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SPECIAL ISSUE: CIVILIAN MILITARY COOPERATION IN JAPAN

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Should We Cooperate with the SDF? Peace Studies and “Military Civilian Cooperation”

MURAI Yoshinori (Sophia University)

According to KODAMA Katsuya, SATO Yasunobu and NAKANISHI Hisae, writing in *Hajimete deau heiwagaku – mirai wa koko kara hajimaru* (Meeting peace studies for the first time: the future starts here), peace studies is not “studies on peace,” but rather “studies for peace.” In this sense, peace studies is not a regular discipline, but rather a normative discipline with a definite purpose. It is also unlike disciplines such as economics, political science and sociology, which discover the principles of a phenomenon seen through a particular set of glasses. Rather it looks at all the elements involved in peace and its opposite, violence, analyzes them, draws out principles, and on this basis, proposes policies and practices for creating peace.

The founding manifesto of the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) reads as follows: “The Peace Studies Association of Japan will certainly not forget the experience of victimization in war, but plans to develop scientific and objective peace studies based on the values that Japan must never again become a victim of war. Studies should be scientific and objective, but can never be in the direction of moral neutrality. . . . On the other hand, we have not agreed to limit ourselves to policy science. We must continue to criticize the misuse of knowledge by the current system,” thus clarifying that its stance is normative and critical. In addition, the Regulations of the PSAJ read, “In principle, individuals belonging to agencies or organizations that may use the research results of this Association for the purpose of war cannot be members” (Article 4). In this unusual step, the PSAJ forbids membership to

individuals belonging to organizations that may support war.

The above is largely a discussion of appearances. It is important, of course, to make appearances clear, but in fact, there is something that is very ambiguous, and which can be interpreted either way.

Here, I would like to discuss ODA and military-civilian cooperation. Recently, the concept of “peace building” has become a stream within ODA. In the New ODA Charter, adopted by the Cabinet on August 29, 2003, “Peace-building” is included as the fourth priority issue, with the following concrete description: “For example, ODA will be used for: assistance to facilitate the peace processes; humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, such as assistance for displaced persons and for the restoration of basic infrastructure; assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), and the collection and disposal of weapons, including demining; and assistance for reconstruction, including social and economic development and the enhancement of the administrative capabilities of governments.” It is certainly admirable to promote peace.

Peace-Building with Whom?

However, one must ask, who is responsible for “assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), and the collection and disposal of weapons, including demining.” In Japan’s case, one can

easily imagine that the SDF will be involved. There are limits to what university researchers, research institutes and NGOs can do on their own to build peace. But does that mean that because peace-building is a good thing, that we should be willing to cooperate with anybody?

One can try to interpret it differently, but the fact is that the SDF is a military force. Not only that, but it is clearly unconstitutional under the Japanese constitution. Even if we take the most generous position, that it is a lawful armed organization, which is the minimum necessary for self-defense, the fact remains that Article 9 reads as follows: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or

movement to amend the constitution, clarifying the right to maintain forces and carry out war, and recognizing in the end the right of collective self-defense.

Under the present constitution, there are strict limits on what can be done overseas to resolve conflicts and build peace, and I believe it is inconceivable that we should consider cooperating with the SDF. I think in particular that researchers and faculty at national universities, who are government workers and thus must uphold the Constitution, must not participate in military civilian cooperation.

However, this may also be a debate that centers on appearances. In actuality, they are beginning to cooperate with the SDF, through national universities, private universities and NGOs. Cooperation between NGOs and the SDF has in fact taken place during the conflict in Rwanda, and in assistance for the Ache tsunami. I have also heard that certain private universities are setting up systems for carrying out research in cooperation with the military. As people working toward peace studies, I think we should be very cautious about accepting the current government's arguments about "peace-building." Just saying "for peace" is too simple. Before World War II, the government argued that it was acting for "peace in the East." For example, the Japanese government's notice of withdrawal to the League of Nations in 1933 contains the following phrase, "the national principle of contributing to peace in the Far East and, as an extension, to world peace." The word "peace" should not be used so carelessly. This is a lesson from history.



Photo by NINDJA

use of force as means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." Considering this, force cannot be employed for the solution of conflicts. As is well known, there are some who are dissatisfied with this stance, and there is a strong

University and Civil-Military Cooperation

OGASHIWA Yoko (Hiroshima University)

Introduction

In February 2005, the faculty of Hiroshima University was shaken by a piece of news. A newspaper reported that the university would launch a three-year Partnership Project for Social Capacity Development for Peacebuilding and International Cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Institute of Developing Economies (IDE)-JETRO and United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Hiroshima Office. This project was selected by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology as one of the newly established Distinctive University Education Programs. Most of the university faculty were surprised at this news, since they had not been informed of the project. Furthermore, the staff learned another surprising fact.

According to the plan, three study working groups would be set up, and one of them, with the aim of proposing practical recommendations on peace-building, would deal with Civil-Military Cooperation, such as creating effective cooperation between the NGOs and Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF). This led to arguments among the university staff on whether the university could or should conduct "Civil-Military Cooperation." This article presents the background to the relations between the university and Civil-Military Cooperation, and its implications for peace studies in Japanese universities.

The Policy of the Japanese Government

In December 2002, the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace under the auspices of the Japanese Cabinet Office released a report on Japan's role in international peace cooperation. The report described pacifism in Japan after World War II as "somewhat theoretical and passive in nature" and argued for the need for a solid national consensus on how Japan should involve itself with the international community in the area of international peace cooperation. Based on these arguments, the report presented recommendations for the policy of the Japanese government to improve and strengthen international peace cooperation, ranging from conflict prevention and "peace consolidation and nation-building" (peace-building) to full-scale assistance for reconstruction and development involving government ministries, police, local governments, medical institutions, research institutions and NGOs, along with the SDF.

In order to implement international peace cooperation, it was recommended that relevant government ministries and agencies should deepen their mutual understanding and strengthen cooperation among JICA, NGOs, private enterprises, and the academic community. In particular, the recommendations called on universities to improve their systems for supporting the dispatch of university teaching staff as specialist human resources, make an appropriate assessment of overseas activities by faculty, and to enhance their participation in the consultant registration system. In terms of education, the recommendations made strong

calls for an internship system on international peace cooperation through fieldwork involving practical training, along with a system to allow such experience to be accredited as undergraduate or postgraduate credits at universities. The universities have been firmly positioned as "organic mechanisms" of the Japanese government's international peace cooperation, in which cooperation with the SDF is regarded as essential.

The Situation of Japanese National Universities

There is another explanation of the relations between the university and "Civil-Military Cooperation." In April 2004, all national universities in Japan were incorporated, as the most "dramatic reform of universities since the Meiji Era." The government stated that this structural reform of universities through incorporation was needed in order to develop universities conforming to the highest international standards in a competitive environment. The government's explanation was that the deregulation of budget and personnel through incorporation would lead to a competitive environment by ensuring the autonomy of universities.

There is no doubt that incorporation has brought a competitive environment to the national universities in Japan. The universities are now struggling to get revenue because the administration grant from the government has been diminishing at the rate of -1% each fiscal year. Other than raising tuition fees and cutting the expenses, obtaining the extra fund attracts the attention of the universities.

Under such circumstances, ironically, the universities are becoming more dependent on the government. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology pooled its budget and created new competitive funds for the universities, such as the Partnership Project

and the 21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) Programs. These funds are major financial resources for the universities and create solid reputations for the universities as excellent and competitive. In order to successfully win funds, the universities try to show the Ministry that their projects can contribute to the national interest at least in some sense. In this regard, projects dealing with policy issues presented by the government, such as Civil-Military Cooperation, are quite appealing for the universities.

Demand from the Business Sector

It should be noted that demand from business sector in Japan has also driven the relations between the universities and Civil-Military Cooperation. Keizai Doyukai (The Association of Corporate Executives), an influential business organization, issued a policy proposal in November 2004 entitled "Report of the Research Group for Iraq Issues: Toward the Establishment of a New System." The proposal had two main points, namely the enactment of a permanent law covering operations contributing to peace and reconstruction following the cessation of hostilities and establishment of "Japanese style" Civil-Military Cooperation.

The proposal stated that the present SDF deployment in Iraq provided an excellent opportunity to deepen discussion leading to the establishment of a highly effective "Japanese style" Civil-Military Cooperation. Unlike other styles of cooperation in which civilians were under the command of the military, the Japanese style would involve a framework for mutually complementary and cooperative activities incorporating the SDF, other government organizations involved in maintaining security, such as the National Police Agency and Japan Coast Guard, Japanese NGOs and NPOs, and specialists, and enterprises from the private sector, while taking advantages of the strengths

of each. The proposal argued that this framework would make it possible for humanitarian reconstruction support to be provided more safely and effectively, even in areas where security had not yet been fully restored. In short, it implied a division of labor between the SDF and civilian organizations, with the latter providing humanitarian reconstruction support beneath a security umbrella provided by the former, under a permanent law.

However, contacts between the military and civilian organizations are infrequent in Japan. Therefore, the proposal urged increasing interaction between the military and civilian organizations on a broad scale. It is expected that universities will contribute to meeting this demand from the business sector by nurturing civilian human resources with the ability to work hand in hand with the military without hesitation.

“Hiroshima” at a Crossroads

Civil-Military Cooperation has been promoted by the government, universities and the business sector in Japan. This trend has inescapable implications for the future of Japanese peace studies. In the past, Japanese peace studies did not ignore “Hiroshima,” or “peace without arms.” Civil-Military Cooperation was regarded as an issue to be dealt with in “security studies,” but not in “peace studies.” However, the situation is rapidly changing, and Civil-Military Cooperation is now discussed by people who call themselves “peace researchers.”

It is quite symbolic for the future of Japanese peace studies that arguments on the relationship between Civil-Military Cooperation and the university took place here in Hiroshima, which commemorated the 60th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb this year (2005).

Universities as Supporters of Militarization?

The Case of Osaka University

KIDO Eiichi (Osaka University)

Co-operation With the Military as an Established Fact

I teach German politics and peace studies at the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) of Osaka University, which was established in 1994 as an independent graduate school focusing on research and education in public policy.¹ Our staff initially consisted of people drawn from the Faculty of Economics, Faculty of Law, and College of General Education with the co-operation of the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER). I have been a member of OSIPP since the very beginning.

OSIPP is at the cutting edge of research and education in the fields of economics, law, and politics, and at the same time is contributing to the development of the field of international public policy. The student body is made up of a diverse blend of university graduates, foreign students, and full-time employees. Each student has a different background and something unique to offer to OSIPP.

After lecturing on Japanese politics at the Institute of Political Science of Leipzig University (Germany) for the winter term of 2000/2001 and the summer term of 2001, I came back to discover that some OSIPP professors began to promote cooperation with the JSDF ("Japan Self Defense Force"). As I visited the secretary's office of our graduate school after a long absence, I saw press

cuttings about OSIPP. I was very shocked by the photos showing our students carrying weapons.

A secretary told me that an associate professor (at that time) of OSIPP had taken his students and some secretaries to the Maizuru base of JSDF. The secretary talked about it as if they had gone on a picnic. In fact, at the meeting of the graduate school faculty, there was no discussion about that problematic project orientated seminar.

Exciting Military Drills

This workshop, co-hosted by OSIPP and the Osaka Provincial Liaison Office of the JSDF, is called "WINS" ("Workshop on International Security"). It is said that altogether, 320 people from OSIPP and 90 from the JSDF participated as of 2004.² Since 2003, some students from the Graduate School of Security Studies of National Defense Academy of Japan have participated as well.

The aim of "WINS" is stated as follows: "think about the security of Japan and the world from various points of view." During each academic year, there are four lessons. Two of the lessons take place at OSIPP. Lectures are given on Japanese defense and intelligence politics, by OSIPP faculty, Director Generals of the Japan Defense Agency and people from the mass media. The students then visit establishments of the JSDF, where they actually come in touch with

¹<http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/general/intro-e.html>

²http://www.osaka.plo.jda.go.jp/guide/guide_wins/guide_wins.html (only Japanese)

weapons and are given some knowledge of the equipment used by the JSDF. Finally, all the participants participate in a training camp. They do role-playing, contriving a “strategy to cope with a critical situation.”

These role-plays are nothing other than war game simulations. One exercise “concerns a fictitious Middle Eastern oil-producing country, A, invaded by its neighbor, B, a terrorism-supporting nation. D (imagined as the USA) dispatches its armed forces, including troops stationed in its ally, C, (imagined as Japan) to the invasion area. In the midst of this situation, a continental dictatorial nation, E, invades its neighbor, F, and the danger arises of a missile attack against C...”³ The participants in the war game are divided into two teams, and come up with ideas on how to cope with various critical situations as members of C’s national government in charge of crisis management. The graduate students and members of the JSDF became more and more excited as the game went on. They decided to shoot down an unidentified plane that entered the national boundary and sink a ferry boat that was seized by a terrorists group.

Under this “co-operation,” the university has become involved in simulated maneuvers by the JSDF. The participants in the military drill receive credits for their participation. Of course, the theme of the project seminar is not to think about causes of the conflict as structural and cultural violence.

Uncritical Students, Indifferent Professors

It seems that the graduate students become strangely courageous during the simulated war games. In interview with the Asahi Shimbun, one JSDF member said with a wry smile, “It

³ *The Sunday Mainichi*, July 28, 2002. (Japanese)

gave me a start, as graduate students spoke with ease about the PKO and the dispatch of troops to maintain public safety. I almost said: ‘Do you know that I who am sitting beside you will have to go?’”⁴

I suppose that the graduate students who speak nonchalantly about “sending troops” simply see people as chess pieces, with a commander’s mind. This is a result from the “elite” education that teaches students to think like technocrats who remain in a safe place and give orders.

I began to prepare lectures on peace studies and conflict transformation. Moreover I asked the famous author ODA Makoto to hold a course on making policy proposals from the point of view of sovereign citizens. The course, “contemporary policy,” was held in 2003 and 2004. We chose five lectures that had to do with the subject of “war and peace” and published a book.⁵



Our course on “contemporary policy” had a much bigger effect outside OSIPP. The same is true of my lectures on peace studies and conflict transformation. It may be that our graduate students like to think about national and international security in a rather technical way.

I believe that this problem reflects the Japanese conception of “public.” In Japanese language, the Chinese character “公” means

⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, Osaka edition, November 12, 2002. (Japanese)

⁵ ODA Makoto and KIDO Eiichi, eds., *Radikaru ni “heiwa” wo tou* (Inquiring about “peace” in a radical way), Kyoto 2005.

both “public” and “authority.” The arbitrary policies of the Japanese government are often justified in the name of the “public”. Edward W. Said wrote: “In no other country beside the modern Japan has the interplay between the imperatives of the collective and the problem of intellectual alignment (with the victors and rulers or the less fortunate – KIDO) been so tragically problematic and vexed.”⁶ I wonder if his remark fits not only modern but also contemporary Japan.

An Act of Destruction of the Constitution

On October 31, 2002, two National Diet members from the Communist Party visited Osaka University and met its president, KISHIMOTO Tadamitsu. The Communists criticized the cooperative research on an “emergency” by the JSDF and the university. Dr. KISHIMOTO, an immunologist, replied: “Academic freedom must be maintained. But in the field of medical science, we examine ethically if clone research is right or wrong. I can imagine that social scientists also discuss such things.”⁷

In fact, there are no such discussions. The cooperation between OSIPP and JSDF goes on. The professors involved don’t take the criticism to heart at all.

Article 23 of the Japanese Constitution states: “Academic freedom is guaranteed.” This article was made from reflection on the fact that research and teaching at Japanese universities until 1945 was based on the nationalistic state doctrine. Some professors

whose research activities were stigmatized as contradicting the “national policy” had to leave their universities. During the war, universities were totally abused as tools of war.

In my mind, the idea of “academic freedom” cannot be separated from other constitutional principles such as popular sovereignty, fundamental human rights and permanent peace. The co-operation between OSIPP and JSDF violates this constitutional spirit.

The members of the JSDF are not ordinary citizens. They are given the responsibility to collect information and spy for the national defense and public security. Co-operation with them has nothing to do with academic freedom, which is originally an individual and collective intellectual activity.



But I’m very afraid that the militarization at universities will advance in future. The Japanese government intends to send JSDF troops all over the world to work on the side of the “Empire.” Since 1999, a Diet majority has passed important war-preparation bills. The pacifistic Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution faces the danger of being abolished. Most members of the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) are lecturers at universities. In the age of globalization and in the holding and development of global economic interests by a global military presence, we should be very vigilant to make sure that our own universities do not become tools of the war politics of the government.

⁶ Edward W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual*. The 1993 Reith lectures, London 1994, p.31.

⁷ *Akahata*, November 2, 2002. (Japanese)

Military Forces in Humanitarian Relief:

The Case of Aceh

SAEKI Natsuko (Sophia University)

Floods of Aid after the Tsunami

Aceh, an isolated Indonesian province on the northern tip of Sumatra Island, suffered tremendously from the Asian Tsunami that occurred on December 26, 2004. Out of a population of approximately four million, 131,029 people died and 37,066 were still missing as of June 2005, according to the Indonesian Red Cross. In addition, nearly 700,000 people were displaced. When the survivors picked themselves up from the mud, their towns and villages no longer existed. In some areas, as many as 80 percent of the inhabitants were dead.

A flood of aid flowed into Aceh. Not only the international/UN agencies and international NGOs, but even foreign military forces took part in the humanitarian effort. The Japanese SDF was also dispatched to Aceh to offer aid.⁸ The SDF troops were bivouacked on a naval ship off Aceh's hard-hit western coast. They ferried food, treated the sick and sprayed insecticide to kill off malaria-carrying mosquitoes.

⁸ AP (1 Feb 2005) reported that a survivor, who still remembered Japan's brutal World War II occupation of Indonesia – the beatings, the forced labor and the stories of terrible punishments — viewed the return of 1,000 Japanese troops to Aceh with little concern.

The Japanese military's mission in Aceh was its largest-ever overseas relief effort, and it was the second-biggest contingent in Aceh. It was also the beginning of Japan's Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) acted as guides for the Japanese Ground SDF which carried out medical operations. The Japanese Maritime SDF provided vessels to JICA for



their staff to rest.⁹

CIMIC emerged from the interventions in Somalia and the Balkan Peninsula. The end of the Cold War created conditions where states could contribute troops more frequently to peacekeeping operations. In their new role in humanitarian efforts, military forces had to rely on local civilian authorities for resources and freedom of movement, and depend on

⁹ *The Nikkei Shimbun*, 2 March 2006.

external civilian organizations for advice and information. On the other hand, civilian organizations also learned from cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda, that they are often unable to do their job effectively without the security provided by military or police operations.¹⁰



However, this strengthened relationship between civilians and the military has raised new questions. I still remember an incident that took place when I was in East Timor in September 1999. After the referendum, as the Indonesian military (TNI) and their militia auxiliaries were withdrawing, they destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and killed at least 1,500 people in a final act of vengeance. I heard gunshots, bombing and horrified cries. All I could do was stay with the Timorese people and pray. One Timorese girl screamed, "Why isn't the UN Peace Keeping Force coming?" But I wondered. Is there no other way but to bring force against force in a situation like this? Is it impossible for civilians to carry out humanitarian efforts effectively without the security provided by the military? These are the questions I will try to answer in

¹⁰ Michael Pugh, "Civil Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: hegemony or emancipation?" paper for Seminar on Aid and Politics, ODI, London, 1 February 2001, <http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/confpapers/pugh.pdf>.

this report, based on the Aceh case.

Can an Aggressive Military Conduct "Humanitarian Relief"?

Resource-rich Aceh has experienced decades of violent conflict. The Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), widely known as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), fought for independence from 1976 to 2005. During the military operations against it, it is estimated that over 13,000 people were killed and thousands of others abducted, arbitrarily arrested, tortured or raped by TNI. Most of these victims were civilians, including women and children.

When the catastrophic tsunami hit Aceh, TNI conducted emergency relief efforts. The Acehnese feared that this would bring more problems to Aceh -- and they were right. The following cases are only the tip of the iceberg of what happened under TNI's control.

TNI's Restrictions against Relief Efforts by Indonesian and International NGOs

- Most of the aid from Jakarta was sent to Banda Aceh through government agencies and was delivered to a military rather than civilian airport. This means that the access to and distribution of the aid was under military control.¹¹
- Civilians and activists who survived the tsunami offered help to distribute the aid, but their offer was rejected by the military. As a result, people had to wait in long lines at military posts in order to receive food. They also had to present

¹¹ TAPOL Press Release, 4 Jan 2005.

identity cards, which many either did not possess or had lost during the disaster.¹²

- Suspicions on the part of the Indonesian military became evident when two American naval doctors arrived in Meulaboh to help, but were confronted by skeptical local commanders. "What are you doing here?" was the greeting they were given.¹³

TNI's Violence and Intimidation against the Victims and Aid Workers

- At some distribution centers managed by the military, desperate survivors were denied aid because they were unable to present all of their proper identification documents. In some cases, people who failed to present their identity cards were harassed or even beaten.¹⁴
- A volunteer from Yogyakarta who tried to deliver food aid was assaulted by TNI soldiers in Banda Aceh on 9 Jan 2005.¹⁵
- Six tsunami victims allegedly involved in GAM activities, were arrested at the refugee camp in North Aceh on 25 Jan 2005. Their parents were warned not to talk about the incident.¹⁶



TNI's Plunder and Extortion

- Survivors felt abandoned. They said, "There has been no help" or "We didn't get anything." Yet only five miles away, at the Indonesian military's main airfield, cartons of instant noodles, bottled water, and medicine were stacked high in a hangar, awaiting delivery to the camps. At the military airfield, ten men in civilian clothes lugged boxes of noodles into the hangar from the tarmac, then stopped working, breaking open a box to snack on dry noodles.¹⁷
- Damien Kingsbury, a lecturer on international development at Deakin University, received reports from a student in Banda Aceh that TNI was

selling instant noodles for Rp 500 per pack.¹⁸

- A 16-member team from Amal Foundation, who tried to deliver medicine and other supplies to the tsunami victims, was forced to bribe its way through a military checkpoint at the Medan-Aceh border. It had to pay Rp 500,000 to TNI soldiers who

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *The New York Times*, 3 Jan 2005.

¹⁴ Forum Asia Press Release, 5 Jan 2005.

¹⁵ *TEMPO Interaktif*, 10 Jan 2005.

¹⁶ Network for Indonesian Democracy, Japan, 5 Feb 2005.

¹⁷ *Washington Post*, 30 Dec 2004.

¹⁸ *Radio Australia*, 10 Jan 2005.

claimed that there was a new rule barring the distribution of aid via land.¹⁹

Humanitarian Relief in an Ongoing War

Out of 35,000 soldiers stationed in Aceh, only 15,000 were engaged in humanitarian relief efforts. The other 20,000 continued their offensive against GAM while families and volunteers were busy collecting and searching for the bodies of those killed in the tsunami.

According to a local anti-military organization, 28 cases of human rights abuse (14 murders, 4 abductions, 8 tortures, 2 arsons) have been reported since the tsunami happened.²⁰ On 22 January 2005, (then) Army Chief-of-Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu proudly announced that there had been 86 gunfights and that 208 GAM members had been killed by TNI since the tsunami.

I myself have often faced TNI harassment during my humanitarian relief efforts in North Aceh, which was seen as the stronghold of GAM. I saw some tsunami victims who were unable to get any aid. I was ordered to report to TNI whenever I delivered aid, and moreover, to hand over what I was delivering to TNI. I could not see it as my partner, but rather an obstacle in carrying out my activities.

Although military forces might claim to be working for a humanitarian purpose, they are in fact no more than an apparatus of violence. This is the risk that CIMIC brings in the politicization of humanitarianism. It is understandable to say that the solution to the problem lies not in excluding the military from these activities but in professionalizing their approaches.²¹ However, I rather sympathize

with Antonio Donini who posed the question: "Should the military be trained to take on tasks other than war and security?"²² One Acehnese human rights activist said to me, "It is only an illusion that the military will transform itself from tukang perang (warmonger) into tukang kemanusiaan (humanitarian)".

I am frequently asked if we, as civilians, cannot cooperate with the state and its military in humanitarian efforts. My personal answer is "No". The answer may differ from person to person, but whatever the conclusion might be, it is necessary for us to be more politically conscious about our roles. We should think about whether we choose to be coopted by the state, substitute for the state or whether we want to maintain our neutrality and independence.

¹⁹ Malaysiakini, 13 Jan 2005.

²⁰ HANTAM, 11 Jan 2005.

²¹ Stuart Gordon, "Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation

(CIMIC)", *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 14 July 2001, <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm>.

²² Antonio Donini, "Asserting Humanitarianism in Peace-Maintenance", *Global Governance*, Vol.4, No.1, 1998, p.82.

IMADR Guatemala Project: Toward Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples

FUJIOKA Mieko (Coordinator, IMADR Guatemala Project)

Background: Guatemala's Peace Accords and Indigenous Peoples

The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) is a Tokyo-based international human rights NGO working to protect and promote the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples around the world. Our Guatemala Project was launched in 1998, about one year after the signing of the final peace accord in Guatemala in December 1996, which ended the 36-year-old conflict.

In the period immediately following the final signing of the accords, the country's indigenous Maya people were hopeful that the accords would bring them a long-awaited opportunity to end the centuries' old racism and achieve self-determination as indigenous people. In particular, the Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognized important rights, such as that to receive bilingual education, although it stopped short of granting full autonomy and self-determination. The implementation of the Accord on Indigenous Rights was an extremely important part of the post-accord process, as it addressed the root causes of the conflict—colonial social and economic structures that gave rise to the extreme gaps between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless.

However, it soon became evident that the government did not have the political will to seriously implement the accords, nor the ability to realize all the programs that they recommended. An influx of foreign aid, both governmental and non-governmental, failed to

cover all the disadvantaged communities or issue areas. With this background, IMADR started to work with a small group of Mayan youth — Movimiento Jovenes Maya por la Paz (later renamed Movimiento Jovenes para la Paz, or MJP) — who were working to organize youth groups in two areas in the southwestern part of the country — one in San Marcos and the other in Sololá Departments — where no national or international NGOs were active.

The Early Years of the Project

In 1988, we launched an educational project aimed at helping local Mayan communities empower themselves so that they could be active participants in the efforts to advance their rights as indigenous people. Following efforts to disseminate the content of the peace accords, and in particular the Accord on Indigenous Rights, among local people through community-based workshops and discussion meetings, we set up community-based classes for basic education. These classes served as a means to continue studying for those who had to drop out of school (most children in those communities cannot finish primary school due mainly to a lack of resources), and an opportunity to be exposed to the content of the peace accords, the history of Guatemala, and so forth. The classes were taught and run by a group of youth in each community, and served a total of 80 to 100 students each year.

But this method had its limitations. First, the number of people who benefited was small and the benefits were "individualized," that is,

they benefited the individuals who could participate, but the benefit—in the form of knowledge or skills—was difficult to share with others. Second, thanks in part to the problems described above, the project did not effectively serve the purpose of helping community organizing efforts. That is why we looked to another method—a community radio.

Community Radio and Community Organizing

Community radio is used worldwide as a tool to disseminate needed information in an area



On the air for the first time

that it aims to serve, express voices that are not conveyed through other media, and exchange ideas among the community members without relying on commercial media. It is used in Guatemala and elsewhere by indigenous peoples as a tool to promote their distinct languages, cultures, ideas and ways of life, and as a means to promote community organizing.

In the Bocacosta area of Sololá Department, where we have been supporting educational activities for youth, the youth group has undertaken a new project to create a community radio. Nobody knew how radio worked and had ever spoken over a

microphone. But everybody knew that they needed a space through which to voice their opinions, let their people know what was going on in the country, and share ideas and hopes for the future, and in their own language, K'iche'.

The objectives of the community radio are:

- To use radio as a tool to promote community organizing and create space where people can express their voices. Radio can contribute to maintaining ties between communities in the area.

- To use radio as a tool for transmitting information that people really need. Various community organizations and groups can transmit their information through radio programs.

- To use radio as a tool to create a space for education and thinking as well as for spiritual and cultural expressions.

The Steering Committee for the project has identified themes for the programs which they wish to produce by themselves, such as, history of Guatemala and Bocacosta, Peace Accords and the status of its implementation, health, women's

empowerment, children's rights, etc.

The Peace Accord on Indigenous Rights stipulates that the government must ensure indigenous peoples the right to access to the media. However, the government's action has so far been contrary to the Accord. In 1997, the Telecommunications Law was revised to make the country's airwaves fully commercial—the start of an auction system for bandwidth. The new auction system effectively prevented new community radio stations from acquiring a band, which now costs US\$28,000, an amount impossible for volunteer-based small community radio. Guatemala's media, including the radio, have

fallen under the domination of foreign businesses and there are no commercial stations in the country that broadcast in any of the Maya languages, while more than 60% of the population is Maya. Under these circumstances, Consejo Guatemalteco de Comunicacion Comunitaria (CGCC), a network of community radio stations, has been waging a campaign since 2001 for legislation to protect community radio from the pressure of the commercial stations. So far their efforts have resulted in limited support from the present administration, but they still face an uphill battle.

Challenges Ahead

Meanwhile in Bocacosta, our experimental radio station "La Voz de La Bocacosta," which opened in September 2004, also faces the difficult task of ensuring that the radio station truly serves and is supported by the communities. The biggest challenge facing the Steering Committee has been to reorganize itself to facilitate the more active and responsible sharing of organizing work by all the members and to encourage more people to join them. This is because the sustained operation of the station depends on joint efforts by all those who are involved and from support from the wider sectors of the communities. The fact that more than 200 peoples from the surrounding 25 communities gathered at the station's opening

ceremony shows the potential interest among the people. However, more work needs to be done in the future to keep up this interest by involving people in the production of the programs and broadcasting. After all, the key to a successful community radio is the active involvement of people as creators and participants, not just as listeners.

To support this organizing work, IMADR will continue its fundraising campaign and will call for the help of those who are interested in this project in whatever way possible, be it donations, offering technical expertise or participating in our publicity work by spreading the word about the station. If you



are interested in any of this, please contact us.

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Military Expansion and the Peace Movement

ISHIDA Kyoko (Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (GENSUIKIN)/Peace Forum)

In order to prevent military expansion and accelerate disarmament, it is crucial that we strengthen the peace movement and/or reform governmental policies. Currently, I am working as International Coordinator for the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (GENSUIKIN)/Peace Forum. At the same time, I am a member of the Board of Directors of the Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES).

The Current Situation of the Expansion of the Use of the Japan Self Defense Forces

The use of the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) is being greatly expanded in Japan at present. In particular, (1) the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq, (2) the revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which forbids the possession of armed forces and the conduct of war, and (3) the transformation of the U.S. military forces stationed in Japan, stand out.

Regarding (1), not only did the Japanese government announce support for the U.S.-led Iraq attack on March 2003, but dispatched the SDF to Iraq in January 2004 under the "Special Measures Act Related to the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activity in Iraq and the Execution of Security Activity." It is the first time for Japan to dispatch the SDF to the territory of a country where combat is still ongoing. There is concern that this constitutes collaboration with the military actions of other countries, in spite of the prohibition of military action under Article 9 of the Constitution. According to one public opinion poll, 77% of


the people are opposed to an extension of the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq (October 10, 2005, *Mainichi Newspaper*).

Regarding (2), in March 2005, following five years of discussion, the Diet's Research Commission on the Constitution released its final report recommending a revision of the Constitution. The Constitution can be revised if two thirds of the Diet members and more than the half of the people agree to it. In the September 2005 election for the House of Representatives, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other parties that are calling for or at least accepting constitutional revision gained a majority of the seats. It is feared that the revision of Article 9 will open the way to participation by the Japanese government in conflicts/wars as well as a transformation of the socioeconomic system toward the execution of war. Since World War II, Japan has been prevented from participating in conflicts/wars by its Constitution.



Regarding (3), the transformation of the U.S. military forces stationed in Japan is currently being discussed between the Japanese and U.S. governments in the Security Consultative Committee (The "Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance:

Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” known as the “midterm report,” was released on October 29, 2005). Currently, the U.S. military has approximately 130 facilities in Japan, with 51,000 service personnel, based on the Japan-US Security Treaty. It is thought that the essence of the proposed transformation will be to change the military system from one based on “defense” into a more American led “aggressive” type with a focus ranging from the East Asia to the Middle



More than 80,000 blocks from around the world

East, and to accelerate the military integration of the two countries (e.g. The command function of the SDF will be transferred to U.S. military bases (Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture and the Yokota base in Tokyo)).

Activities to Stop the Military Expansion and Accelerate Disarmament: the Peace Movement

The Japanese peace movement is roughly divided into three streams: (1) citizen’s movements, (2) the Social Democratic Party/Democratic Party affiliated movement, and (3) the Communist Party affiliated movement. The Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin)/Peace Forum is the major anti-nuclear and peace movement affiliated with the Social Democratic Party/Democratic Party, and works in collaboration with *hibakusha* (radiation victims) groups, labor unions, and political parties.

Gensuikin was established in 1965, based on the awareness of the terrible reality of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bombings, as well as the contamination caused by the U.S. H-bomb test at Bikini atoll on March 1, 1954 – the second time Japanese were victimized by

nuclear bombs – which brought fears of the “ashes of death.” It emerged from the anti-war and peace movement nationwide.

Currently, Gensuikin/Peace Forum conducts lobbying of Diet members and ministries, rallies and demonstrations, and meetings for the dissemination of information on the following issues: (1) Achieving the ideal expressed in Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, (2) Recognizing Japan’s own responsibility for World War II, and dealing with the issue of history textbooks, (3) Opposing any

transformation of the U.S. forces that strengthens the military alliance between the U.S. and Japan, (4) Opposing the aggression of the Iraq War and the extension of the dispatch of SDF soldiers in Iraq, (5) Opposing the policy for the use of plutonium and reprocessing plant operations, and ending reliance on nuclear power, (6) Promoting Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles (never to own, produce or allow nuclear weapons on Japanese territory) and moving out of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and (7) Establishing a Non-Nuclear Peace Zone in North East Asia, etc.

Particularly in relation to the first section of this paper, on the expansion of the use of the SDF, we recently held a “Wooden Block Campaign” and “International Anti-war and Anti-Base Meeting.”

Wooden Block Campaign

The year 2005 represented the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. To commemorate the occasion, we made a 360-meter wooden wall (84,000 blocks from all over the world) showing the desire of people for peace in the Nagasaki Peace Park, in cooperation with German students who launched

the campaign in February 2003, just before the invasion of Iraq. This "International Law Campaign," as it is called, conducted an exhibition at the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in front of the United Nation, and is supported by "Mayors for Peace" (1,306 cities from 115 countries were members as of March 2006), under which the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have called for the abolition of nuclear weapon under "2020 Vision."



Nagasaki Peace Park

International Anti-War Anti-Base Meeting

In order to appeal the problems of and opposition to the proposed transformation of the U.S. forces, we held the "10.21 International Anti-War Anti-Base Meeting" on October 21, 2005, in cooperation with other peace groups including the young people's peace network World Peace Now (WPN), and with guests from South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, and Australia. We shared and discussed the situation of the US bases with the goal of strengthening cooperation among the peace movement in the Asian Pacific region (e.g. transfer of US troops from Okinawa to Guam, joint exercises in Mindanao island, the Philippines by US troops stationed in Okinawa), and presented our demands to Diet members, the media, etc.

Problems and Future Tasks for the Movement

In order to strengthen the peace movement and change government policies, it is crucial to increase the transparency and accountability of government policy decision-making, and to ensure that citizen's views are reflected in

government policies on disarmament and peace issues. For example, several points regarding effectiveness were pointed out during a policy dialogue between the government and citizens in an open and transparent manner on Official Development Assistance (ODA): (1) increasing governmental transparency and accountability, (2) influencing governmental actions, (3) strengthening the government's environmental and social standards, etc. In addition, in recent years there has been concern about coordinated cooperation between ODA and the SDF under the rubric of "Peace Building," and discussion is required on this, too.

As a whole, in order to strengthen peace movement, as well as to reform government policies, there is a particular need: (1) not only to focus on opposition, but also increase our ability to formulate alternative policy proposals and research at the citizen level, (2) to energize the movement, especially among the younger generation (the older generation who experienced or were greatly affected by WWII are more active on this issue), (3) to strengthen effective linkages and collaboration with overseas and/or local movements, and (4) to secure funds to pay staff to carry out this kind of activities, given that there is very scarce funding for the peace activities of civil organizations in Japan.

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