectify the negative relationship that can exist between an NGO and the local population:

- 1) Any initiative for an NGO to intervene in the affairs of the local population should be based on a clear mutual accord so as to delineate concretely the kind of technical assistance to be provided by the NGO.
- 2) A clear accord of representation among the two parties also needs to exist whenever the NGOs seek for opportunities to speak on behalf of the local population.
- 3) A full dialogue needs to exist between the local population and the NGO on the formulation of a project for funding.
- 4) An organization represented by the local population themselves should be the principal entity to design, submit and execute the project.

Further, I would like to suggest a more drastic approach in which there is no room or necessity

for NGO intervention, as illustrated by Figure 6.

The approach principally advocates the elimination of NGOs by strengthening and empowering the local populations themselves. First, the social organization of the local population can be facilitated by networking of those local populations who have achieved organization by themselves, usually through establishing associations legally recognized and registered by public institutions.

Likewise, the articulation of social demands can also be facilitated with support of a group of the local population succeeding in the job. In designing a project, a high-priority component should be training and capacity building for the local population to nurture a specialist who can provide fellow community members with varied technical assistance.

Specialists necessary to be trained with project funds would include a lawyer, a doctor, a nurse, an economist and an agronomist, as well as a project manager. In addition, community members, who are able to make use of their indigenous knowledge and local experiences should be trained as specialists in land-use planning and resource management.

In this manner, the local population will be able to develop and manage a project by themselves, without depending on technical assistance provided by NGOs. The local population will also be able to articulate their further demands and development needs through their own initiatives.

In the future, they will have established a complete project cycle managed by the local population themselves, through the following components:

- 1) the articulation of social demands,
- 2) project design and solicitation of funding,
- 3) execution and evaluation of the project to identify further demands and development needs.

The above model would politically support democratization of the current social development process, in which the local

population and its class organization should be involved as an autonomous leading player, rather than an object of a project designed and maneuvered by outside agents such as NGOs and development institutions.

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
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Figure 1 Three Types of Local Population in the Amazon



Source: Allegretti M H. (1994), FUNAI (1998), IBGE (1985, 1998)

Figure 2 Political Conflicts among NGOs in the Amazon




Figure 3. NGO Intervention between the Local Population and a Funding agency.




Figure 4. NGOs' Intervention in Providing Technical Assistance and Project Formulation




Figure 5. Conflicts among NGOs and the Local Populations' Organizations.





Figure 6. Autonomy of the Local Population and a Project Cycle of without NGO intervention.



The United Nations and the Multinational Force in the Somalia Conflict

OIZUMI Keiko

Why should we continue focusing on Somalia?

Somalia was called "a failed-state" or "a non-state" when the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations (UN) started to deliberate the Somalia conflict early in 1992. From then until March 1995, the UN's management of Somalia was compounded by a conventional type of peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM I), the U.S.-led multinational force (UNITAF) and a new type of peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM II). Nevertheless, Somalia is still now an anarchic country, and sporadic hostilities continue.

Though the UN ended its peace operations without any fruitful results in 1995, we should not forget the way how it was involved in Somalia, because it set "a precedent" for the new UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era. The UN first authorized a peace-enforcement operation to a big-power-led multinational force for the purpose of humanitarian relief under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the operation was handed over to a UN peacekeeping operation.

In this paper, we take special notice of the big-power-led multinational force, i.e., the U.S.-led UNITAF (Unified Task Force) in Somalia, and examine what it was, why and how it was created, paying attention to the policies of the UN Secretary-General and the United States, in order to think about possibilities of UN peace operations in the post-Cold War world.

A new type of UN involvement in a conflict

In its resolution 794, adopted on 3 December 1992, the Security Council determined that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia" constituted "a threat to international peace and security" and authorized the UN Secretary-General and Member States "to use all necessary means" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to

establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. What does this resolution mean?

It is unquestionable that "all necessary means" under Chapter VII in resolution 794 includes peace-enforcement action by "using force", resulting from a precedent of resolution 678 in the Gulf Crisis, which was adopted on 29 November 1990, and was interpreted as authorizing the U.S.-led multinational allied force to use force against Iraq. In the Gulf case, what constituted "a threat to the international peace and security" was the Iraqi military invasion upon Kuwait, and the purpose of UN intervention was to restore peace in the Gulf area. While, in Somalia, the SC interpreted that the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the internal conflict would constitute "a threat to the international peace and security", and the UN intervened in the domestic situation for the purpose of restoring hope in Somalia.

Article 2(7) of the UN Charter says that the principle of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. We could say that the UN, as the result of adopting resolution 794 and intervening in "the human tragedy" in Somalia under Chapter VII, set "a precedent for linking the UN's collective security to humanitarian intervention". However, it was not the UN Force or the UN peacekeeping force, but the U.S.-led multinational force (UNITAF) that was first authorized to do the linked work. A new type of UN involvement in a conflict was born in UN history.

Background on the creation of UNITAF

UNITAF was authorized, under SC resolution

794, to establish a secure environment for a humanitarian relief operation by using "all necessary means", i.e., to stop warring groups and organized militias from looting relief supplies. UNITAF carried out "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia under U.S. command, and continued to operate from December 1992 to May 1993. Was UNITAF the same kind of force as the U.S.-led allied force in the Gulf War, which was drafted and created by the initiative of the United States and carried out "Operation Desert Storm"? In order to answer the question, it is useful to analyze the policies of the UN Secretary-General and the U.S.

1) The policy of the UN Secretary-General

The decision-making process of the Security Council in the case of Somalia could be generally described in the following order: 1) initiating plans by the Secretary-General (SG), 2) consultation among the SC, the SG and Member States, 3) the SG's drafting, proposal and recommendation to the SC, 4) deliberation in the SC, and 5) adopting resolutions in the SC approximately on the lines of the SG's policy. It shows that Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had taken office as the Secretary-General in January 1992 and published *An Agenda for Peace*¹ in June, had a strong initiative in managing the Somalia conflict. This process is much different from that in the Gulf Crisis, where the United States initiated almost all of the SC's decision-making, and the SG went along with the U.S. decision.

In early November 1992, Boutros-Ghali began to recognize that the time had come to take more forceful measures under Chapter VII, because the domestic situation in Somalia was getting worse and more chaotic, and UNOSOM I, which had already deployed in Somalia to observe a ceasefire between warring factions and to provide humanitarian relief assistance, could not operate effectively. There was no peace (a ceasefire) for UNOSOM I to keep, but was faced with the magnitude of human tragedy. The SG sent a letter presenting his

view to the Security Council on 24 November 1992². At its informal meeting on 25 November, many SC's members expressed strong support for the SG's view³.

On 29 November, the Secretary-General presented the Security Council with five options, from continuing the efforts of UNOSOM I, to a country-wide UN enforcement operation under Chapter VII⁴. The SC finally selected the fourth option, under which a country-wide enforcement operation would be undertaken by a group of Member States authorized by the SC, and, therefore, adopted resolution 794 unanimously. The United States had already offered to take the lead of the operation through consultation with the SG. The U.S.-led UNITAF was born through the SG initiative.

2) The policy of the United States

The United States, which had lost interest in Somalia after the end of the Cold War, took a negative attitude on the issue at first. It was the power of mass communication that changed such U.S. policy. In November 1992, when the UN Secretary-General began to plan an enforcement operation, the Department of State and the Pentagon started to draft a new way of U.S. involvement in Somalia. President Bush finally accepted the Pentagon's proposal, under which the U.S.-led multinational force would carry out humanitarian relief operations under U.S. command, and the UN would take over the operations as soon as possible, while the Department of State proposed creating a UN Force including U.S. forces⁵.

The important point is here that the U.S. pointed out the limitation of UNITAF's mandate focusing on only humanitarian relief operations. The U.S., before adoption of resolution 794, rejected Boutros-Ghali's request for UNITAF to disarm Somali gunmen, and also emphasized that UNITAF should hand over its operational responsibility to a UN peacekeeping mission soon, the latter of which was included in resolution 794. This policy is

quite different from that in the Gulf Crisis, where U.S. national interest and world strategy prompted of the U.S. to take leadership and lead the multinational force against Iraq. It was because the U.S. had to get rid of Saddam Hussain to create a new world order, and to maintain U.S. leadership as the only superpower. The Gulf Crisis was of vital importance to the United States.

In Somalia, on the contrary, limited intervention by the U.S.-led multinational force coincided with U.S. national interest. The United States did not want to be involved in Somalia, because the issue was no longer important to its world strategy. However, the U.S. was obliged to consider whether the mass starvation of Somali children and the magnitude of human tragedy would characterize the new world order. President Bush, whose presidency would be taken over to Bill Clinton before long, decided to undertake "Operation Restore Hope".

The "grand design" of Boutros-Ghali

UNITAF would have been one step toward finalizing the "grand design" drawn up by Boutros-Ghali, though the Force was a result of a convergence of interests between the United States and the UN Secretary-General. As soon as he took up his post, Boutros-Ghali was expected to strengthen the capacity of the UN's peace functions in the post-Cold War world. It was his report to the Security Council, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, that he ambitiously answered to that expectation.

Early in 1992, when the SC put the Somalia conflict on its agenda, the SG was of the view that national reconciliation in Somalia should be the goal and that humanitarian relief operations and peacekeeping operations (observance of ceasefires) should be linked to UNOSOM I to reach that goal⁶. In the midst of increased tragedy, the next step taken by the SC was to organize UNOSOM II, which would become the peace enforcement unit planned in *An Agenda for Peace*. Resolution 794 said that

the establishment of a secure environment by UNITAF would enable the SC to make the necessary decision for a prompt transit to UNOSOM II.

It could be said that the SG had a "grand design" for UN peace operations in Somalia, where three factors (peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, peace enforcement) were packed in one operation, namely a "three-in-one-package" peace operation. But the UN lacked the time and the financial and logistical capacity to create UNOSOM II quickly. The U.S. led-multinational force, UNITAF, was needed to be created in order to prepare the way to realize UNOSOM II as envisioned by the Secretary-General. UNITAF started its operation, despite the SG and the U.S. having different interests.

Coordination between the UN and UNITAF

UNITAF was different from the U.S.-led multinational force in the Gulf War not only in the process of its creation, but also in its relationship with the UN. Only Member States, in the Gulf case, were authorized to use "all necessary means", while both the SG and Member States were authorized to do so in the case of Somalia. Moreover, "Operation Desert Storm" in the Gulf War was run by the United States and its allied countries independently. On the contrary, UNITAF was to operate in close liaison with the UN according to resolution 794, under which the Security Council requested the SG and Member States to establish appropriate mechanisms to facilitate coordination between the UN and their forces. These facts show that "Operation Restore Hope" was to be carried out under cooperation between the two.

The actual mechanisms were established both at the UN headquarters in New York and in the field. In New York, a policy group on Somalia in the Secretariat met senior representatives of the U.S. at least once a week, and an operational task force chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General met

representatives of the U.S. several times a week. In the field, the SG Special Representative and the Commander of UNOSOM I worked closely with the Commander of UNITAF. A small UNOSOM liaison staff was attached to UNITAF headquarters and they secured communications with UN headquarters⁷.

Without a doubt, UNITAF carried out its mandate in coordination with the UN, though UNITAF was an independent multinational force organized and commanded by Member States.

Disagreement on the mandate of UNITAF between the SG and the U.S.

The first UNITAF units, which were composed of United States Marines, landed on Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, on 9 December 1992. At its peak strength, UNITAF consisted of more than 20 Member States and about 37,000 troops, of which approximately 28,000 marines and infantry were provided by the U.S. It rapidly spread out across the central and southern parts of Somalia and carried out its mandate to secure ports and airports, provide protective convoys for humanitarian relief supplies, and guard food distribution centers.

The security conditions in Somalia gradually improved. As the UN agencies such as WHO, UNICEF and numerous NGOs began to work again, many Somalis could be saved from starvation and disease. Efforts to achieve a political settlement were also ongoing and two leaders from warring factions agreed on a ceasefire (which was not kept for very long) again in March 1993. However, Somalia was still "a non-state".

The Secretary-General was concerned that the disarmament of armed gunmen and warring factions should be realized before the withdrawal of UNITAF, because he believed that the disarmament was a precondition for national reconciliation in Somalia. A truly secure environment would also have to be established to transfer UNITAF's operation to

UNOSOM II⁸.

Boutros-Ghali kept on requesting that the United States extend UNITAF's mandate, but President Bush rejected it. The new President, Bill Clinton, also showed a negative attitude early in 1993 as his predecessor did. It is when UNOSOM II was created that President Clinton began to show a positive inclination to be involved in the UN peace operation with "assertive multinationalism".

There was disagreement between the UN Secretary-General and the United States on the mandate of UNITAF. As a consequence, in SC resolution 814, adopted on 26 March 1993, UNOSOM II was handed over operational responsibility from UNITAF and was authorized multifunctional operations, including peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disarmament etc. under Chapter VII. UNOSOM II was deployed in an environment in which only a few warring factions had been disarmed, most of the gunmen had still hidden their arms, and the political and social structures were not established. Thus, UNOSOM II failed in Somalia.

What the experience of UNITAF tells us

It was demonstrated in this paper that UNITAF was different from the force in the Gulf Crisis. We could say that a Somalia-type of big-power-led multinational force, in cooperation with the UN, is useful in UN quick, humanitarian involvement in an internal conflict, because "Operation Restore Hope" itself was successfully carried out. Internal conflicts have occurred one by one since the case of Somalia, and have been brought to the attention of the Security Council. Therefore, the UN will be in need of utilizing such a Somalia-type of multinational force from now on, as long as Member States are reluctant to create the UN Force and a peace-enforcement unit such as UNOSOM II.

However, several problems still remain. First, as to whether UNITAF could restore hope in Somalia, the answer is "Yes, but only

temporarily and not completely", because disarmament was excluded from its mandate according to U.S. policy. Disarmament of warring factions and armed gangs should have been a necessary precondition for humanitarian relief, national reconciliation and national reconstruction, as many critics argue⁹.

Secondly, as a consequence, difficulty in coordination between international interest and national interest is a problem. The experience of UNITAF shows that the UN policy is inevitably influenced by a policy of the leading state when it utilizes a big-power-led multinational force.

Finally, the problem is what we think of Boutros-Ghali's "grand design", under which two different kinds of operations, i.e., humanitarian intervention and UN collective security were linked together to UNITAF's operation. Generally speaking, humanitarian operations are described as the genuine activity, comparing to political and military operations. Therefore, such linkage may injure the dignity and legitimacy of the UN and damage the image of the UN.

This problem is deeply connected with the question of what "peace" and "hope" are for the Somalis. The answer should be found by the Somalis by themselves, but the United Nations is being requested to help them to pave the way for their own national conciliation.

Notes:

- 1) UN Document A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992.
- 2) Security Council Document S/24859 of 27 November 1992.
- 3) Security Council Document S/24868 of 30 November 1992.

- 4) Ibid.
- 5) John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.73, No.1, 1993.
- 6) United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*, 1996, pp.17-27.
- 7) Security Council Document S/24992 of 19 December 1992. Colonel W.J.A. Mellor, "Somalia—A Catalyst for Changing in the Command and Control of UN Operations", in Hugh Smith ed., *International Peace Keeping*, Australian Defence Studies Center, 1994.
- 8) *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*, op.cit., pp.40-41.
- 9) Paul Cleasson & Trevor Findley, "Case Study of Peacekeeping: UNOSOM II, UNTAC and UNPROFOR", in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ed., *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (Japanese edition), 1994, p.73.

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