

PSAJ – Newsletter

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MINORITIES IN JAPAN AS A PEACE ISSUE

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I. *International Protection of Minorities and World Peace*

From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties incorporating clauses relating to religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities were concluded among various European countries. The treatment or protection of these minorities had also been the main reason justifying the so-called "humanitarian interventions" of the European powers. In other words, the treatment or the protection of minorities had always been an important issue for the maintenance of the peace in Europe.

The League of Nations, established after the First World War with the primary purpose of maintaining international peace, also functioned as a protector of the minorities in central and Eastern European countries. The League played such a role through the observation of the implementation of international instruments relating to the protection of minorities. Although the League system for the protection of minorities failed, the Organization did play a great and innovative role in the development of international protection of individuals or groups in domestic societies.

After the Second World War, the international protection of the human rights of all individuals made conspicuous progress under the United Nations System. And a number of international instruments have been adopted to protect the human rights of individuals or groups and to eliminate the discriminations against them. Among these instruments, those incorporating clauses aimed at protecting the rights of minorities, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations, come immediately to mind. Despite these developments, however, the treatment of minorities in various countries might still be the cause of conflicts, not only in domestic societies, but also international society. Thus the principle of non-discrimination and the obligations under international instruments relating to the treatment of minorities must be strictly observed by all State Parties including Japan, if the stability or the peace of the world is to be maintained.

II. *The Situation of Minorities in Japan*

Japanese society has hitherto been characterized as homogeneous or pure, both culturally and ethnically, not only by scholars but also by politicians and even by the general public. This characterization of Japanese society suggests there are no minorities; it also suggests the promotion of the concept or the ideology of purism, which denies the existence of ethnic groups other than Japanese and excludes or discriminates against these groups.

But the concept of Japan as a homogeneous society and the notion denying the existence of any minorities in Japan should best be considered as a fabrication or even as an illusion, precisely because there are non-Japanese ethnic groups, such as the Ainu and Koreans, living in Japan. Still more, there are other minorities besides such ethnic groups that can be said to be degraded or discriminated against on the basis of their social or regional origin, such as the Burakumin and Okinawans.

In spite of these undeniable facts, the real situation of these minorities has scarcely been introduced abroad, except through a few articles in recent years. Accordingly, this article briefly sketches the situation of minorities in Japan, and examines the basic attitude of the majority of Japanese and the Japanese Government towards them.

(1) *Koreans as an ethnic or national minority*

During the period of Japanese colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, two-and-a-half million Koreans, mainly from rural districts, were forcibly transferred to Japan to be used as cheap labour and as tools in Japan's wars of aggression. They were then forced to work in conditions little different from slavery. After the Second World War, many were rapidly repatriated to Korea, recently liberated from the colonial rule of Japan. The Government of Japan avoided the possibility of offering even those that remained the opportunity of taking out Japanese nationality. As a result, they were excluded from the social welfare and health insurance system on the grounds of nationality. Thus the 550,000 Koreans who remained in Japan were exposed to various forms of discrimination.

Today, they number about 800,000, of whom 670,000 still retain the nationality of North or South Korea, even though more than 85 per cent of them have been born in Japan. And despite their nationalities, they are beyond doubt an ethnic minority which should be protected in accordance with international law. But discrimination against them, in employment, in marriage and in all other fields of social life, has been such that Koreans are reluctant to use even their real names. Although there has been partial improvement in the field of social welfare and in public service employment since 1979, when the Government of Japan ratified the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Government still continues to pursue a combined policy of security control, assimilation and deportation.

The symbolic policy of security control can be said to be the Aliens Registration Law. Under the law, aliens, of whom 85 per cent are Koreans, are required to carry a registration card in person at all times and to be fingerprinted if over the age of sixteen. Fingerprinting, otherwise than for criminals, should be regarded as degrading treatment prohibited under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and as treatment which is contrary to the principle of non-discrimination and equality, because it is not required for the Japanese majority. Fortunately, there has been a growing movement in favour of the complete abolition of the system among citizens groups, and groups of civil servants, as well as in local governments, after fingerprinting was denied by a number of foreigners almost all of whom are Koreans.

The policy of assimilation pursued by the Japanese Government can be traced back to the colonial era during which the history, culture and even the names of Koreans were denied. As a result of the policy of assimilation pursued by the Government after the War, about 80 per cent of Korean children attend Japanese schools where there are no Korean teachers and no ethnic curriculum. That is the situation, for example, even in the Miyukimori primary school located in Osaka, where more than 70 per cent of the pupils are Koreans, though there is not a single Korean teacher. As a consequence of education aimed at assimilation, most Korean children and young people are being denied the use of their own language and access to their own culture.

It has been alleged that this policy is contrary to the purposes of education agreed to under article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and is also inconsistent with obligations under article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights relating to the protection of minorities. There have been movements growing requesting ethnic education among Koreans as well as Japanese teachers. Thus the pressing problem for Koreans in Japan is whether they can survive as an ethnic group and coexist with other ethnic groups.

(2) *Ainu as an ethnic minority*

The Ainu, most of whom are now living in Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, are the oldest yet smallest ethnic group in Japan. They used to live in the central and northern parts of the mainland of Japan until the 9th or 10th century, when military invasions were mounted against them and they were forced to settle in Hokkaido. Since then they have been the subject of oppression and discrimination by the feudatory and governments on the mainland. And with the increasing number of migrant Japanese from the mainland, the number of intermarriages and interbreeding between Japanese and Ainu has increased. As a result, it has been said that there are few Ainu left who are pure in their lineage.

The basic policy of the Government of Japan towards the Ainu has been to concentrate on their protection based on a sense of cultural superiority and colonial mission. The policy has been practised in accordance with the Hokkaido Former Aborigine Protection Law, the provisions of which have been criticised as discriminatory. Ainu organizations, such as the Society of Utari, have asserted that a new law should be made so that their fundamental human rights and livelihood can be protected. The Government of Japan has also been pursuing a policy of assimilation against the Ainu. As a result of this policy and of discrimination, the children and young people of Ainu origin are unable to speak their own language and to gain access to their own culture.

At the commemorative assembly for the 35th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Mr. Tokuhei Narita, one of the leaders of the Ainu, denounced the policy of assimilation, saying that "the persecution by the Japanese government since the Meiji era meant deprivation to all of us. The Ainu were deprived of their land, mother tongue, manners and customs. They were forced to live the Japanese way, the so-called compulsory assimilative policy."

Today, the situation of the Ainu has improved comparatively in some respects. It has been reported that, although the living standard of the Ainu is still low compared to that of the majority of Japanese, the average income of the Ainu is rising, and 80 per cent of Ainu children now finish compulsory middle school, compared to less than 50 per cent a decade ago. And through the exchange of common experiences with many other indigenous peoples and oppressed minorities both in Japan and abroad, Ainu awareness of their ethnic identity and of their human rights has risen remarkably during these past ten years. Mr. Narita said, in the address above mentioned, "We Ainu are now editing our history, claiming our rights, understanding our identity, beginning to walk by ourselves."

(3) *Burakumin as a minority group of social or regional origin*

The *Burakumin*, numbering 2,000,000 people and the largest minority group in Japan, are discriminated against by the majority of Japanese as the untouchables in India or as outcasts elsewhere in the world. The *Burakumin* are the most "invisible" minority because they cannot be distinguished from other Japanese by any objective biological attribute.

Historically, the *Burakumin* as an oppressed and discriminated against group originated in the system of social classes established in the 17th century, that is, the warriors or administrators, and the farmers, the artisans and the merchants, who were called *ryomin*, which means good subjects, and those not included in these four classes, who were called *senmin*, which means base subjects. And the *senmin* were divided again into several subclasses such as the *eta* and *hinin*; the *hinin* were mainly beggars, itinerant entertainers and diviners, whereas the *eta* were hereditary outcasts performing such polluting tasks as leatherwork, disposal of the dead, herders of cattle, and so forth. These outcaste communities might go back to the 9th century, but they were firmly established during the Tokugawa period (1600-1867).

As a result of the Eta Emancipation Edict (*Eta Kaihorei*) issued by the Meiji government in 1871, all *senmin*, including *hinin* and *eta*, became ordinary citizens. While persecution and discrimination in law or in administration were eliminated by the Emancipation Edict, the communities of the outcastes remained as

tokushu buraku (special communities); it is the residents of these *buraku* who have been degraded and discriminated against by the majority of Japanese. Even though one can identify a *burakumin* in contemporary Japan simply by knowing his place of residence, those *Burakumin* living outside of the *Buraku* (outcaste community) are also suffering discrimination.

To eliminate such discrimination, a militant liberation movement has been carried out by various organizations, such as *Suiheisha*, by which the *Suihei Undo* was inaugurated after the First World War, and *Kaihodomei*, *Dowakai* and *Jenkairin*. These *Buraku* Liberation Movements have resulted in the adoption of a recommendation on *Dowa* Policy in 1965, a Law of Special Measures for *Dowa* Projects in 1969 and the Law on Special Measures for Regional Improvement in 1982, all aimed at the improvement of the *Burakumin's* position. Thus there have been great improvement in the situation of the *Buraku*, especially in housing and education. But there are still many instances of social discrimination in marriage, employment, education and in neighbourhood relations. The average number of cases of such kinds of discrimination taken up by the Ministry of Justice in the past few years has been about 5,000 per annum.

To eliminate these discriminations completely, a movement to make a new law for the liberation of the *Buraku* and to request the early ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations, by which racial discrimination might be declared a crime and be punished, has been developed.

(4) *Okinawans as a minority group of regional origin rather than ethnic origin*

Okinawans are the people of the Ryukyu Islands, located 400 miles south of the Japanese mainland. The Ryukyus used to be a semi-independent kingdom, playing a role as a trading centre in the area and paying tribute for 700 years, first to China, and then to the Satsuma clan based in Kyushu, one of Japan's main islands. The people of the Ryukyus retained their distinctive language and culture during this period. However, from 1872, when the new Meiji government invaded and annexed the Islands forcibly, the islands and the people have been discriminated against and plundered.

The Ryukyu Islands and the islands' people have been sacrificed for the defence of the mainland of Japan, that is, the islands were the main battlefield of World War II in 1945, and more than 150,000 Okinawans died; further, the US military bases were established following the end of the War and are still retained. Today the military bases of the US Army and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces comprise 20 per cent of the total land area of the islands. So agriculture now plays only a small part in the economy of the islands, while tourism is a growing industry, mainly controlled and financed from the mainland of Japan.

In the cultural or ethnic field, the Japanese government has been adopting the policy of assimilation since the annexation of the islands. As a result, most of the children and young people of the Islands can not speak their own distinctive language and have no chance to gain access to their own culture. On the mainland, there are many instances of discrimination against Okinawans in marriage, in employment and in daily life.

In the Ryukyu Islands, there have been movements struggling against the military bases, discrimination and plunder, so that Okinawans might restore their human rights and their own land. Recently, the young leaders of the Okinawans are pushing forward a movement to establish a more self-sufficient autonomous society and economy, which is called the *Shima-okoshi* – the Islands Revival Society.

III. *The Policy of Japanese Government on the Minorities and International Instruments on Human Rights*

As shown by the situation of minorities in Japan, as described above, it can not by any means be said that Japan is a homogenous society. The notion of Japan as a homogeneous society, however, is still accepted or supported, and the policy of the Japanese Government on minority issues is based on this notion. In the National Report on the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, the Government of Japan states that there are no minorities in Japan in the sense of article 27 of the Covenant. Such an obstinate attitude clearly demonstrates the lack of desire to change the policy of assimilation and discriminations against the minorities in Japan.

The right of an ethnic minority to enjoy its own culture, and of a linguistic minority to use its own language, is now recognized in international law, and State Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including Japan, undertook the obligation to respect the rights of minorities. Thus, the Government of Japan is obliged to respect the ethnic identity of minorities and guarantee ethnic education. It is here important to realize the principle of non-discrimination that all States, including Japan, recognize and to respect the rights of all individuals and groups to be different, as proclaimed by the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice of 1978.

Further, to eradicate social discriminations against the members of a minority group, the early ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations is absolutely necessary. The State Parties to the Convention numbered more than 125 at the end of 1984. So the voice demanding ratification of the Convention is being raised by human rights organizations. As a result, the Government of Japan has begun to prepare for ratification. It can thus be expected that, if the Convention is ratified, the Convention, along with the Covenants on Human Rights, could play a great role in the elimination of discriminations against minority groups in Japan.

However, what is more important than the ratification of the instruments of human rights is that the Government of Japan rid itself of the illusion of an homogeneous society and accept the notion of a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. Changing this attitude, maintained for such a long time, is necessary not only for the benefit of ethnic minority groups, but also for the internationalization of Japanese society.

JAPAN IN ASIA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO NIEO ?*

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Japan's Trade Policy

For some years after World War II, the Japanese government maintained that since Japan was a resource-poor country, it should live by trade. Under the slogan of trade-oriented nation-building, export promotion

became the priority task. The consequence has been that Japan imports almost 100% of its raw materials and exports only industrial products. In the 1980s, energy-related raw materials came to account for about 50% of Japan's total imports, and the products of assembling and high-technology industries for 65.2% of its exports.


This pattern is distinct from that of the USA and Western Europe. The USA is a major grain exporter and industrial products are one of its main import items. In Western Europe, the weight of intra-European community trade is high, and EC members both import and export industrial products at large. Taking each of the Western European countries in turn, dependence on trade is much higher than in Japan, but this in fact only means that they trade with each other inside the EC zone.

This comparison shows that trade relations between the US and Western Europe are more or less complementary, while Japan's trade relationship is totally one-sided. What Japan does is to increase without limits the exports of the high value-added products of assembling and high-technology industries to all countries. This is why trade conflicts are bound to occur, and why they cannot be mitigated.

But the real contradictions in Japan's trade are with Asian countries. East and Southeast Asia are full of newly industrializing countries and territories (NICs). Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are primary NICs, and Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia are secondary NICs. In the 1980s, the share of light industrial products in their exports have invariably increased as they have begun to export these products to advanced industrial countries.

But Japan is not buying their products in significant amounts. On the contrary, it has recently reduced the import of industrial products from these countries drastically. Consequently, Japan's share in their exports has become smaller than the US and European share. The serious economic crisis besetting the Philippines, for instance, stems partly from this type of Japanese trade policy in addition to the special vulnerability of the NICs to world recession.

Increase in Shares of Newly Advanced Industrialized Countries for Selected Manufactured Goods



Japan's Investment Policy: The Pacific Basin Economic Community

In Nov. 1978, when the Ohira Cabinet was formed, the Nomura Research Institute published in its monthly journal, *Zaikai Kansoku*, an article titled "A Design for a Pacific Basin Economic Community." The idea was to propose an alternative economic order for the industrialized world to counter the Third World's New International Economic Order, which the Institute labelled as being influenced by Soviet foreign policy. In concrete terms it was to create a Pacific version of the Lome Treaty of the EC.

What is the real essence of the Pacific Basin Economic Community plan? The Plan envisions that Japan, with its capital and technology, in close collaboration with Australia which has abundant mineral reserves, is to "industrialize" ASEAN which is in fact assigned to be a semi-processing industrial base for the primary resources brought from Australia, Brazil, South Africa or elsewhere. Japan will be guaranteed an uninterrupted supply of natural resources in semi-processed form. Thus, ASEAN fits very well into the Japanese scheme.

It is important to note that the plan, prior to being formulated by the Nomura Research Institute in a written policy recommendation, had already been worked out according to the needs of individual corporations. In the Philippines, Kawasaki Steel Corporation's sintering plant in Mindanao is a typical example. Kawasaki Steel processes iron ore into semi-finished steel. Iron ore is brought presently from Australia where Japanese firms, jointly with the US and European transnational corporations, develop the mines, and later from Brazil where a plan to jointly develop iron ore mines is also underway. On the part of Japan, the plan is to guarantee a long-term and uninterrupted supply of iron ore and enable Kawasaki to shift abroad a portion of its processing within their factory which causes pollution. Finally the plan also envisages remaking ASEAN *à la mode japonaise* jointly by Japan and Australia.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Japanese government began to talk about the establishment of a "Comprehensive Security System." According to the government, because of the collapse of Pax Americana, the US-Japan security system backed by the American nuclear umbrella became insufficient for Japanese defense purposes, and it is therefore necessary to establish an enhanced economic security system based on strengthening Japan's military capabilities.

The economic security system is in fact a "strategy to secure stable supplies of industrial raw materials" as specified in the Pacific Basin Economic Community concept, to which energy resources and food have been added as strategic items.

Food and Energy

How does Japan intend to secure a stable supply of food and energy resources from abroad? With respect to energy, the Japanese government argues that the existence of OPEC, the powerful producers' cartel, not only

results in higher oil prices but also limits the oil supply. It stresses that since Japan depends almost entirely on oil as its primary energy source, and since 70% of all crude oil is imported from the Gulf area, Japan's oil supply is highly vulnerable to changes in the world political situation.

In the petrochemical sector, a series of overseas investment projects are now underway, while in the electric power industry, the largest oil consuming sector, the government is encouraging a switch-over from oil to alternative energy resources such as nuclear power, coal, and LNG. According to the government plan, nuclear power generation will account for 35% of total primary energy supply in the 1990s. LNG will be used to fuel thermal power stations in place of oil, and the "develop-and-import" formula for energy resources will serve Japanese energy needs into the 1990s.

Concerning food, Japan has been almost completely dependent for wheat, soybeans, and corn—staple food items for Japanese and fodder for livestock raising—on imports from the US. Japan is currently making an effort to switch the supply source of these foods from the US to Japanese-controlled "develop-and-import" projects in Brazil, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries.

The "comprehensive security system" is "comprehensive" because the system combines Japanese military strength with an economic security system designed to secure a stable supply of industrial raw materials, energy resources, and food. The present security system also aims at achieving its objective by "integrating" the overseas investment structure of Japanese enterprises into a total Japan-centered system.

However, this strategy will inevitably make Japan richer, drive poor Asian nations further into poverty and marginalization, and reintegrate them as dependent economies into Japan Inc.

* Discussion paper presented at a conference on "Peace and Autonomy in the Asia-Pacific Region," Yokohama, 25–27 March, 1985, sponsored by Kanagawa Prefecture, The United Nations University and the Asian Peace Research Association.

THE POLITICS OF JAPAN'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES

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Japan now faces a turning point: the people must choose whether to continue the pursuit of economic prosperity, as heretofore, or to swallow the Reagan Administration's demand to increase the military budget and shoulder part of the military burden in the Asia-Pacific region, and boost military spending and the size of Japan's military forces. The ruling conservative party in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is willing to bow to the US demands in line with the belief that Japan is a member of the Western Bloc. Supporting this belief is the party's acceptance of the old Roman dictum: if you want peace, prepare for war. Preparations until the Nakasone Cabinet, however, were a source of irritation for the US: Japan was frequently charged with being a "free rider" on the US-Japan Security Treaty. With the advent of the Nakasone Cabinet, however, the Americans have been placated: Nakasone, unique among Japanese political leaders, speaks glibly and makes decisions satisfying the "common sense" of Western countries, while at home he modifies his language to fit into Japanese political culture. Still, from the Japanese voters' point of view, his approach is to break many of the taboos on defense, building up military expenditure at the expense of welfare and education. This will become clear as we examine the current defense posture of Japan against the background of the post-war political environment.

Political environment

The structure of the post-war political system was profoundly shaped by the experience of the Allied, primarily American, occupation of Japan from 1945–1951. The central prop of this system, the Japanese Constitution, was in reality forced on Japan by a US government fearful of the revival of Japanese militarism. In the sense that the Japanese people acted as a sturdy bulwark against the attempts by conservative forces to revise the constitution, however, we can in fact say that the Japanese people *chose* the constitution. In short, by maintaining the war renouncing clause of the constitution (article 9) the Japanese people chose the path which minimises military expenditures but maximises economic growth. This choice is a result of two interrelated factors: the impact of the international environment, and the impact of the Japanese people's strong antipathy to war.

Succeeding LDP Cabinets have adopted a policy of making small defense allotments while concentrating on economic growth. The mainstream factions of the LDP have followed in the footsteps of Prime Minister Yoshida, a conservative who governed Japan in the early 1950s. Thus, prime ministers Ikeda (1960–64), Sato (1964–72), Ohira (1978–80), Tanaka (1972–74) and Suzuki (1980–82) are all graduates of the so-called Yoshida School, adopting a pro-American attitude, keeping the US-Japan Security Treaty, but emphasizing economic growth. In contrast, Prime Minister Nakasone follows in the steps of Prime Minister Kishi (1957–60), who openly declared the need to revise the constitution and boost military spending. In either case, the Opposition has attacked the government's policy: in the former case, the criticism has been of "dependence on America;" in the latter, of a "revival of Japanese militarism." The Opposition has functioned to restrict the growth of Japan's Self Defense Forces, keeping them within certain limits; the Opposition has exerted an influence on the LDP, too. The Miki Cabinet (1974–76), for instance, decided that the defense budget should remain under one per cent of GNP. Given the high economic growth rates of Japan, however, the military budget has continued to increase, placing Japan No. 8 in the world.

The LDP's pro-American policy has appealed to Japanese voters. This is the main reason why the party has continued in power for more than thirty years. The LDP can claim it has built up Japan's economic prosperity. It could nevertheless be argued that this growth was due not so much to the LDP's policies, but to two other factors: first, that Japan did not become directly embroiled in any international conflicts; second, that cheap energy was available to Japan. The former was satisfied even during the Korean and Vietnam War; the latter until the oil crisis of 1973–4, and even after the oil crisis Japan has made efforts to save oil. As a result, although Japan's rate of economic growth since the oil crisis has been reduced from around ten per cent to five or six per cent, thanks to her high productivity, Japan still maintains a higher growth rate than any other industrial power. Thus, the LDP's "economic development first" policy realized miraculous economic prosperity. Every

Japanese voter is proud of his high standard of living, and even blue collar workers now have something to lose. In this sense, a majority of Japanese voters support and vote for the LDP.

The role of the opposition parties here needs to be taken into account. The biggest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), has suffered a decline in the number of seats in the Lower House of the Diet. The party has played an important role in resisting amendment of Article 9, but, to the Japanese voter, the party has failed to present a clear image of the political direction it will take. This is one of the main reasons the voters do not trust the party's ability to govern. In particular, the JSP's policy of "unarmed neutralism" has been taken by the voters as an indication that the party lacks realistic policy options. The so-called middle-of-the-road parties, such as the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and the Komei Party have attacked the LDP's policy, but, they too, have failed to present a realistic alternative to the LDP policies. In fact, all the opposition parties have now come to accept the existence of the Self Defense Forces (8 out of 10 Japanese accept the SDF are legitimate, despite the constitution), and the middle-of-the-road forces have undergone a right-wing shift (the DSP, for instance, is prepared to accept the breaking of the one per cent ceiling.) With the weakening of opposition attacks on the SDF, and their general acceptance by the public, the military budget has been increased.

The Current Situation¹

Fiscal Year	Defense Budget (in billion yen)	Per cent of GNP	Percent of General Account	Per cent of Increases
1980	2230	0.90	5.24	6.5
1981	2400	0.91	5.13	7.61
1982	2586	0.93	5.21	7.75
1983	2754	0.98	5.47	6.50
1984	2935	0.991	5.80	6.55
1985	3137	0.997	5.98	6.9

Although the military budget has thus shot up markedly in recent years, the ratio to GNP still remains under one per cent. However, the difference between the military budget and one per cent of GNP is only 8.9 billion yen in 1985, thus suggesting the symbolically important barrier will be broken during this year. We must also be cautious in handling these figures because, even though the US insists the amount is too small for an advanced country, the calculations do not include such things as pensions as do the NATO military budgets. In this case, the Japanese budget would amount to approximately 1.6 percent of GNP.

Another point worthy of consideration is the automatic expansion of the Japanese military budget. Under Japanese law, weapons can be paid for beyond one fiscal year. For example, in the first year the Japanese government pays less than one per cent of the cost to the weapons manufacturer, the rest being paid in the following few years. This technique avoids a budget check by the Finance Ministry. In the 1985 budget, for instance, the amount of the deferred payments comes to 2300 billion yen, i. e. 73 per cent of the military budget itself.

Furthermore, weapon procurements are rapidly increasing: in 1983, for instance, there was an increase of 17.9 percent, whereas the military budget increased by 6.5 percent, in 1984 this figure was 12.9 per cent to 6.55 per cent. In 1985 the amount will still surpass the military budget's increase of 6.9 per cent. This means the arms industries' dependence on the Defense Agency is increasing annually: for instance, Kawasaki Heavy Industry's rate of dependence was 7.4 per cent in 1980, but it reached nearly 20 per cent in 1984. In Fiscal Year 1985 the Defense Agency will procure the Patriot Missile System, which will amount to 1000 billion yen. The major contractor is Nihon Electronics. If this trend continues, in the near future a military-industrial complex could well develop in Japan.

During the past decade, military collaboration between Japan and the US has been gradually institutionalized. In July 1976, for instance, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation was established. In October 1978, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense were formulated by the committee. In January 1979, the Joint Staff Office of the Self Defense Forces and the US forces in Japan were engaged in setting up joint operational plans. In such ways, Japan is being gradually integrated into US strategy.

The US would like to force Japan to build up her military forces and integrate them into US global strategy. The ultimate goal is to force Japan to increase her military budget to the level of the NATO countries, and to use the SDF as a supplement to US forces in the Pacific. One of the ex-bureaucrats of the Defense Agency puts it this way: "The Defense Agency bureaucrats who cannot find a *raison d'être* for the SDF without war, emphasize the Soviet threat as if the Soviet Union were simply waiting for a chance to invade Japan."² In addition to the "Soviet threat" thesis, requests from the US, though tempered in comparison to the Carter era's brazen demand for Japan to build up her military forces, are placed in the context of Japanese promises to build up the military. Thus, in contrast to earlier days, when US demands were a double-edged sword — they could be used by those domestic forces in favor of a military build up as well as by those who could charge the US with interference in domestic affairs — the present demands can be placed in the context of the responsibility of the Japanese Cabinets to fulfill their promises to the US.

Forecasting the future

It is of course difficult to forecast the future, but it is highly likely that, in 1985, the Japanese military budget will break through the one per cent barrier. Prime Minister Nakasone argues it is difficult to keep the defense budget under one per cent of GNP, given a difference of only 8.9 billion yen, though it is the prime minister himself who has pushed for an increase in the military budget, promising Reagan an increase at the time of the US-Japan summit meeting. If the Japanese economy grows at a less rate than forecasted, or if the Japanese government allows an increase in public officials salaries, as the Minister of Finance has insisted, then the military expenditures will automatically surpass one per cent of GNP. This type of "non-decision" will serve to break the symbolically important one per cent barrier.

What alternative is there to military expansion? One alternative, taking into consideration the different needs of Japan as compared with the US or NATO countries, is to increase the amount of Official Development Aid (ODA). It is true that Japan's ODA has been increased by 10 percent in the 1985 fiscal budget, but the quality of Japan's aid to developing countries, and the ODA ratio to GNP (0.33 in 1983 compared to the devel-

oped countries average of 0.36), falls below average. Moreover, Japanese ODA has a high ratio of loan and credit terms that are too harsh for the developing countries to accept. The ratio of technological aid is also low: 10.2 percent. This places Japan fourteenth out of seventeen countries.

In 1981 the Suzuki Cabinet decided that from 1981 to 1985 Japan would double her ODA. In order to keep this promise, Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone have tried to increase the ODA budget, nearly fulfilling this obligation. The government should continue to strive to fulfill its obligations in this regard, accepting its role in international society to be one of aiding the developing countries rather than being integrated into the military strategy of the USA, though care needs to be exercised to ensure the aid from Japan is not used for political purposes.

- 1 See my book, *Decision-making Process of the Japanese Defense Budget (Nihon no Boeishi o Kangaeru)* Diamond Press, 1983, which covers from 1980 to 1982.
- 2 H. Maeda "The Free-Rider Myth," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, 1982, p. 179.

THE SECURITY DISCOURSE IN JAPAN*

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In the late 1940s and early 1950s leading Japanese intellectuals developed an alternative concept of security to replace the concept of security rooted in balance of power and deterrence. This has been the fountainhead for the creation of a Japanese identity rooted in demilitarization and autonomous political development. The concept of "unarmed-neutralism," as championed by the Peace Issues Discussion Group,¹ was included in the platform of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), coming to form the core of the party's security policy. The JSP has never been able to gain the political power necessary to realize this alternative, but the concept of alternative security, as championed by the party, has enjoyed varying degrees of support throughout the postwar period.

This example from the Japanese context suggests the need to investigate the obstacles to the realization of alternative security policies. Two approaches can be taken: first, the socio-political factors impeding the realization of the alternative can be examined in the empiricist tradition. Ultimately, this approach is rooted in a view of language as simply a neutral tool in the description of an objective reality. Second, the language of the security discourse can be examined in order to shed light on the political role language plays in structuring reality. My aim here is to briefly draw attention to the problematic link between language and reality as a means to sharpen our understanding of security issues in postwar Japan.

A major impediment to the realization of alternative security policies is the charge that they are "unrealistic." As the "realist school" in international politics has captured the central ground of the security discourse, alternatives to "Living with Nuclear Weapons" (The Harvard Nuclear Study Group) can be branded "unrealistic," i.e. negatively. Unrealistic in this case means the alternative can not be realized given the present distribution of political power, despite the existence of the alternative on the intellectual level. Yet it is precisely the existence of the alternative that suggests another way of looking at reality. To what extent the alternative poses a challenge to the hegemonic security discourse is crucial in determining how the boundaries of the discourse are drawn. By adopting the alternative view of reality, changes in attitude, and then action, may occur, leading to the possibility of a redistribution of political power supportive of the alternative.

In the case of Japan, even though the concept of alternative security centering on unarmed-neutralism has never been realized, the availability of this alternative has made two important contributions to the shaping of the security discourse, and security policy. First, the idea of *unarmed-neutralism* has helped to make zero the reference point for Japanese military expenditures. This has had an impact on political actions as well as attitudes: the ruling party has adopted a policy of keeping military spending under one per cent of GNP since 1976, and the majority of Japanese still support the one per cent ceiling, despite the likelihood that it will be broken through this year.² Second, the boundaries of the discourse have been set so that an alternative which in other countries would often be considered too "unrealistic" even to be discussed has been the reference point for the major opposition party during most of the postwar period. This has meant an alternative to nuclear deterrence and the balance of power has helped shape the security discourse. This, along with the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has no doubt contributed to the strength of anti-nuclear attitudes.

The rhetorical language of the security discourse moreover functions to highlight, shade or obfuscate different aspects of political reality. The metaphors used to denigrate the attempts to develop alternative forms of security are here crucial. This surfaced recently in the case of the New Zealand government's decision not to allow the visit of the USS Buchanan. It was reported in the *Japan Times* (16/2/85) that Pentagon and State Department officials fear Australia may be the next case of "nuclear allergy." Concern about Japan was also expressed, as "there has always been a Japanese nuclear allergy." By branding those countries attempting to distance themselves from nuclear weapons as allergic, these officials were attempting to place anti-nuclear attitudes and policies in a context calling forth the metaphorical entailment of "cure." In the case of Japan, as has been argued elsewhere,³ the "cure" was administered from the mid-1960s onwards partly on the basis of gradual exposure to the nuclear "allergen" by increasing the number of port calls by US vessels, so that now few suffer an "allergic reaction" to port calls, despite the deployment of Tomahawk missiles last June. In fact, the Mayor of Sasebo, the port where massive protests were held against the 1968 visit of the *Enterprise*, recently announced his city's willingness to be the home port for an aircraft carrier.⁴

In contrast, New Zealand, under a government publicly committed to a policy of refusing port calls by vessels not declared to be nuclear free, is giving substance to the Japanese government's three non-nuclear principles (not to produce, possess nor permit introduction of nuclear weapons), rather than joining the US in attempting to cure the "allergy," as succeeding Japanese governments have done. The withholding of military intelligence, and the possibility of dumping US dairy products in New Zealand's traditional markets, are obstacles to New Zealand's attempt at nuclear delinking, especially as neither the government nor a majority of the public wish to opt out of ANZUS. This suggests there are problems both in attempts to realize "unrealistic" alternative security policies, as with the JSP's "unarmed-neutralism," and alternative "realistic" security policies, as with Lange's attempt to maintain only conventional military relations with the US: in the former case, the

Liberal Democratic Party's "realistic" policy of turning a blind eye to the introduction of nuclear weapons while maintaining close relations with the US undermines the JSP's position; in the latter, the US balks at the idea of a conventional military relationship. AS Paul D. Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, complains: "... without access to ports and the surface ship deployments that access supports, we cannot maintain the naval presence in the Pacific that helps to deter war and preserve the peace. And we can't go around advertising which of those ships has nuclear weapons on board, or when they do and when they don't. For an ally to insist on that kind of disclosure as a condition for port access is just not responsible."⁵ The Japanese government has always been a "responsible" ally insisting that, as the United States has never made a request to bring nuclear weapons into Japan, this has never occurred, though an overwhelming majority in public opinion polls do not believe the government.⁶

The language of the hegemonic security discourse can also play a role in shaping attitudes and influencing action on security issues. For instance, peace activists in Japan in the early 1980s often stated they became involved in the anti-nuclear movement again, or for the first time, as a result of the change in rhetoric accompanying the advent of the Reagan Administration.⁷ This change in declaratory policy, rather than changes in employment policy accompanying the increasing accuracy and miniaturization of nuclear weapons, thus helps to explain the revitalization of the peace movement in Japan. Reagan's bellicose rhetoric functioned to make people more aware of the possibility of nuclear war. The decline in peace activities in Japan these last two or three years may in some way be connected to the decline in such rhetoric. In contrast, disarmament talks, so far having little to do with disarmament, may create an information environment less likely to stimulate the growth of the peace movement. Paradoxically, the Reagan rhetoric seems at least in the short term to have influenced Japanese people to become active in the anti-nuclear movement. What role language can play in the activation of the peace movement in Japan is a topic deserving further investigation.

Notes

1. An English translation of one of the group's major statements, "On Peace for the Third Time," is included in *Peace Research in Japan*, 1976, edited by the Japan Peace Research Group, Tokyo.
2. A recent poll by the *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 March, 1985, reported the following findings: Continue as heretofore to maintain the 1% ceiling, 58%; Abandon the present ceiling and establish a new ceiling, 22%; Do not decide on a ceiling and devote enough funds to defense, 5%; No or other answers, 15%.
3. See the author's, "The Nuclearization of Language: Nuclear Allergy as Political Metaphor," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1984, pp. 259-275.
4. *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 March, 1985.
5. Address by Paul D. Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Before Symposium of National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 22, 1985.
6. A poll by the *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 June, 1981, reported 80% did not believe the government's statement that neither port calls nor transit of nuclear armed ships had occurred.
7. See the author's, "The Ban-the-Bomb Movement in Japan: Whither Alternative Security?" *Social Alternatives*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 35-39.

* Discussion paper presented at a conference on "Peace and Autonomy in the Asia-Pacific Region," March 25-27, 1985, Yokohama, sponsored by Kanagawa Prefecture, The United Nations University and the Asian Peace Research Association.

JAPANESE PEOPLE'S IMAGE OF PEACE

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As Johan Galtung points out, "an important task in peace research has always been and will always be the exploration of the concept of peace." (Johan Galtung: 'Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, p. 183) In spite of Galtung's emphasis, there have been very few studies on the concept or image of peace of the *public*, though there have been numerous studies on the concept of peace of great thinkers, philosophers, or statesmen. Among the few, however, two types of studies are worthy of note here. One is the research beginning with Peter Cooper, and the other is Takeshi Ishida's study. The first type of research on peace images, begun by Cooper, followed by Trond Alvik, Leif Rosell, Magnus Haavelsrud, J. A. E. A. Ehly, Glenn D. Hook and others, has concentrated on children's image of peace. Their research has the following characteristics in common. First, their main research concern is directed toward the relationship or correlation between peace images and other independent variables such as age (or more specifically, the developmental stage of children), sex, socio-economic status, culture or political culture and so on. Second, they adopt a rather specific assumption on the nature of peace images. Cooper classifies peace images (actually, children's responses or verbal associations to "peace") into the four categories; "inactivity," "respite," "sociable activity," and "reconciliation." (Peter Cooper: 'The Development of the Concept of War', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 4) Though not without minor revisions and criticisms, subsequent research basically follows Cooper's classification. Apart from the validity of the classification, this type of research tacitly assumes that the peace image of any particular child falls into one and only one of the four or five or any number of the completely discrete categories and never takes a complex structure where two or more categories coexist. In other words, the peace image is assumed to be a variable which takes one and only one of any finite values. In contrast, Ishida adopts a slightly different assumption from this. Ishida compares "shālōm" in ancient Judaism, "eirene" in Greece, "Pax" in Rome, "ho p'ing" or "p'ing ho" in China and Japan, and "śānti" in India, and shows the differences of emphasis among them. (Takeshi Ishida: 'Beyond the Traditional Concepts of Peace in Different Cultures,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 135) For example, whereas in the case of "shālōm," the emphasis lies on the notions "the will of God, justice" and "prosperity," in the case of "eirene" it is on the notions "prosperity" and "order." As is clear from the example, here the peace concept has a complex structure and can theoretically take more than one value at the same time. To be more precise, the dependent variable, peace image, is assumed to be a matrix in Ishida's approach, while in Cooper and others'

approaches it is assumed to be a scalar variable which can take one and only one value at a time. Needless to say, Ishida's approach is much nearer to the real nature of the peace image. From this, it is obvious that the peace image of any culture or group should be regarded as consisting of possibly more than one component and examined and described accordingly.

It is also clear from the brief discussion above that research on peace images has focused its attention on what constitutes peace or the substance of peace. Though it is a very, or perhaps the most, important aspect of the peace image, is it the only important aspect? Is it the only dimension of the peace image worth examination? Consider Figure 1. The figure shows, in terms of the relative distance, the mutual relationship of the 13 groups of components of the peace image based on the verbal responses to the Japanese word "*heiwa* (peace)" elicited by the association experiment technique. The experiment was conducted in 1982 with about 1000 university and college students as subjects. Interesting observations can be made from the figure concerning Japanese students' image of peace. For example, taken as whole, their peace image consists of two major components: one corresponding to the notion of "negative" peace, and the other to "positive" peace. Note that the two are sharply divided by the vertical axis in Figure 1. Moreover, there is no sex difference in this respect. Again, it can be observed that the presence of such categories as "atomic bombs" and "nature" in the peace image of Japanese students and the absence of such categories as "justice" and "order" may reflect some underlying characteristics of the Japanese people's peace image. Though these are very important points, let us revert to our question.

Most of the categories appearing in Figure 1 can be regarded as representing components essential to "negative" and "positive" peace. On the one hand, the absence of "atomic bombs," "nuclear arms race," and nuclear and conventional "wars" is a relatively necessary condition to achieve peace, and the presence or achievement of "love and happiness," "freedom" and "tranquility" is a relatively sufficient condition, on the other. Here, let us refer to these categories as *value* categories. As is evident from Figure 1, the value categories are the most important components of the peace image. It is, therefore, natural that research on peace images so far has focused its attention on this aspect of the peace image.

However, it is also certain that there are other categories than the value categories. For example, "world," "family" and "nature" in Figure 1 cannot be termed as value categories in any sense at all. These are categories clearly different in nature from the value categories. These represent, to the Japanese people at least, the very sphere or space where peace is, or can be, achieved or maintained. So let us refer, as *sphere* categories, to the categories like these which represent the sphere or space within which peace can exist. Sphere categories are quite different in nature from the value categories. So, we must conclude that the value categories are not the only component of the peace image, but that there is more than one dimension in the peace image. In addition, as in the case of the value categories discussed above, each dimension like value and sphere consists of more than one category. Therefore, the peace image should now be seen neither as a scalar variable nor as a unidimensional matrix, but as a multidimensional matrix.

The problem of the multidimensionality of the peace image was first suggested by Glenn D. Hook. Though he does not use the term nor raise the issue quite explicitly, he stresses the importance of categories other than the value categories, arguing that, in dealing with children's peace images, it is very important to examine who they think makes peace. This dimension of the peace image is obviously different from the two we mentioned above and can be referred to as the *agent* dimension. (Glenn D. Hook: "Orientations to Peace among Canadian and Indian Children," *Peace Research in Japan*, 1978-79, p. 85) In addition, Galtung's analysis and classification of the peace concept into "universalists," "ingroup/outgroup," and "inward-oriented" approaches can also be seen as representing differences of emphasis on the sphere dimension of the peace image among different cultures (Galtung, op. cit., p. 196).

The discussion above has, I believe, sufficiently shown the multidimensional nature of the peace image. Now let us briefly examine Japanese people's image of peace from this point of view. Though there are many important points to be raised about the value categories, let us confine our attention to the sphere categories since this is the least explored area in the case of the Japanese or other peoples. First of all, what kinds of categories are there on this dimension? Table 1 shows the relative quantitative importance of the nine major sphere categories in the Japanese peace image. What is given in Table 1 is the result obtained by means of a kind of content analysis based on the samples of the Japanese word "*heiwa*" ("peace") taken from Japanese paperback fictions. Since the number of the sample is not large, the observations which follow must of course be tentative. But it will be sufficient to obtain a general idea of the sphere dimension of the Japanese people's peace image. The categories are chosen on the basis of their relative frequency and their distributional and conceptual independence. Moreover, the categories have a grammatical property in common, that is, they can occur both in the linguistic environments "*heiwana* _____" ("peaceful _____") and "_____ *no heiwa*" ("peace of _____"). "Shizen" ("nature") is the only exception. In the usual context, it cannot occur in the latter environment.

It is not clear at present whether the categories in Table 1 can be used as a framework for a crossnational or crosscultural comparison. And without such a comparison, we cannot properly speak of *Japanese* characteristics. With this reservation, however, let me point out some of what seem to be the characteristics of the Japanese sphere dimension of the peace image. First of all, almost every arena of human activity or relationship can be a sphere of peace to the Japanese. Peace can be achieved, maintained or destroyed within villages, towns, cities, political parties, schools, among brothers and sisters, or between husband and wife. The nine categories given in Table 1 are the most important among them. Secondly, "*katei*" ("family"), "*mura*" ("village"), and "*shizen*" ("nature") are (at least quantitatively) the most important of the nine. "Peace of the village" (see Ishida, op. cit., p. 133), "peace of the family" and "peaceful nature" have traditionally been, and still are, very important ingredients of the Japanese peace image. To take an extreme example, we often find passages in the memoirs of atomic-bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki where they recall that, even amidst the damages caused by the bomb and the misery and confusion of the defeat, they felt peace regained in some way or other when their family fortunately reunited or when they were watching the "calm nature" which, perhaps to their eyes, transcended the worldly affairs of man. Of course, this is an extreme case, but we daily come across expressions and passages which indicate the prevalence of these categories in the Japanese peace image. And though it is not clear whether the predominance of the sphere dimension itself is a Japanese characteristic, these three can be regarded as characteristic of the Japanese peace image. Thirdly, the substance of peace which exists within the spheres represented by these categories has a distinctive character. In other words, the three sphere categories

correspond respectively to particular value categories, though the correspondences are not exactly one to one. In terms of the degree of cooccurrence or contingency within the samples, the sphere "katei" ("family") has a very strong correlation with the value "(the absence of) conflict/trouble," and the sphere "shizen" ("nature") with the value "calmness/quietness." In fact, all the categories in Table 1 have a strong correspondence with one or more particular value categories.

We have here shown the multidimensional nature of the peace image and very briefly examined the peace image of the Japanese people on that basis. What is urgently required of research on peace image is a detailed examination, structural in nature like this, of peace images of different peoples, nations and cultures, and the comparisons on the basis of them.

Table 1
Major Categories on the Sphere Dimension

sphere categories	%*
"jinrui" ("human race")	4.2
"sekai" ("world")	7.5
"kuni" ("country")	15.1
"shudan" ("group")	7.5
"machi" ("town / city")	6.7
"mura" ("village")	16.8
"katei" ("family")	21.8
"kojin" ("individual")	13.4
"shizen" ("nature")	17.6

* indicates the percentage to the total samples




Figure 1. Major Components of the Japanese Students' Peace Image

THE COMPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES OF PSAJ

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The PSAJ, founded in 1973, has been very active in academic research, organizing a national conference in the spring and fall, and publishing an annual journal. It has some 600 members, consisting of social scientists (72 per cent), humanists (14 per cent) and natural scientists (7 per cent). More than a half of the social scientists or 39 per cent of the total are specialists in international studies, e.g. international relations, politics, economics or law. It is more interdisciplinary within the social sciences than it is across the three fields. It is least international in membership, 97 per cent of the members being Japanese.

The organizing topics of the PSAJ symposia, offered at every national conference, are in some sense indicative of our recent academic concern. The topics are multi-faceted, lacking any strong tendency, and can be grouped into the following.

"Peace in Japan's context" and "Nuclear problems" are the most popular—spring 1977 / fall 1979 / spring 1983 / spring 1984 / fall 1984; and fall 1975 / fall 1976 / spring 1981 / fall 1981 / fall 1983, respectively. "Methodology of peace research" comes next—fall 1973 / fall 1974 / fall 1976 / spring 1980. "International conflicts", "Science and technology" and "Philosophy of peace" were discussed three times respectively. Then "Militaryization of economics," "World order," "Peace in Asia or the Third World" and "Peace movements," were each discussed twice. Finally, "Peace education," "Rural development" and "The Ryukyu islands between war and peace" were discussed once each.

The subjects of all the reports, presented at the conferences, also indicate our concern. These were analyzed to single out our general interest in peace studies. The frequency of key words, cited below, was counted in the report titles. The total number of reports is 238, with foreign guest speakers excluded.

The highest is "nuclear" or "atomic" (32), composed of "being A-bombed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (13), "contemporary military affairs" (15) and "peaceful uses" (4). In the next place is "peace education" (16). Third is "science" and / or "technology" (14). Four cases of "arms race" and ten cases of "disarmament" or "arms control" can be grouped together as one category, showing our apprehension about the increasing militarization of the world. In addition, ten cases of "development" with six cases of "environment," and nine cases of "human rights" are noted as relatively high. "National security" (3), with "Japan-US Security Treaty" (6) and "The Self-Defence Forces" (6), indicates our lesser interest in state-administered security through bigger military capabilities. Five cases of "peace movements" imply our dialogue with such activists. Four cases of "refugees" suggest our very recent concern about this world problem.

In summing up the two analyses of the symposia and reports, some tendencies can be discerned in our activities.

First, we are repeatedly concerned with the nuclear problem. The common denominator is our anti-nuclearism, stemming from the history of being A-bombed in the two cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. It must be admitted at once that our attitudes differ in regard to the tenacity of this negation, with those who are totally negative, even negating nuclear power generation, and those who are partially negative, accepting non-military uses.

Second, we have recently become concerned with the worsening domestic milieu for peace. This concern

comes from our firm support for the "Peace" Constitution, in the face of the accelerating build-up of the Self-Defense Forces. Although the letters and spirit of the Constitution deny in explicit terms any war or war potential as a method of settling international conflicts, the SDF has increasingly become involved in the US nuclear strategy. This concern is shared among us, and is the second common denominator.

Third, we are interested in the meaning of peace and the methodology of peace research, which is not unusual for an association of this kind. It must, however, be added that we are sensitive to the particular implications as well as the general meaning of peace, considering the Japanese or Asian particularity as an indispensable element of indigenous peace.

Fourth, while peace in Asia or the Third World, the World Order, and science and technology have been taken up from time to time, they remain peripheral to our central concern. It must be stressed in parenthesis that peace education and human rights are not neglected. The former is supported very strongly by a fixed number of members and the latter is given due but less consideration by all members.

Fifth, social and peace activists have been invited to attend our conferences in order to discuss the reality and significance of their activities and to discuss peace problems with us. It is recognized that more opportunities should be provided for such dialogues, since they can enrich and enlighten us.

Finally, there are a few problems to be mentioned. The PSAJ's membership is less oriented toward the natural scientists, with only 40 members in this category in 1979, and still only 42 in 1984. None of our studies has been conducted on future nuclear calamities or the so-called "nuclear winter." Our interest in nuclear problems has more or less centered on the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which stamped anti-nuclearism on our minds. It is now time for us to learn from simulations of the probable tragedy of nuclear war done in other countries, since the time has passed for us to simply send out precise information on our past tragedy. The greater participation of natural scientists in our association is much needed in order to build firmer bulwarks against nuclearism.

The membership within the social sciences is also less oriented toward economists, with 78 members in 1979, declining to 75 in 1984. No comprehensive study has been attempted on projecting Japan's peace in the Asian economic context, e. g. Asian economic inter-relationships to replace the present North-South relationships in Asian countries, transforming the Northern as well as the Southern societies. It must be noted that the discussion of peace in Japan's context has been more or less separated from that of peace in the Asian or Third World context.

The PSAJ, being somehow idealistic, needs to learn from the practical achievements of peace research in other parts of the world.

SEARCH FOR JAPAN'S PEACE AND SECURITY: 1984 FALL SESSION OF PSAJ

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The 12th session of the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) was held at Meiji University on the 17th and 18th November, 1984 in Tokyo. The agenda of the two day session was "Search for Japan's Peace and Security."

In a retrospect of the Japan-US Security System, Prof. Seki of the University of Tokyo reported on the Japan-US Security System and the international political system from the 1950s to the present. Seki pointed out the multidimensional aspects of the 1950s political system: The war in Asia started later than in Europe and the Middle East. This is because the US had been influenced by the revolution in China. The Korean War triggered the Asian Cold War structure, and Japan was made into a "factory" in Asia by the US policies. With the impact of the Korean War, the US tried its best to eliminate the influence and effect of the Chinese Revolution on Japan by the Occupation Forces enforcing the Japan-US Security Treaty as the condition for Japan's post-war independence.

The next reporter, Prof. Hara of the College of International Commerce, examined the causal links between the Japan-US Security Treaty System and domestic politics, especially during the administration of Prime Minister Kishi (1957-1960). He discussed this point based on an analysis of the Shigemitsu-Dulles Meeting of 1955. At this time, Dulles brought up the issue of the revision of the Constitution of Japan and the Japan-US Security Treaty as one set. This is because the Constitution prohibits sending Japan's Self Defense Forces overseas. Shigemitsu, the then Foreign Minister, expressed his desire to conclude the Japan-US Security Treaty as an "equal" treaty. As a result of the Kishi-Eisenhower meeting and the Kishi-Dulles meeting, the Japan-US summit mutually agreed to complete revision of the Security Treaty and conclude a "new treaty". Prof. Hara concluded that the US's perception of Japan as dangerous, a fearful potential power, led to the agreement to revise the security treaty in 1960. As discussant, Prof. Yamagiwa of Yokohama City University referred to the current perspective on the Japan-US Security Treaty. In this context, the treaty serves to tie Japan to the US, rather than to the USSR or China, helping to crush national liberation movements in Asia, and thus becoming one of the key factors for economic aid to friendly allied governments. In spite of such desires, the US intention to establish a Pacific Military Alliance has not been actualized over the past 35 years with the sole exception of the Japan-US Security Treaty, which has come to be strengthened successfully in Asia in line with US world strategy. Further, Prof. Fukuda of Meiji Gakuin University, questioned the significance of the idea of making Japan into a so-called "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and of the military alliance with the US. Prof. Seki finally commented by saying that Japan's defeat in World War II was characterised by the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but, this A-bomb experience has only been shared by the Japanese population, domestically, and has not effectively been communicated and introduced overseas. This is one of the weaknesses of the Japanese pattern of communication with the outside world.

The afternoon session centered on the idea of Japan's Basic Self-Defense Capability focusing on the Security Treaty disputes since the 1970s.

In the report, Prof. Kurokawa of Toyo University pointed out that the idea of Basic Self-Defense capability not only aims to stop military expansion, but also aims to improve Japan's self-defense capacity based on the Basic Policy for National Defense. He said that it was "rational" for Japan to limit her military expenditure within the minimum allowable amount to the extent the US was not being frustrated by that. This is in sharp

contrast to the situation wherein the US has a strong, and large scale military-industrial complex which exerts pressure on the economy. In short, basic self-defense capability is "small but high quality" supported by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty on condition that detente will continue. From 1980, the LDP tried to amend the guidelines for defense planning; it wants to stress that there will be a confrontation between the build up of the SDF following the guidelines and keeping the defense budget under one per cent of GNP. As discussant, Mr. Chuma of the Asahi Newspaper commented on the intention of the Government's National Defense Program Outline. Under Prime Minister Miki's administration, Director-General of the Self Defense Agency realized the necessity of a program of Basic Defense concept for Japan to cope with a limited scale of threat, although "detente" politics was observed in international relations. Mr. Chuma explicitly stated that the Ministry of Finance decides the budget of the Defense Agency, and the Ministry bureaucrats tend to affirm the necessity of the Self-Defense Forces, but cannot obtain essential information on important defense and security matters. Civilians in the Defense Agency have become weaker in gaining access to vital information. He went on to outline some of the characteristic traits of bureaucrats as follows: i) the Defense Agency high ranking officials were ex-bureaucrats of the Ministry of Interior who give top priority to the maintenance of internal order, ii) the Ministry of Finance bureaucrats hardly possess any philosophy of self-defense, though they take the post of the chief of bureau of defense policy. Prof. Kurokawa finally commented by saying that when the Self-Defense Forces are playing a supplementary role to the US, the direction the governing party is leading Japan must be carefully monitored.

The other afternoon topic focused on the military issues in Japan-US trade friction. Prof. Sekishita of Ritsumeikan University first commented on the automobile problem, high-technology industry, including semi-conductors, the transfer of military technology, communication information, and so forth. He pointed out that in the 1970s, the restructuring of the postwar system had been taking place, though the roots could be found in the 1950s. As discussant, Prof. Masuda of Osaka City University commented by saying that the high-technology industry, especially the semi-conductor industry, is regarded as a military industry in the US, but this aspect is not emphasized in Japan. Imports in the field of high-technology may reach an excess in the US, causing trade friction.

In the reports on Attitudes Concerning the Security Treaty and Peace, Prof. Nakaji of Ryukyu University presented the results of his opinion survey of students in Okinawa islands, where 50 per cent of US bases in Japan are located. According to the findings, students fear the presence of the American military bases—57 per cent of the students expressed the fear that the bases may be the cause of a Soviet military attack, while on mainland Japan, only 38 percent of students responded similarly.

Students also expressed a high degree of anti-nuclearism. 85 per cent of the students in Okinawa consider that nuclear weapons have been brought into Japan, compared to 79 percent of students outside of Okinawa. Likewise, Prof. Nakaji also referred to the students' high evaluation of Japan's Peace Constitution and the efforts at peace-keeping by the people: 53 percent in Okinawa, 42 percent on the mainland. Prof. Ohta of Rakuno Gakuen University mentioned in his report that the feeling "peace is in danger" has to be related to the difficulty of attaining control of nuclear weapons. He further observed that differences in political regimes, be it the Soviet Union or China, do not matter at all for high technology companies. Both the Soviet Union and China are prepared to open markets for these companies. Leaders of "Socialist" regimes also fail to promote peace by production of conventional weapons as tools to oppress and repress people. In the discussion, Prof. Kawata of Sophia University commented on Ohta's report suggesting that the term "Socialist-Market Economy" has appeared in China. What needs to be considered is how we can practice peaceful exchange rather than how we should act in the case of a Soviet invasion. As discussant, Mr. Koshida, a teacher of Gakushuin High School, commented on the erosion of Japan's war experience among youth, arguing too much emphasis has been placed on the need to pass on the war experience. He also observed that adults are not contributing to raising children's peace-consciousness.

On the second day of the PSAJ conference, the economic aspects of Comprehensive National Security were the focus of discussion. The former Japanese Ambassador to Kuwait, Mr. Ishikawa, reported on oil and the crisis of the Middle East, taking as his starting point the fact that the oil crisis in 1973 affected the whole world. However, because of the information gap on the real question at issue, the sense of crisis in Japan did not reflect the true situation in the Middle East. The interdependent relationship between Japan and the Middle East is better now than at any previous time. Mr. Ishikawa concluded Japan should continue to show her understanding of the peace and security of the Middle East and make efforts to strengthen friendly relations with Middle Eastern countries, including Palestine.

As discussant, Mr. Okakura of the Mainichi Newspaper added that most information about the Middle East in Japan comes via Europe and is frequently distorted. He argued Japan should develop her own original policy which may differ from the US policy by paying closer attention to the movement of the Shiah group along the Gulf coast. It was in fact not until 1973 that Japan developed any specific Middle East policy. The information gap is thus not the only problem.

The session continued with the Idea and Reality of Economic Aid-Its Political and Economic Implications. Prof. Muro of Towa University categorized types of aid as follows: i) Warrior Style Aid. Here both military and political strategies are combined. This exemplifies America's policy against communism as in the case of the US assistance to the administration of the Shah in Iran; ii) Merchant Style Aid. This is the government to government level economic aid and assistance. This is often aid for and within a small number of elites, thereby creating potential danger. However, such aid may not directly cause domestic civil war or large scale rebellion; iii) Development Aid. Such countries as Sweden, Denmark and Holland are giving such aid, which is humanitarian assistance based on a global perspective. After introducing his unique categorization, Prof. Muro went on to reflect on the economic aid of Japan. According to his explanation, Japan is an underdeveloped country in the field of assistance—Japan is not only a late-comer but an indecisive one. Japan is the only country among the developed countries which does not have an explicit policy guided by a written law on aid. As discussant, Mr. Yamamoto, a critic, observed that since the Afghan invasion, the content of Japan's comprehensive national security, which is envisioned by the Japanese conservative mainstream as a policy which limits military force and promotes economic development, has been changing. The Nakasone administration decided to provide 4 billion dollars to South Korea, for instance, a decision indicating the increasing importance of "political aid."

In the discussion, Prof. Suzuki and other members of the PSAJ argued that economic aid from Japan has

had political implications from the first, and such aid being put into the framework of the Cold War as compensation to Asian countries. In his remarks, Prof. Muro stressed how it was only last year that the government realized that NGOs have the ability to give countries effective aid and help in development for people outside of the elite class. In this regard, the Government ought to search for an effective system to assist NGOs.

The final session dealt with the problem of Japan's Self Defense Forces and UN cooperation with a report by Prof. Hirose of Meiji Gakuin University. Hirose argued that the function of Peace Keeping Forces (PKO) should be extended to non-military activity. He then went on to discuss the military relations with the US noting that even when an attack on Japan is limited to the military bases of the United States, it is still an attack on Japanese territory and the individual right of defense of Japan automatically arises from that attack. A security system which gives the US permanent military bases in Japan, is essentially taking into account the military policy of the United States.

As discussant, Prof. Iwashima of the Defense Institute pointed out that, as the type of international disputes has been changing, the meaning of military force has changed. The participation of Japanese Self-Defense Forces in peace keeping activities is not inconsistent with the Japan-US Security Treaty. Iwashima suggested that, by sending Japanese Self Defense Forces to participate in UN activities, the quality of the Forces would be improved.

A general discussion then followed with a number of points being made by members of the PSAJ. Prof. Kobayashi, of Senshu University, for instance, commented as to whether it is possible for human rights to be protected when reliance on the Japan-US Security Treaty system is growing stronger, particularly if an emergency should arise. Prof. Kurino, President of the PSAJ, emphasized the danger of justifying the overseas dispatch of the Self Defense Forces, given the importance of the Peace Constitution. Prof. Seki noted how the actions of peace-keeping forces during the Korean War caused a classical case of misperception.

Finally, Prof. Fukase of Hokkaido University pointed out that on the juridical level, the Supreme Court has not determined the legality of the Self Defense Forces. The way to disarmament does exist. In order to establish the right to a peaceful existence, it is necessary to search for a way to limit the growth of the Self Defense Forces. On this note, the PSAJ ended the meeting.

MEMBER'S VOICE: WHY I JOINED THE PSAJ

HUSIMI Kodi

Ex-President, Science Council of Japan, Member, House of Councillors

I am an ex-President of the Science Council of Japan, and, in a broader sense, an ex-scientist, working now as a Member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet, the House of Councillors, namely, as a politician. Since I joined the PSAJ several years before I became a politician, the two are not directly connected, but there is still, I think, some connection.

I started my scientific career as a nuclear physicist in Osaka University. I worked under Professor S. Kikuchi on the neutrons produced by D-D reaction, just a few years after their discovery, the discovery of the neutron by Chadwick in 1932, and the discovery of so-called artificial nuclear reactions by Cockcroft in the same year. We began a systematic study of neutrons interacting with various atomic nuclei, being principally concerned with the capture of neutrons by nuclei with emission of gamma rays, in contrast with Fermi's school in Rome, where the so-called activation of nuclei was systematically pursued.

My only reason for citing the above facts is to give the background against which the US occupation forces, shortly after the termination of the war in 1945, demolished our beloved cyclotron at Osaka University as well as the one of Dr. Nishina and his colleagues at the Riken (Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry) in Tokyo — they were sent to the bottom of Osaka Bay and Tokyo Bay respectively. This should clarify the situation in Japan in contrast to Europe, where only one cyclotron was operating at the time.

My first impression of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was as an average Japanese citizen and as a nuclear physicist who had failed to forecast the advent of the atomic bomb. In fact, both Kikuchi and Nishina had analysed the feasibility of producing nuclear weapons and reached the conclusion that, though a nuclear fission bomb could be theoretically produced, the engineering difficulty of separating uranium 235 would require tremendous amounts of money, material resources and time. The defeat I felt at the time was thus both as an ordinary citizen and as a nuclear physicist. The whole picture changed gradually but completely when I became aware of the horrible effects of the atom-bomb disaster. I felt a deep sense of responsibility as a member of the scientific community. After long meditation I came to the conclusion that the technological knowledge obtained by scientific inquiry should be utilized for constructive and not destructive purposes. This decision was made several years before the famous 1953 declaration of "Atoms for Peace" by President Eisenhower, and was proclaimed in the meetings of the Science Council of Japan. Nevertheless, few were prepared to forge ahead with the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy until the issue of nuclear weapons was settled.

In 1954 Mr. Nakasone, the present prime minister, at the time a member of a small conservative party, proposed funding the construction of a nuclear reactor. The Science Council of Japan, after heated debate, recommended the government establish three principles for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy: autonomy, democracy, non-secrecy. These principles were adopted in the draft of the Atomic Energy Act of 1955, thus providing a safeguard for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, steadfastly maintained during these past thirty years.

The Science Council of Japan has over the years taken an active interest in the nuclear war issue and published numerous anti-nuclear statements. In 1982, during my tenure as president, the Council issued a renowned statement calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons in an attempt to influence the UN SSDII.

It is against this background of specialization in nuclear physics and science that I became a member of the PSAJ. In addition to my knowledge of the scientific and technical details of nuclear weapons, I was also aware of the attitude and behaviour of eminent scientists such as L. Szillard, A. Einstein, R. J. Oppenheimer, and E. Teller. On the occasion of Szillard's death in 1964, I wrote an obituary, describing him as a man who had been successful in advising the creation of the atomic bomb, but unsuccessful in advising its abolition. This can be said to apply not only to Szillard, but to the whole scientific community.

Despite the numerous times I have joined in making appeals for peace and for nuclear disarmament, I have

never witnessed any substantial reduction in nuclear arms. It seems that to appeal in this way is to cry into the wind. I thus became anxious to learn of any means of persuading authoritative people to reduce and eventually abolish nuclear weapons. As this is beyond my own speciality, I thought I must seek colleagues in sociology and political science to help me understand and thus control the behaviour of social institutions, ever producing more fearful weapons and strategies. It was concerns such as these which led me to join the PSAJ. I am well aware that there is no ready-made remedy for the nuclear evil, even in the PSAJ, but what I expect to find is an objective attitude in attacking this kind of problem. I recently read Freeman Dyson's *Weapons and Hope*, where the author classifies people into two types: warriors and victims. The author wants to act as a go-between. Likewise, I want to have an objective logic which the two parties can equally understand. The PSAJ can help me in this endeavour.

Recently, at a symposium I attended dealing with nuclear disarmament and especially the problem of the nuclear winter, I was impressed by a confrontation between two speakers. One appealed to his fellow scientists all over the world as follows: "Usually scientists want to be objective, impartial and cool, but, in the matter of nuclear disarmament, be emotional!" The second speaker stressed the importance of dividing the steps in the study of the present problem, namely a cognitive step and an evaluative step. The first speaker, in contrast, curtailed the first step to go directly to the second step.

In order to achieve the final goal of nuclear disarmament we must first understand the behavioural and psychological make-up of the military-industrial-scientific establishments, both in the capitalist and socialist states, as these continue to provide us with new, more powerful weapons and strategies. Until we can understand these establishments we will be unable to control them and persuade them to abandon defense policies dependent on nuclear weapons. It is precisely in order to understand how this is possible that I became a member of the PSAJ.

THE JAPAN PEACE MUSEUM

Ronni ALEXANDER
Sophia University

The Japanese peace movement is known today throughout the world for its opposition to nuclear weapons and for the moving testimonies given by the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While Japan has a long history of interest in pacifism and peace issues, the peace movement as such did not come to the fore until 1954. The impetus at that time was the contamination of the Japanese fishing vessel "Lucky Dragon, No. 5" and its 23-man crew by radioactive fallout from a United States hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll. This served to bring the *hibakusha* and other groups in Japan together in their opposition to nuclear weapons.

Since 1954, the Japanese peace movement has been characterized by the overwhelming strength of two of its aspects. These are its political nature and its concentration on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The tendency for the peace movement to be affiliated with the left-wing opposition parties has served to discourage citizen participation and to limit the scope and emphasis of activities for peace. This, in conjunction with a general reluctance to discuss Japan's role as an aggressor in World War II, has managed to keep much of the focus of peace activities on the plight of the *hibakusha* of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Although the political elements of the peace movement have remained very strong, there has also been a small but consistent group of people involved in "citizens" or grass roots movements. These groups have objected to the limiting political nature of the larger peace organizations and have conducted their activities on a smaller and more local level. One such group, the "Committee of Japanese Citizens to Send Gift Copies of a Photographic Record of the Atomic Bombing to Our Children and Fellow Human Beings of the World!" (HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI Publishing Committee) met with tremendously widespread popular support, and that movement has now grown into the "Committee to Establish the Japan Peace Museum." The work of the HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI Publishing Committee and the proposed Japan Peace Museum exemplify many of the objectives of the grass roots peace movement in Japan and, when viewed in perspective, offer some indications of the direction that movement is likely to take in the future.

The HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI Publishing Committee was begun in 1977, with the objective of making an album of photographs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bombings. This book was to be presented to the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSDI) in 1978. At the same time, the campaign itself was arranged so that for every Japanese volume purchased, a foreign-language edition would be sent abroad. This campaign proved to be a great success and the book has been reprinted several times since its original publication in 1978. Although there are many reasons for this success, perhaps the most important are that it was an apolitical, educationally-oriented campaign which called on the Japanese desire to share the truth about the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with people in other countries, as well as the Japanese affinity for the United Nations. The fact that the objective was to publish a book which could be used in a variety of educational settings made it easy for Japanese citizens to participate.

The publication of the book and the research which accompanied it led to the discovery that there was approximately 85,000 feet of film of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the United States National Archives. This film had been taken by the film crew of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, and had never been shown to the public. Once again, the HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI Publishing Committee planned an apolitical, educationally-oriented campaign, the 'Ten Feet Campaign', to purchase copies of the 85,000 feet in order to make three new documentaries about the effects of nuclear weapons. The timing of this campaign was arranged to coincide with the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSDII). The nature of the campaign, particularly the concrete objectives and ease of participation, greatly appealed to the public and was further enhanced by the general enthusiasm surrounding SSDII. As a result, the 10 Feet Campaign was able to involve a tremendous number of people who had not yet been active in the peace movement, and was in itself an overwhelming success.

The third and final film of the three-film series produced by the Ten Feet Campaign was completed in August, 1983. By this time, the enthusiasm promoted by SSDII had died down in Japan, and plans were made to end the campaign. However, as preparations continued, it became clear that many of the people who had participated in the peace movement for the first time with the Ten Feet Campaign were still interested in being

involved. This knowledge, coupled with 6 years of experience, led to the idea of starting a Japan Peace Museum. This grew to fruition with the creation of the "Committee to Establish The Japan Peace Museum" in December, 1983.

The idea of The Japan Peace Museum uses the same principles as the two campaigns before it; the Museum will be an apolitical, educationally-oriented resource centre for use by the general public. The fund-raising methods are similar to those used in the 10 Feet Campaign in that citizens are asked to make a small contribution which will be kept in a fund for the construction of the actual Museum. Additional revenue is obtained through the sale of films, books and other materials, as well as film rentals, etc.

The concept of The Japan Peace Museum includes several different aspects. It will be a museum in the traditional sense, in that it will have facilities for the storage of negatives, film and other materials. This has become a great necessity as the HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI Publishing Committee has already obtained a large number of these materials in the course of its activities. Further, as time passes and the individual photographers grow older, many are beginning to relinquish their exclusive hold on their negatives and to turn them over to the Peace Museum for preservation and public use. Up until now there has been no single organisation which has been in contact with the photographers and has obtained their cooperation. However, more and more people are becoming concerned over the possible loss and/or damage to these materials and also are becoming aware of the need to share them with the younger generations. The Japan Peace Museum is hoping to be able to obtain at least a majority of these negatives and to have the facilities to make them available to the general public.

In addition to these "traditional" services of preservation, storage and exhibition, the Japan Peace Museum is working toward creating a new type of "living museum." This concept has two aspects. One is to gather items of historical significance, along with the stories of those who used them, and have them available for study. Many such items have already been donated to the Museum, and they include such things as a tree which survived the bombing of Hiroshima and was kept alive by students there. When it finally died, it was sent to the Museum by the Hiroshima High School Students' Peace Seminar. The other aspect is the creation of new materials related to peace. The Museum has a Film Department, Art Department, etc. and these are devoted to the creation and support of new efforts for peace. As a result, the Museum was able to sponsor exhibitions of anti-war cartoons and comics, anti-nuclear and peace posters, the Tokyo Air Raids and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and currently has plans for exhibitions on Auschwitz and the bombing of the Ginza, Tokyo.

Since its inception in 1983, the Committee to Establish the Japan Peace Museum has also produced two new films, a short subject about US plans to deploy the Tomahawk cruise missile in Japan and an hour-long indictment of genocide and massacre in war. The latter is an indication of the progress of the Japanese peace movement in recent years, as it focuses on the evils of war itself, rather than on nuclear weapons. Further, the films include footage of Japanese atrocities in Asia, a subject which has heretofore been virtually taboo. This reflects a growing awareness on the part of the Japanese people that the one-sided approach of Japan as a victim of nuclear warfare is no longer acceptable abroad, and is growing less so at home. This realization becomes difficult to implement when it is taken as a political issue with political imperatives. The strength of movements such as the Committee to Establish the Japan Peace Museum is that they separate the moral and/or human issues from the political ones, thereby making participation possible for people who are concerned merely with their own survival. For The Japan Peace Museum, that survival is the central issue of our day.

N. B.: Information on The Japan Peace Museum is available from:

The Japan Peace Museum
Shiba 1-4-9
Minato-ku, Tokyo 105
TEL: 03-454-9875, TLX: J33609-JAPAX

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN (4)

Peace Research Institute, Soka University
(Soka Daigaku Heiwamondai Kenkyujo)
HANAMI Tsuneyuki
Soka University

The Peace Research Institute was established at Soka University in April of 1976 for the purpose of research and interdisciplinary investigations toward creating a peaceful society in the world and thereby realizing one of Soka University's founding principles: "To be the fortress for the peace of mankind." Since its establishment, the Institute has steadily promoted its activities as follows: 1) to pursue peace research on three specific research projects; 2) to hold Lecture Series on peace issues, and 3) to sponsor or support symposia and international conferences on peace research in order to exchange ideas with scholars both in this country and abroad.

(1) Research projects:

- a) Peace ideologies and peace movements. With regards to this project, the Institute sponsored the 2nd International Seminar on "Buddhism and Leadership for Peace" from the 2nd to the 6th of December 1984, inviting Dr. Johan Galtung, Rector de Universite Nouvelle Transnationale, Prof. Glenn D. Paige, University of Hawaii, and 17 other foreign scholars and activists from ten countries.
- b) International studies of nuclear problems and issues relating to the U.N.
- c) Regional studies of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Southeast Asia and other Pacific Basin countries. With regards to this project, "The Security Problem of the Pacific Basin Countries and the Role of Japan," the chairman, Prof. ITO Mann, has received an academic grant from the Foundation for Private Educational Institutions in the fiscal year 1984. On the 3rd of October, the Institution held a symposium on the above theme, in which Prof. SEKI Hiroharu, Tokyo University, and Prof. SAITO Shizuo, Aoyama Gakuin University, submitted the main reports.

(2) Lecture Series on peace issues. This Lecture Series began in July of 1983 with the objective of heightening peace consciousness among students. The list of lectures includes Soka University staff members, and foreign as well as domestic scholars and researchers, such as Prof. MUSHAKOJI Kinhide, the Vice-President of the U.N. University, Dr. Reinhard Drifte, the Assistant Director of IISS, and Prof. Alberto Gomez from the

University of Buenos Aires. Most recently, the 9th lecture in the series: "The SHANTI SENA (Peace Brigade) of Gandhigram Rural University in India" was given by Dr. N. Randhakrishnan on the 4th of December, 1984.

(3) In addition to the first mentioned seminar, the Institute has, to date, co-sponsored two symposia. One entitled "The Threat of Nuclear War and Conditions for Human Survival: The Contemporary Meaning of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto" was co-sponsored with the Science Council of Japan and four other domestic research institutes and took place in November of 1981. The other symposium entitled "The 5th Russo-Japanese Historical Symposium" was held in December of 1981.

Publications. (1) Journal, *Sodai Heiwa Kenkyu* (Peace Research, Soka University). This bulletin has been published annually since 1979. (2) Newsletter, *Heiwa no Toride* (Fortress for the Peace of Mankind). In September of 1983, the Institute began to publish a semi-annual newsletter to report its activities and to exchange and supply information relating to peace research as well as peace movements.

Staff. Director — YAMAMOTO Noboru; Staff Members — ITO Mann, MITSUMORI Shigero, NAKANISHI Osamu, WAKAE Shozo, TAKANO Tadayoshi, FUKUSHIMA Katsuhiko, TAKAMURA Tadashige, KITA Masami, YAMAZAKI Junichi, HANAMI Tsuneyuki, TAKAGI Isao; Visiting Researcher — TAKAHASHI Michitoshi, SEKI Hiroharu and Alberto Gomez Farias.

For further information, write to:

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1-236, Tangi-cho, Hachioji-shi, Tokyo 192 Japan.
Tel. (0426) 91-2211

STATUTES OF THE PEACE STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN

1. This Association shall be called The Peace Studies Association of Japan.
2. The purpose of this Association shall be to focus on conflicts between nations, to carry out scientific research on the causes of any resultant strife and conditions for peace, and to contribute to academic progress in related fields of study.
3. This Association shall be engaged in the following activities;
 - (1) the holding of study meetings and lectures
 - (2) the publishing of research conducted by members
 - (3) the coordination of national and foreign academic societies and other related institutions, and the promotion of exchange among researchers
 - (4) the sponsorship of various activities which are considered to be necessary and appropriate in achieving the purposes of this Association
4. Membership in this Association shall be decided by the Board of Directors upon the recommendation of two members, including at least one Board member, and shall be approved by the General Assembly. However, nobody belonging to an institution or an organization which, it is feared, may exploit the research efforts of this Association for war purposes shall in principle be allowed to join the Association.
5. Members of this Association shall have the right to receive Association publications, to attend various meetings, to vote, and to be elected as an officer.
6. In the case that a member misuses membership rights, or a member leads or participates in activities contrary to the purposes of the Peace Studies Association, he/she may be expelled from the Association following certain procedures.
7. A member shall pay a prescribed membership fee. A member who has not paid the membership fee for more than two years shall in principle lose membership status.
8. Regular General Assemblies shall be called by the President of the Association and extra-ordinary ones whenever necessity arises, under the discretion of the Board.
9. Resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of those attending the General Assembly. However, the revision of statutes shall require the consent of more than two-thirds of the attending members.
10. The Association shall have several Board members.
11. Board members shall be elected at the General Assembly by vote of the members. The Board members shall constitute the Board and shall be in charge of the business of the Association. The term of appointment of the Board members shall be two years and may be renewed.
12. The President shall be elected from among the Board members. The President shall represent the Association and shall supervise the business of the Association.
13. The President may appoint Vice-Presidents and other officers from among the Board members. The Vice-President shall assist the President and shall carry out the duties of the President as proxy in case he/she cannot execute them. The term of appointment of the Vice-President shall be two years.
14. The Association may have supporting members. Regulations regarding supporting members shall be decided separately.

Overseas Liason Committee

Chairperson: Glenn D. HOOK, Okayama University
MATSUO Masatsugu, Hiroshima University
ISHITANI Susumu, Hosei University
KAN Hideki, Kitakyushu University