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## Editor's Note :

Beginning with the previous issue, the title of this publication has been changed from the Peace Studies Newsletter to the Peace Studies Bulletin. Our editorial policy remains essentially the same. Issue numbers will continue uninterrupted from the Peace Studies Newsletter.  
(SATAKE Masaaki)

## A New Interstate System in Asia : Formation and Implications

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### Introduction

Recently, there have been great transformations in Asian economics and politics. In particular, since the 1990s, an interstate system has come into being in East Asia. This is an unprecedented event in the modern history of Asia. This essay shall shed light on this formation and explore its implications for Japan's relationship with other Asian nations.

### 1. Formation of an interstate system in East Asia

Soon after World War Two, Asian nations, formerly colonies, regained independence: the Philippines in 1946, India in 1947, Burma and the two Koreas (the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) in 1948, China (the founding of the People's Democratic Republic of China as a complete sovereign state ending its former status of a semi-

colony) and Indonesia in 1949, Laos and Cambodia in 1953, and Malaya in 1957 (later Malaysia in 1963), and Singapore in 1965 (formerly a part of Malaysia). In Indochina, Vietnamese struggles for independence led to the first Indo-Chinese War in November 1946, and the Geneva Agreement on its conclusion in July 1954 brought about two Vietnamese states (the Vietnamese Democratic Republic in the North and the State of Vietnam/the Vietnamese Republic in the South). Independence of those countries was an essential prerequisite for the formation of an Asian interstate system. However, two factors delayed the formation of such a system until the late-1980 s.

Firstly, the Cold War became "hot" in the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1960-75). Both of the wars divided the countries in the region along two camps: the "Communist" and the "Free" World. Thus the founding of an independent Asian interstate system was considerably delayed. It was the ending of the Cold War in the early 1990 s that brought about a completely new set of rules to this region. For example, now Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, cannot afford to intervene in Asian politics. Moreover, in the economic sphere, the Asian region has increasingly become a new center in accordance with the remarkable economic growth, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded in 1989, is an example of economic cooperation schemes in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, by the early 1990 s, the global milieu had been firmly set up for promoting an interstate system in Asia.

Secondly, the new socialist countries in Asia became "turbulent" actors in diplomacy immediately after their independence. (a) North Korea invaded South Korea to "liberate" it from its oppressors on 25 June 1950, but now it has diplomatic relationships with most of the Asian countries (except South Korea and Japan).

(b) China, together with India, Indonesia and

Burma, formed the leading bloc at the top of the newly independent states or those nations striving for independence in Asia and Africa in the 1950 s. But in the late 1960 s, the Cultural Revolution made China break off relations with even Communist or friendly countries. It has become a "normal" state in diplomatic terms since the 1980 s, and now is fully accepted into the Asian interstate system. (c) Asian countries recognized the legitimacy of North Vietnam even before unification (1976), or that of the unified Vietnam immediately after it. But Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 to provide Heng Samrin's (later Hun Sen's) faction with military support and became a great destabilizer in the embryonic interstate system in the region. Only after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989, could Vietnam formally recover friendly relations with the major Asian countries and the US. Today Vietnam, pursuing the 'Doi Moi' policy, is no longer a revolutionary (f) actor in international politics in East Asia.

If we turn to positive factors, we note that Southeast Asian countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia) have taken the most active initiatives in forming an interstate system in East Asia. (a) In the mid-1970s, they established formal relationships with North and South Korea, and with North Vietnam or the unified Vietnam. If there had been no invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978, the mid-1970 s would have been the time to start an interstate system in East Asia. (b) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, expanded to accept Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia in the late-1990 s, although it originally started as an organ against the Socialist Vietnam. (c) The original members of ASEAN promoted the founding of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, which is based on the principle of equality among

the major countries in Asia and Europe. ASEM exemplifies the rise of Asian countries as important players in world politics today. Thus, now we recognize the strong political voices of the member countries of ASEAN, something which was totally unthinkable fifty years ago.

Next, in domestic politics, after independence most of the countries in Asia sooner or later came to govern by an authoritarian regime. In the economic sphere, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have succeeded in export-oriented industrialization and been the economic powers since the late 1970s. In the 1990s, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia followed suit, and so did Communist China, which began to adopt the "Reform and Open Policy" in the late 1970s. In politics, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand moved to democracy in the late 1980s-the early 1990s, and Indonesia in the late 1990s, but authoritarian regimes still exist in North Korea, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore. Dynamism for economic growth and democracy has become increasingly stronger in domestic politics in most of the Asian countries in these years. In particular, economic developmentalism became a common cultural norm supporting an interstate system in Asia.

Summing up the above discussions, an interstate system has been emerging in East Asia since the early 1990s. In this system all nations are now equals. Among the member states, economic stratification is collapsing rapidly. Accordingly, the central role of Japan in the region is decreasing. Now our problem is not how to build bridges between Japan as a leader and other Asian countries as counterparts, but how to create networks placing Japan as one of many equals in the region. But it seems that many Japanese people cling to the old image that Japan is the only advanced country, while other Asian countries are still less

developed.

## 2. Discourses on "Japan and Asia"

It is often discussed in Japan whether Japan is of Asia as well as in it. Needless to say, in geographical and economic terms, Japan is located in Asia. But whether in political and social terms Japan forms part of Asia is a moot question, which in turn leads to a question of whether Japan is of Asia. The answer depends on the image each person holds of Asian situations that is mixed up with his/her hopes for, illusions of, and despair at Asian nations. Our images do not necessarily reflect real situations. In particular, whether being honorable or dishonorable, memories of the past nation distort our contemporary images.

Before World War Two, there were only two independent nations in the region-Japan and Thailand-and only one Power-Japan-in the region. Other nations were under Western or Japanese colonial rule, provided that China was a semi-colony under Western and Japanese dominance. Thus Japanese people came to hold the belief that Japan is the only advanced country in Asia. In their view, the rest of the Asian nations are much less advanced, lagging far behind Japan. An example was Y. Fukuzawa's proposition in 1885 that "Japan should immediately leave Asia and join the West." As he was a great intellectual leader in the Meiji period, a photo of his face appears on a 10,000-yen note. Another example was the slogan, loudly shouted in the 1930s-1940s, that Japan should take the leadership in forming the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere." Such a view lingers on even in contemporary discourses on Japan's relations with other Asian nations.

In the early 1990s, a group of professors, writers and journalists in Japan started a campaign to revise the history textbooks for middle school and high school. For them, Japanese school textbooks reflect

nothing more than a "masochistic view of history," which plays up the misdeeds of the Japanese Forces from the Meiji period onwards. In their understanding, modern Japan did not set out to rule over other Asian countries: it instead tried to free them from Western dominance. For instance, Professor K. Nishio remarks, "China and Korea are still bureaucratic, old, dying countries, and are not deemed to be modernized when measured with Western yardsticks. That was so before the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and still is.... Now is the time for Japan to show the reality of civilization to those countries on the continent." (Nishio 1997:216-218) Obviously, this statement is an extension of Fukuzawa's proposition in 1885, and does not match the Asia of today. Assuredly classical nationalism is worn-out, but it still persists.

In modern Japan there has been another line of views on Asian affairs which stresses Japanese solidarity with other Asian nations against Western dominance over them. We call it Pan-Asianism. However, actually, it has turned out to be a variant of expansionistic nationalism to the extent that it stresses Japan's leadership in achieving solidarity. Immediately after the War, when Japan had lost the political power in Asia, there could not be any chance of expansionistic Pan-Asianism. However, part of the former Pan-Asianism transformed itself into the voices for solidarity among Asian and African nations in the 1950s. Those voices sounded very nice at that time. But actually, in accordance with Asian economic prosperity since the mid-1970s, Asia nations seem to have lost most of their emotional ties with African nations. In essence, the post-War optimism resulted from a lack of information on Asian societies, cultures or people, Chinese studies being the sole exception. Thus, even when we used to argue for a prosperous Asia in the future, our illusions about Asia went far

ahead of its reality. For example, we paid little attention to ethnic problems inherent in Asian countries in the 1950s.

Professor T. Aoki, specializing in cultural anthropology of Asian societies, remarks, "Pan-Asianists are those exponents of Asia who have very flat images of Asia. Protagonists for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere "have had very thin interest in and perceptions of Asian societies and cultures." (Aoki 1999:37) In a similar vein, Professor Y. Hara, being a specialist in Southeast Asian economics, observes, "When the economic crisis struck East Asia toward the end of the twentieth century,...the global market raised its voices in chorus for modifying the crony type of Asian economic system from the foundations. This is the reappearance of the worn-out idea that we should now leave Asia and join the West....There were other loud voices as well. They shouted that we should now unite ourselves as Asian people, against the global project for American finance capitalism pursued by a complex of the Wall Street and the Treasury. This is nothing but the reappearance of Pan-Asianism. Both 'Leave Asia and join the West' and Pan-Asianism were intellectual products that could not be supported by academic findings in *area studies*." (Hara 2001:228) The professors stress the importance of academic 'area studies' as intellectual bulwarks against the chauvinistic Pan-Asianism in Japan.

Y. Wakamiya, a journalist from Asahi Shinbun (newspaper), examines in his book the views about Asia taken by Japanese prime ministers (conservative) in the post-War period, and summarizes them as follows.

In Japanese views on Asia, while the traditional idea of "Leave Asia and join the West" proposed by Y. Fukuzawa in 1884 still stubbornly persists, the visions of the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" or the aspiration after a "Greater Asia" has not yet passed away. Post-War Japanese

politics looks away from the scars on Asian peoples left by pre-War Japan. Is it indebted to them for its own misdeeds? Or is it seeking to hear their Romantic voices? Essentially, while being predicated on historical continuity, these views have come to be conditioned to a great extent by the Cold-War structure in the post-War era. Has Japanese politics faced Asia, setting the "settlement of its colonial rule and aggression" as a vertical axis and "the East-West confrontation" as a horizontal one? Thus, in tandem with the collapse of the horizontal axis, the voice for the "Age of Asia" has become much stronger. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, Japanese views on Asia seem to be stuck in a state of confusion and embarrassment, being unaware of the time and necessity for their great transformation. (Wakamiya 1995 : 4)

As Wakamiya notes in the above, Japanese discourses on its relations with the rest of Asia are predicated upon a mixture of true and illusionary images of Asia.

### 3. Concluding remarks

Today it is absolutely necessary to abandon the memories of old days when Japan was the only advanced countries in Asia, let alone the only Power. As shown above, Asian international politics have entered a new stage where all nations are equal in political and economic terms. However, peace researchers in Japan are inclined to think that such terms as the structural violence, good governance and human security are only applicable to less-advanced Asian countries. On second thought, this inclination is also based on idea of Japan-exceptionalism conceived in the Asian context. Actually, since the 1990s, Japan itself has turned out to be short of good governance and human security in its domestic scene. Peace researchers must start again, and look at Asia from the eyes of Asian people.

In this regard, Kim Bong-jin, a Korean specialist in Asian international relations, raises three points of reference. The first is to take more multinational than national viewpoints. Secondly, he recommends that we think in a comparative and comprehensive way so that we can see both the positive and negative aspects of the pre-modern (traditional) and modern eras. Lastly he emphasizes the necessity of finding a way to de-construct the West-centered modernism or Orientalism in international politics, international relations and other social science fields. (Kim 2000 : 127-128)

The author fully supports Kim's three points, but would like to add that multinationalism can be a new version of nationalism in the age of globalization. For instance, MNCs need more multinationalism than nationalism in order to secure their profits. Under the guise of globalism or multinationalism, a new type of the "Quit Asia" thesis might come out in the future.

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## Development of Peace and Conflict Studies

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Several hundred universities around the world now offer peace studies, drawing popularity especially in North America and Europe. The history of general peace education can go back to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Boulding, 1990). However, peace studies, as an official degree program in higher education, were more popular in small liberal arts colleges mostly under the sponsorship of the Brethren, Quakers, Catholics, Mennonites and the United Church of Christ in the 1950s and the 1960s following the establishment of the first academic program at Manchester College (Indiana, the US) in 1948. Influenced by the pacifist convictions of these religious traditions, the central commitment of these programs has been social justice and nonviolence. Approximately 40 percent of peace studies programs in North America are currently affiliated with colleges and universities founded by religious groups (Harris, 1998).

In response to the general public's concerns about the Vietnam War and the Cold War, peace studies were expanded to many private liberal arts colleges and state universities. Thus the second generation of peace studies programs in the US includes but are not limited to large public academic institutions such as University of California (Berkeley), the Ohio State University, University of Missouri (Columbia) and

University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee). These universities have peace and conflict studies either as an independent degree program or as part of an interdisciplinary program. Their undergraduate peace studies courses teach the causes and effects of social violence, strategies for their management, the history of peace movements, philosophical foundations of nonviolence, etc. The popularity of these courses has been well proved with a huge enrollment.

In the case of public universities, changes in the political and social environment have an impact on peace studies. Its origin owes much to public concerns about international conflict and war. The demand for peace related courses increases at a time of a political crisis. Peace studies have also been accepted at well endowed private universities such as University of Pennsylvania, Georgetown, Columbia and Cornell and other well funded private universities. One of the major characteristics of these second generation programs is their devotion to teaching with innovative curricula.

While the main goals of the first and second generations of peace studies programs still remain important, the emergence of the third generation movement is related to the creation of institutions and centers which have independent graduate programs with a strong research orientation. Their research areas tend to be more specialized with a

focus on conflict resolution, social change and international security. Strong peace studies programs at a graduate level were built in Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom.

Contrary to their American counterparts, European universities have focused on developing postgraduate programs and research institutions while their undergraduate studies have yet to gain significance. Well established programs are found at Gothenburg, Uppsala and Lund Universities in Scandinavia. In the United Kingdom, the first peace studies program was created at the University of Bradford in 1973 in the wake of lobbying and public support by the Society of Friends. Other programs in conflict studies are found at universities in Lancaster and Canterbury. These programs have independent standing rather than depending on other units for coordination.

Programs evolve in response to a school's general mission and political influence. One of the major trends since the early 1990s has been a growing emphasis on conflict resolution. The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, developed the first graduate degree program with a focus on intractable social conflict in the early 1980s. Programs at various other universities, including University of Notre Dame and American University, have been attempting to integrate conflict resolution approaches into a mainstream peace studies curriculum. The universities of Bradford and Lancaster expanded their interests from disarmament and security issues to theoretical studies in peacekeeping, mediation and conflict resolution with a range of practical programs.

In the 1990s, there has been a growth in the number of new graduate dispute resolution programs (Antioch, Nova Southeastern and California State universities) that promote the management of

problems relevant to organizational settings. They respond to the necessity of post-industrial societies for professionals in the areas of labor disputes, racial relations and human resource development. Training and facilitation skills are taught as a requirement for professional degrees. These programs are not oriented toward social justice and other values prevalent in traditional peace education.

The degree of the commitment to creating a peaceful world are not the same across peace and conflict resolution programs. In general, many link the concerns with peace to social justice and nonviolent means of struggle. On the other hand, some have paid more serious attention to arms control, disarmament and prevention of violent conflict than structural transformation. The schism between the practical management of narrow policy issues and social change has long been observed in such areas as nonviolence and conflict resolution. The traditional emphasis of many liberal arts college on social justice remains strong, while more established universities tend to move their research, for funding and political reasons, toward policy questions that can be more easily accepted by the main stream society.

There are diverse paths to the evolution of peace and conflict studies programs. Given their interdisciplinary nature and flexible administrative structure, liberal arts colleges provide an ideal environment. The goal of education is more geared toward the interest of students in small colleges than large universities which have a hierarchical administrative structure. In that sense, it may be more challenging to establish peace studies programs at large universities.

It is critical to have a core group of the faculty and students who are committed to rallying political support and making a concrete proposal for a new program. The motivation of students may result from their

disappointment with the traditional curriculum that does not deal with human concerns for peace (Alger, 1994). A combination of student enthusiasm and faculty commitment may produce a very successful introduction even though the new program may mainly serve as a minor for other departments.

In general, a small group of academics in a single traditional department may work together in introducing basic courses and seeking campus and community support. Establishing a new program may result from an endowment, but its ultimate success depends on the devotion of the faculty. Despite a primary focus on teaching, the initiation of a new institute can also be driven by interest in research with some interdisciplinary graduate work.

Compared with other disciplinary areas, it is relatively difficult to see the development of an integrated university department of peace studies. Many programs at established institutions started with a small free-standing status, focusing initially on teaching. Peace studies, more specifically, in a large university setting may have to struggle to overcome traditional departmental boundaries. The creation of a substantial independent department requires the university commitment to offering complete full-time peace studies degrees (Rogers, 1995).

Peace studies has often been hampered by a lack of support from university administrators. A demonstrated student interest in peace studies is typically contrasted with the slow university response (Alger, 1995). Interdisciplinary programs have a difficult time being respected at a traditional university setting with strong disciplinary departments. Those who strive to overcome disciplinary provinciality to stretch their work to peace studies are not rewarded. In the situation where funding is not made available to compensate faculty for

teaching a required introductory course, a member of the regular faculty may have to teach it voluntarily.

Peace studies degrees can be pursued as a major in a single department, minor or track established in other programs such as international studies. It is common to have an introductory course and multi-disciplinary course requirement. In general, course work drawn from several disciplines needs to be integrated into the peace studies framework. Students can select specific courses according to their interests. Some courses are concerned with directly controlling violence and exploring the root causes of violence and social oppression.

Reflecting on the interest of students, the main themes taught in peace studies are diverse, including conflict resolution, alternative security, the environment, human rights, development, cross cultural issues, nonviolence, peace education and movements. In reaction to Cold War politics, the nuclear arms control and prevention of inter-state wars were dominant topics before the 1990s. As we began to observe atrocities of communal conflict and explore social and economic conditions of human misery, such themes as disparities between the rich and the poor, oppression of indigenous populations and minority groups, ecological destruction and violence against women have become more important. In the evolving peace and conflict studies curriculum, thus, the determinants of international peace and security are seen in terms of environmental constraints on human development, the legacy of militarization left by the Cold War and the deep global socio-economic divisions.

The career goals of students vary. Some study peace issues to become specialists in a specific region torn apart by violence, including the Middle East and Africa. Peace studies may also be able to lend a useful background for those who might pursue a specific profession such as the law. Still



others might pursue positions in government service or work with international governmental or nongovernmental organizations. In enhancing their career goals, students would be helped by selecting courses which converge on a common area, problem or theme.

As long as human potential is not fulfilled with the existence of extreme suffering, peace and conflict studies has a legitimate place in college education. It is essential to teach the next generation strategies for building solid foundations for peace. Theoretical perspectives and skills are demanded for turning human conflict into positive experience in the struggle for social change. In the visions of peace studies, genuine human security is taught to embrace the issues of sustainable development and ecological protection as well as the control of militarism.

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***Chimurenga : Spiritual Attachment  
to Land in Zimbabwe***

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Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. In the very first broadcast of the new nation the newscaster solemnly announced :

Newscaster : Good Morning. This is Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. Here is the news. Zimbabwe will become a new state with effect from midnight to-night... It's five past seven. On we go

with music- the music of Zimbabwe !  
Listen now to the voices of our comrades with 'Mbuya Nehanda' .

Grandmother Nehanda,  
You prophesied,  
Nehanda's bones resurrected,  
ZANU's spear caught their fire  
Which was transformed into ZANU's gun,

The gun which liberated our land.

The exploiters of Zimbabwe  
Were cannibals drinking the masses's  
blood,  
Sucking and sapping their energy.  
The gun stopped all this.  
Grandmother Nehanda,  
You prophesied.<sup>1</sup>

Who was this Mbuya Nehanda? What was her prophecy? Why did it mean so much to ZANU (the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union) ?

Zimbabweans, particularly Shona people, are a deeply religious people. The living take the spirits of their dead ancestors very seriously. I say this to clarify that all Africans are not the same. There are some, like me, who register in their mind what they have learned, been told about matters spiritual, respect the beliefs of others without necessarily becoming part of those belief systems. There are others, like the combatants in Zimbabwe who believed, literally, that they would not have won the war of liberation without the help they received from their ancestors.

*Duramazwi* (Shona-English Dictionary) defines 'Chimurenga', variously, as rebellion, revolution, riot, revolt and even civil war<sup>2</sup>. However, reading the world in the context in which it is used by the ex-guerillas and peasants in the songs they sang to celebrate the role of the ancestors it carries a much more potent meaning.

In Shona cosmology ancestors involve themselves in the wellbeing of their living descendants. The spirits of these ancestors may possess a person, who becomes a medium through which that particular spirit communicates. There are dead grandparents, and even parents who might wish to communicate with the living for their (the living) own good. Other spirits have wider concerns, like bringing rain to end drought

and famine. These spirits are therefore of a higher order because they intervene for the good of the larger community and not just family members. Zimbabwe's climate is delicate. Droughts are a constant menace, and therefore, spirits, with their power to alleviate drought acquire reputations for producing rain<sup>3</sup>. Spirits can therefore be called upon in times of natural crises. And such was the war against the white invaders in 1896. In that war a woman of the name Charwe, who was the medium of the famous mhondoro (lion spirit) Nehanda, was a major leader. She, and the medium of another spirit, Kaguvi, were captured, after the rebellion failed, and were executed. Charwe, or Ambuya Nehanda (Grandmother Nehanda, as she is consecrated in memory) defied her killers, before she expired on the scaffold with the prophecy<sup>4</sup>: *Mapfupa angu achamuka* (my bones shall rise from the dead)<sup>5</sup>

Her martyrdom inspired the freedom fighters in the north-east of the country when they entered from Mozambique to launch the second *Chimurenga* in the 1970s. They discovered that the tradition of the spirit mediums of Sekuru (Grandfather) Kaguvi, and Mbuya Nehanda were alive and were perpetuated in the new generation of mediums who were as opposed to the oppressive system of the Rhodesian government as the pioneers were in the first *Chimurenga* (1896-7).<sup>6</sup>

Mbuya Nehanda's powerful denunciation of settler colonialism has also spawned poets, musicians and novelists since the 1950s. In Solomon Mutsware's novel, *Feso* (first published in 1957 and later banned by the white settler government) the 'Vanyai' who stand for the suffering Shona people call to Nehanda to deliver them.

Where is our freedom, Nehanda?  
Won't you come down to help us?  
Our old men are treated like children  
In the land you gave them, merciful

creator.

More recently (1988) the Zimbabwean writer/poet, Chenjerai Hove evoked and recreated the prophecy in his novel, *Bones* :

you can torture me, ...  
my bones will rise in the spirit of war...  
My bones will rise  
with such power  
the graves will be too small  
to contain them.

Hove came to Japan in 1988 to receive the Noma Prize for African Literature (sponsored by the Yoneyama Trust of the Kodansha Publishers), which he had won through the novel, *Bones*. And *Bones* was translated into Japanese, helping in propagating awareness about Zimbabwe.

Hove's purpose in invoking the memory of Nehanda's prophecy was partly because the independent government of Zimbabwe was choosing to forget, or even treat with contempt, the Zimbabweans who died fighting for the independence that the new elite in government was flouting. In spite of the emotionally uplifting song in praise of Nehanda, which was broadcast on the eve of independence the prime minister (subsequently president) Robert Gabriel Mugabe could, quite nonchalantly, respond in parliament (to a question raised about the criteria used to decide who merited to be buried at the ostentatious Heroes Acre) with the Orwellian quip, "Heroes are of different kinds : some are more heroes than others" Not very illuminating, one could say.

And even more unconcernedly, given the almost sacred resonance that bones convey in Shona Chimurenga cosmology, Mugabe dismissed the sensitivity of rural people who were complaining that they were being forced by government officials to rebury bones from shallow exposed graves without distinguishing those of guerillas from those

of the hated Rhodesian soldiers : "How do you distinguish the good bones from the bad bones? The heroic ones from the fascist ones and so on?"

Mugabe could exploit the memory of the dead when it served him well. And sneer at it when he felt like it. One man could not stand Mugabe's hypocrisy. Listening to the president's speech during the 1991 Heroes Day commemoration, boasting about the successes of his government, he shouted in Shona : "You are saying rubbish. Smith was better than you. Prices are going up all the time. Those fallen heroes you are talking about died for nothing". Quite serious words against someone who self-proclaimed himself the inheritor of Mbuya Nehanda's mantle. The despondent heckler appeared in court, and was charged with insulting the president.

Hove, in *Bones*, was writing from the point of view of the guerilla and the farm worker who were left out of the fruits of independence. His lament was that the cruel white farm owner was still in command. Mugabe might be an irritating swaggerer who has fattened on the misery of the Africans for whom he claims to have served well. But the real villain is the white farm-owner, characterized as Manyepo in the book. Chisaga, a peasant woman who slaves on Manyepo's farm bemoans her fate :

My mind is not here any more... there is nothing more for me. Nothing, only ashes and broken roofs, and the trees whose firewood I cannot take freely... Even the water here does not belong to me. It belongs to Manyepo. The air belongs to Manyepo. Nothing belongs to the farm workers who are so full of fear for Manyepo that if he tells them not to eat for many days they will stop. Old people the age of Manyepo's father kneel in front of Manyepo, 'There is nothing the government in the city can do. I rule here, says Manyepo. 'If your government

wants to run this farm, let them bloody take over. Then we will see if they can run a farm.

Hove, through the fictional medium of Chisaga, is speaking for all Zimbabweans. He acutely feels the collective pain of Zimbabweans, and is emotionally in sympathy with their unbearable feeling of utter powerlessness before a racist, arrogant and utterly contemptuous Manyepo.

This state of extreme debility is rooted in a pathological fear of the white man. And until this fear is overcome the white man will continue to trifle with Africans.. Nyerere, the late former president of Tanzania strongly felt the need to awaken Africans to this weakness and the absolute necessity of ridding ourselves of it. Speaking to teachers in 1969 he said it is a matter of great shame that two hundred thousand whites could oppress four million Africans saying "*Watafanya nini hawa?*" (What can these fellows do?) and then Africans foolishly start shouting saying Britain must use force to discipline the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe). He was speaking about the unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia.

There was no way the British Labor government was going to use force against its own "kith and kin". Nyerere's view was that the independent countries in Africa should garner sufficient force to fight the minority white regime. Freedom, he asserted, can only be attained by using one's own force. It is never given out graciously.

Indeed, when Mugabe and his fellow Zimbabweans determinedly launched the guerilla campaign (the *Second Chimurenga*) with crucial support from Nyerere, and were about to trounce Ian Smith's white supremacist regime, prime minister Margaret Thatcher hurried to intervene and arrange a meeting to agree on a formula for land

transfer from whites to Africans. But the real intention was to ensure that whites would continue to lord it over Africans. In statistical terms little changed. 4,500 white farmers (0.3% of a population of nearly 13 million) own 11.2 million hectares; 73% of arable land).<sup>14</sup>

And when Mugabe insisted that it was about time that the land transfer agreement was honoured, he was branded as a monster who had to be prevented from taking power. But Britain and its allies unwittingly played into Mugabe's hands in the crucial election held on March 9-11. Because Britain (and its media) went all out to campaign for Morgan Tsvangirai, Zimbabweans-and indeed Africans at large-who would not have cared that much if Mugabe lost, after 22 years as president, made it a point of honour to keep at bay the sceptre of a colonial power seeking to come back in Zimbabwe. It became a straight fight between Mugabe and Britain with her allies. And Mugabe romped in with a majority of 56.2% against Tsvangirais 41.9%.

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## To be an Active Pacifist Through Ideas and Communications : Japanese Responses to the Simultaneous Terrorist Attacks in the US and to the Gulf Crisis/War

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### Introduction

The Japanese have been searching for a new identity in the international community for more than ten years, ever since the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990. The response to the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the US on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 revealed what the Japanese have learnt in these 10 years.

The successive governments of Japan have carefully tried not to be engaged in any war, and have identified Japan as a pacifist state, based upon its Constitution that forbids any military forces to be used as to settle international conflicts. The Japanese governments have made every effort not to

commit the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to providing logistic support to foreign military forces, especially for US military operations in overseas combat zones, to say nothing of joining in a combat itself. They believed the most certain way for Japan to be a pacifist state is to avoid any commitment to military behavior, even in a rear field.

This passive attitude to world peace, however, is no longer sufficient to be a pacifist in the world today where active peacekeeping, including humanitarian intervention and international police action, have become key issues. In other words, in order to be called a pacifist state, Japan has

to be involved in active peace operations, instead of isolating itself from dangerous zones (i.e., so-called one-country pacifism). Since the Gulf Crisis/War, many Japanese have come to recognize the necessity of joining in international peacekeeping activities', and some have begun to search for an effective way for Japan to contribute to international cooperation efforts to maintain world order.

Nevertheless, Japan faces two obstacles to having a good reputation as an active pacifist state in the international community. One obstacle is that the Japanese decision-makers of the ruling parties tend to be preoccupied with the idea of utilization of the SDF as the most important way to be a respectable state. Since most Japanese have traditionally regarded dispatch of the SDF overseas as a violation of the 9<sup>th</sup> article of the Constitution that prohibits engagement in any warfare except for self-defense, discussion on how to contribute to international peace activities is easily interrupted by harsh arguments about the range of activities by the SDF. For example, such questions as, "may the SDF transport weapons and ammunition as part of logistic support?" are controversial in Japan. Thus, fruitful discussion on Japan's role in the international community cannot easily evolve in Japan.

The other obstacle is that most Japanese do not put priority on publicity. Japanese decision-makers lack proficiency in conveying their beliefs, ideas, and achievements to foreign countries. This causes foreign countries and media to underestimate Japanese contributions to international cooperative activities. As a result, Japan cannot acquire a good reputation, and this underestimation frustrates Japanese decision-makers.

In this article, I argue the importance of publicity and of the basic idea of working effectively as an active pacifist state,

comparing Japanese responses to the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the US with those to the Gulf Crisis/War in 1990. First, I explain Japanese contributions and failures during the Gulf Crisis/War, and extract three lessons for Japanese diplomacy: 1) lack of the basic idea of, and institutions for being an active pacifist state, 2) miscommunications among decision-makers, and 3) poor public relations. Focusing on the first two lessons, I will examine the Japanese response to the terrorist attacks, and then analyze the Japanese public relations in depth, conceptualizing four types of public relations. Finally, I will evaluate Japanese responses to the terrorist attacks in terms of those types of public relations, and think about effective way to be an active pacifist state.

#### Japan's contributions and failures during the Gulf Crisis/War

Throughout the Gulf Crisis/War period, Japan offered huge amounts of money, \$13 billion in total. This financial support not only helped US military deployment in the Arabian Peninsula but also assisted financially some Arabian countries like Egypt and Syria, whose partnership was essential to the anti-Iraqi coalition. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti government did not express its gratitude for the Japanese help. Some foreign countries and foreign media criticized Japan for only offering money. Actually, however, financial support was not the only contribution by Japan. The Japanese government proposed four fields of cooperation: 1) airlift or sealift of materials and soldiers, 2) material support, 3) medical support, and 4) financial support. Although the plan of medical support was not realized, Japan's provision of necessary materials to the American Central Command (CENTCOM) in Saudi Arabia during the Crisis was greatly appreciated. The Japanese government also sent minesweepers to the

Persian Gulf after the fighting. What is more, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) made tremendous efforts to enact the Bill Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace Operations (the Peace Operations Bill) to authorize the SDF to provide rear-area support to multinational forces, though it was rejected in November 1990.

As a whole, however, most Japanese decision-makers were deeply frustrated with their failures during the Crisis/War, including the lack of recognition by some foreign countries. Those failures derived from three factors: 1) lack of a basic idea of, and institution for how to cooperate with other countries to keep world security, 2) miscommunications and clashes of viewpoints among the ministries and politicians, and 3) poor public relations. Rejection of the Peace Operations Bill clearly showed failures of the first and the second factors. First, MOFA was not prepared to make a contribution to world security. Until the outbreak of the Crisis, only the exclusively defensive security policy and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (US-Japan Security Treaty) were regarded as important issues with regard to Japan's basic security policy. That is why most officials in MOFA regarded contributions to multilateral cooperation as a matter of US-Japan cooperation<sup>2</sup>. Although some discussions concerning Japanese contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations had occasionally taken place since the 1960s, and serious research on this issue was conducted in late 1980s at MOFA, this theme attracted little attention both among Japanese decision-makers and the public<sup>3</sup>. As a result of the lack of a basic policy, there was no department in MOFA set up to deal with international peace operations. In addition, many decision-makers did not even

have a good understanding of the legislative basis of multinational forces, and the difference between collective defense and collective security. These circumstances kept MOFA officials and politicians from smoothly taking effective measures during the Crisis/War.

Since decision-makers did not share opinions of the Peace Operations Bill, debate on the Bill got totally entangled. In particular, the concept of rear-area logistic support as separate from the use of force was most controversial. Decision-makers were not able to harmonize their views on the permissible range of rear-area support. This is a result of the second above mentioned failure, the lack of enough communications and discussions on the issue. For example, soon after Foreign Minister NAKAYAMA Taro explained that the SDF would not transport weapons and ammunition as part of logistic support, Director-General for MOFA Treaties Bureau YANAI Shunji said the opposite at the House of Representative Special Committee on Cooperation for UN Peace Operations<sup>4</sup>. This muddle not only originated from a shortage of communications and discussions among politicians and bureaucrats, but also revealed different views on overseas activities of the SDF between the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) and MOFA. While the CLB took a strict interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, concluding that any overseas activities of the SDF that might be integrated with the use of force should not be approved, MOFA asserted that the SDF should be involved in peace operations based on a broad interpretation of the same Article. The CLB and MOFA did not succeed in coordinating their views.

The third factor, poor recognition of the importance of public relations, was also crucial. Even though the Japanese decision-makers were quite conscious of how foreign countries and foreign media (especially that

of the US) evaluated Japanese foreign policies, they did not pay attention to their messages were conveyed. For example, the Japanese government missed a good opportunity to show its strong will to support US policy at the end of August, 1990. The Japanese government decided to give financial support to the US policy, but it was the Chief Cabinet Secretary, rather than Prime Minister KAIFU Toshiki, who disclosed the financial details of the financial support. At a press conference on August 29<sup>th</sup>, the Prime Minister announced Japan's four-point support plan, but made no reference to the details of the financial support. The actual amount, one billion dollars, was declared the next morning, August 30<sup>th</sup>. The Prime Minister should have announced the financial details himself. The press conference was a big event and the foreign media had expected a concrete sum to be announced as proof of the Japanese decision-makers' strong will to support US policy. No one paid attention to the Chief Cabinet Secretary's announcement the next day. Disappointed with the Prime Minister's announcement, the American media criticized Japan's support plan for having no substance.

As Deputy Director-General for North American Affairs Bureau TANBA Minoru pointed out, Japan should have impressed the US with a firm policy to support America, because many American decision-makers had been dissatisfied with Japan's support up to that time<sup>5</sup>. American decision-makers strongly expected Japan to provide airlifts and sealifts to the Persian Gulf, but the Japanese government did not at first promise to provide them, because the SDF was not permitted to approach would-be combat zones and civilian airlines and shipowners hesitated to contract for such a dangerous job. Clear announcement of the concrete sum of financial support was one of the few important options available for the Japanese government to show its will to be a

trustworthy friend of America, considering the restrictions of the Constitution and public opinion. Japanese decision-makers failed to send a clear message to the world public at the proper time. What is still worse, the supplementary announcement the next morning gave an image of Japan easily providing money only when pressured by foreign countries; an image of a cash dispenser<sup>6</sup>. This time lag caused foreign underestimation of Japanese financial support. Thus, Japan got a bad reputation of lacking any initiative of its own and being easily influenced by foreign countries.

This failure of public relations partly derived from miscommunications between MOFA and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). MOFA officers did not swiftly communicate their demand of one billion dollars to MOF, while the decision by MOF to meet the demand did not reach MOFA in time. This episode shows a typical malady of bureaucratic sectionalism. Moreover, many Japanese decision-makers did not seem to put priority on sending a clear message to the international public. OKAMOTO Yukio, then Chief of the First North America Division, confessed that most politicians regarded it better to inform just a few core American personnel of Japanese decisions and achievements than to expand public relations, while MOFA officials asserted Japan should make more effort to inform the world public. This hesitation derived from the governing politicians' and officers' fear of objections from the opposition parties that regarded the Japanese active contribution to multilateral forces led by US inappropriate<sup>7</sup>. The LDP and bureaucrats chose stability of national politics rather than the international reputation of Japan.

Lessons of the Gulf Crisis/War (I) : The Case of the Japanese Campaign Against Terrorism

Have Japanese decision-makers learnt



the lessons of the Gulf Crisis/War? The answer is yes and no. In this section, I examine Japanese responses to the simultaneous terrorist attacks in America with a particular focus on the first two lessons, i.e., lack of the basic idea of and institutions for being an active pacifist state, and miscommunication among decision-makers.

First, has Japan found a way of overcoming the lack of ideas and institutions concerning the Japanese active role in world security? In these 10 years, Japanese decision-makers have intermittently discussed this issue along two basic lines, i.e., cooperation with UN peacekeeping operations, and cooperation with the US military. They have also legislated two epoch-making laws that enabled the SDF to engage in overseas cooperative activities more smoothly: the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping and Other Operations (the International Peace Cooperation Law) in 1992, and the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan (Emergency-at-Periphery Law) in 1999, related to US-Japan security arrangements. In addition, the Foreign Policy Bureau was established in MOFA, a result of reflections on the government's failures during the Gulf Crisis/War. The Foreign Policy Bureau "takes charge of the planning of basic and middle- or long-term foreign policy from wider points of view and the coordination of policies formulated by other bureaus" particularly "on national security issues and issues related to the United Nations," and "plays a leading part in a serious emergency" as the case of the Gulf Crisis/War<sup>8</sup>.

Public opinion also changed drastically after the Gulf War. For example, according to a poll by the Yomiuri Shinbun in April 1991, 83% of Japanese answered that the Japanese government should commit the Japanese to overseas cooperative activities, an 18-point increase over a poll result in

December 1990. The Mainichi Shinbun showed a 57-point decrease concerning disagreement to commit the SDF abroad from November 1983 (70%) to March 1991 (only 13%). Moreover, according to a poll by the Prime Minister's Office from 1996 to 2000, almost 80% of Japanese answered that the Japanese should join in PKO activities. Overall, we seem to feel it their duty to commit ourselves to multilateral activities after the Gulf War.

These legislative and institutional settings and national consensus to broaden Japanese overseas activities enabled the government to respond promptly to the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the US. Since Japanese decision-makers understood the issues and shared basic concepts and viewpoints during the process of legislation, it was easier than it was ten years ago for them to discuss how Japan should contribute to the anti-terrorism campaign, particularly about the role of the SDF. General agreement among decision-makers about the need for more active Japanese participation in activities to maintain the international order also backed up the prompt decision-making. MOFA seemed to be able to lead the debate, partly because it managed to first refine its arguments at the Foreign Policy Bureau. The Foreign Policy Bureau and the Treaties Bureau were responsible for dealing with the matter after September 12<sup>th</sup>, and concluded just in three days that they had to elaborate a new bill instead of stretching the existent law.

On the other hand, general hesitation to commit the SDF to overseas activities has persisted during these 10 years. Forty percent of Japanese disagreed with the SDF participate in PKO, and 42% answered that the Japanese should be involved in only nonmilitary activities of PKO (Asahi Shinbun, June 1991). That means that nearly half of the Japanese people still opposed an active overseas roll for the SDF, even after the

Gulf experiences. Forty percent disagreed with expanding overseas activities of the SDF (Asahi Shimbun, October 2001). Fifty-six percent said that the Japanese should cooperate in nonmilitary activities like medical services and assistance for refugees (Mainichi Shinbun, September 2001). These data seem to reflect the passive attitudes of decision makers toward serious arguments about in which area the SDF should serve overseas, under what conditions they should use weapons, and whether they should transport weapons and ammunition. Overall, the Gulf Crisis/War seems to have generated a general atmosphere among the Japanese toward supporting an active role of Japan in the international community, but it did not produce thorough discussions about the range of overseas cooperative activities of the SDF and basic arguments on specifically what Japan could and should do in multilateral cooperation with nonmilitary means. Thus, lack of serious discussions and the public hesitation left aside the arguments on "cooperation not integrated with the use of force."

Next, we move to the argument on the second lesson of the Gulf Crisis/War, i.e., miscommunications and clash of viewpoints among ministries and politicians, in other words, a split in the Cabinet. Soon after the Japanese decision-makers acknowledged the terrorist attacks, MOFA Under Secretary NOGAMI Yoshiji (Deputy Director-General for Middle and Near Eastern and African Affairs Bureau during the Gulf Crisis/War) decided to enact a new bill to enable the SDF to contribute to multilateral cooperation as long as it was not integrated with the use of force. Regarding this case not only as a good opportunity to establish better US-Japan relations but also as a critical issue of world security, most officials in MOFA thought that the government of Japan needed to show its firm commitment to eradicate terrorism in order

to be regarded as a respectable member of the world community<sup>9</sup>. On the other hand, the Defense Agency (DA) officers searched for a way to stretch the Emergency-at-Periphery Law instead of making a new bill, because they were afraid that long debates surrounding legislation of a new bill would prevent prompt and ample assistance to the international anti-terrorism campaign. Their anxiety originated from the experience of having failed to enact the Peace Operations Bill during the Gulf Crisis/War. In addition, the CLB opposed, as usual, the idea of transportation of weapons and ammunition by the SDF, and some politicians of the ruling LDP also opposed making a new bill.

Despite some difference of opinions, decision-makers discussed the issue thoroughly and harmonized their views six hours before Prime Minister KOIZUMI Junichiro's announcement of the seven measures to support the US on September 19<sup>th</sup>. After that, Japanese decision-makers tried to establish a new bill: The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations (the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,) which passed on October 29<sup>th</sup> 2001, just 24 days after being submitted to the Diet.

The decision-makers managed to coordinate their views promptly, partly because of the Prime Minister's strong leadership and support from his inner circle. Chief Cabinet Secretary FUKUDA Yasuo and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary FURUKAWA Teiji gathered officials of MOFA, the DA, and the CLB to coordinate their views and prepared the seven measures

that the Prime Minister announced on September 19<sup>th</sup>. In addition, the bill that would become the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was prepared according to directions from executive board members of the LDP, without much consultation with members of the National Defense Division in the Policy Deliberation Commission of the LDP. The Prime Minister and his inner circle seem to have avoided deliberations on controversial matters intentionally. Despite such lacks of communication, the Prime Minister's strong leadership prevented the Cabinet from a split. The split among decision-makers during the Gulf Crisis/War largely originated from the lack of then Prime Minister Kaifu's leadership. Prime Minister Koizumi showed great leadership in coordinating different opinions toward dispatch of the SDF abroad. From the beginning, he was eager to send the SDF and pressured opposing politicians. He took advantage of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's utterance that Japan should "show the flag," interpreting the phrase that the US expected Japan to send the SDF overseas. The Prime Minister used pressure from the US to make a trend to dispatch the SDF, even though Armitage's real intention was not clear on that point.

Lessons of the Gulf Crisis/War (II) : Lesson on public relations

This section examines Japan's response to the terrorist attacks from the angle of the third lesson learned during the Gulf Crisis/War, i.e., public relations. The traumatic experiences of underestimation during the Gulf Crisis/War seem to have not

only brought Japanese decision-makers straight to the idea of dispatching the SDF, but also to have made them more conscious of public relations.

How can we characterize decision-makers' attitudes toward public relations? We can classify governmental public relations into four types based on the content and targets of their messages. One pole of the first axis (the "content" axis) is publicity about performance or achievements (what they did), and the other pole is that of worldview or fundamental beliefs and policy related to national interest (what they believe in). The second axis (the "target" axis) concerns the target audience (the domestic or international public). Most decision-makers are always conscious about both the domestic and the international public, and provide information about both their performance and fundamental policy. However, they often prefer one pole to the other, depending on the situation, so we can differentiate four types of public relations. The *conservative* public relations contain publicity targeted at the domestic public on specific achievements of the government. Decision-makers who put priority on explaining their fundamental policy based on their worldview and aim at the domestic public would take advantage of *reformist*-type public relations. When decision-makers appeal to the international public with their fundamental policy, we can call this *active internationalist* appeal. On the other hand, when decision-makers give only information about their achievements to the international public, we call this *passive or ordinary internationalist* publicity.

< Types of public relations >

	Content	Performance (achievements)	Worldview (Fundamental policy)
Target			
Domestic		Conservative	Reformist
International		Passive/ordinary internationalist	Active internationalist

The first public relations activities by the Japanese government regarding its response to the terrorist attacks were conservative, because Japanese decision-makers did not clearly show the international public their will to join in international cooperation to eradicate terrorism. Soon after the terrorist attacks, they concentrated on announcing their domestic achievements, not their own beliefs against international terrorism. For example, the Chief Cabinet Secretary emphasized some domestic measures, such as strengthening of the guard at American facilities in Japan and the establishment of a special response division at the Prime Minister's official residence, but mentioned the Prime Minister's comments only briefly at the end of the announcement. The Prime Minister stated his impressions three and a half hours after the disaster, but did not express his will to support the US or fight against international terrorism. Although the government responses announced the next morning contained a policy to support the US, it ranked fifth of the six items. The government did not seem to think highly of defining their attitude toward international cooperation against terrorism. The members of the Prime Minister's inner circle also hesitated to appeal to the international public at first. The Prime Minister's remarks were not televised because it was midnight in Japan, and because his message would be delivered only to foreign countries. The Prime Minister decided to visit the US after being criticized for having responded to the crisis too late<sup>10</sup>. In this sense, the government of Japan did not seem to have learnt anything from the third lesson of the Gulf Crisis/War.

Japanese decision-makers became eager, however, to appeal to the international public, and Japan began to behave as an active internationalist in a week. The Prime Minister announced the basic policy of Japan,

accompanied with seven specific measures to support the US and other countries, at an emergency press conference on September 19<sup>th</sup>. In this announcement, the Prime Minister referred first to Japan's resolution "to take its own initiative towards the eradication of terrorism, in cooperation with the United States and other countries concerned," a clear message of Japanese active involvement in international cooperative activities. In addition, he seemed to have learnt the importance of acting for the mass media, appearing on CNN and giving a speech in English late in September.

Dispatch of the SDF, a concrete sum of money, speed and timing were keywords for the lesson on public relations from the Gulf War. The decision-makers learnt the importance of those keywords. First, they focused on the SDF, and the first item of those seven measures on of September 19<sup>th</sup> was surely on the dispatch of the SDF. Second, since the Prime Minister knew the importance of showing a concrete sum of financial assistance, he told American Ambassador Howard Baker that Japan would provide \$10 million financial assistance at a meeting in the evening of September 19<sup>th</sup>, soon after his announcement. Third, decision-makers strived to show specific measures as soon as possible, in order to avoid being criticized for being too late. The inner circle produced these policy and measures in such a hurry that they did not consult with the Director-General of the DA in advance on the dispatch of SDF vessels to gather information, the third of the seven measures. Members of the inner circle gave priority to the timing of the announcement rather than to thorough discussions on the controversial issue in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister announced these policy and measures as soon as possible, ahead of the G8 Summit Meeting held the next morning, in order to impress foreign countries with the active attitude of the Japanese government<sup>11</sup>. In

addition, to impress the international community with Japanese will and ability, the inner circle successfully submitted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill to the Diet. It passed the House of Representatives the day before the APEC Summit Meeting due to be held on October 20<sup>th</sup>. The Prime Minister refused to accept the amendment that would have required the Diet to approve the dispatch of the SDF in advance, in order to "show the flag" of the SDF as promptly as possible<sup>12</sup>. The Cabinet decided to dispatch three SDF vessels for gathering information on November 8<sup>th</sup>, before its decision on the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Although the lack of a Basic Plan that could provide the SDF with enough authority to support the US put those SDF vessels on legally tenuous ground, the Cabinet acted to fulfill the third item mentioned above as soon as possible, in order to appeal to the US<sup>13</sup>. The Prime Minister's emphasis on speed may have caused his decision not to demand a supplementary UN resolution to the Security Council Resolution 1368 to legitimize US military operations.

Such an improvised active internationalist attitude, however, may change to a passive one, because decision-makers avoid thorough discussions on Article 9<sup>th</sup> of the Constitution. They also put aside the issues concerning the institutional basis for international emergency assistance including nonmilitary cooperative activities. For example, they have not tried to establish a nonmilitary organization for humanitarian assistance. In other words, the Japanese still lack a firm basic idea of, and institutions for being an active internationalist. Thus, in the next section, I will think about the future of Japanese foreign policy.

## US, UN, or the Third Way : Which Course Will We Take ?

Since Japan is situated at the door of the Soviet Union and China, US-Japan relations had not only regional meaning, but also had a global strategic importance for the security of the Liberalist world in the Cold War era. Therefore, the ruling decision-makers concentrated on US-Japan relations as a vehicle for contributing to the international community, while asserting their respect for the UN as a symbol to conciliate the domestic left that opposed the US. After the end of the Cold War, however, Japan has had to separate concepts of the international community and US-Japan regional relations. In other words, Japan has had to rethink the role in the United Nations, independent of American policies. For example, Japan needs to answer such questions as : What should it do when American policy differs from that of the UN ? ; What does it think about the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly ? ; What should it do for the UN if it become a permanent member of the Security Council ?

Since the end of the Gulf War, the Japanese decision-makers have tried to play a more active role in the UN, and at the same time have worked to strengthen US-Japan security relations. The most important fruit of the former was the establishment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, and that of the latter was the establishment of the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan in 1999, a supplement to the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law closely relates to the latter, though it was enacted under the pretense of being a law for UN peace operations. The process of titling the bill is illustrative of how the decision-makers tried to dress it up. The first title for the bill on September 25<sup>th</sup> was "The Law Concerning Support for Military

Activities of the US and Other Foreign Countries", but this title was to be gradually amended. First, the word "US" was eliminated. Next, the word "military" was deleted. Finally, phrases such as "charter of the United Nations", "humanitarian measures", and "relevant resolutions of the United Nations" were added<sup>14</sup>. Although the final title looks like a law for UN peace operations, this law aims to support the US military.

The Prime Minister clearly expressed his view that another UN Security Council resolution was not necessary to dispatch the SDF because Security Council Resolution 1368 on September 12<sup>th</sup> sufficiently legitimized US military activities based on the right of the self-defense, even though the Democratic Party, the biggest opposition party in Japan, demanded another UN resolution. The Prime Minister's decision to cut off a traditional symbol of the international community from Japanese cooperation with the US military, and his emphasis on US-Japan relations generated further arguments on the extent of the collective-defense banned by the Constitution, while obscuring other issues concerning the balance between the US and UN.

For about half a century, the SDF has been one of the most important topics in Japanese politics, first as a question of approval for its very existence, and then in terms of the possibility of, and the radius and the scope of overseas dispatch. The lessons of the Gulf Crisis/War set the agenda for the dispatch of the SDF for PKO or multilateral military cooperation. It seems that Japanese officers who worked hard to contribute to the multilateral forces during the Crisis/War remembered the traumatic experience of the SDF vessels that did not manage to show Japan's national flag in the Persian Gulf, and naturally understood Armitage's demand ("show the flag") as a request for the dispatch of the SDF. Thus, the lessons of the Gulf Crisis/

War combined with Japanese political tradition and the desire of MOFA officials to take advantage of the high capabilities of, the SDF, has allowed Japanese decision-makers to concentrate on the SDF, putting aside other issues such as reform of the Constitution in terms of collective security, foundation of an organization for international peace operations, and specific measures for human security. Japan seems to have chosen the path of being a follower of the US. In this sense, Japanese foreign policy will be passive in the future. In other words, Japan will merely *contribute* to the international community, but not *lead* international cooperative activities with its own initiatives. If Japan wants to be a leader in the international community, it should become an active internationalist. It needs to define a coherent basic course of action, and send a clear message on its worldview to the international public. If it disregards public relations with the foreign public, and goes back to a conservative attitude, it will be isolated in the international community.

As TERASHIMA Jitsuro, the President of the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute wrote, a country which has a sound, reasonable, and coherent belief as the basis of its fundamental foreign policy could naturally make its presence in the international community<sup>15</sup>. Such a coherent policy basis is the first step to become a respectable country. The second step is good public relations, in other words, having an effective way to send its messages to the world. If the Japanese government aims to take an active part in the international community, it should make much more effort to take advantage of international communication. Public relations comprise a part of international communication, and are one of the most important tools for a country to wield its soft power. Appropriate evaluations originating from good public

relations give a nation high self-esteem, an important basis for its cooperative foreign policy. Although further discussion about the appropriate methods for public relations is needed, the first thing the Japanese decision-makers need to do is to realize that public relations is not a trivial matter.

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- 1 According to a poll taken by the Prime Minister's Office during the Gulf War on January 19<sup>th</sup>, 1991, a majority of Japanese people accepted that Japan has responsibility for maintaining the international order as one of the major powers.
  - 2 MATSUURA Koichiro, "Sono toki Gaimu-sho ha do taio shita-ka (How did Ministry of Foreign Affairs respond to the Gulf Crisis/War?)," *Gaiko Forum*, September 2001, p.22.
  - 3 TANAKA Akihiko, "Kokuren Heiwa Katsudo to Nihon (UN Peace Operations and Japan)" in NISHIHARA Masashi and Selig S. Harrison, *Kokuren PKO to Nichibei-Anpo (UN Peacekeeping : Japanese and American Perspectives)*, Tokyo : Aki-shobo, 1995, p.140.
  - 4 KUNIMASA Takeshige, *Wangan-senso toiu Tenkai-ten (The Gulf War as a Turning Point of Japanese Politics)*, Tokyo : Iwanami-shoten, 1999, p.202.

- 5 KUNIMASA, op. cit., p.38.
- 6 OKAMOTO Yukio, "Mata Onaji Koto ni Naranaika (Won't It Happen Again?)," *Gaiko Forum*, September 2001, p.15.
- 7 OKAMOTO, op. cit., p.16.
- 8 [http : //www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html)
- 9 Yomiuri Shinbun, September 27<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- 10 Yomiuri Shinbun, September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- 11 Tokyo Shinbun, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- 12 Mainichi Shinbun, October 16<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- 13 Asahi Shinbun, November 9<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- 14 Asahi Shinbun, October 6<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- 15 TERASHIMA Jitsuro, "Sekaishi no Shinso-Teiryu ha Nanika (What is the Undercurrent in Depths of the World History?)," *Cuokoron*, 2001.11., 2001, p.148.

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- 2) publications
  - a) *Peace Studies* (annals of PSAJ, in Japanese)
  - b) *PSAJ Newsletter* (in Japanese)
  - c) *Peace Studies Bulletin* (in English)
  - d) books and other publications
- 3) the coordination of national and foreign academic associations and other related institutions, as well as the promotion of intellectual exchange among researchers
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- 5) various activities which are considered to be necessary and appropriate achieving the purposes of this Association

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