

## PSAJ – Newsletter

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### “Soviet Threat Theory”

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### “SOVIET THREAT THEORY” — PSEUDO-IMAGE AND REAL PROBLEM —

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The attitude of the majority of the Japanese people towards the Soviet Union has been mostly and rather constantly negative in the postwar period. The images of the state, the military, the social system and sometimes, even of the Soviet people are perceived negatively; in addition, the Soviet “military threat” theory, especially stressed by journalists, ex-military officers and others, has recently helped to create a popular feeling of a “Soviet threat”. This is in striking contrast to the reversal of the feelings to the US in the occupation period – from the image of a “bloody devil” to that of a “cheerful fellow”, – and to the drastic improvement in the image of China at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

There are three salient characteristics in the Japanese attitude towards the USSR. First is the self-righteous interpretations of past relations between the two countries. The majority of Japanese assume they have been victims of the relations with the USSR. Thus among various historical events, they keep the memory of Japanese as victims not aggressors. For example, when they are asked about their attitude towards the USSR, the older generation sometimes trot out as evidence of Russian “treachery” the violation of the Japanese-Soviet pact in August 1945. The sudden Russian attack resulted in the crushing of Japanese armies in Manchuria. Some of them also express regret that the USSR “stole” from Japan the northern colonies, Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands including the four islands over which the Japanese government still claims sovereignty. Yet none mention Japanese military intervention in the Russian revolution of 1918–22.

The second characteristics in the Japanese attitudes towards the USSR is their perception of the USSR’s lack of measures to break the vicious cycle of armament dynamics in the Far East. It is true that from the long-term view, the self-propelling process of armament dynamics within the Soviet military-industrial complex exerts a rather constant pressure to increase military forces in the Far East. And the Russian government often attaches much importance to military power in international affairs. But it is also true that the action-reaction processes between the USSR and Japan and her allies is the important factor in the military buildup from the short-term perspective. Although these processes increase the danger to the Japanese people, the Japanese government has adopted policies which accelerate the armament processes.

Moreover, the major target for the Soviet military in the Far East does not seem to

be the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but mainly the US Forces and the massive Chinese armies, though the Russian military regards the SDF as an important subsidiary arm of the US military. Originally in the Far East and the Northern Pacific, the US Air and Naval Forces with the support of the SDF were much superior to those of the USSR. Japan has maintained the security treaty with the USA for 30 years and the important military bases of the US Air and Naval Forces are located in Japan. The SDF, too, has steadily increased their military capabilities. It is safe to say that initially the increase in the Soviet military presence in the Far East was a kind of countermove to the superior military forces of the USA and Japan. But since 1978, the interactions between Japan and the USSR have begun to develop into a vicious cycle, with a sharp deterioration in their relations. First, diplomatic relations became a serious problem when Japan and China concluded the peace treaty in 1978, which included the "anti-hegemonism" clause. At the time, China was fiercely attacking the "hegemonism" of the USSR, and she implicitly regarded the clause as a symbol of the alliance against the USSR. Although Japan tried to reduce the the implications of the anti-Soviet thrust of the clause, the USSR repeatedly filed vigorous protests.

Second, while she took no direct retaliatory measures against Japan for the Japan-China peace treaty, the USSR quickly adopted measures to meet a possible tripartite military alliance of the USA, China and Japan. The Soviet's military policies made the situation move from bad to worse. Since 1979, the USSR has rapidly increased her military capabilities in the Far East: (1) the integration of three separate military districts under the centralized headquarter of the Far East, (2) Sending an aircraft carrier to the Far East, (3) Deployment of SS-20s and Backfires in the Far East, (4) The buildup of military forces in the Kurile Islands. Though the increase in air and naval forces seems still to place the USSR in an inferior position vis a vis a USA and the Japanese forces in the area, the buildup unsettled the nerves of Japanese military officers as well as the foreign office. The Soviet moves presented a fair pretext for acceleration the buildup of Japanese military forces.

Third, the political action taken by the Japanese government deadlocked the worsed relations. The cabinet and foreign office gave special priority to the question of the title of the 4 islands of the Kuriles. They began to refuse to enter into formal negotiations regarding a treaty of friendship between the two as long as the USSR continued to the question the title of the islands as "settled". Emphasizing of sovereignty over the islands served the Japanese government as pretext not to take any initiative to break the vicious cycle.

Finally, the tension between the two rose as result of the moves of both sides: on the one hand, the actual use of force in Afganistan and the threat of force in Poland badly affected the political climate in Japan and brought about nearly unanimous anti-Soviet feeling among the public; on the other, the antagonistic attitude of the Japanese government reduced the chance to improve relations. The Director General of the Defense Agency formally warned against a "Soviet threat" and the government intensified its political campaign for a Return of the Four Islands; indeed, the Prime Minister went on a formal inspection tour of the islands by helicopter.

While the foreign office and political leaders in Japan made the tension higher, such non-governmental actors as businessmen and the representatives of Japanese fishermen narrowly kept the path towards detente open. In the first half of the 1970's trade between the two rapidly increase; 632 million roubles in 1970 and 1922 million roubles in 1975. But in the latter half of the 1970's, the increase in trade declined; in 1980 the amount was 2722 million roubles, about one half of the amout between the USSR and its biggest Western trade partner, West Germany. In the issue area of "low politics" such as credit arrangements for trade and decisions regarding the fishery quote, non-governmental actors could muddle through with the help of government technocrats.

The third characteristics of the Japanese attitude towards the USSR is the fear of how these precarious relations will develop in the future. Fear of the "Soviet threat" can be aroused not only by the armaments of the USSR, but also by a sense of insecurity among the Japanese people. This sense of being unsafe in the future has mainly arisen as a result of the unreliability and unforeseeable nature of the developments in relations with the USSR. The worsened diplomatic relations, the prolonged fishery talks and the deadlocked dispute over the four islands seem to be prophetic signs of forthcoming evil. In the circumstances, there has emerged a tendency among the Japanese people to accept the exaggerated image of the "Soviet threat" promulgated by Japan's political and military leaders. For example, when the USSR protested the peace treaty between Japan and China, many Japanese overreacted, some journalists even falsely and senselessly warning of a Soviet occupation of Hokkaido, the second largest island of Japan. Such Russophobia or "Soviet threat-neurosis" can partly be interpreted within the context of the anti-Soviet campaign.

The mainline of the "Soviet threat" theory was imported from the USA by active military officers, lobbyists and journalists in the late 1970's. They started to raise the tone of the "Soviet threat" campaigns just as Japan began to show signs of militarization, especially as seen by the closer relationship between the US forces and the SDF as well as by the legitimization of the expansion of the SDF. Those who promoted the militarization used the "Soviet threat" theory for the legitimization of their movements and those who initiated the "Soviet threat" propaganda campaign could make full use of the negative images of the USSR and the unforeseeable nature of these relations. In exaggerating the "Soviet threat" and overreacting to it, they promoted a vicious cycle. This led to countermeasures by the USSR that resulted in an increase in the danger to more than the previous level of the threat. Crying wolf excessively creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It is worth noting that the exaggerated "Soviet threat" did not fit well with in the framework of the military policies established by the ruling conservatives in the mid-1970's, nor with the psychology of the attentive public. While some of the ex-military officers and young officers of the SDF joined the "Soviet threat" campaign, a considerable number of the officers only indifferently or half-heartedly observed the consequences of the events. Even Dr. Masamichi Inoki, the former president of the Defense Academy and one of the chief architects of the "liberal" military policies of the postwar period, took part in a bitter controversy with an advocate of the "Soviet threat" theory. The discordance between those propagating the rapid militarization of Japan to meet the "Soviet threat" and those defending the policies of the conservative establishment — namely, a steady increase in armaments with general consent — was a storm in a teacup i.e. a choice in the speed and style of militarization. However, the difference between the feelings of the people and "Soviet threat" campaigns pointed the limits of propaganda instituted from above. Among the inhabitants of Hokkaido, where, according to the scenario of the "Soviet threat" theory, the people were face to face with the fear of a Soviet invasion, business circles clearly pointed out that the so called "Soviet threat" theory did not represent business leader's opinions in Hokkaido but was just a Tokyo based "theory".

What is the essential nature of the popular fear regarding Japanese relations with the USSR? It seems to me that among the majority of the Japanese, the ominous prediction that the USSR will behave as a Leviathan in the international system is more prevalent and persuasive than the fear of the penetrations of Communist ideology. Though the memories of subversive activities by Communists still remains, the primary concern of the people is in regard to interstate or inter-military relationships in which the USSR is assumed to use her military force without effective regulatory rules. The emphasis upon the dimensions of the state and the military is reflected in the stereotypes

of the people: as representatives of the states, "tough, authoritarian and cunning" as soldiers, "strong, ruthless and brutal". While those Japanese who know common Russians from their experiences of everyday-life in the USSR tended to regard them as "honest and warm-hearted".

Such an attitude towards the people of another state could easily emerge among the members of any sovereign state if international relations became anarchical i.e. a highly uncertain situation with the prospect of the use of force. In case an inclination to depend upon the protection of military forces developed this could lead the political attitude of the public to ready acceptance of the militarization of state and society. Japanese attitude towards the USSR is moving in the direction of autism. The alternative to the pathological consequences of interstate or inter-military relations would be inter-people relations. Because it is evident that the people need not the help of "balance of power" nor "deterrence theory" in order to co-exist with other peoples, it is an important task for peace researchers to research and develop the policies of the people for co-existence and cooperation.

### **JAPANESE PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

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The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 by the United States Air Force brought the death of over 200,000 people, including old people, women and children. The two cities were layed waste. The survivors have in the succeeding years suffered from illnesses due to radiation and mothers have lived in fear of giving birth to abnormal children. These weapons are nothing more than "evil weapons" created by civilization.

The Japanese were thus the first nation in history to become the victims of the atomic bomb. In March 1954, Japanese people again became victims when the United States conducted the first hydrogen bomb test in the Bikini atol, Marshall Islands. During the Occupation period, 1945-1951, the US had covered the damage created by the atomic bombings, and had suppressed any Japanese expression of opposition to the atomic bomb. Although the United States Forces still remained stationed in Japan under the conditions of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty in 1951 had removed direct control of the Japanese people. With the death of Mr. Kuboyama, the wireless operator aboard the Japanese fishing vessel, Lucky Dragon 5, which had been showered with radioactive fall out ("death ash") while fishing near the Bikini test site, the Japanese were again reminded of the dangers of nuclear weapons. A ban-the-bomb movement built up throughout the country, in August a National Committee for a Petition Movement to Ban Hydrogen Bombs was formed, and 34 million signatures collected. Local governments also passed resolutions to ban hydrogen bombs. This Japanese movement joined forces with the Vienna Appeal Movement to oppose preparations for nuclear war. In August 1955 the first World Congress to Ban Hydrogen Bombs was held in Hiroshima, the conference continuing to be held annually in Tokyo, Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

In light of the Japanese people's experience of becoming the victims of nuclear weapons three times, let us examine their attitude towards nuclear weapons; changes in their attitude; their attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests, Japan's three non-nuclear principles, the peaceful use of nuclear power, and nuclear armaments, and the legacy of the atomic experience.

*The Use of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Tests*

In a national poll conducted by the Japan News Network in 1975, the pollees were asked: "What do you presently think about the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States?" The replies were as follows: "It was war, so unavoidable," only 16%; "Even though it was war, from the moral perspective this can never be forgiven," 58% (24% could not decide, 2% did not answer). The Chugoku Broadcasting Corporation of Hiroshima carried out a poll in the same year, showing that in Hiroshima only 17% of the pollees answered "unavoidable," whereas 70% answered "this can never be forgiven." A poll conducted in the same year by Nagasaki Broadcasting Corporation shows only 10% answered "unavoidable," 77% answering "this can never be forgiven." Furthermore, according to a 1982 survey by the Asahi Newspaper, (the US survey was conducted by Harris) 63% of Americans considered the dropping of the atomic bomb as "unavoidable," only 26% considering it to be a "mistake" (9% gave other answers or did not answer). In Japan, in contrast, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was considered an "unavoidable means" by only 19%, and "natural as it was war," by only 16%, 14% considering it "inhumane but not something they now resent," and 49% considering it "inhumane and unforgiveable", (2% did not answer or gave other answers). In another survey by the Asahi Newspaper in 1982, 77% said "we should not forget" the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 37 years ago, this being 18% higher than the response in a 1975 survey: 14% responded they "could not forget," 4% responded they "would like to forget," 33% responded "it is something which happened in the past and of no concern" (2% did not answer or gave other answers). Even thirty seven years after the end of the war, despite close co-operation between the United States and Japan, the Japanese people, particularly those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, still maintain a strong feeling that the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan can never be forgiven from a moral point of view.

The Japanese people's opposition against using nuclear weapons can be seen in a 1953 poll conducted by the Asahi Newspaper. The pollees were questioned: "It has recently been stated by a member of the United States Senate that in order to win the Korean War, the use of nuclear weapons is permissible. What do you think?" Only 6% were in favor; 4% thought it unavoidable, and the overwhelming majority, 73%, were opposed to the use of nuclear weapons. The majority of Japanese people were opposed even to use of nuclear weapons on foreign countries. A poll by the Yomiuri Newspaper conducted in 1969 asked: "The opinion has been expressed that in certain circumstances, a nuclear war may be unavoidable. Do you accept the values, goals and ideals underlying this opinion?" Only 2% answered they accepted, 4% said they would probably accept, whereas the overwhelming majority, 82%, stated they did not accept (11% were undecided). In a 1982 survey by the Asahi Newspaper, the polless were asked: "Shortly the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament will be convened. Do you think the Japanese government should appeal for the unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons at the Special Session? Or, do you think the government should appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons taking into consideration the military balance between the US and USSR?" 54% were in favor of the former, 32% in favor of the latter (14% did not answer or gave no reply).

In 1961, Gallup Poll asked Americans: Do you agree with the statement that, "in order to protect the Free World, thermonuclear war should not be ruled out?" 81% agreed. Only 6% agreed to the statement: "It would be the end if nuclear war broke out. Communism is better than that." Recently the number of Americans who are opposed to nuclear war seems to be increasing. According to a poll conducted by Associated Press and the National Broadcasting Corporation in October 1981, 52% of

the people believe the USA should not counter attack, even if Europe suffers a limited nuclear attack from the USSR; 16% said the USA should execute a limited counter attack against Eastern Europe; 13% said a full scale nuclear attack should be launched against the USSR. Despite these changes, however, the Japanese sentiment against the use of nuclear weapons is still stronger than the American.

In 1957 an Asahi Newspaper poll asked: "Should hydrogen bomb tests be banned?" 87% answered they should be banned. Only 5% answered "I do not think so" (8% others and could not answer). In 1973 a Sankei Newspaper poll asked: "Should all hydrogen bomb tests be opposed?" 87% agreed, 9% answered "I do not think so," 4% could not decide. These polls show an overwhelming majority of the Japanese people are opposed to nuclear tests.

### *The Three Non-Nuclear Principles and Nuclear Armaments*

In 1967, reflecting Japanese public opinion against nuclear weapons, the Government of Japan announced Japan's three non-nuclear principles: not to produce, maintain or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. A resolution on this was later passed in the Diet. A poll conducted by the Yomiuri Newspaper in 1968 shows 78% in favor of these principles, 8% against, 7% undecided (others etc. 7%). A 1981 poll conducted by the Mainichi Newspaper points to a change in the people's attitude: the three non-nuclear principles were supported by 53%, just a majority, not supported by 12%, 34% replying "I cannot answer one way or the other," (others etc. 1%). In a 1982 Asahi Newspaper survey, the pollees were asked: Do you think that those countries possessing nuclear weapons, for whatever reason, should abolish the nuclear weapons they now have? Or, do you think that it cannot be helped if some countries have nuclear weapons to defend the country? 62% were in favour of the former, 31% in favour of the latter (7% did not answer or gave other replies). In the US, the pollees were asked: "Are you in favour of a ban on the production, storage, and use of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear weapon states, or are you against it? 73% were in favour, and 23% were against (4% did not answer or gave other answers).

In the 1981 Mainichi poll the pollees were asked: "According to the US-Japan Security Treaty, when the United States brings nuclear weapons into Japan, prior consultation with Japan is required. When the United States asks to introduce nuclear weapons from the United States, what do you think should be done?" 50% said Japan should refuse under all circumstances, 44% said it would be acceptable under certain conditions, 3% said it would be acceptable under any conditions (others or no response 3%). To the question: "Do you think United States vessels carrying nuclear weapons have ever made port calls in Japan?" 76% thought they had, 2% did not think so, and 22% answered they did not know. Asked whether they ever thought United States nuclear weapons had ever been brought ashore in Japan, 52% thought so, 8% did not think so, and 39% answered they did not know (no answer, etc. 1%). It can be said that the government's failure to keep a strict check on the introduction of US weapons to Japan has brought about a change in the Japanese people's attitude towards the three non-nuclear principles. In regard to fear about the outbreak of nuclear war, a 1982 survey by the Asahi Newspaper asked: "Do you feel uneasy about the possibility in the future of an all-out war in which nuclear weapons are used?" 69% of the US pollees and 63% of the Japanese pollees felt uneasy, 31% of the Japanese and 29% of the Americans not feeling uneasy (no answer or other replies: Japan, 6%, USA, 2%). In both Japan and the US, therefore, twice as many people are uneasy about the possibility of nuclear war as those who are not.

According to a poll by Kyodo News Service in 1968 in regard to the US nuclear umbrella, 24% approved the protection of Japan's peace and security by being under

the US nuclear umbrella, whereas a majority, 55%, were opposed (1%, others, 21% did not decide or answer). In a 1975 survey by the Asahi Newspaper, only 29% thought it is necessary to rely on the power of US nuclear weapons for Japan's security, 47% thought it was not necessary (7% others, 17% no answer). In a 1969 poll by the Mainichi Newspaper, on the mainland, 35% thought Japan is being protected by the US nuclear weapons (the nuclear umbrella), 24% thought Japan is not being protected, 29% thought this in fact increases the danger (12% others did no answer). In Okinawa, which is thought to have nuclear weapon bases, 21% thought it is not, and 41% that it in fact increases the danger. Thus the pollees in Okinawa gave more negative replies. In 1981, however, the pollees were asked by the Mainichi Newspaper: "Japan is under the US nuclear umbrella through the US-Japan Security Treaty. Do you think this is useful for Japan's security?" 34% answered positively, 17% negatively, 48% being unable to answer one way or the other (1% others did not give no answer). Although the inclusion of the last option may have influenced the findings, we can probably say that there has been a change in the people's attitude.

In regard to Japan possessing nuclear weapons, however, a poll by the Yomiuri Newspaper in 1969 found only 9% were in favor, and 76% against (15% did not know or did not answer). Even in a 1972 survey by the Mainichi Newspaper, over half, 58%, answered that Japan should absolutely not possess nuclear weapons, 22% that Japan should at some time possess nuclear weapons, 11% that Japan should in the near future possess nuclear weapons, and 2% that Japan should immediately possess nuclear weapons. In 1981 the same survey gave the figures respectively 56%, 25%, 13%, 2% indicating an increase in those in favor of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, but the majority are still opposed.

### *Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power*

In a 1975 poll by the Asahi Newspaper the pollees were asked: "What do you think of the nuclear power plants now being built in Japan?" 20% said that, as an energy source to replace oil and other energy, full scale development should go ahead; 49% were negatively in favor, agreeing that there are some uncertainties regarding safety, but as energy resources are limited, the development of nuclear energy cannot be avoided. This gives 69% in favor of development. Only 15% were opposed for fear of radiation pollution or environmental destruction, and 6% as there is the danger of this being linked to the production of nuclear weapons. Thus, 21% are opposed — one third of those in favor (10% others and gave no answer).

In a 1975 poll by the Prime Minister's Office, the pollees were asked: "In Japan at present approximately 5% of all electric power is produced by nuclear power. What do you think about the development of nuclear power? Please choose one of the following. 39% opted for "I think development should be carried out more positively." 18% opted for "I do not think development should be carried out any further." 9% chose "I think nuclear power plants should be given up." Thus, there are many opponents of nuclear power plants in Japan (27%). (34% of the pollees did not know). However, according to a 1968 poll by the Yomiuri Newspaper, the pollees were asked: "If a nuclear power plant was built near you, would you feel uneasy?" 28% answered very uneasy, 32% a little uneasy, Hence, 60% had some sense of uneasiness. Only 24% answered they would feel no uneasiness. (5% said they could say neither way, 11% others and did not know or did not answer). In the previously mentioned 1975 survey by the Prime Minister's Office, those who were positively in favor of development or those who did not know (71%), were asked: "If a nuclear power plant was going to be built in the town where you live, how would you feel? 8% answered they would hope the plant would be built, 38% said they would feel uneasy but would not oppose, 24% said they would

oppose (7% said they would be unconcerned and 24% said they did not know what their reaction would be).

*Passing on the Experience of the Atomic Bombings and the Ban-the-Bomb Movement*

As can be seen from the above poll findings, the Japanese people's nuclear attitude has been disturbed by the entry of nuclear weapon bearing ships, and submarines, and an awareness of the entry into Japanese territory of nuclear weapons. It has also been disturbed as a result of propaganda in favor of a security treaty based on the nuclear umbrella, and that in favor of the peaceful use of atomic power. Even so, many Japanese people are still opposed to nuclear weapons and have fear against the peaceful use of atomic power. A 1975 poll by the Japan News Network gave the following figures regarding the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences: "Do you think the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has an impact on the politics of Japan?", only 6% answered it had a major impact, 34% some impact, making 40% who think the atomic bombing experience has an impact, whereas 42% answered it has little impact, and 11% that it has no influence. 6% gave no answer. Hence the majority, 53%, think the experience has little or no influence. The pollsters were also asked: "Do you think it has any influence on world politics?" The figures were respectively 4%, 28%, 45%, 16%. The number of those who think it has some influence is even less, 32%, 61% thinking it has no influence (8% gave no answer). When asked "Do you think it is necessary to pass on the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the future generations?" a majority of answered it should be passed on without any omission, only 15% approved of what can be considered the Ministry of Education policy, when they chose "The history of the bombings should be taught, but there is no necessity to pass on the influence of the bombs as this is cruel." An even smaller 3% felt there was no necessity to pass on the experience (18% could not decide. 2% did not answer). Furthermore, a 1982 Asahi poll asked: "Do you support or not support a citizen's movement aimed at the abolition of nuclear weapons?" 76% supported the movement, 15% did not (9% did not answer or gave other answers). The US pollsters were asked: "Do you support or not support the movement against the deployment of nuclear weapons now occurring in many countries of the world?" 55% supported such movements, whereas 39% were against them (6% gave no answers or other answers). In both the US and Japan, therefore, more people support the movement than oppose it, though the supporters in Japan are greater, and those opposed fewer than in the US.

The USA and the USSR do not inform their citizens of the damage of the atomic bombs and the number of weapons is being pushed ahead with development. But, the Japanese people want the people of the world to know of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and hope the extinction of mankind does not occur due to the use of these "evil weapons."

< RESEARCH COMMUNICATION >

POSTWAR NUCLEAR ARMS BUILDUP AND HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI:  
SEARCHING FOR NEW PERSPECTIVES

TAKAHARA Takao

Learning about historical incidents and giving them a new meaning should influence the way one views the world, and consequently on how one acts to change the present conditions. While conducting research in a way that meets scientific requirements, it is one of the important tasks of peace researchers to contribute to this process and promote it in order to construct a more peaceful world.



One significant example in this respect is the conveyance of the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the Western public through researchers and journalists. It was in the fall of 1981 that the intensive and voluminous work of Japanese researchers *Hiroshima Nagasaki no genbaku saigai* (*Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings*) was introduced to the Western readers and widely lauded in book reviews. Translation and subsequent attention to this and other books (notably *Goka o mita* (*Unforgettable Fire: Pictures Drawn by Atomic Bomb Survivors*)), along with other efforts by Japanese peace researchers and activists, contributed greatly to informing the Western public what future wars would result in, and how inhumane even a "limited" nuclear war could be. It is needless to say that such understandings should pave the way for their appreciation of the movements with symbolic phrases like "Ground Zero" or "Euroshima."

Hence through exchange of research, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now appreciated in the context of the present crisis by an increasing number of the Western public. This fact is encouraging for the Japanese peace researchers and perhaps also for our Western counterparts since we have always been a small minority in appreciating the fate of the two cities and the message of the survivors. However, it is high time for us to go beyond the appreciation of the destruction that the atomic bombings brought about, although more research seems to be still needed on the subject. We should turn our attention also to the "after-effects" of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, namely, what they actually meant to the postwar arms buildup which has been taking place on an unprecedented scale. Here I tentatively point out three aspects that I regard as important: Firstly the relation of the atomic bombing to the nuclear *arms race* of the postwar period, secondly to the unsuccessful nuclear *disarmament efforts*, and thirdly to the present nuclear *strategy*.

Firstly, Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be considered in the context of the postwar arms race if only in the sense that they must have provided a strong impetus to the Russians to acquire their own atomic bomb. In the past, controversies among historians have raged regarding the intentions of the American decision-makers who were responsible for dropping of atomic bombs on the two Japanese cities. The debate has centered around whether the decision-makers contemplated gaining some postwar advantage over the Russians, or, alternatively, made their decision based on the military consideration to end the war as soon as possible. But what has been important to the postwar world has been just how the Russians themselves actually reacted to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the debate curiously averts this question. Of course, the difficulty of obtaining first-hand Russian materials is one reason for this. But it is possible to follow what the Russians themselves have had to say about these bombings and how they teach about them at school. According to a recent study, it was after August 1945, when the effects of the bomb were dramatically shown to the world, that the Russians seem to have put top priority on the atomic bomb development project. Assuming that this is true, it can be said that Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided an important stimulant to the postwar arms race. In fact, what the authors of the famous Franck Report attempted to avoid was this (and not the destruction of Japanese cities, to follow the text literally). Moreover, nobody can deny that it actually provided one of the issues that led to the Cold War.

Secondly, in another sense, Hiroshima and Nagasaki had influence over the failure of the nuclear disarmament negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission which commenced in 1946. If it were not for the droppings of the atomic bombs, certainly there would not have been any talks about nuclear disarmament anyway, at least during the period just after the War. It is also said that it was the atomic bomb which brought the attention of the United Nations to the issue of disarmament which was more lightly treated in the Charter than in the Covenant of the League of Nations. What needs more attention here, however, is how the *acceptance* of the

bombings affected the American approach towards the negotiations. It must have been very difficult for them to outlaw as an inhumane weapon the glorious symbol of victory and the proud achievement of advanced U.S. science and technology. But signing a treaty that outlaws atomic bombs was precisely the traditional method to restrict a certain weapon and also what the Russians actually demanded. American "atomic scientists" and those who led the negotiations at the time, while pressing for complete control over the whole field of atomic energy, asserted that to merely outlaw atomic weapons was not effective enough. And by emphasizing that point, they virtually bypassed the question of whether this weapon really should be declared inhumane and banned. Once the dropping of the bomb was legitimized, the reasoning for its restriction became alien to the ordinary mind. Moreover, it was typically American to regard a monopoly on the bomb as safe not only for Americans themselves but also for the rest of the world. Most Americans could not be sympathetic to the fear that the Russians possibly felt. Weapons are usually used as in the previous war. The atomic bomb was used over the cities without clear warning. Moreover, when it was dropped the possible effects had already been expected from calculations and by an experiment. Weren't the Russians the most likely target of this formidable, new weapon? But the Americans could only interpret the Russian demand for outlawing the weapon as unreasonably obstinate. In retrospect, this American approach seems to have been a significant factor in rendering the negotiations a failure.

Thirdly, we should focus attention on just how the nuclear arsenals are intended to be used in future wars, namely, nuclear strategy. The most significant and unhidden character of postwar nuclear strategy is the targeting of the civilian population, i.e. indiscriminate killing of non-combatants. Nuclear weapons are inherently inhumane weapons given the indiscriminate character of their destructive power and the cruel after-effects on the survivors. But the present defense systems of the nuclear powers are premised on these weapons and these kind of strategies. This did not happen with gas weapons after WWI, for example. Is this simply because gas as a weapon is technically inefficient? The strength of public indignation over its employment was undoubtedly the most important factor here.

The idea of targeting civilian population without remorse can be said to have its origins in WWII. The strategic bombing that the British and the Americans executed virtually turned out to be a strategy of indiscriminate killing towards German and Japanese citizens. These incendiary raids clearly served as precedents to the atomic bombings. (Later, as a matter of fact, at the time when the casualties of Hiroshima were underestimated as approximately 78,000 deaths, some would cite the incendiary raid over Tokyo, March 10, 1945, with an estimated 100,000 deaths in order to denigrate the importance of the atomic bombings.) Without these precedents it would have been at least more difficult for the American leaders to decide on the droppings of the atomic bomb. But the voices raised to condemn the incendiary bombings were then just a whisper. And after the bombings came the *acceptance* by the Western leaders and the public of the atomic bombing of the two Japanese cities. This must have been a necessary condition for the postwar adoption of such a strategy. A collective "numbing" is said to have accompanied the buildup of the nuclear arsenals. This is not a "postwar" phenomenon. It is the continuance of the war-time attitude which has its origins in the acceptance of incendiary bombings and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima-Nagasaki as "necessary."

All the above three questions might seem rather controversial; yet they merit some controversy, especially as they concern our present issues and the "militarized" culture of ours. They also call for analyses of perceptions and attitudes of the decision-makers or of the public, which are the aspects that have been most neglected so far in the study of postwar armaments and disarmament.

Generals might study previous wars to fight the next. But peace researchers study them to avert the next. The victors of the last World War, notably the superpowers of the present age, are now leading the arms race. They may hold a certain conviction that wars can be fought and "won." Their reliance on military power and the attitude toward war apparently have their roots in historical experiences and how they appreciate them. Reexamination and reinterpretation of historical incidents remain essential tasks of ours.

## PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN (2) NAGASAKI INSTITUTE FOR PEACE CULTURE

( *Nagasaki Heiwa Bunka Kenkyusho* )

TACHIBANA Seiitsu

Nagasaki Institute of Applied Science

The Nagasaki Institute for Peace Culture (NIPC) was established against the unique historical background of Nagasaki. This city was the only Japanese port where exchanges with foreign countries were permitted and it became the center of a substantial Roman Catholic population, though the freedom of these Catholic to practice their religion was suppressed during the some three centuries of Japan's seclusionism. In Japan's drive toward "modernization," Nagasaki became a fortified outpost for advance into Asia, and a major center for shipbuilding and the manufacture of munitions. With the city's destruction by the second atom bomb on August 9, 1945, Nagasaki received a new mandate to strive to make it the last target of nuclear weapons in the world.

The parent body of NIPC, the Nagasaki Institute of Applied Science (NIAS), is committed by its very founding to "science and technologies in the interest of peace and the happiness of humankind." Consistent with this, in August 1977, NIAS made its campus and supporting services available to the International Symposium on the Damage and After-Effects of the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with its staff assisting in the preparation of the *Nagasaki Report* for the symposium. It was appropriate that in that autumn NIAS should inaugurate a Peace Culture Institute.

The aims of NIPC are clearly set out in its prospectus. "The purpose of NIPC is to comprehend cultural phenomena in a broad sense—learning, thought, religion, arts, sciences, technologies, international understanding—and to re-evaluate and re-shape them with a view to contributing to the building of lasting world peace . . . ."

*Areas of Research:* 1) Peace, and the role of science and technology. The history of science and technology; methodological techniques in applied science; the history and structure of industry; urban planning in the service of peace; the energy problem and world peace. 2) The culture and thought of peace. Problems of nations and classes in relation to international understanding and peace; the theme of peace and international security in the fine arts and culture; peace education. 3) The nuclear age. The damage and after-effects of the atomic bombing; conditions of the *Hibakusha* (atom bomb victims); the nuclear arms race, nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament; attitude surveys on the dangers of nuclear war.

*Membership* of NIPC consists of two semi-full-timers plus some 30 part-time researchers appointed from among members of the NIAS faculty, whose specializations range from the natural and social sciences to the humanities, including: biology, physics, mathematics, electrical engineering, architectronics, political science, jurisprudence, international relations, sociology, economics, accounting, history, logic, education, linguistics, and literature. Researchers from outside NIAS also may become associate members.

*Activities* include both those of NIPC itself and those undertaken jointly with other

institutions and civic groups for research and public service.

- 1) Monthly study meetings of the members.
- 2) Ad hoc study meetings held occasionally for an exchange of views with Japanese and foreign visiting scholars; often with the participation of researchers from other institutions in Nagasaki and citizens concerned.
- 3) The collection of research materials. This began from practically zero, but is making gradual progress.
- 4) Public lecture meetings are held both independently by NIPC and jointly with other NIAS departments. Guest speakers have included: Dr. Bernd Mahl, President, Goethe Institute, Stuttgart, FRG, and Professor Anatol Rapoport, University of Toronto (July 1979); Mr. Jan Martenson, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Director of UN Disarmament Centre (August 1981). The UN "International Year of the Child" and the "International Year of Disabled Persons" were both observed, one by a public meeting (December 1979) and the other by a symposium (July 1981).
- 5) Cooperation with other institutions. NIPC in April 1981 hosted one of the bi-annual meetings of the Peace Studies Association of Japan. Since 1981, in association with the Nagasaki Municipality and the Nagasaki Council for the Study of Problems of the Atomic Bombing and for the Dissemination of its Findings (*Genfukyo*), NIPC has observed UN Disarmament Week in October by holding a seminar on disarmament. In November 1981, NIPC joined with the Science Council of Japan and four other institutions of peace studies and international relations in sponsoring a symposium in Tokyo, "The Danger of Nuclear War and Conditions for Human Survival" in a study of the present-day significance of the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto.

*Publication.* NIPC issues an annual journal, *Heiwa Bunka Kenkyu (Studies of Peace Culture)*; the latest issue, vol. 6, was published in 1983.

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