

PSAJ – Newsletter

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INAUGURAL ADDRESS FUKUSHIMA Shingo Senshu University

“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”

I have always appreciated this first sentence of the Constitution of UNESCO although I have not as yet found a way to actually construct the defences of peace in the minds of men.

I was brought up during the fifteen year-long Pacific War (1930-1945). As a result I share with others of my generation a deeply ingrained hatred of all who are enemies, and a deeply felt commitment to defend all who are allies. For us it is quite easy to understand that war begins in the minds of men. It seems to me to be not so difficult to hate war *per se* and its futility on the level of personal thought. But when we are once involved in a confrontational situation, or outright war, it is quite difficult for us not to hate our enemies, and to submissively bear the damage and disadvantages imposed upon us and our allies. I must confess to my own personal experience during the Pacific War: though I hated our military institutions and was opposed to war in general, I could not contain my joy or sorrow over our nation's victories or losses in the war, and I myself followed many of my generation into the army.

When the Japanese Government established the National Police Reserve in 1950, in violation of the peace clause of the newly enacted Japanese constitution, I felt instinctively that this might lead our country once again down the road to war. I thus started to conduct research on the problems of war and peace. I arrived after some time at the conclusion that, in order to prevent wars in a nuclear era, we must first abolish the state's specialized organs of violence. Thenceforth, I have continued to conduct research into the conditions necessary for a disarmed world, and into the various dangers spawned by militarization.

Through these studies I have been able to come to an understanding of the driving forces of militarization--the need for security, the desire not to be disadvantaged, the fear of war. There are some who turn their attention in other directions--they burn with anger at social forces trending towards war and against structural violence. But I wonder if such anger can act as a catalytic force in order to change people's attitude and behaviour patterns in the direction of the defences of peace. It is surely a difficult problem to discover the proper process in order to bring about the necessary changes in the people's attitude and behaviour patterns.

In the Fall of 1981, at a time when I am 60 years old, I have been elected as the President of the Peace Studies Association of Japan. It is not only a great honour, but also a heavy burden. It was in fact in the Fall, 38 years ago, that I was drafted into the army in the midst of my college life. I am inspired the same now as I was then to "do my duty" ---but this time for peace.

Today, militarization is in progress globally. As a specialist, I take this to be quite a sophisticated manipulation of war-illusion; but, at the same time, I fear the unexpected may result in an era of mass politics and nuclear strategy. Since it seems even those who heartily long for peace have been drawn into the process of militarization, we must aim, in our peace studies, to change the people's mind to the defences of peace. This is a major task for peace researchers.

This Association is composed of the most diverse kinds of people. We all hold peace-loving views, but do not necessarily hold the same opinion; nor are we trained in the same specialities. If we can succeed in persuading our colleagues in this Association of the scientific logic of a peace theory, then we can succeed in constructing a theory to build solid peace oriented behaviour among the people. Hence we peace researchers must be able to produce a convincing theory in order to convert the people's sense of peace in their actual daily lives into firm beliefs.

I would like to devote myself during my term of office to building up such peace studies in Japan and to promulgating the results of our research both at home and overseas.

THE JAPANESE PEOPLE FACE MILITARIZATION

OHNISHI Hitoshi

University of Tohoku

In this essay, I shall briefly sketch how the Japanese people have responded to the militarization of Japan.

Has Japan been (re-) militarized? To answer this question, two other questions should be posed: (1) has the Japanese government tended to become militarized? ; (2) have social forces in Japan effectively checked any tendency toward militarization by the government? This essay will mainly deal with the latter question.

1. *The Militarization of the Government*

Many scholars, journalists, politicians and bureaucrats have recently begun to discuss whether or not Japan has been militarized. However, their arguments have tended to center on trends in the policy or the power structure of the Japanese government : whether or not the policy has become based on international "power-politics," or whether or not the influence of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the "sympathizers" of the SDF have increased within the government.

In reality, there have been significant changes in the policy and the power structure of the Japanese government: the ratio of military expenditure to total government expenditure has been rapidly built up during the last few years; the relationships between the SDF and the US Forces have become increasingly close - for example, in the field of training; and the influence of the uniformed high-ranking officers of the SDF (and veterans) has become relatively strong in the decision-making process vis-a-vis the defense policy of the government. (eg., in the decision-making process to allocate the budget). However, at the same time, it is also true that the ratio of Japanese military expenditure to the GNP (about 1%) has so far remained significantly less than that of other industrially advanced countries. And the influence of military officers has remained relatively weak in comparison with that of many other advanced countries. In short, on the level of the government, while Japan has exhibited a tendency toward becoming a big military power, it still remains a medium one.

2. *The Militarization of Society*

Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is in fact another, more dangerous, aspect to the recent political change in Japan: social forces to check the more militarized government have become weaker and weaker. At least during the early post-war years, the majority of Japanese people, both the intellectuals and masses, chose an alternative security policy to that based on power-politics.¹ In other words, they tried to realize the ideal that the Constitution of Japan declares in its preamble, " ... we (the Japanese people) have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world." Unfortunately, henceforth, the Japanese government gradually committed itself to international power-politics, as evidenced by rearmament and the growth in the size and quality of the SDF, the US-Japan Security Treaty, the support offered the USA during the Vietnam War, etc. However, during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, whenever the government strengthened its inclination toward international power-politics or bolstered its armament policy, the Japanese people sensitively and effectively opposed the government's reactionary policies, and this opposition often developed into big mass movements (eg., the 1960 anti-Security Treaty movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement). In this sense, during these years pacifism and democracy in Japan developed hand in hand to a high degree.

Since the late 1970s, partly as a response to the increasing political tension between the USA and the USSR, the Japanese government has made significant progress toward militarization, as has already been discussed. Nevertheless, there has not been any strong opposition movement by the people so far.

3. *Why Have the People Not Opposed Militarization?*

Why have the people not taken action in order to check the government? It seems to me that the following factors are responsible:

First, the Japanese government has taken such a sophisticated militarization policy that the people have failed to be aware of how dangerous the policy is. In order to prevent the militarization of Japan, the Japanese people have consistently concentrated their effort mainly on the anti-nuclear weapon movements and resistance to institutional changes which may lead to the resurgence of pre-war type militarism. In contrast, the government has recently changed the style of its militarization policy and is now trying to realize high speed armament and to participate in the international power-game as "a member of the Western Alliance," without touching any sensitive nerves among the people. For example, the government has carefully avoided taking any action to remind the people of the dangers of the nuclear arming of Japan or the abrogation of the war-renouncing clause of the Constitution. As a result, on the one hand, the people have not become significantly conscious of the degree to which Japan has been militarized. On the other, in reality, the Japanese government has built up war-preparedness, as is clearly illustrated by the fact that Japan, in respect of the size of its military budget, has already become the eighth largest military power in the world, although the Constitution declares "... land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." In this sense, the government has succeeded in a "creeping militarism," in Susumu Takahashi's terms.

In addition, the government has largely used the domestic and international "center-peripheral structure" as a cover for the costs of the military build-up. Domestically, for example, most of the bases of both the SDF and US Forces have been located in marginal areas. Thus, for example, people in Okinawa and some areas of Hokkaido are forced to depend on military-related income for their livelihood. Accordingly, it is difficult for the people in the "center" of Japan to recognize how large the military forces are that exist in Japan, and how the military bases have caused suffering to the people in the periphery - politically, socio-economically, culturally, and ecologically. Internationally, Japan has supported repressive militaristic regimes in South Korea and other South-East Asian countries through its "economic" aid in order to maintain its strong economic and political

influence in this area. In other words, Japan has gained the same economic and political fruits by helping these military regimes remain in power as in the case of Japan itself being militarized. As a result, the political system in the area Japan supports, as a whole, has been highly militarized, although the majority of Japanese people feel that Japan has maintained "clean hands."

Second, the attitude of the Japanese people toward peace or security issues has become passive in a double sense: the people have easily tended to accept the views of the government or the elites on security/peace issues even if they have held different views; in fact, the people have tended to cease to build their own views on the issues.

The majority of people feel that they have gained benefits and indeed have gained benefits by accepting the leadership of the elites or the government during the period of "rapid economic growth" (i.e., 1960s and 1970s), and have trusted the elites/government for the protection of their vested interests. As a result, the people have tended to easily accept militarization/armament policies, if they are persuaded by the elites that these policies are necessary or desirable for the maintenance of the economic growth of Japan. For example, a considerably large segment of the population, though opposed to the militarization of Japan, still support the argument that strong sea power is necessary to guard the tankers which transport oil to Japan from the Middle East.

As has been already discussed, during the 1960s and 1970s a large proportion of the people recognized that a security policy based on international power-politics was not the only feasible choice, and tried to design an alternative security policy for Japan and a disarmed global order. However, the people recently seem to accept the "realist" view that power-politics is the only feasible way in international politics today. For example, many Japanese people learned from the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that nuclear weapons are incompatible with human beings and that, therefore, refusal to accept nuclear weapons is a fundamental human right. Thus, they developed strong anti-nuclear mass movements from the early post-war years onwards. This clearly shows awareness of an important point: neither power-politics nor nationalism can provide security for human beings in the atomic age; hence, peoples throughout the world must pursue people's security and peace not on the basis of national governments but by themselves. In contrast, the majority of Japanese people now seem to accept the view of the government that the US "nuclear umbrella" or the US nuclear "deterrence" policy has effectively worked for the national security of Japan. Thus, there has been no strong people's movement against Reagan's nuclear policy so far, in contrast to the recent anti-nuclear movements in Europe.

4. *Toward Alternative People's Security*

As has been discussed above, the Japanese people have so far failed to oppose the militarization/armament policy of the government. Will this continue hereafter? It seems to me that there has emerged the following signs of change.

Domestically, it has become difficult for the militarization/armament policy of the government to maintain a sophisticated cover for the policy's inherent contradictions: the militarization of Japan inevitably brings about a considerable degree of restriction on human rights (eg., restriction of the freedom of religion and speech) as the pre-war militarism did; the armament policy is also incompatible with the welfare policy, etc. This has increased the chances that the people can become clearly aware of what costs they must pay for the militarization of Japan, and that the people can regain their *cartes blanches* from the elites or the government. Internationally, Reagan's threat policy toward the USSR has begun to irritate and cause feelings of insecurity among the Japanese people. If Reagan demands that Japan follows his tough policy, the Japanese people may revive the anti-US movement in order to secure their own peace and international democracy. In short, the possibility has increased for the blossoming of domestic and transnational democratic movements by the people demanding people's peace. But how can this possibility be changed into reality?

Since the late 1960s, in Japan, as in many other advanced societies, a new kind of participatory democratic movement has emerged and been developed to a considerable degree. The grassroots level has spontaneously participated in the movements demanding the maintenance of ecological balance, consumers' rights, direct participation in the decision-making process of local governments, etc. However, these new democratic movements have not so far been linked with disarmament/peace movements. Perhaps when the people who have already participated in the new democratic movements also begin to get engaged in movements for people's peace, the possibility will be changed into reality. Then, Japanese society would be re-demilitarized not only for the benefit of the Japanese, but also for the benefit of the world at large.

Notes

I thankfully acknowledge that many parts of this essay owe much to Ken'ichi Nakamura's article on the militarization of Japan, published in the special issue on Japan of the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, No. 1, 1982.

1 Regarding what kinds of alternative security policies the Japanese people have designed in the post-war era, see Susumu Takahashi and Ken'ichi Nakamura, "Peace Research in Postwar Japan" in *Peace Research in Japan* (1978-79).

THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN JAPAN

Glenn D. HOOK
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The peace movement in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s, along with the peace movement in the United Kingdom, was particularly active in protesting against the build up of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, and so forth. The burgeoning of the peace movements in Europe during the last year or two, however, did not find any comparable activity in Japan in fact, except for a build up of interest among intellectuals and certain segments of the student population in urban centers of Japan during 1981 and the early part of 1982, it seemed as though the peace movement was still suffering from the over-politicalization of the 1960s, when the movement split into two main groups over the question of nuclear testing by socialist countries: the *Gensuikin*, supported by the Japan Socialist Party, and the *Gensuikyo*, supported by the Japanese Communist Party.

The two main arms of the movement joined together again in the late 1970s, but a popular based movement did not gain impetus until March 1982, when large numbers of people gathered in Hiroshima to protest for the abolition of nuclear weapons and for disarmament. This demonstration was different from previous peace demonstrations in a number of respects: first, the meeting on March 21, 1982 was much larger than any other demonstration. According to the organizers, 186,300 people joined the demonstration, and even according to the police, the number was 94,500. Second, the people who came to Hiroshima were not just the usual activists who always participate in peace demonstrations as subservient units of labor unions and the opposition parties, but included many people who had not previously been involved in the peace movement. Third, the people gathered irrespective of political allegiance, the political parties and peace organizations keeping a low profile.

Why was the meeting able to draw such a cross section of people? In the case of the growth of the peace movements in Europe, the immediate catalyst is clear---the fear and danger engendered by the Reagan administration's plan to introduce a new range of missiles to Europe and talk of limited nuclear war---but it would be a mistake to regard this as the main catalyst in the case of Japan. Immediate threats to the people's life are few---full employment, low inflation, a robust economy, a stable government---all

lead to a sense of security. The threat of nuclear war, "limited" or otherwise, seems distant. Even when, in May 1981, former US ambassador to Japan, Reischauer, rudely reminded the Japanese that nuclear weapons were being brought into Japanese territory, only a few persons gathered to protest the arrival of the US Enterprise. However, in the intervening period the peace movement in Europe became active. This gave *legitimacy* to peace action in Japan. In other words, instead of the peace movement burgeoning as a result of a sense of danger—though this of course cannot be completely discounted—it would be more correct to say the peace movement burgeoned as a *reaction* to what had happened in Europe. Demonstrating for peace could no longer be branded as a pathological overreaction growing out of a "nuclear allergy" when "normal" Europeans were now protesting. It could thus be argued that the Japanese peace movement would have remained dormant had the peace movement not become active in Europe.

Second, the movement at this stage does not pose a direct threat to the established order. A peace movement ultimately gains its *raison d'être* from being a threat to the status-quo, and as such may be suppressed, isolated and/or infiltrated by the agents of the state. At the moment, however, this is not the case for one very important reason: the focus of the movement is the amorphous concept of "international disarmament." This covers up the most crucial problem among Japan's security issues, i.e. the relationship with the U.S. Specifically, it is the existence of the security treaty with the US which directly links Japan to the nuclear issue because 1. nuclear weapons are (probably) stored in Japan; 2. they enter Japanese territory aboard US craft; 3. Japan becomes a target because of the existence of the treaty as Japan provides the US with bases. However, the peace movement has not taken up the question of the security treaty. Why not?

First, opposition to the security treaty is highly *political*. By definition opposition to the treaty means opposition to the conservative government that has brought the prosperity of the post-war years. It also means identification with the opposition parties that have advocated the abolition of the treaty. These are the self-same parties that have controlled the peace movement heretofore, and alienated the mass of people from the movement.

Second, in terms of strategy, the introduction of the treaty issue would probably alienate many people. To put it differently, the wide support the movement gained in Hiroshima was partly a consequence of the fact that controversial issues were not touched on—few oppose "international disarmament." The problem the peace movement faces now is how to spread the movement; the introduction of the security issue would hinder this goal.

Finally, and paradoxically, however, even the goal of "international disarmament" will have to deal with the problem of Japan's nuclear arrangement with the US and the remilitarization of Japan. One characteristic of the *gensuikin* arm of the peace movement heretofore is opposition to *all* weapons, nuclear or otherwise, based on an understanding of Japan's unique responsibility for peace. Unlike the peace movements spreading in Europe, therefore, which largely accept the necessity of conventional weapons, the Japanese have been opposed to all weapons and alliances. How the peace movement will deal with this question will no doubt be important in determining the course of the peace movement from now on.

**THE PREPARATORY GROUP OF THE STUDENTS' LEAGUE
FOR DISARMAMENT (INTERNATIONAL)
YANADA Takayuki and SATO Motohiko
undergraduate student, Gakushuin University
graduate student, Hiroshima University**

The Preparatory Group of the Students' League for Disarmament (International) was founded in Tokyo on December 21, 1981. Though the founding group was composed of only seven undergraduate students from five universities, the number of members has multi-

plied about thirty times in three months and is still increasing. The members of the group are mainly undergraduate students (the number of universities now stands at over seventy), but many high school students, housewives and workers have also joined the group or support its activities financially.

The motives for founding the group can be summarized as follows. Firstly, many Japanese students feel global militarization and the rapid accumulation of nuclear weapons on a worldwide scale have hindered and will continue to hinder the achievement of economic well-being, social justice, and the protection of human rights in both industrially developed and developing countries. At the same time, they themselves want to take action to oppose these trends. Despite this awareness, however, little opportunity has presented itself to make joint efforts on a global level in order to promote disarmament. In Japan this is closely related to the tendency of specific political parties and religious groups to utilize the peace movement as an instrument for enlarging their own political and social influence. In short, most existing bodies which act for disarmament do so from the standpoint of a particular political party, religious group or ideological camp, and this has dissuaded many students from becoming involved in disarmament issues. It was for this reason that the Preparatory Group of the Students' League for Disarmament (International) was founded as a voluntary group not swayed by a specific ideology or religious belief.

Secondly, although there is a widespread interest in promoting disarmament, the absence of a communication network between students of all countries has hindered worldwide cooperation for general disarmament. For example, the idea of nuclear disarmament based on the atomic bomb experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not well known by students outside Japan. This means a gap exists between the ideas and policies for disarmament of Japanese students and those of other countries. As there is a need for global cooperation to promote disarmament, international as well as national movements are essential.

For the above mentioned reasons, the founders of the group established a secretariat in Tokyo and adopted the following action program, and three principles of action aimed at general disarmament.

Action Program:

- (1) the collection of information on the activities of various bodies involved in peace research and/or peace movements and the founding of a liaison center which provides an information service for students or students' groups that act against armament;
- (2) the publication of a newsletter in order to contribute to inter-communication between students;
- (3) the setting up of a worldwide communication network and the promotion of solidarity between students of various countries by exchanging materials and ideas on disarmament;
- (4) the establishment of study groups on disarmament issues, such as the economic and social consequences of disarmament;
- (5) the holding of meetings at each level (local, national, regional, global);
- (6) the carrying out of a worldwide campaign to collect signatures for disarmament;
- (7) the initiation of a letter campaign asking governments of all countries and international organizations to promote disarmament.

This action program was made in order to prepare for the establishment of the Students' League for Disarmament (International) in October, 1982.

Action Principles:

- (1) neither use nor advocacy of violence;
- (2) respect for the voluntary association and independence of each member, and the exclusion of any form of compulsory, authoritarian or plutocratic behaviour;

- (3) independenc. from specific ideologies, religious beliefs or political doctrines.

The first local assembly of members in or near Tokyo was held on March 9 1982 in Ikebukuro. Over two hundred students, representing different ideologies and ideas, enthusiastically discussed the problem of disarmament.

For further information contact:

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<RESEARCH COMMUNICATION>

LOGICAL OR ILLOGICAL : Toward a New Concept of Integration

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Why is it said that political integration comes after the achievement of cultural homogeneity and the building of a central organ of power in a society? Is it ridiculous to conceptualize integration without either? If so, why?

Theories of modernization, nation-building and international integration tell us that integration does not go along with internal social cleavages. These theories commonly presuppose that the effective functioning and stabilization of democratic institutions, i.e., the possibility of nonviolent resolution of conflicts, is in inverse proportion to social cleavages.

Thus, we have for a long time accepted the state-centric hypotheses of national assimilation. We have been taught that social mobilization finally pushes any society toward integration through assimilation, because the development of communication and transportation systems helps to link different parts of a society, either domestically or internationally, diminishes differences in regional culture, standardizes language and values, and increases the chance to form a more universal (nationwide or global) common identity.

This supposed automatic process of integration, however, has been given the lie to in the real process of development. In the 60's and 70's we saw many serious uprisings due to ethnic antagonism. Despite the assertion that traditional ethnic ties are on the wane, we have had to confront the intensification of ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the "three worlds" especially the protests and demands of ethnic minorities in the "first world" - the Scots and Welsh; Corsicans, Bretons and Alsations; Basques and Batalans; Quebecois; Flemings and Walloons; Croats and Macedonians; Jurassians; and Ulster Irish. These conflicts have shattered the assumption that Western European states are devoid of significant national minorities and have successfully solved their national problems of integration through assimilation.

It is clear now that the increasing number of transactions occurring among various ethnic groups in the process of social mobilization has not brought about the expected national assimilation; rather, it has caused the intensification of subnational cohesion, ethnic nationalism, and tension among ethnic groups elsewhere. And the reality we are facing demands the re-examination and reconceptualization of integration.

We are asked to contemplate mankind in its great variety. Why should we not accept communities as right-and-duty-bearing units? Vernon Van Dyke tells us, "It is quite illogical to take the view that only states, nations, and "peoples" are entitled to be treated as entities and that lesser groups are not. It is illogical...to say that the ethnic communities that exist in-between do not deserve consideration. Not only is it illogical, it is also unjust. It is unjust to accept or assume status and rights for states, nations, and "people," but to reject them for ethnic communities that are also historically constituted."

If we follow Van Dyke, we would have to start conceptualizing integration which is compatible with the diverse ethnic identities of the sub-units. The logic of this sort of

integration would be as follows: firstly, each unit that comes to be integrated must be treated as a "pole," a self-determining identity and also an individuality; secondly, the integrated body must be regarded as something like a system in which the individuality is polarized to individual poles, and at the same time, all individual poles come to form the totality.

What does this mean? Isn't this self-contradictory? It is. Indeed, the idea of integration *per se* is based on a contradiction. Each actor (pole) cannot be itself without being interrelated with other actors. In other words, actors in this system can be self-determining entities only in interdependence and interdependency itself can exist only when such entities exist, and *vice versa*. Each actor, therefore, works as a go-between and a non-go-between at the same time. This means that continuity and discontinuity are not incompatible in integrated relations. That is, because of its unique identity, each actor is an autonomous and independent pole in and of itself; at the same time, however, each pole cannot help intermediating with other poles because no pole can exist without the others. If an actor loses its individuality by depending on one or more than one other pole, then this actor can no longer be a pole. So, the relationship between units necessarily presupposes the exclusion of each other; specifically, subjects in relation with others are presupposed to be the opposing units. Although actors in relations include homogeneous elements on a broader level, as opposing units they cannot help excluding each other on another level. Integration, in itself, comes to be in reality, with innumerable assortments of inclusions and exclusions, supplying each other's needs.

The organizing logic of this idea of integration is that A is not only A, but also non-A. This clearly deviates from formal logic, but is natural logic for the so-called "one is many; many is one" type of relationships in a Buddhist context. And only in this sort of integration can true reciprocity exist, without straying into atomized individualism or totalitarian collectivism. In this framework, ethnic communities can be treated as in-between entities.

This understanding of integration is obviously different from the one conceptualized by the nation-building theorists--cultural homogeneity and the building of a single ethnic power center are not involved as necessary conditions. Insofar as we accept a series of nation-building hypotheses based on the idea of national assimilation, this sort of integration would be treated as a primitive one, or rather as disintegration itself.

Recent ethnic movements elsewhere in the world, however, seem to suggest to us that this sort of integration is another pattern of integration which makes it possible to secure a new way of peaceful coexistence for various ethnic groups.

Consociational democracies in Western Europe, for instance, may fit this concept of integration to a certain extent. It is remarkable at least that consociational integration as a framework of ethnic coexistence works for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts.

The nation state will not be the sole end any more. We don't have to try to reduce or eliminate politically significant ethnic solidarities, or to accept patiently domination of minorities by the majority (or of the majority by the minority), to get integration. It is time for us to accept the task to find ways to guarantee peaceful ethnic coexistence and the maintenance of ethnically plural societies on a consensual basis.

But undoubtedly in the field of peace studies, the old idea of integration has been predominant. And we frequently hear that convenience of communication brings about increasing interdependency, that by interdependency societies enlarge their sizes transnationally through increasing non-governmental transactions across borders, and that at the end of this process is a world society under some sort of federation or with a single government.

The integrated international society expected by this assumption -- the nation state beyond nation states, in a sense -- would surely suffer from increasing inhumanity. As Robert Dahl once pointed out, the expansion of integrated relations carries the individual to a more anonymous and weak position, and naturally our chance to control the government is decreased.

If the elimination of structural violence is the basic subject of peace studies, the making of a nation state on the global level will not be of any help, in spite of our liberal expect-

tations. Isn't it clear now that the global perspective must be linked to various ethnic worlds so that we can gain the relevant logic for the integration of grassroots individualism with global collectivism?

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN (1) :

Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University (IPSHU)

MATSUO Masatsugu, Hiroshima University

1. The Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University (IPSHU) was established on August 1, 1975 as a facility of Hiroshima University. IPSHU aims :
 - to build a new integrated paradigm for peace research on an interdisciplinary basis,
 - to promote national and international cooperation between peace researchers and peace research institutions,
 - to accumulate peace research information and to develop a system for the processing and dissemination of such information,
 - to integrate Hiroshima and Nagasaki's experiences into a global perspective for peace.
 to realize the idea of an "open university" through close cooperation with the citizens of Hiroshima.

Since its establishment, IPSHU has carried out the following research projects:

Japanese People's Attitudes towards Nuclear Issues (1976-77),

Organization of Peace Research Information and Development of Peace Science Theory (1976-77),

Organization of Academic Information in Interdisciplinary Fields of Social Sciences (1978-80).

At present, IPSHU has been carrying out a research project entitled "Peace and Development," which began in 1979. In this project, IPSHU has cooperated closely with the United Nations University (UNU), taking part in the latter's "Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development (GPID)" project, and holding joint study meetings.

2. Since IPSHU is a small institute with only three permanent members of staff, its research activities are carried out on the basis of cooperation with affiliated researchers. At present, about fifty researchers from both within and without the university are affiliated on a part-time basis. Thus, the research activities of IPSHU have been carried out mainly in the form of symposia, workshops, and study meetings in which these affiliated researchers participate.

IPSHU holds an annual symposium called "Hiroshima University Symposium on Peace Studies." The main themes of the past symposia were as follows:

Construction of World Order Theory (1976),

Structure of World Order -- Past, Present, and Future (1977),

Interdisciplinary Approaches to World Order Problems (1978, international symposium),

Peace and Development -- What is the Substance of Peace?

What is Sound Development?

(1979, partly in cooperation with UNU)

Peace and Development -- Development and Education (1980),

Peace and Development -- Development and Education (1981, with special reference to technology transfer)

IPSHU also held two joint study meetings with UNU in 1980 on the theme of peace and development. It holds study meetings monthly or bimonthly. Part of the results of these symposia and study meetings have been published in the IPSHU publications.

3. IPSHU publishes a journal, two kinds of research reports, and a newsletter. The journal *Hiroshima Heiwa Kagaku (Hiroshima Peace Science)* is published annually, part of the content being in Japanese and part in English.

The following titles were published in the IPSHU Research Report Series (English Series).

- United States Containment Policy 1947-50 (O. Ishii),
- At the Mercy of Nuclear Weapons (S. Tachibana),
- Global Militarization and Its Remedy (H. Seki),
- On the Possibility of Nonviolent Political Science (G. Paige),
- Socio-economic Development as an Objective of Peace (S. Yamashita),
- The Concept of Peace Research in Japan and its Political Context (H. Seki),
- Summary of the Discussions, Disarmament Symposium,
- The Urban Type of Society and International War (K. Matsushita),
- The "Dead Angle" of Analyzing Japanese Militarization (K. Hirose).

Six titles have been published in the Japanese series of the IPSHU Research Reports. They deal with such problems as Japanese people's nuclear attitudes, Japan-US military relationships, education for international understanding, the refugee problem in Indochina, and so on.

IPSHU also publishes a newsletter in Japanese, *Heiwa Kagaku Kenkyu Tsushin (Peace Science Newsletter)*.

All these publications are available on request.

4. As part of a project of Hiroshima University, IPSHU has given the following lecture series (consisting of fifteen lectures by the staff of IPSHU and affiliated researchers) to the citizens of Hiroshima:

- What is Peace to Citizens? (1978),
- Hiroshima and the World (1979),
- To Study Peace (1981) (given on radio, with a textbook in Japanese)

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POSTSCRIPT

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